Consciousness and cognition in plants

Evidence of quantum-entangled higher states of consciousness

What if quantum entanglement could accelerate learning by unlocking higher states of conscious experience? This study provides empirical and statistical evidence of how quantum entanglement influences consciousness at a biophysical level. We analyzed data from 106 monozygotic twin pairs (N = 212), randomly assigned to control and experimental groups. Using a consanguinity-based matching technique, twin pairs (A-B) were formed. Two distinct 2-qubit circuits were designed: C1 (non-entangled) for the control group and E1 (entangled) for the experimental group. These circuits manipulated visual stimulus contingencies during a 144-trial implicit learning experiment conducted under nonlocal conditions, executed via the IBM Brisbane supercomputer. Mental states were assessed with 3D electroencephalography (EEG), while biomarkers-including Brain-Derived Neurotrophic Factor (BDNF) for neuroplasticity, Free Fatty Acids (FFA), and Alpha-Amylase for physiological arousal-were measured. To advance this field, we introduced the Quantum-Multilinear Integrated Coefficient (Q), a groundbreaking metric capable of estimating variance increases attributable to quantum entanglement effects within response matrices. Our findings revealed that the entanglement of qubits in stimulus configurations explained 13.5 % of the variance in accuracy within the experimental group. The Q coefficient captured up to a 31.6 % increase in variance across twin responses, while neuroplasticity markers explained a 26.2 % increase in cognitive performance under entangled conditions. These results provide robust evidence that quantum entanglement enhances conscious experience and facilitates faster, more efficient learning. They point to the existence of anomalous cognitive mechanisms capable of anticipating future, unpredictable stimuli, representing a profound leap in our understanding of consciousness and its quantum underpinnings.

Plant "intelligence" and the misuse of historical sources as evidence

Proponents of the concepts of plant intelligence and plant neurobiology often use historical sources as "evidence" and argue that eminent past scientists have supported ideas of plant intelligence, memory, learning, decision-making, agency, and consciousness. Historical sources include writings by Charles Darwin, Julius von Sachs, F. W. Went, K. V. Thimann, Barbara McClintock, and J. B. Lamarck. Advocates of plant neurobiology also argue that the ideas of J. C. Bose, an Indian scientist who is considered an important forerunner of plant neurobiology, were suppressed chiefly because of racism. Plant neurobiology has been criticized on scientific grounds, but there has not been close scrutiny of the use of historical sources as a form of evidence. We provide the first in-depth analysis of how historical sources have been used and misused, and conclude that there is a consistent pattern of distortion of these sources. Distortions include the use of erroneous quotations, alteration of quotations, selective quotations without context, and misinterpretation and exaggeration of historical statements. In the case of Bose, we show that there were legitimate scientific reasons for questioning his interpretations of botanical experiments and argue that this context cannot be ignored in evaluating contemporary responses to Bose. Overall, the common practice by proponents of plant intelligence and plant consciousness of uncritically citing the words of eminent scientists of the past, taken out of their historical context to bolster their arguments, should not be confused with scientific evidence supporting these concepts, even when the quotations, themselves, are accurate.

How Metarhizium robertsii's mycelial consciousness gets its conidia Zen-ready for stress

This memoir takes a whimsical ride through my professional adventures, spotlighting my fungal stress research on the insect-pathogenic fungus Metarhizium robertsii, which transformed many of my wildest dreams into reality. Imagine the magic of fungi meeting science and me, a happy researcher, arriving at Utah State University ready to dive deep into studies with the legendary insect pathologist, my advisor Donald W. Roberts, and my co-advisor Anne J. Anderson. From my very first "Aha!" moment in the lab, I plunged into a vortex of discovery, turning out research like a mycelium on a mission. Who knew 18 h/day, seven days a week, could be so exhilarating? I was fueled by an insatiable curiosity, boundless creativity, and a perhaps slightly alarming level of motivation. Years later, I managed to bring my grandest vision to life: the International Symposium on Fungal Stress-ISFUS. This groundbreaking event has attracted 162 esteemed speakers from 29 countries to Brazil, proving that fungi can be both fun and globally fascinating. ISFUS is celebrating its fifth edition in 2024, a decade after its 2014 debut.

An evidence-based critical review of the mind-brain identity theory

In the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology, the causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation, and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the one hand, material monism posits consciousness and mind as pure brain epiphenomena. One of its most stringent lines of reasoning relies on a 'loss-of-function lesion premise,' according to which, since brain lesions and neurochemical modifications lead to cognitive impairment and/or altered states of consciousness, there is no reason to doubt the mind-brain identity. On the other hand, dualism or idealism (in one form or another) regard consciousness and mind as something other than the sole product of cerebral activity pointing at the ineffable, undefinable, and seemingly unphysical nature of our subjective qualitative experiences and its related mental dimension. Here, several neuroscientific findings are reviewed that question the idea that posits phenomenal experience as an emergent property of brain activity, and argue that the premise of material monism is based on a logical correlation-causation fallacy. While these (mostly ignored) findings, if considered separately from each other, could, in principle, be recast into a physicalist paradigm, once viewed from an integral perspective, they substantiate equally well an ontology that posits mind and consciousness as a primal phenomenon.

