Executive control within strategic deception: a window on early cognitive development?

The role of executive function and language abilities in explaining theory of mind development in preschool-age children

The development of theory of mind is linked to executive functions and language abilities in preschool-age children. Its relationship with these two cognitive variables has been studied from two research perspectives, providing a clear theoretical view on the links between theory of mind and executive functions on the one hand, and theory of mind and language on the other. However, the link between these three variables together has only recently been studied through a single research question and few data exist. This study therefore aimed to assess to what extent executive functions and language abilities contribute to theory of mind development. A sample of 112 children between 3 and 6-years old completed three language tasks from the ELO (Batterie d'Evaluation du Langage Oral) test: a receptive and an expressive vocabulary task and a syntax understanding task, the Wellman and Liu scale as a theory of mind task and three executive function tasks, namely the grass/snow task to measure inhibition, the DCCS (Dimensional Change Card Sort) to evaluate cognitive flexibility and the WPPSI (Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale Intelligence) to assess working memory. The findings revealed significant correlations between theory of mind and executive function domains, except for cognitive flexibility. Theory of mind and all language variables were also found to be significantly correlated. Multiple regression analyses justified only syntax and general language abilities as possible explanatory factors of the children's theory of mind performance. These findings support the view that language, more specifically syntax, is an important explanatory factor of theory of mind in young children. Theoretical implications of these finding are discussed.

Three- but not 2-year-olds misinform others spontaneously in an interaction-based task

One-year-olds spontaneously inform others, but less is known about the emergence of spontaneous misinforming. The current study investigated whether young children who spontaneously inform ignorant others also deliberately misinform others in matched uninstructed interactions. Conceptually, misinforming provides a convincing case for interaction-based, implicit false belief understanding. In a simplified, anticipatory and interactive paradigm, a protagonist puppet played with the child and an object and then hid the object in one of two boxes. When the protagonist was temporarily absent, either her friend or a competitor puppet searched for the hidden object. Children spontaneously joined the play and helped or hindered by informing or misinforming the puppets. Experiment 1 revealed that 2-year-olds spontaneously informed the friend. However, they did not selectively misinform the competitor. In order to exclude methodological biases and replicate previous findings, Experiment 2 tested 3-year-olds, confirming skills for spontaneous misinforming with the same paradigm. Findings reveal that informing, but not misinforming, is part of younger children's early spontaneous communication, which suggests a conceptual distinction in the use of communication and casts doubts on an interactive use of false belief understanding in early interactions.

Continuity in false belief understanding from 33 to 52 months of age

Conceptual continuity in children's false belief understanding from toddlerhood to childhood was investigated in a longitudinal study of 75 children. Performance in a low-demands false belief task at 33 months of age was significantly correlated with performance in a content false belief task at 52 months independent of language ability and executive function. In contrast, there was no correlation with performance in a location false belief task, which differed from the "Sally-Anne" format of the low-demands task and was high in executive demands. These findings support the view that explicit false belief understanding may be continuous from toddlerhood to childhood and that developmental change may be characterized in terms of enrichment and increasing stability of core conceptual understanding rather than in terms of fundamental change.

Preschoolers' deception related to prefrontal cortex activation: An fNIRS study

Deception is an essential part of children's moral development. Previous developmental studies have shown that children start to deceive at the age of 3 years, and as age increased to 5 years, almost all children were able to deceive for their own benefit. Although behavioral studies have indicated that the emergence and development of deception are related to cognitive abilities, their neural correlates remain poorly understood. Therefore, the present study examined the neural correlates underlying deception in preschool-aged children (N = 89, 44 % boys, age 3.13 to 5.96 years, Han Chinese) using functional near-infrared spectroscopy. A modified hide-and-seek paradigm was applied to elicit deceptive and truth-telling behaviors. The results showed that activation of bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was positively associated with the tendency to deceive an opponent in a competitive game in the 3-year-olds. In addition, 3-year-olds who showed a high tendency to deceive showed the same brain activation in the frontopolar area as 5-year-olds did when engaged in deception, whereas no such effect was found in 3-year-olds who never engaged in deception. These findings underscore the link between preschoolers' deception and prefrontal cortex function.

