The neural correlates of consciousness: an update

Active change detection by pigeons and humans

Detecting change is vital to both human and nonhuman animals' interactions with the environment. Using the go/no-go dynamic change detection task, we examined the capacity of four pigeons to detect changes in brightness of an area on a computer display. In contrast to our prior research, we reversed the response contingencies so that the animals had to actively inhibit pecking upon detecting change in brightness rather than its constancy. Testing eight rates of change revealed that this direct report change detection contingency produced results equivalent to the earlier indirect procedure. Corresponding tests with humans suggested that the temporal dynamics of detecting change were similar for both species. The results indicate the mechanisms of change detection in both pigeons and humans are organized in similar ways, although limitations in the operations of working memory may prevent pigeons from integrating information over the same time scale as humans.

The self and its resting state in consciousness: an investigation of the vegetative state

Recent studies have demonstrated resting-state abnormalities in midline regions in vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome and minimally conscious state patients. However, the functional implications of these resting-state abnormalities remain unclear. Recent findings in healthy subjects have revealed a close overlap between the neural substrate of self-referential processing and the resting-state activity in cortical midline regions. As such, we investigated task-related neural activity during active self-referential processing and various measures of resting-state activity in 11 patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) and 12 healthy control subjects. Overall, the results revealed that DOC patients exhibited task-specific signal changes in anterior and posterior midline regions, including the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (PACC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). However, the degree of signal change was significantly lower in DOC patients compared with that in healthy subjects. Moreover, reduced signal differentiation in the PACC predicted the degree of consciousness in DOC patients. Importantly, the same midline regions (PACC and PCC) in DOC patients also exhibited severe abnormalities in the measures of resting-state activity, that is functional connectivity and the amplitude of low-frequency fluctuations. Taken together, our results provide the first evidence of neural abnormalities in both the self-referential processing and the resting state in midline regions in DOC patients. This novel finding has important implications for clinical utility and general understanding of the relationship between the self, the resting state, and consciousness.

Evolution of consciousness: phylogeny, ontogeny, and emergence from general anesthesia

Are animals conscious? If so, when did consciousness evolve? We address these long-standing and essential questions using a modern neuroscientific approach that draws on diverse fields such as consciousness studies, evolutionary neurobiology, animal psychology, and anesthesiology. We propose that the stepwise emergence from general anesthesia can serve as a reproducible model to study the evolution of consciousness across various species and use current data from anesthesiology to shed light on the phylogeny of consciousness. Ultimately, we conclude that the neurobiological structure of the vertebrate central nervous system is evolutionarily ancient and highly conserved across species and that the basic neurophysiologic mechanisms supporting consciousness in humans are found at the earliest points of vertebrate brain evolution. Thus, in agreement with Darwin's insight and the recent "Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness in Non-Human Animals," a review of modern scientific data suggests that the differences between species in terms of the ability to experience the world is one of degree and not kind.

General anesthesia and human brain connectivity

General anesthesia consists of amnesia, hypnosis, analgesia, and areflexia. Of these, the mechanism of hypnosis, or loss of consciousness, has been the most elusive, yet a fascinating problem. How anesthetic agents suppress human consciousness has been investigated with neuroimaging for two decades. Anesthetics substantially reduce the global cerebral metabolic rate and blood flow with a degree of regional heterogeneity characteristic to the anesthetic agent. The thalamus appears to be a common site of modulation by several anesthetics, but this may be secondary to cortical effects. Stimulus-dependent brain activation is preserved in primary sensory areas, suggesting that unconsciousness cannot be explained by cortical deafferentation or a diminution of cortical sensory reactivity. The effect of general anesthetics in functional and effective connectivity is varied depending on the agent, dose, and network studied. At an anesthetic depth characterized by the subjects' unresponsiveness, a partial, but not complete, reduction in connectivity is generally observed. Functional connectivity of the frontoparietal association cortex is often reduced, but a causal role of this change for the loss of consciousness remains uncertain. Functional connectivity of the nonspecific (intralaminar) thalamic nuclei is preferentially reduced by propofol. Higher-order thalamocortical connectivity is also reduced with certain anesthetics. The changes in functional connectivity during anesthesia induction and emergence do not mirror each other; the recovery from anesthesia may involve increases in functional connectivity above the normal wakeful baseline. Anesthetic loss of consciousness is not a block of corticofugal information transfer, but a disruption of higher-order cortical information integration. The prime candidates for functional networks of the forebrain that play a critical role in maintaining the state of consciousness are those based on the posterior parietal-cingulate-precuneus region and the nonspecific thalamus.