Perspectives on Computation in Plants

Plants thrive in virtually all natural and human-adapted environments and are becoming popular models for developing robotics systems because of their strategies of morphological and behavioral adaptation. Such adaptation and high plasticity offer new approaches for designing, modeling, and controlling artificial systems acting in unstructured scenarios. At the same time, the development of artifacts based on their working principles reveals how plants promote innovative approaches for preservation and management plans and opens new applications for engineering-driven plant science. Environmentally mediated growth patterns (e.g., tropisms) are clear examples of adaptive behaviors displayed through morphological phenotyping. Plants also create networks with other plants through subterranean roots-fungi symbiosis and use these networks to exchange resources or warning signals. This article discusses the functional behaviors of plants and shows the close similarities with a perceptron-like model that could act as a behavior-based control model in plants. We begin by analyzing communication rules and growth behaviors of plants; we then show how we translated plant behaviors into algorithmic solutions for bioinspired robot controllers; and finally, we discuss how those solutions can be extended to embrace original approaches to networking and robotics control architectures.

Decision Making in Plants: A Rooted Perspective

This article discusses the possibility of plant decision making. We contend that recent work on bacteria provides a pertinent perspective for thinking about whether plants make choices. Specifically, the analogy between certain patterns of plant behaviour and apparent decision making in bacteria provides principled grounds for attributing decision making to the former. Though decision making is our focus, the discussion has implications for the wider issue of whether and why plants (and non-neural organisms more generally) are appropriate targets for cognitive abilities. Moreover, decision making is especially relevant to the issue of plant intelligence as it is commonly taken to be characteristic of cognition.

A Concise Account of Information as Meaning Ascribed to Symbols and Its Association with Conscious Mind

The term information is used in different meanings in different fields of study and daily life, causing misunderstanding and confusion. There is a need to clarify what information is and how it relates to knowledge. It is argued that information is meaning represented by physical symbols such as sights, sounds, and words. Knowledge is meaning that resides in a conscious mind. The basic building blocks of information are symbols and meaning, which cannot be reduced to one another. The symbols of information are the physical media of representation and the means of transmission of information. Without the associated meaning, the symbols of information have no significance since meaning is an ascribed and acquired quality and not an inherent property of the symbols. We can transmit symbols of information but cannot transmit meaning from one mind to another without a common protocol or convention. A concise and cohesive framework for information can be established on the common ground of the mind, meaning, and symbols trio. Using reasoned arguments, logical consistency, and conformity with common experiences and observations as the methodology, this paper offers valuable insights to facilitate clear understanding and unifies several definitions of information into one in a cohesive manner.

Congratulations to Animal Cognition on its 50th birthday! Some thoughts on the last 50 years of animal cognition research

In this article, the author reflects on some of the key issues that have arisen in comparative cognition and the role and impact of the journal Animal Cognition through its first 25 years by pretending to look back at this period from the year 2047. Successes within comparative cognition are described and the role that Animal Cognition has played in the growth of comparative cognition are discussed. Concerns are presented about issues that affect the opportunities that researchers have to work with nonhuman species and to produce good comparative cognitive science. Prescriptions for what the author hopes will happen next also are offered all in the lens of a prospectively imagined retrospective on this field.

Enacting Plant-Inspired Robotics

Plants offer a source of bioinspiration for soft robotics. Nevertheless, a gap remains in designing robots based on the fundamental principles of plant intelligence, rooted in a non-centralized, modular architecture and a highly plastic phenotype. We contend that a holistic approach to plant bioinspiration—one that draws more fully on the features of plant intelligence and behavior—evidences the value of an enactivist perspective. This is because enactivism emphasizes not only features of embodiment such as material composition and morphology, but also autonomy as an important aspect of plant intelligence and behavior. The enactivist sense of autonomy concerns the dynamics of self-producing systems (such as plants) that create a distinction between themselves and a domain of interactions that bear on the conditions of viability of the system. This contrasts with the widespread, but diluted notion of autonomy that merely indicates the independent operability of a system for an arbitrary period. Different notions of autonomy are relevant for soft roboticists, for instance, when evaluating limitations on existing growing robots (“growbots”) that take bioinspiration from plants, but depend on a fixed source of energy and material provided by an external agent. More generally, plant-inspired robots serve as a case study for an enactivist approach to intelligence, while, correspondingly, enactivism calls attention to the possibility of non-zoological forms of intelligence embodied in a self-organizing, autonomous system.

Our sisters the plants? notes from phylogenetics and botany on plant kinship blindness

Before the upheaval brought about by phylogenetic classification, classical taxonomy separated living beings into two distinct kingdoms, animals and plants. Rooted in 'naturalist' cosmology, Western science has built its theoretical apparatus on this dichotomy mostly based on ancient Aristotelian ideas. Nowadays, despite the adoption of the Darwinian paradigm that unifies living organisms as a kinship, the concept of the "scale of beings" continues to structure our analysis and understanding of living species. Our aim is to combine developments in phylogeny, recent advances in biology, and renewed interest in plant agency to craft an interdisciplinary stance on the living realm. The lines at the origin of plant or animal have a common evolutionary history dating back to about 3.9 Ga, separating only 1.6 Ga ago. From a phylogenetic perspective of living species history, plants and animals belong to sister groups. With recent data related to the field of Plant Neurobiology, our aim is to discuss some socio-cultural obstacles, mainly in Western naturalist epistemology, that have prevented the integration of living organisms as relatives, while suggesting a few avenues inspired by practices principally from other ontologies that could help overcome these obstacles and build bridges between different ways of connecting to life.