The Role of Cognition in Dishonest Behavior

Dishonesty has received increased attention from many professionals in recent years for its relevance in many social areas such as finance and psychology, among others. Understanding the mechanisms underlying dishonesty and the channels in which dishonesty operates could enable the detection and even prevention of dishonest behavior. However, the study of dishonesty is a challenging endeavor; dishonesty is a complex behavior because it imposes a psychological and cognitive burden. The study of this burden has fostered a new research trend that focuses on cognition’s role in dishonesty. This paper reviews the theoretical aspects of how such cognitive processes modulate dishonest behavior. We will pay special attention to executive functions such as inhibitory processes, working memory, or set-shifting that may modulate the decision to be (dis)honest. We also account for some frameworks in cognitive and social psychology that may help understand dishonesty, such as the Theory of Mind, the role of creative processes, and discourse analyses within language studies. Finally, we will discuss some specific cognitive-based models that integrate cognitive mechanisms to explain dishonesty. We show that cognition and dishonest behavior are firmly related and that there are several important milestones to reach in the future to advance the understanding of dishonesty in our society.

Why are some inhibitory tasks easy for preschool children when most are difficult? Testing two hypotheses

Understanding the processes that create inhibitory demands is central to understanding the role of inhibitory control in all aspects of development. The processes that create inhibitory demands on most developmental tasks seem clear and well understood. However, there is one inhibitory task that appears substantially easier than the others: the Reverse Categorization task, in which children are asked to "reverse sort" items (e.g., put large items in a small box and put small items in a large box). This finding is both surprising and problematic because it cannot be explained by any existing account of inhibitory development. Four experiments with 3- and 4-year-olds sought to explain why the Reverse Categorization task is easy. Two experiments (N = 64) investigated the hypothesis that children conceptualize the task in a way that reduces its inhibitory demands; and two experiments (N = 56) tested the hypothesis that the task is easier because children sort items slowly. The data indicate that children spontaneously respond more slowly on the Reverse Categorization task than on other inhibitory tasks and that this slowing reduces the task's cognitive demands. The way in which slowed responding works, and its relation to other inhibition-reducing interventions, is discussed.

The developmental origins of a default moral response: A shift from honesty to dishonesty

People are sometimes tempted to lie for their own benefit if it would not harm others. For adults, dishonesty is the default response in these circumstances. The developmental origins of this phenomenon were investigated between 2019 and 2021 among 6- to 11-year-old Han Chinese children from China (N = 548, 49% female). Children had an opportunity to win prizes in a behavioral economics game (Experiment 1) or a temptation resistance game adapted from developmental psychology (Experiment 2). In each experiment, the youngest children showed a default tendency of honesty and there was an overall age-related shift toward a default tendency of dishonesty. These findings provide direct evidence of developmental change in the automatic and controlled processes that underlie moral behavior.

Deceptive behaviour in autism: A scoping review

LAY ABSTRACT

The ability to deceive others is an important skill that usually develops in early childhood. In this review, we give an overview of studies that have examined deceptive behaviour in autistic children, adolescents and adults. We separated the study findings into three main categories and seven sub-categories: (1) Deception ability and prevalence (1a) gameplay deception; (1b) naturalistic deception; (2) Psychological processes in deception (2a) verbal, intellectual and social ability; (2b) ability to understand others' thoughts and beliefs; (2c) cognitive ability; and (3) Social learning (3a) training; (3b) social contexts. Contrary to some stereotypes, we found that autistic people can and do deceive but often find this more difficult than non-autistic people. We also found that autistic people may use different psychological processes than non-autistic people when deceiving and may get better at deception in adulthood.

