Neurocomputational models of altruistic decision-making and social motives: Advances, pitfalls, and future directions

A neurocomputational account of the link between social perception and social action

People selectively help others based on perceptions of their merit or need. Here, we develop a neurocomputational account of how these social perceptions translate into social choice. Using a novel fMRI social perception task, we show that both merit and need perceptions recruited the brain's social inference network. A behavioral computational model identified two non-exclusive mechanisms underlying variance in social perceptions: a consistent tendency to perceive others as meritorious/needy (bias) and a propensity to sample and integrate normative evidence distinguishing high from low merit/need in other people (sensitivity). Variance in people's merit (but not need) bias and sensitivity independently predicted distinct aspects of altruism in a social choice task completed months later. An individual's merit bias predicted context-independent variance in people's overall other-regard during altruistic choice, biasing people toward prosocial actions. An individual's merit sensitivity predicted context-sensitive discrimination in generosity toward high and low merit recipients by influencing other- and self-regard during altruistic decision-making. This context-sensitive perception-action link was associated with activation in the right temporoparietal junction. Together, these findings point toward stable, biologically based individual differences in perceptual processes related to abstract social concepts like merit, and suggest that these differences may have important behavioral implications for an individual's tendency toward favoritism or discrimination in social settings.

Adult age differences in the integration of values for self and other

Previous research suggests that older adults may display more prosocial behavior than younger adults. However, recent meta-analyses indicate that effects are heterogeneous, may be small, and are influenced by how prosociality is measured. Further, the precise cognitive and computational factors contributing to age-related differences in prosocial behavior remain largely unknown. In this study, we utilized a modified dictator game to combine a value-based decision framework with Bayesian hierarchical drift-diffusion modeling to investigate prosocial decision-making in a sample of younger (n = 63) and older adults (n = 48). We observed differences in how older and younger individuals incorporate information corresponding to potential gains for themselves (self) and another person (other) to reach a (potentially prosocial) decision. Younger adults integrated values for benefits for themselves and others in the decision-making process and demonstrated increased decision-making efficiency by effectively integrating both sources of information. In contrast, older adults showed improved decision-making efficiency when solely considering values for self and others separately. Interestingly, individual differences in the capacity of inhibitory control in older adults moderated the observed age effects: older adults with stronger inhibitory control abilities made decisions based on the integrated information of benefits for themselves and others. Together, these findings offer new insights into the behavioral and computational mechanisms influencing age effects in prosocial decision-making.

A social information processing perspective on social connectedness

Social connectedness (SC) is one of the most important predictors for physical and mental health. Consequently, SC is addressed in an increasing number of studies, providing evidence for the multidimensionality of the construct, and revealing several factors that contribute to individual differences in SC. However, a unified model that can address SC subcomponents is yet missing. Here we take a novel perspective and discuss whether individual differences in SC can be explained by a person's social information processing profile that represents individual tendencies of how social information is perceived and interpreted and leads to motivated social behavior. After summarizing the current knowledge on SC and core findings from the fields of social perception and mentalizing, social motivation and social action, we derive a working model that links individual stages of social information processing to structural, functional, and qualitative aspects of SC. This model allows for deriving testable hypotheses on the foundations of SC and we outline several suggestions how these aspects can be addressed by future research.

Age differences in prosociality across the adult lifespan: A meta-analysis

Lifespan developmental theories and research suggest a positive effect of adult age on prosociality. However, this effect lacks consistency, with many studies excluding the period of midlife. This study summarized cross-sectional studies on adult age and prosociality, combining 120 (independent) samples (n = 103,829) in a lifespan meta-analysis approach. Linear and quadratic age effects on prosociality were analyzed, as well as comparisons between younger, middle-aged, and older adults. Prosociality was assessed via behavioral measures and self-reports. In both these domains, results indicated small linear age effects and higher prosociality in older compared to younger adults, supporting the hypothesis of increased prosociality in older age. Additionally, leveraging open data sets (64/120 independent samples), predominantly unpublished, we found some evidence for potential quadratic age effects on behavioral prosociality: Middle-aged adults exhibited higher behavioral and self-reported prosociality than younger adults, but no differences between middle-aged and older adults were observed. This meta-analysis offers new perspectives on age trajectories of prosociality, suggesting midlife as a potentially important phase of pronounced prosociality.