Towards an integrative theory of consciousness: part 1 (neurobiological and cognitive models)

The study of consciousness is poised today at interesting crossroads. There has been a surge of research into various neurobiological underpinnings of consciousness in the past decade. The present article looks at the theories regarding this complex phenomenon, especially the ones that neurobiology, cognitive neuroscience and cognitive psychology have to offer. We will first discuss the origin and etymology of word consciousness and its usage. Neurobiological correlates of consciousness are discussed with structures like the ascending reticular activating system, the amygdala, the cerebellum, the thalamus, the frontoparietal circuits, the prefrontal cortex and the precuneus. The cellular and microlevel theories of consciousness and cerebral activity at the neuronal level contributing to consciousness are highlighted, along with the various theories posited in this area. The role of neuronal assemblies and circuits along with firing patterns and their ramifications for the understanding of consciousness are discussed. A section on the role of anaesthesia and its links to consciousness is presented, along with details of split-brain studies in consciousness and altered states of awareness, including the vegetative states. The article finally discusses the progress cognitive psychology has made in identifying and theorising various perspectives of consciousness, perceptual awareness and conscious processing. Both recent and past researches are highlighted. The importance and salient features of each theory are discussed along with the pitfalls, if present. A need for integration of various theories to understand consciousness from a holistic perspective is stressed, to enable one to reach a theory that explains the ultimate neurobiology of consciousness.

A range of antiepileptic drugs do not affect the recovery of consciousness in vegetative and minimally conscious states

Since most antiepileptic drugs (AEDs) have cognitive effects, the aim of this study was to evaluate the influence of AED therapy on the recovery of consciousness in 103 consecutive patients in a vegetative or minimally conscious state (VS, MCS). The levels of cognitive functioning (LCF) score was retrospectively compared after a three-month period of rehabilitation between patients who were medicated (n=54) and patients who were not medicated (n=49) with AEDs. Mean LCF scores in AED-medicated and nonmedicated patients were 2.2±0.7 and 2.3±0.8 at admission and 3.8±2.2 and 3.7±2.1 after three months, respectively (p values>0.05). These results did not change when we compared patients with the same etiology separately, with the same disorder of consciousness only, or patients treated with only one or more than one AED. In conclusion, AEDs did not affect the recovery of consciousness in a large cohort of patients in a VS or MCS following an acute brain injury.

Dissecting visual awareness with FMRI

In recent years, substantial progress has been made in the scientific study of perceptual awareness, or synonymously, the contents of consciousness. By many standards, the field of consciousness research is in a phase of unprecedented productivity and progress, with high-impact publications, popular science books, specialized journals, dedicated academic societies, scientific conferences, and, above all, competing cognitive and neurobiological theories of consciousness . In the present review, I highlight a selection of recent fMRI and related behavioral studies that examine the neuronal underpinnings of awareness in higher order and early visual cortex. After the introduction, I also provide a brief overview of the crucial problem of measurement, that is, the fact that any exploration of consciousness depends on some kind of report, which pertains to all studies summarized in this review.

Neuronal avalanches differ from wakefulness to deep sleep--evidence from intracranial depth recordings in humans

Neuronal activity differs between wakefulness and sleep states. In contrast, an attractor state, called self-organized critical (SOC), was proposed to govern brain dynamics because it allows for optimal information coding. But is the human brain SOC for each vigilance state despite the variations in neuronal dynamics? We characterized neuronal avalanches--spatiotemporal waves of enhanced activity--from dense intracranial depth recordings in humans. We showed that avalanche distributions closely follow a power law--the hallmark feature of SOC--for each vigilance state. However, avalanches clearly differ with vigilance states: slow wave sleep (SWS) shows large avalanches, wakefulness intermediate, and rapid eye movement (REM) sleep small ones. Our SOC model, together with the data, suggested first that the differences are mediated by global but tiny changes in synaptic strength, and second, that the changes with vigilance states reflect small deviations from criticality to the subcritical regime, implying that the human brain does not operate at criticality proper but close to SOC. Independent of criticality, the analysis confirms that SWS shows increased correlations between cortical areas, and reveals that REM sleep shows more fragmented cortical dynamics.

Differential effects of deep sedation with propofol on the specific and nonspecific thalamocortical systems: a functional magnetic resonance imaging study

BACKGROUND

The current state of knowledge suggests that disruption of neuronal information integration may be a common mechanism of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness. A neural system critical for information integration is the thalamocortical system whose specific and nonspecific divisions may play the roles for representing and integrating information, respectively. How anesthetics affect the function of these systems individually is not completely understood. The authors studied the effect of propofol on thalamocortical functional connectivity in the specific and nonspecific systems, using functional magnetic resonance imaging.

METHODS

Eight healthy volunteers were instructed to listen to and encode 40 English words during wakeful baseline, light sedation, deep sedation, and recovery in the scanner. Functional connectivity was determined as the temporal correlation of blood oxygen level-dependent signals with seed regions defined within the specific and nonspecific thalamic nuclei.

RESULTS

Thalamocortical connectivity at baseline was dominantly medial and bilateral frontal and temporal for the specific system, and medial frontal and medial parietal for the nonspecific system. During deep sedation, propofol reduced functional connectivity by 43% (specific) and 79% (nonspecific), a significantly greater reduction in the nonspecific than in the specific system and in the left hemisphere than in the right. Upon regaining consciousness, functional connectivity increased by 58% (specific) and 123% (nonspecific) during recovery, exceeding their values at baseline.