A Longitudinal Study of the Relations Between Theory of Mind, Executive Function, and Lying in Children

This study used longitudinal cross-lagged modeling to examine the contribution of theory of mind (ToM), executive function (EF) to children’s lying development and of children’s lying to ToM and EF development. Ninety-seven Chinese children (initial M_age = 46 months, 47 boys) were tested three times approximately 4 months apart. Results showed that the diverse desire understanding and knowledge access understanding components of ToM, as well as the inhibitory control component of EF predicted the development of children’s lying, while the diverse belief understanding and false belief understanding components of ToM, and the working memory component of EF did not predict development of children’s lying. Meanwhile, children’s lying predicted development of children’s belief-emotion understanding components of ToM, but not any other ToM components, or EF components. These findings provide longitudinal evidence for the relation between ToM, EF, and children’s lying during the preschool years.

Can We Boost Preschoolers' Inhibitory Performance Just by Changing the Way They Respond?

Changing the way children make their response appears to sometimes, but not always, boost their inhibitory control-though interpreting existing findings is hampered by inconsistent methods and results. This study investigated the effects of delaying, and changing, the means of responding. Ninety-six preschoolers (M_age 46 months) completed tasks assessing inhibitory control, counterfactual reasoning, strategic reasoning, and false belief understanding. Children responded either immediately or after a delay, and either by pointing with their finger, or with a hand-held arrow. Delaying boosted performance on all tasks except false belief understanding; arrow-pointing only improved strategic reasoning. It is suggested that delay helps children work out the correct response; it is unlikely to help on tasks where this requirement is absent.

Three-year-olds' spontaneous lying in a novel interaction-based paradigm and its relations to explicit skills and motivational factors

Previous research has investigated children's lying and its motivational and social-cognitive correlates mostly through explicit tasks. The current study used an anticipatory interaction-based paradigm adopted from research with preverbal infants. We investigated 3-year-olds' spontaneous lying within interaction and its motivational basis and relations to explicit skills of lying, false belief understanding, inhibitory control, and socialization. Children interacted with puppets to secure stickers that were hidden in one of two boxes. Either a friend or a competitor puppet tried to obtain the stickers. Nearly all children helpfully provided information about the sticker's location to the friend, and about half of the sample anticipatorily provided false information to the competitor. Children misinformed the competitor significantly more often than the friend, both when the reward was for themselves and when it was for someone else. Explicitly planning to lie in response to a question occurred significantly less often but predicted spontaneous lying, as did passing the explicit standard false belief task. Thus, by 3 years of age, children spontaneously invoke false beliefs in others. This communicative skill reveals an interactional use of false belief understanding in that it requires holding one's perspective to pursue one's goal while providing a different perspective to distract a competitor. Findings support the view that practical theory of mind skills emerge for social coordination and serve as a basis for developing explicit false belief reasoning.

Does Abstract Mindset Decrease or Increase Deception?

Abstract. Past research produced mixed results regarding the effect of abstract/concrete mindset on the moral judgment of hypothetical scenarios. I argued that an abstract mindset could decrease or increase deception as different lines of research suggested that the effect could be in both directions. In four experiments, three different paradigms were used to manipulate mindset and its effect on participants’ own deceptive behavior was examined. Abstract mindset manipulation increased the level of deception in Study 1 and 2, but not in Study 3. Study 4 provided an opposite result as abstractness decreased deception. The results suggested that mindset manipulation might trigger multiple mechanisms having contradictory effects. I argued that future research should account for these mechanisms and individual differences in understanding the effect of abstract mindset on moral decision-making.

Opening the "Black Box": Functions of the Frontal Lobes and Their Implications for Sociology

Previous research has provided theoretical frameworks for building inter-disciplinary bridges between sociology and the neurosciences; yet, more anatomically, or functionally focused perspectives offering detailed information to sociologists are largely missing from the literature. This manuscript addresses this gap by offering a comprehensive review of the functions of the frontal lobes, arguably the most important brain region involved in various "human" skills ranging from abstract thinking to language. The paper proposes that the functions of the frontal lobe sub-regions can be divided into three inter-related hierarchical systems with varying degrees of causal proximity in regulating human behavior and social connectedness: (a) the most proximate, voluntary, controlled behavior-including motor functions underlying action-perception and mirror neurons, (b) more abstract motivation and emotional regulation-such as Theory of Mind and empathy, and (c) the higher-order executive functioning-e.g., inhibition of racial bias. The paper offers insights from the social neuroscience literature on phenomena that lie at the core of social theory and research including moral cognition and behavior, and empathy and inter-group attitudes and provides future research questions for interdisciplinary research.

