Increased US prescription trends associated with the CDC Bacillus anthracis antimicrobial postexposure prophylaxis campaign

Medical Spending for the 2001 Anthrax Letter Attacks

ABSTRACTIntroductionThis paper assesses the total medical costs associated with the US anthrax letter attacks of 2001. This information can be used to inform policies, which may help mitigate the potential economic impacts of similar bioterrorist attacks.

METHODS

Journal publications and news reports were reviewed to establish the number of people who were exposed, were potentially exposed, received prophylactics, and became ill. Where available, cost data from the anthrax letter attacks were used. Where data were unavailable, high, low, and best cost estimates were developed from the broader literature to create a cost model and establish economic impacts.

RESULTS

Medical spending totaled approximately $177 million.

CONCLUSIONS

The largest expenditures stemmed from self-initiated prophylaxis (worried well): people who sought prophylactic treatment without any indication that they had been exposed to anthrax letters. This highlights an area of focus for mitigating the economic impacts of future disasters. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2019;13:539-546).

Prioritizing "psychological" consequences for disaster preparedness and response: a framework for addressing the emotional, behavioral, and cognitive effects of patient surge in large-scale disasters

While information for the medical aspects of disaster surge is increasingly available, there is little guidance for health care facilities on how to manage the psychological aspects of large-scale disasters that might involve a surge of psychological casualties. In addition, no models are available to guide the development of training curricula to address these needs. This article describes 2 conceptual frameworks to guide hospitals and clinics in managing such consequences. One framework was developed to understand the antecedents of psychological effects or "psychological triggers" (restricted movement, limited resources, limited information, trauma exposure, and perceived personal or family risk) that cause the emotional, behavioral, and cognitive reactions following large-scale disasters. Another framework, adapted from the Donabedian quality of care model, was developed to guide appropriate disaster response by health care facilities in addressing the consequences of reactions to psychological triggers. This framework specifies structural components (internal organizational structure and chain of command, resources and infrastructure, and knowledge and skills) that should be in place before an event to minimize consequences. The framework also specifies process components (coordination with external organizations, risk assessment and monitoring, psychological support, and communication and information sharing) to support evidence-informed interventions.

Psychosocial considerations for mass decontamination

Mass exposure to explosions, infectious agents, foodborne illnesses, chemicals or radiological materials may require mass decontamination that have critical psychosocial implications for the public and for both traditional and non-traditional responders in terms of impact and of response. Five main issues are common to mass decontamination events: (i) perception, (ii) somatisation, (iii) media role and communication, (iv) information sharing, (v) behavioural guidance and (vi) organisational issues. Empirical evidence is drawn from a number of cases, including Chernobyl; Goiania, Brazil; the sarin gas attack in Tokyo; the anthrax attacks in the USA; Three Mile Island; and by features of the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome pandemic. In this paper, a common platform for mass casualty management is explored and suggestions for mass interventions are proposed across the complete event timeline, from pre-event threat and warning stages through to the impact and reconstruction phases. Implication for responders, healthcare and emergency infrastructure, public behaviour, screening processes, risk communication and media management are described.

Stockpiling drugs for an avian influenza outbreak: examining the surge in oseltamivir prescriptions during heightened media coverage of the potential for a worldwide pandemic

OBJECTIVE

During fall 2005, personal stockpiling of oseltamivir for use during an outbreak of H5N1 influenza virus infection was widely reported. The present study aimed to identify indications for oseltamivir prescriptions to determine whether oseltamivir that was not intended for seasonal influenza was inappropriately consumed and to compare persons who were likely to have stockpiled oseltamivir and those who did not with respect to their knowledge, understanding, concerns, and expectations regarding avian influenza.

DESIGN

Survey to evaluate usage patterns for oseltamivir and assess views about avian influenza.

SUBJECTS

A total of 109 outpatients who received a prescription for oseltamivir between September 1, 2005, and December 31, 2005, and 825 matched control subjects.

RESULTS

Of 109 prescriptions, 36 (33.0%) were prescribed for patients with appropriate indications. Sixty-eight (62.4%) of 109 patients identified as having received oseltamivir and 440 (53.3%) of 825 individuals identified as not having received it responded to the questionnaire. Only 2 prescription recipients whose oseltamivir was not intended for immediate consumption reported that they had consumed the oseltamivir. Persons who probably intended to stockpile oseltamivir were older and more often white than those unlikely to stockpile it. They also reported greater worry about avian influenza and more often expected avian influenza to spread to the United States than those unlikely to stockpile, but there were no significant differences in responses to other questionnaire items.