CONCLUSIONS

Propofol conferred differential changes in functional connectivity of the specific and nonspecific thalamocortical systems, particularly in left hemisphere, consistent with the verbal nature of stimuli and task. The changes in nonspecific thalamocortical connectivity may correlate with the loss and return of consciousness.

Local category-specific gamma band responses in the visual cortex do not reflect conscious perception

Which neural processes underlie our conscious experience? One theoretical view argues that the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) reside in local activity in sensory cortices. Accordingly, local category-specific gamma band responses in visual cortex correlate with conscious perception. However, as most studies manipulated conscious perception by altering the amount of sensory evidence, it is possible that they reflect prerequisites or consequences of consciousness rather than the actual NCC. Here we directly address this issue by developing a new experimental paradigm in which conscious perception is modulated either by sensory evidence or by previous exposure of the images while recording intracranial EEG from the higher-order visual cortex of human epilepsy patients. A clear prediction is that neural processes directly reflecting conscious perception should be present regardless of how it comes about. In contrast, we observed that although subjective reports were modulated both by sensory evidence and by previous exposure, gamma band responses solely reflected sensory evidence. This result contradicts the proposal that local gamma band responses in the higher-order visual cortex reflect conscious perception.

What the brain's intrinsic activity can tell us about consciousness? A tri-dimensional view

Current neuroscience applies a bi-dimensional model to consciousness. Content and level of consciousness have been distinguished from each other in their underlying neuronal mechanisms. This though leaves open the role of the brain's intrinsic activity and its particular temporal and spatial structure in consciousness. I here review and investigate the spatial and temporal features of the brain's intrinsic activity in detail and postulate what I describe as spatiotemporal structure that implies a virtual (e.g., statistically based) spatiotemporal continuity. Such spatiotemporal continuity is supposed to structure and organize the neural processing of the incoming extrinsic stimuli and their potential association with consciousness. I therefore conclude that the current bi-dimensional view of consciousness focusing only on content and level may need to be complemented by a third dimension, the form, e.g., spatiotemporal structure, as provided by the intrinsic activity. In short, I here opt for tri-rather than bi-dimensional view of consciousness.

The compatibility between sociological and cognitive neuroscientific ideas on consciousness: is a neurosociology of consciousness possible?

This article considers the possibility of integrating sociological and cognitive neuroscience ideas on consciousness and developing a new research area: neurosociology of consciousnesses. Research was conducted taking into account the limited knowledge on consciousness produced in these disciplines and the necessity of finding ways to study the social roles concerning the neural correlates of consciousness. Applying several ideas on consciousness from these disciplines (intersubjectivity, close connection with collective forms representations, deriving awareness from the brain's processes, and so on), I show that it is difficult to reconcile the differences in the treatment of consciousness through the simple combination of the different ideas. The integration should be pursued in light of the neuroscientific findings concerning consciousness in different social contexts (role behavior, social interactions, and so on). In integrating the concepts, I predicted the role of time delay in conscious awareness in decision making, synchronization of neural oscillations under conscious perception, and the activations of certain brain zones in correspondence to different conscious cognitive processes for understanding in face-to-face situations. The study reveals that the optimal path for neurosociological research on consciousness is in its primary development without a rigid binding to either sociology or neuroscience.

Emergence in the central nervous system

"Emergence" is an idea that has received much attention in consciousness literature, but it is difficult to find characterizations of that concept which are both specific and useful. I will precisely define and characterize a type of epistemic ("weak") emergence and show that it is a property of some neural circuits throughout the CNS, on micro-, meso- and macroscopic levels. I will argue that possession of this property can result in profoundly altered neural dynamics on multiple levels in cortex and other systems. I will first describe emergent neural entities (ENEs) abstractly. I will then show how ENEs function specifically and concretely, and demonstrate some implications of this type of emergence for the CNS.

The human somatosensory system: from perception to decision making

Pioneering human and animal research has yielded a better understanding of the brain networks involved in somatosensory perception and decision making. New methodical achievements in combination with computational formalization allow research questions to be addressed which increasingly reflect not only the complex sensory demands of real environments, but also the cognitive ones. Here, we review the latest research on somatosensory perception and decision making with a special focus on the recruitment of supplementary brain networks which are dependent on the situation-associated sensory and cognitive demands. We also refer to literature on sensory-motor integration processes during visual decision making to delineate the complexity and dynamics of how sensory information is relayed to the motor output system. Finally, we review the latest literature which provides novel evidence that other everyday life situations, such as semantic decision making or social interactions, appear to depend on tactile experiences; suggesting that the sense of touch, being the first sense to develop ontogenetically, may essentially support later development of other conceptual knowledge.