Sophisticated Deception in Junior Middle School Students: An ERP Study

Sophisticated deception refers to the deception of others based on inferences of their mental states (e.g., answering honestly when inferring that the other will not believe their answer). Studying the brain mechanism of sophisticated deception in junior middle school students can provide physiological evidence for deception detection and deceptive ability measurement. Sixteen junior middle school students were asked to engage in different trial types (i.e., instructed truth/lie and chosen truth/lie), during which we recorded their response times (RT) along with electroencephalographic data to calculate event-related potentials (ERPs). We observed significant differences in amplitude [N2, P3, N450, and medial frontal negativity (MFN)] between chosen reactions (sophisticated deception and simple deception) and instructed reactions (instructed truth and instructed lie) in both the stimulus presentation and feedback stages. In the former, the task scores of participants in the chosen condition were significantly and positively correlated with the N2 amplitude over the central brain area during sophisticated deception. In the latter, the task scores of participants in the chosen condition were negatively correlated with the MFN amplitude over the left frontal and left frontocentral regions. Overall, deception intention, rather than simply making counterfactual statements, appears to underlie the increased demand for cognitive control in deceivers. This can be attributed to deceivers' need to strongly consider their opponent's mental state-the better the deceivers' deceptive ability, the more they will make conjectures about the mental state of their opponent with sophisticated deception and monitor conflict; the less conflict they experience while answering honestly with the intention to deceive, the more conflict may arise when the results of their deception are inconsistent with these conjectures.

Effects of task-irrelevant emotional information on deception

Deception has been reported to be influenced by task-relevant emotional information from an external stimulus. However, it remains unclear how task-irrelevant emotional information would influence deception. In the present study, facial expressions of different valence and emotion intensity were presented to participants, where they were asked to make either truthful or deceptive gender judgments according to the preceding cues. We observed the influence of facial expression intensity upon individuals' cognitive cost of deceiving (mean difference of individuals' truthful and deceptive response times). Larger cost was observed for high intensity faces compared to low intensity faces. These results provided insights on how automatic attraction of attention evoked by task-irrelevant emotional information in facial expressions influenced individuals' cognitive cost of deceiving.

Optimistic expectations about communication explain children's difficulties in hiding, lying, and mistrusting liars

We suggest that preschoolers' frequent obliviousness to the risks and opportunities of deception comes from a trusting stance supporting verbal communication. Three studies (N = 125) confirm this hypothesis. Three-year-olds can hide information from others (Study 1) and they can lie (Study 2) in simple settings. Yet when one introduces the possibility of informing others in the very same settings, three-year-olds tend to be honest (Studies 1 and 2). Similarly, four-year-olds, though capable of treating assertions as false, trust deceptive informants (Study 3). We suggest that children's reduced sensitivity to the opportunities of lying, and to the risks of being lied to might help explain their difficulties on standard false belief tasks.

Young children discover how to deceive in 10 days: a microgenetic study

We investigated how the ability to deceive emerges in early childhood among a sample of young preschoolers (Mean age = 34.7 months). We did this via a 10-session microgenetic method that took place over a 10-day period. In each session, children played a zero-sum game against an adult to win treats. In the game, children hid the treats and had opportunities (10 trials) to win them by providing deceptive information about their whereabouts to the adult. Although children initially showed little or no ability to deceive, most spontaneously discovered deception and systematically used it to win the game by the tenth day. Both theory of mind and executive function skills were predictive of relatively faster patterns of discovery. These results are the first to provide evidence for the importance of cognitive skills and social experience in the discovery of deception over time in early childhood.