CONCLUSIONS

A large proportion of the oseltamivir prescriptions written in fall 2005 were probably intended for personal stockpiling. Similarities in participants' responses to questionnaire items suggest that educational campaigns may not be an effective method to curtail stockpiling of antimicrobial medications during an infectious threat. Promoting appropriate prescribing practices among providers may be a better means by which to minimize personal stockpiling.

Trends in healthcare use in the New York City region following the Terrorist Attacks of 2001

BACKGROUND

In 2001, terrorism led to emotional stress, disruptions in adherence to treatments and access to services, and exposure to environmental contaminants in New York City (NYC).

METHODS

To describe healthcare use following the terrorist attacks of 2001, we examined insurance claims for January 2000 to March 2002 among more than 2 million residents of the NYC region who were enrolled in the health plans of a large insurer, including overall use by care setting and use for selected conditions that may be associated with stress or other disaster consequences. For all enrollees and for those residing at varying distances from the World Trade Center (WTC), we compared observed use to expected use, based on comparable intervals in prior years and adjusted for seasonal and secular trends.

RESULTS

Use declined across all care settings in the 3 weeks following September 11. From October 1 to December 31, 2001, outpatient visits rose beyond expected both overall and for specific cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, and dermatologic conditions. Declines in overall mental health service use began immediately after September 11 and were sustained through March 2002. Changes in healthcare use were more marked among those residing within 10 miles of the WTC than those residing at greater distances.

CONCLUSIONS

A transient decline in visits across all settings occurred immediately after September 11, followed by a sustained increase in demand for health care for conditions that may be associated with stress or other disaster consequences.

Viewpoint: Terrorism and Dispelling the Myth of a Panic Prone Public

Governments and commentators perceive the public to be prone to panic in response to terrorist attacks--conventional or involving chemical, biological or radiological weapons. Evidence from five such incidents suggests that the public is not prone to panic, although people can change their behaviours and attitudes to reduce the risk of themselves being exposed to a terrorist incident. Behavioural responses may be divided into acts of omission, such as not making unnecessary journeys, and acts of commission, such as taking prophylactic medication despite the inherent risk of side effects. Evidence suggests that the public are aware of these differences, and tend to adopt responses proportionate to the risk. Drawing upon the literature in the social and natural sciences, our discussion encompasses differing risk perceptions of terrorist threats and consequences of attacks. How do fear and anxiety interact with behavioural responses to amplify or attenuate perceptions that can be modified through risk communication undertaken by authorities?

Dark Winter and the Spring of 1972: Deflecting the Social Lessons of Smallpox

This article examines how the master status of bioterrorism has distracted professional and political attention from the social lessons of smallpox. I illustrate this by comparing an influential bioterrorism simulation known as Dark Winter with the social history surrounding the Yugoslavian smallpox epidemic of 1972. Dark Winter's epidemiological premises were largely based upon what was learned from the Yugoslavian outbreak. Yet, although this epidemic was non-deliberate, the exercise did not attend to the social conditions within which it developed. Most notably, it did not consider that this epidemic was mainly borne by marginalized communities of Kosovan Albanians and that difficulties in controlling it were linked to the relative lack of pre-existing public health infrastructure among these people; instead, the Dark Winter exercise mainly focused upon the proximate determinants of violence and its immediate management. This distraction from the social dynamics of infectious diseases has major implications for the prevention and management of future outbreaks, regardless of whether or not they are deliberately initiated.

A psychosocial risk assessment and management framework to enhance response to CBRN terrorism threats and attacks

Evidence in the disaster mental health literature indicates that psychosocial consequences of terrorism are a critical component of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) events, both at the clinical level and the normal behavioral and emotional levels. Planning for such psychosocial aspects should be an integral part of emergency preparedness. As Canada and other countries build the capacity to prevent, mitigate, and manage CBRN threats and events, it is important to recognize the range of social, psychological, emotional, spiritual, behavioral, and cognitive factors that may affect victims and their families, communities, children, the elderly, responders, decision makers, and others at all phases of terrorism, from threat to post-impact recovery. A structured process to assist CBRN emergency planners, decision makers, and responders in identifying psychosocial risks, vulnerable populations, resources, and interventions at various phases of a CBRN event to limit negative psychosocial impacts and promote resilience and adaptive responses is the essence of our psychosocial risk assessment and management (P-RAM) framework. This article presents the evidence base and conceptual underpinnings of the framework, the principles underlying its design, its key elements, and its use in the development of decision tools for responders, planners, decision makers, and the general public to better assess and manage psychosocial aspects of CBRN threats or attacks.