Immanuel Kant's mind and the brain's resting state

The early philosopher Immanuel Kant suggested that the mind’s intrinsic features are intimately linked to the extrinsic stimuli of the environment it processes. Currently, the field faces an analogous problem with regard to the brain. Kant’s ideas may provide novel insights into how the brain’s intrinsic features must be so that they can be linked to the neural processing of extrinsic stimuli to enable the latter’s association with consciousness and self.

The sleeping brain and the neural basis of emotions

In addition to active wake, emotions are generated and experienced in a variety of functionally different states such as those of sleep, during which external stimulation and cognitive control are lacking. The neural basis of emotions can be specified by regarding the multitude of emotion-related brain states, as well as the distinct neuro- and psychodynamic stages (generation and regulation) of emotional experience.

Impaired consciousness in epilepsy

Consciousness is essential to normal human life. In epileptic seizures consciousness is often transiently lost, which makes it impossible for the individual to experience or respond. These effects have huge consequences for safety, productivity, emotional health, and quality of life. To prevent impaired consciousness in epilepsy, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms that lead to brain dysfunction during seizures. Normally the consciousness system-a specialised set of cortical-subcortical structures-maintains alertness, attention, and awareness. Advances in neuroimaging, electrophysiology, and prospective behavioural testing have shed light on how epileptic seizures disrupt the consciousness system. Diverse seizure types, including absence, generalised tonic-clonic, and complex partial seizures, converge on the same set of anatomical structures through different mechanisms to disrupt consciousness. Understanding of these mechanisms could lead to improved treatment strategies to prevent impairment of consciousness and improve the quality of life of people with epilepsy.

Temporal dynamics of neural activity at the moment of emergence of conscious percept

From which regions of the brain do conscious representations of visual stimuli emerge? This is an important but controversial issue in neuroscience because some studies have reported a major role of the higher visual regions of the ventral pathway in conscious perception, whereas others have found neural correlates of consciousness as early as in the primary visual areas and in the thalamus. One reason for this controversy has been the difficulty in focusing on neural activity at the moment when conscious percepts are generated in the brain, excluding any bottom-up responses (not directly related to consciousness) that are induced by stimuli. In this study, we address this issue with a new approach that can induce a rapid change in conscious perception with little influence from bottom-up responses. Our results reveal that the first consciousness-related activity emerges from the higher visual region of the ventral pathway. However, this activity is rapidly diffused to the entire brain, including the early visual cortex. These results thus integrate previous "higher" and "lower" views on the emergence of neural correlates of consciousness, providing a new perspective for the temporal dynamics of consciousness.

The principle of coherence in multi-level brain information processing

Synchronisation has become one of the major scientific tools to explain biological order at many levels of organisation. In systems neuroscience, synchronised subthreshold and suprathreshold oscillatory neuronal activity within and between distributed neuronal assemblies is acknowledged as a fundamental mode of neuronal information processing. Coherent neuronal oscillations correlate with all basic cognitive functions, mediate local and long-range neuronal communication and affect synaptic plasticity. However, it remains unclear how the very fast and complex changes of functional neuronal connectivity necessary for cognition, as mediated by dynamic patterns of neuronal synchrony, could be explained exclusively based on the well-established synaptic mechanisms. A growing body of research indicates that the intraneuronal matrix, composed of cytoskeletal elements and their binding proteins, structurally and functionally connects the synapses within a neuron, modulates neurotransmission and memory consolidation, and is hypothesised to be involved in signal integration via electric signalling due to its charged surface. Theoretical modelling, as well as emerging experimental evidence indicate that neuronal cytoskeleton supports highly cooperative energy transport and information processing based on molecular coherence. We suggest that long-range coherent dynamics within the intra- and extracellular filamentous matrices could establish dynamic ordered states, capable of rapid modulations of functional neuronal connectivity via their interactions with neuronal membranes and synapses. Coherence may thus represent a common denominator of neurophysiological and biophysical approaches to brain information processing, operating at multiple levels of neuronal organisation, from which cognition may emerge as its cardinal manifestation.

Neurosurgery and consciousness: historical sketch and future possibilities

Neurosurgery has played an important role in the development of neuroscience and the science of consciousness. In this paper, the authors reflect on some of the historical contributions of neurosurgeons to the science of consciousness and discuss the ways in which clinical neurosurgery can contribute to the science of consciousness in the 21st century. An approach to the "hard problem" is proposed based on the principles of psychophysics, and the opportunities offered by intracranial recording and stimulation in patients capable of reporting changes in subjective experience are discussed. Such an approach will allow the systematic study and description of the bridging relationships between neurobiology and conscious experience.

Emerging Roles of the Brain’s Default Network

During periods of inactivity, global metabolism does not decrease in the brain, and small but consistent increases in activity occur in a specific set of regions called the “default network”. Although much is known about the topological and connectional properties of the default network, its functions remain a matter of debate. Functional neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies have suggested two apparently contrasting functions for this network: spontaneous cognition and monitoring the environment. Spontaneous cognition, however, is by default situated in a given external context, an external milieu to which we align ourselves and which must be monitored. This review integrates recent literature suggesting that the two proposed functions of the default network functions need not to be mutually exclusive, and that spontaneous cognition and monitoring of the environment represent complementary instances of conscious experiences occurring during idle moments of daily life.