When You're Happy and I Know It: Four-Year-Olds' Emotional Perspective Taking During Online Language Comprehension

Using a novel emotional perspective-taking task, this study investigated 4-year-olds' (n = 97) use of a speaker's emotional prosody to make inferences about the speaker's emotional state and, correspondingly, their communicative intent. Eye gaze measures indicated preschoolers used emotional perspective inferences to guide their real-time interpretation of ambiguous statements. However, these sensitivities were less apparent in overt responses, suggesting preschoolers' ability to integrate emotional perspective cues is at an emergent state. Perspective taking during online language processing was positively correlated with receptive vocabulary and an offline measure of emotional perspective taking, but not with cognitive perspective taking, conflict or delay inhibitory control, or working memory. Together, the results underscore how children's emerging communicative competence involves different kinds of perspective inferences with distinct cognitive underpinnings.

The Role of Executive Functions in Social Cognition among Children with Down Syndrome: Relationship Patterns

Many studies show a link between social cognition, a set of cognitive and emotional abilities applied to social situations, and executive functions in typical developing children. Children with Down syndrome (DS) show deficits both in social cognition and in some subcomponents of executive functions. However this link has barely been studied in this population. The aim of this study is to investigate the links between social cognition and executive functions among children with DS. We administered a battery of social cognition and executive function tasks (six theory of mind tasks, a test of emotion comprehension, and three executive function tasks) to a group of 30 participants with DS between 4 and 12 years of age. The same tasks were administered to a chronological-age control group and to a control group with the same linguistic development level. Results showed that apart from deficits in social cognition and executive function abilities, children with DS displayed a slight improvement with increasing chronological age and language development in those abilities. Correlational analysis suggested that working memory was the only component that remained constant in the relation patterns of the three groups of participants, being the relation patterns similar among participants with DS and the language development control group. A multiple linear regression showed that working memory explained above 50% of the variability of social cognition in DS participants and in language development control group, whereas in the chronological-age control group this component only explained 31% of the variability. These findings, and specifically the link between working memory and social cognition, are discussed on the basis of their theoretical and practical implications for children with DS. We discuss the possibility to use a working memory training to improve social cognition in this population.

Participants Don’t Need Theories

The theory-theory is not supported by evidence in the everyday actions of infants and toddlers whose lives a Theory of Mind is meant radically to transform. This paper reviews some of these challenges to the theory-theory, particularly from communication and deception. We argue that the theory’s disconnection from action is both inevitable and paradoxical. The mind–behaviour dualism upon which it is premised requires a conceptual route to knowing minds and disallows a real test of the theory through the study of action. Taking engagement seriously avoids these problems and requires that both lay people and psychologists be participants rather than observers in order to know, and indeed to create, minds.

Young children’s difficulty with deception in a conflict situation

This study examined young children’s deception in a conflict situation. A puppet show was prepared involving a protagonist who went into hiding, an enemy who wanted to catch the protagonist, and a friend who was looking for the protagonist. In the no-conflict condition, the enemy asked the children about the location of the protagonist. In the conflict condition, the friend asked the children; however, the enemy was nearby and could eavesdrop. Thus, there was a conflict between deceiving the enemy and telling the truth to the friend. In Experiment 1, the enemy hid behind a tree and was not visible to the friend; 80 children aged 4, 5, and 6 years old participated. In Experiment 2, the enemy was visible to the friend but was disguised; 24 children aged 5 and 6 years old participated. Most 5- and 6-year-olds did not give accurate information to the enemy in the no-conflict condition. However, in the conflict condition, most of the children did not control their behavior and immediately gave accurate information to the friend although the enemy was nearby. Young children from the age of 5 years were able to deceive in the no-conflict situation, but it was difficult for them to deceive in the conflict situation.

Impact of Reminders on Children's Cognitive Flexibility, Intrinsic Motivation, and Mood Depends on Who Provides the Reminders

Reminding children to think about alternatives is a strategy adults often use to promote children's cognitive flexibility, as well as children's engagement in and enjoyment of the task. The current study investigated whether the impacts of reminders on kindergarten children's cognitive flexibility, intrinsic motivation, and mood are moderated by who provides the reminders. Eighty-three healthy 5-year-old kindergarten children were randomly assigned to 2 (Reminder: no reminders vs. Reminders) × 2 (Agent: Tester vs. Partner) conditions. Children's cognitive flexibility was measured via the Block Sorting Task (Garton and Pratt, 2001; Fawcett and Garton, 2005). Children reported their motivation and mood before Block Sorting, after practicing for Block Sorting, and after the actual Block Sorting. Children's intrinsic motivation was measured by evaluating children's choices during a period of free play after Block Sorting. The results revealed that, depending on who provides the reminders, reminding children of alternatives can influence kindergarten children's performance on Block Sorting, children's intrinsic motivation, and children's self-reported mood.