E3LSI research: an essential element of biodefense

The threat of bioterrorism has prompted the U.S. to undertake a vast biodefense initiative, including funding biodefense-related scientific research at unprecedented levels. Unfortunately, the many ethical, economic, environmental, legal, and social implications (E(3)LSI) of biodefense research and activities are not yet receiving the attention they warrant. Previously, in laudable demonstrations of foresight and responsibility, the federal government has funded research into the E(3)LSI of other recent scientific endeavors--namely, the Human Genome Project and the nanotechnology research program--through directed appropriations from their respective research budgets. This article advocates and proposes a model for a portion of biodefense funding to be similarly set aside for an E(3)LSI research program to complement biodefense research, to ensure that bioterror preparedness does not give rise to harmful or otherwise undesirable unintended consequences.

Terrorism's psychologic effects and their implications for primary care policy, research, and education

This paper examines primary care physicians' (PCP) roles in helping the nation prepare for, respond to, and recover from the psychologic consequences of chemical, biologic, radiologic, or nuclear (CBRN) terrorism. First, we discuss the psychologic consequences of a CBRN attack and PCPs' roles in responding to these consequences. Second, we analyze these roles in light of the known barriers to delivering high-quality, primary care-based, mental health care. Third, we offer recommendations for mitigating these barriers and preparing PCPs to respond to the psychosocial consequences of a CBRN weapon. Importantly, our recommendations provide dual-use benefits to PCPs faced with the daily concerns of primary care mental health, including improved linkages and electronic connectivity with mental health, information technology, and decision support for providers, and needed education and research.

Demand for prophylaxis after bioterrorism-related anthrax cases, 2001

In 1991, most physicians in Minnesota and Wisconsin managed patients concerns about anthrax without dispensing prophylactic antimicrobial agents.

Media reports suggested increased public demand for anthrax prophylaxis after the intentional anthrax cases in 2001, but the magnitude of anthrax-related prescribing in unaffected regions was not assessed. We surveyed a random sample of 400 primary care clinicians in Minnesota and Wisconsin to assess requests for and provision of anthrax-related antimicrobial agents. The survey was returned by 239 (60%) of clinicians, including 210 in outpatient practice. Fifty-eight (28%) of those in outpatient practice received requests for anthrax-related antimicrobial agents, and 9 (4%) dispensed them. Outpatient fluoroquinolone use in both states was also analyzed with regression models to compare predicted and actual use in October and November 2001. Fluoroquinolone use as a proportion of total antimicrobial use was not elevated, and anthrax concerns accounted for an estimated 0.3% of all fluoroquinolone prescriptions. Most physicians in Minnesota and Wisconsin managed anthrax-related requests without dispensing antimicrobial agents.

Patients' request for and emergency physicians' prescription of antimicrobial prophylaxis for anthrax during the 2001 bioterrorism-related outbreak

Background

Inappropriate use of antibiotics by individuals worried about biological agent exposures during bioterrorism events is an important public health concern. However, little is documented about the extent to which individuals with self-identified risk of anthrax exposure approached physicians for antimicrobial prophylaxis during the 2001 bioterrorism attacks in the United States.

Methods

We conducted a telephone survey of randomly selected members of the Pennsylvania Chapter of the American College of Emergency Physicians to assess patients' request for and emergency physicians' prescription of antimicrobial agents during the 2001 anthrax attacks.

Results

Ninety-seven physicians completed the survey. Sixty-four (66%) respondents had received requests from patients for anthrax prophylaxis; 16 (25%) of these physicians prescribed antibiotics to a total of 23 patients. Ten physicians prescribed ciprofloxacin while 8 physicians prescribed doxycycline.

Conclusion

During the 2001 bioterrorist attacks, the majority of the emergency physicians we surveyed encountered patients who requested anthrax prophylaxis. Public fears may lead to a high demand for antibiotic prophylaxis during bioterrorism events. Elucidation of the relationship between public health response to outbreaks and outcomes would yield insights to ease burden on frontline clinicians and guide strategies to control inappropriate antibiotic allocation during bioterrorist events.

Emotional and behavioral consequences of bioterrorism: planning a public health response

Millions of dollars have been spent improving the public health system's bioterrorism response capabilities. Yet relatively little attention has been paid to precisely how the public will respond to bioterrorism and how emotional and behavioral responses might complicate an otherwise successful response. This article synthesizes the available evidence about the likely emotional and behavioral consequences of bioterrorism to suggest what decision makers can do now to improve that response. It examines the emotional and behavioral impact of previous "bioterrorism-like" events and summarizes interviews with experts who have responded to such events or conducted research on the effects of community-wide disasters. The article concludes by reflecting on the evidence and experts' perspectives to suggest actions to be taken now and future policy and research priorities.