Returning from oblivion: imaging the neural core of consciousness

One of the greatest challenges of modern neuroscience is to discover the neural mechanisms of consciousness and to explain how they produce the conscious state. We sought the underlying neural substrate of human consciousness by manipulating the level of consciousness in volunteers with anesthetic agents and visualizing the resultant changes in brain activity using regional cerebral blood flow imaging with positron emission tomography. Study design and methodology were chosen to dissociate the state-related changes in consciousness from the effects of the anesthetic drugs. We found the emergence of consciousness, as assessed with a motor response to a spoken command, to be associated with the activation of a core network involving subcortical and limbic regions that become functionally coupled with parts of frontal and inferior parietal cortices upon awakening from unconsciousness. The neural core of consciousness thus involves forebrain arousal acting to link motor intentions originating in posterior sensory integration regions with motor action control arising in more anterior brain regions. These findings reveal the clearest picture yet of the minimal neural correlates required for a conscious state to emerge.

Brain connectivity in disorders of consciousness

The last 10 years witnessed a considerable increase in our knowledge of brain function in survivors to severe brain injuries with disorders of consciousness (DOC). At the same time, a growing interest developed for the use of functional neuroimaging as a new diagnostic tool in these patients. In this context, particular attention has been devoted to connectivity studies-as these, more than measures of brain metabolism, may be more appropriate to capture the dynamics of large populations of neurons. Here, we will review the pros and cons of various connectivity methods as potential diagnostic tools in brain-damaged patients with DOC. We will also discuss the relevance of the study of the level versus the contents of consciousness in this context.

GABAA Agonist Reduces Visual Awareness: A Masking–EEG Experiment

Consciousness can be manipulated in many ways. Here, we seek to understand whether two such ways, visual masking and pharmacological intervention, share a common pathway in manipulating visual consciousness. We recorded EEG from human participants who performed a backward-masking task in which they had to detect a masked figure form its background (masking strength was varied across trials). In a within-subject design, participants received dextromethorphan (a N-methyl-d-aspartate receptor antagonist), lorazepam (LZP; a GABAA receptor agonist), scopolamine (a muscarine receptor antagonist), or placebo. The behavioral results show that detection rate decreased with increasing masking strength and that of all the drugs, only LZP induced a further decrease in detection rate. Figure-related ERP signals showed three neural events of interest: (1) an early posterior occipital and temporal generator (94–121 msec) that was not influenced by any pharmacological manipulation nor by masking, (2) a later bilateral perioccipital generator (156–211 msec) that was reduced by masking as well as LZP (but not by any other drugs), and (3) a late bilateral occipital temporal generator (293–387 msec) that was mainly affected by masking. Crucially, only the intermediate neural event correlated with detection performance. In combination with previous findings, these results suggest that LZP and masking both reduce visual awareness by means of modulating late activity in the visual cortex but leave early activation intact. These findings provide the first evidence for a common mechanism for these two distinct ways of manipulating consciousness.

Neural correlates of cognitive ability

The challenge to neuroscientists working on intelligence is to discover what neural structures and mechanisms are at the basis of such a complex and variegated capability. Several psychologists agree on the view that behavioral flexibility is a good measure of intelligence, resulting in the appearance of novel solutions that are not part of the animal's normal behavior. This article tries to indicate how the supposed differences in intelligence between species can be related to brain properties and suggests that the best neural indicators may be the ones that convey more information processing capacity to the brain, i.e., high conduction velocity of fibers and small distances between neurons, associated with a high number of neurons and an adequate level of connectivity. The neural bases of human intelligence have been investigated by means of anatomical, neurophysiological, and neuropsychological methods. These investigations have led to two important findings that are briefly discussed: the parietofrontal integration theory of intelligence, which assumes that a distributed network of cortical areas having its main nodes in the frontal and parietal lobes constitutes a probable substrate for smart behavior, and the neural efficiency hypothesis, according to which intelligent people process information more efficiently, showing weaker neural activations in a smaller number of areas than less intelligent people.