Brain responses to self- and other- unfairness under resource distribution context: Meta-analysis of fMRI studies

Under resource distribution context, individuals have a strong aversion to unfair treatment not only toward themselves but also toward others. However, there is no clear consensus regarding the commonality and distinction between these two types of unfairness. Moreover, many neuroimaging studies have investigated how people evaluate and respond to unfairness in the abovementioned two contexts, but the consistency of the results remains to be investigated. To resolve these two issues, we sought to summarize existing findings regarding unfairness to self and others and to further elucidate the neural underpinnings related to distinguishing evaluation and response processes through meta-analyses of previous neuroimaging studies. Our results indicated that both types of unfairness consistently activate the affective and conflict-related anterior insula (AI) and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex/supplementary motor area (dACC/SMA), but the activations related to unfairness to self appeared stronger than those related to others, suggesting that individuals had negative reactions to both unfairness and a greater aversive response toward unfairness to self. During the evaluation process, unfairness to self activated the bilateral AI, dACC, and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), regions associated with unfairness aversion, conflict, and cognitive control, indicating reactive, emotional and automatic responses. In contrast, unfairness to others activated areas associated with theory of mind, the inferior parietal lobule and temporoparietal junction (IPL-TPJ), suggesting that making rational judgments from the perspective of others was needed. During the response, unfairness to self activated the affective-related left AI and striatum, whereas unfairness to others activated cognitive control areas, the left DLPFC and the thalamus. This indicated that the former maintained the traits of automaticity and emotionality, whereas the latter necessitated cognitive control. These findings provide a fine-grained description of the common and distinct neurocognitive mechanisms underlying unfairness to self and unfairness to others. Overall, this study not only validates the inequity aversion model but also provides direct evidence of neural mechanisms for neurobiological models of fairness.

Assessing the performance of MM/PBSA and MM/GBSA methods. 10. Prediction reliability of binding affinities and binding poses for RNA-ligand complexes

Ribonucleic acid (RNA)-ligand interactions play a pivotal role in a wide spectrum of biological processes, ranging from protein biosynthesis to cellular reproduction. This recognition has prompted the broader acceptance of RNA as a viable candidate for drug targets. Delving into the atomic-scale understanding of RNA-ligand interactions holds paramount importance in unraveling intricate molecular mechanisms and further contributing to RNA-based drug discovery. Computational approaches, particularly molecular docking, offer an efficient way of predicting the interactions between RNA and small molecules. However, the accuracy and reliability of these predictions heavily depend on the performance of scoring functions (SFs). In contrast to the majority of SFs used in RNA-ligand docking, the end-point binding free energy calculation methods, such as molecular mechanics/generalized Born surface area (MM/GBSA) and molecular mechanics/Poisson Boltzmann surface area (MM/PBSA), stand as theoretically more rigorous approaches. Yet, the evaluation of their effectiveness in predicting both binding affinities and binding poses within RNA-ligand systems remains unexplored. This study first reported the performance of MM/PBSA and MM/GBSA with diverse solvation models, interior dielectric constants (εin) and force fields in the context of binding affinity prediction for 29 RNA-ligand complexes. MM/GBSA is based on short (5 ns) molecular dynamics (MD) simulations in an explicit solvent with the YIL force field; the GBGBn2 model with higher interior dielectric constant (εin = 12, 16 or 20) yields the best correlation (Rp = -0.513), which outperforms the best correlation (Rp = -0.317, rDock) offered by various docking programs. Then, the efficacy of MM/GBSA in identifying the near-native binding poses from the decoys was assessed based on 56 RNA-ligand complexes. However, it is evident that MM/GBSA has limitations in accurately predicting binding poses for RNA-ligand systems, particularly compared with notably proficient docking programs like rDock and PLANTS. The best top-1 success rate achieved by MM/GBSA rescoring is 39.3%, which falls below the best results given by docking programs (50%, PLNATS). This study represents the first evaluation of MM/PBSA and MM/GBSA for RNA-ligand systems and is expected to provide valuable insights into their successful application to RNA targets.