A Longitudinal Assessment of the Relation between Executive Function and Theory of Mind at 3, 4, and 5 Years

This longitudinal study contributes to the growing literature on the predictive nature of the relation between executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM). A latent variable model was fit to the data acquired from 226 socioeconomically and racially diverse children (52% female) at 3, 4, and 5 years of age on a number of age-appropriate tasks designed to assess EF and ToM. After controlling for sex, income-to-needs, and receptive language ability, there was substantial stability within each construct as children aged. In addition, EF at 3 years predicted ToM at 4 years but ToM did not predict EF, replicating earlier results. This pattern also appeared from 4 to 5 years of age, suggesting that the developmental precedence of EF persists later in development. Implications of these findings are discussed in terms of contemporary cognitive development theories, as well as the relation between EF and social reasoning in general.

Limited capacity to lie: Cognitive load interferes with being dishonest

The current study tested the boundary conditions of ethical decision-making by increasing cognitive load. This manipulation is believed to hinder deliberation, and, as we argue, reduces the cognitive capacity needed for a self-serving bias to occur. As telling a lie is believed to be more cognitively taxing than telling the truth, we hypothesized that participants would be more honest under high cognitive load than low cognitive load. 173 participants anonymously rolled a die three times and reported their outcomes — of which one of the rolls would be paid out — while either under high or low cognitive load. For the roll that determined pay, participants under low cognitive load, but not under high cognitive load, reported die rolls that were significantly different from a uniform (honest) distribution. The reported outcome of this roll was also significantly higher in the low load condition than in the high load condition, suggesting that participants in the low load condition lied to get higher pay. This pattern was not observed for the second and third roll where participants knew the rolls were not going to be paid out and where therefore lying would not serve self-interest. Results thus indicate that having limited cognitive capacity will unveil a tendency to be honest in a situation where having more cognitive capacity would have enabled one to serve self-interest by lying.

Why do alternative ways of responding improve children's performance on tests of strategic reasoning?

Changing the way in which children respond significantly improves performance across a variety of cognitive domains. However, the basis for this response-mode effect is unknown. To address this issue, the current study tested 78 preschool children on a measure of executive functioning (the windows task: Hala & Russell, ). The task requires children to point to an empty box to receive a box with a treat in it. There were four versions of the task, differing only in the way in which children made their responses. Children in the baseline condition, who pointed with their finger, performed poorly. However, children in three alternative response-mode conditions won the treat significantly more often. Strikingly, even children who pretended to be pointing with an arrow - but were in reality pointing with their finger - performed significantly better than baseline. We suggest that non-standard response modes encourage children to reflect on their actions and that this reduces the number of unreflective errors they make. The findings demonstrate that response-mode effects do not depend on the presence of a physical means of responding (such as an arrow), but can be achieved via a purely cognitive means (such as engaging in pretence).

Young children's trust in overtly misleading advice

The ability of 3- and 4-year-old children to disregard advice from an overtly misleading informant was investigated across five studies (total n = 212). Previous studies have documented limitations in young children's ability to reject misleading advice. This study was designed to test the hypothesis that these limitations are primarily due to an inability to reject specific directions that are provided by others, rather than an inability to respond in a way that is opposite to what has been indicated by a cue. In Studies 1 through 4, a puppet identified as The Big Bad Wolf offered advice to participants about which of two boxes contained a hidden sticker. Regardless of the form the advice took, 3-year olds performed poorly by failing to systematically reject it. However, when participants in Study 5 believed they were responding to a mechanical cue rather than the advice of the Wolf, they were better able to reject misleading advice, and individual differences in performance on the primary task were systematically correlated with measures of executive function. Results are interpreted as providing support for the communicative intent hypothesis, which posits that children find it especially difficult to reject deceptive information that they perceive as being intentionally communicated by others.

