Realist errors in children's responses to pictures and words as representations

Piecing Together the Puzzle of Pictorial Representation: How Jigsaw Puzzles Index Metacognitive Development

Jigsaw puzzles are ubiquitous developmental toys in Western societies, used here to examine the development of metarepresentation. For jigsaw puzzles this entails understanding that individual pieces, when assembled, produce a picture. In Experiment 1, 3- to 5-year-olds (N = 117) completed jigsaw puzzles that were normal, had no picture, or comprised noninterlocking rectangular pieces. Pictorial puzzle completion was associated with mental and graphical metarepresentational task performance. Guide pictures of completed pictorial puzzles were not useful. In Experiment 2, 3- to 4-year-olds (N = 52) completed a simplified task, to choose the correct final piece. Guide-use associated with age and specifically graphical metarepresentation performance. We conclude that the pragmatically natural measure of jigsaw puzzle completion ability demonstrates general and pictorial metarepresentational development at 4 years.

Iconic realism or representational blindness? How young children and adults reason about pictures and objects

When reasoning about a representation (e.g., a toy lion), children often engage in "iconic realism," whereby representations are reported to have properties of their real-life referents. The present studies examined an inverse difficulty that we dub "representational blindness": overlooking (i.e., being 'blind' to) a representation's objective, non-symbolic features. In three experiments (N = 302), children (3-6 years) and adults saw a series of representations (pictures and toys) and were tested on how often they endorsed a property that was true of the real-world referent (e.g., reporting that a toy lion is dangerous; iconic realism) or rejected a property that was true of the representation (e.g., denying that a toy elephant can be lifted with one hand; representational blindness). We found that representational blindness and realism were separable tendencies. Children (and to a lesser extent, adults) displayed both, but at different rates for pictures than for toys. We conclude that children's reasoning about representations includes a bias to overlook the features of the representation itself. Further, although pictures and toys are both representations, they provoke ontologically distinct interpretations. We discuss the implications of these results for a variety of important conceptual tasks, including learning to read, draw, or objectively evaluate scientific evidence.

Getting the picture: iconicity does not affect representation-referent confusion

Three experiments examined 3- to 5-year-olds' (N = 428) understanding of the relationship between pictorial iconicity (photograph, colored drawing, schematic drawing) and the real world referent. Experiments 1 and 2 explored pictorial iconicity in picture-referent confusion after the picture-object relationship has been established. Pictorial iconicity had no effect on referential confusion when the referent changed after the picture had been taken/drawn (Experiment 1) and when the referent and the picture were different from the outset (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 investigated whether children are sensitive to iconicity to begin with. Children deemed photographs from a choice of varying iconicity representations as best representations for object reference. Together, findings suggest that iconicity plays a role in establishing a picture-object relation per se but is irrelevant once children have accepted that a picture represents an object. The latter finding may reflect domain general representational abilities.

Japanese children's understanding of notational systems

This study examined Japanese children's understanding of two Japanese notational systems: hiragana and kanji. In three experiments, 126 3- to 6-year-olds were asked to name words written in hiragana or kanji as they appeared with different pictures. Consistent with Bialystok (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 2000, Vol. 76, pp. 173-189), 3- and 4-year-olds' identification of written words varied according to the picture with which they appeared, and older children named the words with different pictures more accurately. The 4-year-olds who could read words written in hiragana but could not read words written in kanji named both hiragana words and kanji words with different pictures more accurately than those who could not read hiragana and kanji words. The interrelationship between the symbol-sound relationships and the symbol-referent relationships of notational systems is discussed.

Drawings of very preterm-born children at 5 years of age: a first impression of cognitive and motor development?

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study was to examine differences in drawing skills between very preterm and term children, and to determine whether very preterm children's cognitive and motor development is reflected in the draw-a-person test (DAP) at age 5. Seventy-two very preterm children (birth weight <1,500 g and/or gestational age <32 weeks) and 60 term children at 5 years of age were compared on the DAP. Cognitive and motor skills of the very preterm children had been assessed four times, at 1/2, 1, 2, and 5 years of age. Very preterm children showed a developmental delay in drawing ability. Structural equation modeling revealed a positive relation between both cognitive as well as motor development and the DAP.

CONCLUSION

The DAP could be a crude parameter for evaluating cognitive and motor deficits of very preterm children. A worrisome result should be followed by more standardized tests measuring cognitive and motor skills.

In Tribute to Luigi Castagnetta--Drawings: A Narrative Approach for Children with Cancer