Consciousness and the prefrontal parietal network: insights from attention, working memory, and chunking

Consciousness has of late become a “hot topic” in neuroscience. Empirical work has centered on identifying potential neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), with a converging view that the prefrontal parietal network (PPN) is closely associated with this process. Theoretical work has primarily sought to explain how informational properties of this cortical network could account for phenomenal properties of consciousness. However, both empirical and theoretical research has given less focus to the psychological features that may account for the NCCs. The PPN has also been heavily linked with cognitive processes, such as attention. We describe how this literature is under-appreciated in consciousness science, in part due to the increasingly entrenched assumption of a strong dissociation between attention and consciousness. We argue instead that there is more common ground between attention and consciousness than is usually emphasized: although objects can under certain circumstances be attended to in the absence of conscious access, attention as a content selection and boosting mechanism is an important and necessary aspect of consciousness. Like attention, working memory and executive control involve the interlinking of multiple mental objects and have also been closely associated with the PPN. We propose that this set of cognitive functions, in concert with attention, make up the core psychological components of consciousness. One related process, chunking, exploits logical or mnemonic redundancies in a dataset so that it can be recoded and a given task optimized. Chunking has been shown to activate PPN particularly robustly, even compared with other cognitively demanding tasks, such as working memory or mental arithmetic. It is therefore possible that chunking, as a tool to detect useful patterns within an integrated set of intensely processed (attended) information, has a central role to play in consciousness. Following on from this, we suggest that a key evolutionary purpose of consciousness may be to provide innovative solutions to complex or novel problems.

Recurrent neural processing and somatosensory awareness

The neural mechanisms of stimulus detection, despite extensive research, remain elusive. The recurrent processing hypothesis, a prominent theoretical account of perceptual awareness, states that, although stimuli might in principle evoke feedforward activity propagating through the visual cortex, stimuli that become consciously detected are further processed in feedforward-feedback loops established between cortical areas. To test this theory in the tactile modality, we applied dynamic causal modeling to electroencephalography (EEG) data acquired from humans in a somatosensory detection task. In the analysis of stimulation-induced event-related potentials (ERPs), we focused on model-based evidence for feedforward, feedback, and recurrent processing between primary and secondary somatosensory cortices. Bayesian model comparison revealed that, although early EEG components were well explained by both the feedforward and the recurrent models, the recurrent model outperformed the other models when later EEG segments were analyzed. Within the recurrent model, stimulus detection was characterized by a relatively early strength increase of the feedforward connection from primary to secondary somatosensory cortex (>80 ms). At longer latencies (>140 ms), also the feedback connection showed a detection-related strength increase. The modeling results on relative evidence between recurrent and feedforward model comparison support the hypothesis that the ERP responses from sensory areas arising after aware stimulus detection can be explained by increased recurrent processing within the somatosensory network in the later stages of stimulus processing.

The use of information theory in evolutionary biology

Information is a key concept in evolutionary biology. Information stored in a biological organism's genome is used to generate the organism and to maintain and control it. Information is also that which evolves. When a population adapts to a local environment, information about this environment is fixed in a representative genome. However, when an environment changes, information can be lost. At the same time, information is processed by animal brains to survive in complex environments, and the capacity for information processing also evolves. Here, I review applications of information theory to the evolution of proteins and to the evolution of information processing in simulated agents that adapt to perform a complex task.

Paradigm shift in consciousness research: the child's self-awareness and abnormalities in autism, ADHD and schizophrenia

Self-awareness is a pivotal component of any conscious experience and conscious self-regulation of behaviour. A paralimbic network is active, specific and causal in self-awareness. Its regions interact by gamma synchrony. Gamma synchrony develops throughout infancy, childhood and adolescence into adulthood and is regulated by dopamine and other neurotransmitters via GABA interneurons. Major derailments of this network and self-awareness occur in developmental disorders of conscious self-regulation like autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and schizophrenia.

CONCLUSION

Recent research on conscious experience is no longer limited to the study of neural 'correlations' but is increasingly lending itself to the study of causality. This paradigm shift opens new perspectives for understanding the neural mechanisms of the developing self and the causal effects of their disturbance in developmental disorders.

From baconian to popperian neuroscience

The development of neuroscience over the past 50 years has some similarities with the development of physics in the 17th century. Towards the beginning of that century, Bacon promoted the systematic gathering of experimental data and the induction of scientific truth; towards the end, Newton expressed his principles of gravitation and motion in a concise set of mathematical equations that made precise falsifiable predictions. This paper expresses the opinion that as neuroscience comes of age, it needs to move away from amassing large quantities of data about the brain, and adopt a popperian model in which theories are developed that can make strong falsifiable predictions and guide future experimental work.

The sound of consciousness: neural underpinnings of auditory perception

The neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), i.e., patterns of brain activity that specifically accompany a particular conscious experience, have been investigated mainly in the visual system using particularly suited paradigms, such as binocular rivalry and multistable percepts in combination with neural recordings or neuroimaging. Through the same principles, we look here for possible NCC in the auditory modality exploiting the properties of the Deutsch's illusion, a stimulation condition in which a sequence of two specular dichotic stimuli presented in alternation causes an illusory segregation of pitch and side (ear of origin), which can yield up to four different auditory percepts per dichotic stimulus. Using magnetoencephalography in humans, we observed cortical activity specifically accompanying conscious experience of pitch inside an early bilateral network, including the Heschl's gyrus, the middle temporal gyrus, the right inferior, and the superior frontal gyri. The conscious experience of perceived side was instead accompanied by later activity observed bilaterally in the inferior parietal lobe and in the superior frontal gyrus. These results suggest that the NCC are not independent of stimulus features and modality and that, even at the higher cortical levels, the different aspects of a single perceptual scene may not be simultaneously processed.