A neurocomputational account of the link between social perception and social action

People selectively help others based on perceptions of their merit or need. Here, we develop a neurocomputational account of how these social perceptions translate into social choice. Using a novel fMRI social perception task, we show that both merit and need perceptions recruited the brain's social inference network. A behavioral computational model identified two non-exclusive mechanisms underlying variance in social perceptions: a consistent tendency to perceive others as meritorious/needy (bias) and a propensity to sample and integrate normative evidence distinguishing high from low merit/need in other people (sensitivity). Variance in people's merit (but not need) bias and sensitivity independently predicted distinct aspects of altruism in a social choice task completed months later. An individual's merit bias predicted context-independent variance in people's overall other-regard during altruistic choice, biasing people towards prosocial actions. An individual's merit sensitivity predicted context-sensitive discrimination in generosity towards high and low merit recipients by influencing other-regard and self-regard during altruistic decision-making. This context-sensitive perception-action link was associated with activation in the right temporoparietal junction. Together, these findings point towards stable, biologically based individual differences in perceptual processes related to abstract social concepts like merit, and suggest that these differences may have important behavioral implications for an individual's tendency toward favoritism or discrimination in social settings.

Higher subjective socioeconomic status is linked to increased charitable giving and mentalizing-related neural value coding

Socioeconomic status (SES), a concept related to an individual's economic and social position relative to others, can shape social interactions like altruistic behaviors. However, little is known about the exact neurocognitive mechanisms that link SES with altruism. Our study aimed to provide a comprehensive account of the sociocognitive and neural mechanisms through which SES affects charitable giving - an important variant of human altruism. To this end, participants completed a charitable donation task while their brain activity was measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We also assessed participants' socio-cognitive ability to infer other people's mental states (i.e., mentalizing) - a driver of prosocial behavior - in an independent social task. Behaviorally, we found that both charitable giving and social cognition were status-dependent, as subjective SES positively predicted donations and mentalizing capacity. Moreover, the link between SES and charitable giving was mediated by individuals' mentalizing capacity. At the neural level, a multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI data revealed that higher subjective SES was associated with stronger value coding in the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ). The strength of this value representation predicted charitable giving and was linked to mentalizing. Furthermore, we observed an increased negative functional coupling between rTPJ and left putamen with higher SES. Together, increased charitable giving in higher-status individuals could be explained by status-dependent recruitment of mentalizing-related value coding and altered functional connectivity in the brain. Our findings provide insights into the socio- and neurocognitive mechanisms explaining why and when higher SES leads to prosociality, which might ultimately inform targeted interventions to promote prosocial behavior in human societies.

Neural signatures of social inferences predict the number of real-life social contacts and autism severity

We regularly infer other people's thoughts and feelings from observing their actions, but how this ability contributes to successful social behavior and interactions remains unknown. We show that neural activation patterns during social inferences obtained in the laboratory predict the number of social contacts in the real world, as measured by the social network index, in three neurotypical samples (total n = 126) and one sample of autistic adults (n = 23). We also show that brain patterns during social inference generalize across individuals in these groups. Cross-validated associations between brain activations and social inference localize selectively to the right posterior superior temporal sulcus and were specific for social, but not nonsocial, inference. Activation within this same brain region also predicts autism-like trait scores from questionnaires and autism symptom severity. Thus, neural activations produced while thinking about other people's mental states predict variance in multiple indices of social functioning in the real world.