In troublesome situations, each of us uses verbal communication carefully, at times diminishing our meaning with words of little significance. However, since the need to communicate remains a part of us, body language or other forms of expression are put into use. Inside a hospital a child is always a stranger with regards to the uneasiness that accompanies his/her experience. Because diagnostic and therapeutic ends are the primary concern of the health care professionals, there is often little sign of affection in their impersonal gestures, glances and body language. Graphic and pictorial communication, therefore, hold great importance for sick children since this is an area they have easier access to, and that they cultivate at school and through play. This activity fulfills their innate need to communicate with themselves and with others. Children express themselves through drawings, using them as a stage to dramatize their needs, wishes anxieties, and joys. When in hospital, children are afraid, and they feel embarrassed around strangers and even parents, especially when the parents are speaking with their caregivers. The children are afraid of making a poor impression and of being rejected by adults, of being considered inadequate and untruthful. Their need for truth and for communication unfolds through artistic expression, and this is the basis of art therapy. The opportunity to express themselves through drawings is what makes the ill child his/her won therapeutic agent through a self-healing mechanism. This may be further guided so as to lead to an increase in self-esteem, which in turn will lead to both enhancement of their full expressive possibilities and to positive feedback of their self-image. In addition to verbal language itself, art therapy is the preferred and ideal means to communicate following the rules of "narrative-based medicine", and to understand children. In this study spontaneous drawings of 50 Italian children affected by leukemia or cancer in different stages were evaluated during 2003 at the outpatient clinic of G. Gaslini Children's Hospital. Ages ranged from 4 to 14 years (median 8 years); 27 were males and 23 females. They drew in three situations: spontaneously when they were alone; with play workers; and with the psychologist. Pictures emerging from these settings have proven to be significant and denote the children's perception of the disease, and of their fears and hopes. The children's drawings allowed them to depict their present and future relationship with the disease, with the hospital, and with the environment in general. Their pictures reflected not only their current state of mind, but also past experiences and future prospects. Art therapy proved to be a vitally important means of "narrative" communication for severely sick children in hospital. Thus, collecting and evaluating drawings in an attempt to establish the intellectual, cultural, and emotional status of each child is of paramount importance. To this end, workers have been trained to carefully observe ech child while drawing. Such extremely important collaboration prevents the loss of relevant and vital details. This research confirms our theory that art therapy has to be included in the total care of a severely ill child while in hospital. Drawings accompanied by comments certainly provide a broader approach to better understanding the child's anxiety and feelings.

Three- to four-year-olds' recognition that symbols have a stable meaning: pictures are understood before written words

In 4 experiments 120 three- to four-year-old nonreaders were asked the identity of a symbolic representation as it appeared with different objects. Consistent with Bialystok (2000), many children judged the identity of written words to vary according to the object with which they appeared but few made such errors with recognizable pictures. Children also made few errors when the symbols were unrecognizable pictures. In Experiments 2 to 4 this pattern of responses was preserved in conditions that made it unlikely or impossible for children to answer correctly by taking the symbol to refer to one of the objects with which it appeared. Instead, correct answers required children to appreciate that the symbol had a generic, abstract meaning.

Can one written word mean many things? Prereaders' assumptions about the stability of written words' meanings

Results of three experiments confirmed previous findings that in a moving word task, prereaders 3 to 5 years of age judge as if the meaning of a written word changes when it moves from a matching to a nonmatching toy (e.g., when the word "dog" moves from a dog to a boat). We explore under what circumstances children make such errors, we identify new conditions under which children were more likely correctly to treat written words' meanings as stable: when the word was placed alongside a nonmatching toy without having been alongside a matching toy previously, when two words were moved from a matching toy to a nonmatching toy, and when children were asked to change what the print said. Under these conditions, children more frequently assumed that physical forms had stable meanings as they do with other forms of external representation.

Notation to symbol: Development in children’s understanding of print

Three studies used the moving word task to examine children's understanding of the symbolic nature of print. A card containing a printed word is presented with two pictures, one of which is named by the word. The child is told what the card says and then asked three times what the word is. For the second question, the card is spatially adjacent to the picture it does not name, and 4-year-olds typically respond that the word has changed to name this picture. The studies examined the impact of how the move is carried out and the role of other cognitive abilities (Study 1), the influence of the source of the print and the visibility of the cards (Study 2), and the role of the matching picture in children's solutions (Study 3). In all cases, children continued to name the picture that is closest to the card, indicating an incomplete grasp of how print carries meaning. The conclusion is that children's error in this task represents a fundamental misconception about how print signifies meanings, and that prior to reading, children do not understand the symbolic function of the constituents of print. Furthermore, executive processes of representation and inhibition are identified as significant to children's solutions.

Five-year-olds' handling of reference and description in the domains of language and mental representation

Children's concurrent success on false belief tasks and their handling of two labels for one object (e.g., bunny/rabbit) has been interpreted as demonstrating understanding about the essential features of representation. Three experiments reveal the limitations in 5-year-olds' understanding for both mental and linguistic representations. We report relatively poor performance on a task involving two labels for one object (e.g., dice/eraser) which required children to treat another's knowledge as representing only some of the feature of its real referent: Dice but not eraser. Five year olds who made errors also had difficulty handling the fact that a written word 'dice' referring to such a dice/eraser, can also be applied to a standard dice but not to a standard eraser. These children lacked metalinguistic awareness of words as entities that both refer and describe.

Video reminders in a representational change task: memory for cues but not beliefs or statements

Two experiments investigated the effect of video reminders on 3-year-olds' performance in a representational change task. In Experiment 1, children in a video support condition viewed videotapes of their initial incorrect statements about a misleading container prior to being asked to report their initial belief. Children in a control condition viewed an irrelevant videotape. Despite reporting what they had said on the videotape, children in the video support condition typically failed the representational change task. Experiment 2 replicated the main findings from Experiment 1 and also revealed that a video reminder failed to increase the likelihood that children would correctly report what they had said about the object. Results are discussed in terms of the processes whereby mnemonic cues might affect performance on tasks assessing theory of mind.

Symbolic representation across domains in preschool children

The study examines children's understanding of notational representation. Children 3 to 5 years old were shown a card containing a notation and told what it said. The children were asked to say what was printed on the card 3 times: when it was under a display named by the notation, when it was under a different display, and finally when it had been returned to the original position. In Study 1, the card contained a word or a picture indicating object identity or a numeral or an analogue indicating quantity. All the children could solve the problems containing pictures, numerals, or analogues, but the word condition was difficult and children believed that the word changed when the card moved to the new display. In Study 2, the comparison between object names and quantities was made more equitable by introducing easy and difficult versions of each condition. This time, there was little difference between cards indicating names and those indicating quantities but large differences in children's ability to solve the problem as a function of their familiarity with the notation that was written. The results point to weaknesses in children's understanding of how representations refer to meanings.