Recovery of cortical effective connectivity and recovery of consciousness in vegetative patients

Patients surviving severe brain injury may regain consciousness without recovering their ability to understand, move and communicate. Recently, electrophysiological and neuroimaging approaches, employing simple sensory stimulations or verbal commands, have proven useful in detecting higher order processing and, in some cases, in establishing some degree of communication in brain-injured subjects with severe impairment of motor function. To complement these approaches, it would be useful to develop methods to detect recovery of consciousness in ways that do not depend on the integrity of sensory pathways or on the subject's ability to comprehend or carry out instructions. As suggested by theoretical and experimental work, a key requirement for consciousness is that multiple, specialized cortical areas can engage in rapid causal interactions (effective connectivity). Here, we employ transcranial magnetic stimulation together with high-density electroencephalography to evaluate effective connectivity at the bedside of severely brain injured, non-communicating subjects. In patients in a vegetative state, who were open-eyed, behaviourally awake but unresponsive, transcranial magnetic stimulation triggered a simple, local response indicating a breakdown of effective connectivity, similar to the one previously observed in unconscious sleeping or anaesthetized subjects. In contrast, in minimally conscious patients, who showed fluctuating signs of non-reflexive behaviour, transcranial magnetic stimulation invariably triggered complex activations that sequentially involved distant cortical areas ipsi- and contralateral to the site of stimulation, similar to activations we recorded in locked-in, conscious patients. Longitudinal measurements performed in patients who gradually recovered consciousness revealed that this clear-cut change in effective connectivity could occur at an early stage, before reliable communication was established with the subject and before the spontaneous electroencephalogram showed significant modifications. Measurements of effective connectivity by means of transcranial magnetic stimulation combined with electroencephalography can be performed at the bedside while by-passing subcortical afferent and efferent pathways, and without requiring active participation of subjects or language comprehension; hence, they offer an effective way to detect and track recovery of consciousness in brain-injured patients who are unable to exchange information with the external environment.

Hallmarks of consciousness

Consciousness, ranging from the primary, or perceptual, level to high levels that include a sense of self, can be identified in various organisms by a set of hallmarks that include behavioral, neural and phenomenal and/or informational. Behavioral hallmarks include those that indicate high cognitive abilities, such behavioral flexibility, verbal abilities, episodic memories, theory of mind, object constancy, transitive inference and multistability, all of which have been demonstrated in birds as well as in primates. Neural hallmarks include the thalamocortical model for mammals and similar circuitry in some nonmammalian taxa. Informational hallmarks include sensorimotor awareness, as provided by somatosensory and/or lateral line systems, which may form the basis for the sense of self and distinguishing self from nonself, as well as other sensory information, such as the richness and quantity of color and form information obtained by the visual system. The comparative method reveals a correlation of these different types of hallmarks with each other in their degree of development, which thus may be indicative of the level of consciousness present in a particular species.

Primary visual cortex: awareness and blindsight

The primary visual cortex (V1) is the principal telencephalic recipient of visual input in humans and monkeys. It is unique among cortical areas in that its destruction results in chronic blindness. However, certain patients with V1 damage, though lacking visual awareness, exhibit visually guided behavior: blindsight. This phenomenon, together with evidence from electrophysiological, neuroimaging, and psychophysical experiments, has led to speculation that V1 activity has a special or direct role in generating conscious perception. To explore this issue, this article reviews experiments that have used two powerful paradigms--stimulus-induced perceptual suppression and chronic V1 ablation--each of which disrupts the ability to perceive salient visual stimuli. Focus is placed on recent neurophysiological, behavioral, and functional imaging studies from the nonhuman primate that shed light on V1's role in conscious awareness. In addition, anatomical pathways that relay visual information to the cortex during normal vision and in blindsight are reviewed. Although the critical role of V1 in primate vision follows naturally from its position as a bottleneck of visual signals, little evidence supports its direct contribution to visual awareness.

Distilling the neural correlates of consciousness

Solving the problem of consciousness remains one of the biggest challenges in modern science. One key step towards understanding consciousness is to empirically narrow down neural processes associated with the subjective experience of a particular content. To unravel these neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) a common scientific strategy is to compare perceptual conditions in which consciousness of a particular content is present with those in which it is absent, and to determine differences in measures of brain activity (the so called "contrastive analysis"). However, this comparison appears not to reveal exclusively the NCC, as the NCC proper can be confounded with prerequisites for and consequences of conscious processing of the particular content. This implies that previous results cannot be unequivocally interpreted as reflecting the neural correlates of conscious experience. Here we review evidence supporting this conjecture and suggest experimental strategies to untangle the NCC from the prerequisites and consequences of conscious experience in order to further develop the otherwise valid and valuable contrastive methodology.