Evidence accumulation, not 'self-control', explains dorsolateral prefrontal activation during normative choice

What role do regions like the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) play in normative behavior (e.g., generosity, healthy eating)? Some models suggest that dlPFC activation during normative choice reflects controlled inhibition or modulation of default hedonistic preferences. Here, we develop an alternative account, showing that evidence accumulation models predict trial-by-trial variation in dlPFC response across three fMRI paradigms and two self-control contexts (altruistic sacrifice and healthy eating). Using these models to simulate a variety of self-control dilemmas generated a novel prediction: although dlPFC activity might typically increase for norm-consistent choices, deliberate self-regulation focused on normative goals should decrease or even reverse this pattern (i.e., greater dlPFC response for hedonistic, self-interested choices). We confirmed these predictions in both altruistic and dietary choice contexts. Our results suggest that dlPFC response during normative choice may depend more on value-based evidence accumulation than inhibition of our baser instincts.

Neurocomputations of strategic behavior: From iterated to novel interactions

Strategic interactions, where an individual's payoff depends on the decisions of multiple intelligent agents, are ubiquitous among social animals. They span a variety of important social behaviors such as competition, cooperation, coordination, and communication, and often involve complex, intertwining cognitive operations ranging from basic reward processing to higher‐order mentalization. Here, we review the progress and challenges in probing the neural and cognitive mechanisms of strategic behavior of interacting individuals, drawing an analogy to recent developments in studies of reward‐seeking behavior, in particular, how research focuses in the field of strategic behavior have been expanded from adaptive behavior based on trial‐and‐error to flexible decisions based on limited prior experience. We highlight two important research questions in the field of strategic behavior: (i) How does the brain exploit past experience for learning to behave strategically? and (ii) How does the brain decide what to do in novel strategic situations in the absence of direct experience? For the former, we discuss the utility of learning models that have effectively connected various types of neural data with strategic learning behavior and helped elucidate the interplay among multiple learning processes. For the latter, we review the recent evidence and propose a neural generative mechanism by which the brain makes novel strategic choices through simulating others' goal‐directed actions according to rational or bounded‐rational principles obtained through indirect social knowledge.

This article is categorized under:

Economics > Interactive Decision‐Making

Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making

Neuroscience > Cognition

Altruism under Stress: Cortisol Negatively Predicts Charitable Giving and Neural Value Representations Depending on Mentalizing Capacity

Altruism, defined as costly other-regarding behavior, varies considerably across people and contexts. One prominent context in which people frequently must decide on how to socially act is under stress. How does stress affect altruistic decision-making and through which neurocognitive mechanisms? To address these questions, we assessed neural activity associated with charitable giving under stress. Human participants (males and females) completed a charitable donation task before and after they underwent either a psychosocial stressor or a control manipulation, while their brain activity was measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging. As the ability to infer other people's mental states (i.e., mentalizing) predicts prosocial giving and may be susceptible to stress, we examined whether stress effects on altruism depend on participants' general capacity to mentalize, as assessed in an independent task. Although our stress manipulation per se had no influence on charitable giving, increases in the stress hormone cortisol were associated with reductions in donations in participants with high mentalizing capacity, but not in low mentalizers. Multivariate neural response patterns in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) were less predictive of postmanipulation donations in high mentalizers with increased cortisol, indicating decreased value coding, and this effect mediated the (moderated) association between cortisol increases and reduced donations. Our findings provide novel insights into the modulation of altruistic decision-making by suggesting an impact of the stress hormone cortisol on mentalizing-related neurocognitive processes, which in turn results in decreased altruism. The DLPFC appears to play a key role in mediating this cortisol-related shift in altruism.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Altruism is a fundamental building block of our society. Emerging evidence indicates a major role of acute stress and stress-related neuromodulators in social behavior and decision-making. How and through which mechanisms stress may impact altruism remains elusive. We observed that the stress hormone cortisol was linked to diminished altruistic behavior. This effect was mediated by reduced value representations in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and critically depended on the individual capacity to infer mental states of others. Our findings provide novel insights into the modulation of human altruism linked to stress-hormone dynamics and into the involved sociocognitive and neural mechanisms, with important implications for future developments of more targeted interventions for stress-related decrements in social behavior and social cognition.