Attention and olfactory consciousness

Understanding the relation between attention and consciousness is an important part of our understanding of consciousness. Attention, unlike consciousness, can be systematically manipulated in psychophysical experiments and a law-like relation between attention and consciousness is waiting to be discovered. Most attempts to discover the nature of this relation are focused on a special type of attention: spatial visual attention. In this review I want to introduce another type of attention to the discussion: attention to the olfactory modality. I will first clarify the position of attention to smells in a general taxonomy of attention. I will then review the mechanisms and neuroanatomy of attention and consciousness in the olfactory system before using the newly introduced system to provide evidence that attention is necessary for consciousness.

Properties of slow oscillation during slow-wave sleep and anesthesia in cats

Deep anesthesia is commonly used as a model of slow-wave sleep (SWS). Ketamine-xylazine anesthesia reproduces the main features of sleep slow oscillation: slow, large-amplitude waves in field potential, which are generated by the alternation of hyperpolarized and depolarized states of cortical neurons. However, direct quantitative comparison of field potential and membrane potential fluctuations during natural sleep and anesthesia is lacking, so it remains unclear how well the properties of sleep slow oscillation are reproduced by the ketamine-xylazine anesthesia model. Here, we used field potential and intracellular recordings in different cortical areas in the cat to directly compare properties of slow oscillation during natural sleep and ketamine-xylazine anesthesia. During SWS cortical activity showed higher power in the slow/delta (0.1-4 Hz) and spindle (8-14 Hz) frequency range, whereas under anesthesia the power in the gamma band (30-100 Hz) was higher. During anesthesia, slow waves were more rhythmic and more synchronous across the cortex. Intracellular recordings revealed that silent states were longer and the amplitude of membrane potential around transition between active and silent states was bigger under anesthesia. Slow waves were mostly uniform across cortical areas under anesthesia, but in SWS, they were most pronounced in associative and visual areas but smaller and less regular in somatosensory and motor cortices. We conclude that, although the main features of the slow oscillation in sleep and anesthesia appear similar, multiple cellular and network features are differently expressed during natural SWS compared with ketamine-xylazine anesthesia.

Consciousness cannot be separated from function

Numerous theories of consciousness hold that there are separate neural correlates of conscious experience and cognitive function, aligning with the assumption that there are 'hard' and 'easy' problems of consciousness. Here, we argue that any neurobiological theory based on an experience/function division cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified and is thus outside the scope of science. A 'perfect experiment' illustrates this point, highlighting the unbreachable boundaries of the scientific study of consciousness. We describe a more nuanced notion of cognitive access that captures personal experience without positing the existence of inaccessible conscious states. Finally, we discuss the criteria necessary for forming and testing a falsifiable theory of consciousness.

Causal density and integrated information as measures of conscious level

An outstanding challenge in neuroscience is to develop theoretically grounded and practically applicable quantitative measures that are sensitive to conscious level. Such measures should be high for vivid alert conscious wakefulness, and low for unconscious states such as dreamless sleep, coma and general anaesthesia. Here, we describe recent progress in the development of measures of dynamical complexity, in particular causal density and integrated information. These and similar measures capture in different ways the extent to which a system's dynamics are simultaneously differentiated and integrated. Because conscious scenes are distinguished by the same dynamical features, these measures are therefore good candidates for reflecting conscious level. After reviewing the theoretical background, we present new simulation results demonstrating similarities and differences between the measures, and we discuss remaining challenges in the practical application of the measures to empirically obtained data.

Preferential inhibition of frontal-to-parietal feedback connectivity is a neurophysiologic correlate of general anesthesia in surgical patients

Background

The precise mechanism and optimal measure of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness has yet to be elucidated. Preferential inhibition of feedback connectivity from frontal to parietal brain networks is one potential neurophysiologic correlate, but has only been demonstrated in animals or under limited conditions in healthy volunteers.

Methods and Findings

We recruited eighteen patients presenting for surgery under general anesthesia; electroencephalography of the frontal and parietal regions was acquired during (i) baseline consciousness, (ii) anesthetic induction with propofol or sevoflurane, (iii) general anesthesia, (iv) recovery of consciousness, and (v) post-recovery states. We used two measures of effective connectivity, evolutional map approach and symbolic transfer entropy, to analyze causal interactions of the frontal and parietal regions. The dominant feedback connectivity of the baseline conscious state was inhibited after anesthetic induction and during general anesthesia, resulting in reduced asymmetry of feedback and feedforward connections in the frontoparietal network. Dominant feedback connectivity returned when patients recovered from anesthesia. Both analytic techniques and both classes of anesthetics demonstrated similar results in this heterogeneous population of surgical patients.

Conclusions

The disruption of dominant feedback connectivity in the frontoparietal network is a common neurophysiologic correlate of general anesthesia across two anesthetic classes and two analytic measures. This study represents a key translational step from the underlying cognitive neuroscience of consciousness to more sophisticated monitoring of anesthetic effects in human surgical patients.