Chimpanzee 'folk physics': bringing failures into focus

Differences between individuals are the raw material from which theories of the evolution and ontogeny of cognition are built. For example, when 4-year-old children pass a test requiring them to communicate the content of another's falsely held belief, while 3-year-olds fail, we know that something must change over the course of the third year of life. In the search for what develops or evolves, the typical route is to probe the extents and limits of successful individuals' ability. Another is to focus on those that failed, and find out what difference or lack prevented them from passing the task. Recent research in developmental psychology has harnessed individual differences to illuminate the cognitive mechanisms that emerge to enable success. We apply this approach to explaining some of the failures made by chimpanzees when using tools to solve problems. Twelve of 16 chimpanzees failed to discriminate between a complete and a broken tool when, after being set down, the ends of the broken one were aligned in front of them. There was a correlation between performance on this aligned task and another in which after being set down, the centre of both tools was covered, suggesting that the limiting factor was not the representation of connection, but memory or attention. Some chimpanzees that passed the aligned task passed a task in which the location of the broken tool was never visible but had to be inferred.

Perspective-Taking Ability in Bilingual Children: Extending Advantages in Executive Control to Spatial Reasoning

Monolingual and bilingual 8-year-olds performed a computerized spatial perspective-taking task. Children were asked to decide how an observer saw a four-block array from one of three different positions (90°, 180°, and 270° counter-clockwise from the child's position) by selecting one of four responses -- the correct response, the egocentric error, an incorrect choice in which the array was correct but in the wrong orientation for the viewer, and an incorrect choice in which the array included an internal spatial error. All children performed similarly on background measures, including fluid intelligence, but bilingual children were more accurate than monolingual children in calculating the observer's view across all three positions, with no differences in the pattern of errors committed by the two language groups. The results are discussed in terms of the effect of bilingualism on modifying performance in a complex spatial task that has implications for academic achievement.

How do alternative ways of responding influence 3- and 4-year-olds' performance on tests of executive function and theory of mind?

A total of 69 preschool children were tested on measures of false belief understanding (the Unexpected Transfer task), inhibitory control (the Grass/Snow task), and strategic reasoning (the Windows task). For each task, children indicated their response either by pointing with their index finger or by using a nonstandard response mode (pointing with a rotating arrow). The means of responding had no effect on children's performance on the Grass/Snow task or on the Unexpected Transfer task, although children performed better on the Unexpected Transfer task when the key object in the story was removed. In contrast, performance on the Windows task was significantly better when children pointed with the rotating arrow. A follow-up experiment with 79 preschoolers found that this improved performance on the Windows task was sustained even after the nonstandard response mode was removed and children again pointed with their finger. These findings together suggest that nonstandard response modes do not help children to inhibit prepotent pointing responses but may help them to formulate response strategies on reasoning tasks by discouraging unreflective impulsive responding.

Two is better than one, but mine is better than ours: preschoolers' executive function during co-play

The current study investigated how playing with another individual may influence 3- and 4-year-olds' executive function in the Less-Is-More (LIM) task, where children point to the tray with the smaller amount of treats so as to obtain the larger amount of treats in the other tray. In Experiment 1, 35 Singaporean children were tested with a self version and a co-player-split version of the LIM task. Results showed that children appeared to be less impulsive when playing with a co-player than when playing individually. Experiment 2 further investigated how the intention of the co-player, collective profit oriented versus individual profit oriented, may influence children's executive function. In total, 96 children were tested with a self version, a co-player-share version, and a co-player-opponent version. Results showed that the co-playing facilitation effect appeared in only the co-player-opponent version. Together, the results of the current study showed that when preschoolers play with an individual who shares a common goal with them, they may become more efficient in executive control.

Searching and planning: young children's reasoning about past and future event sequences

Six experiments examined children's ability to make inferences using temporal order information. Children completed versions of a task involving a toy zoo; one version required reasoning about past events (search task) and the other required reasoning about future events (planning task). Children younger than 5 years failed both the search and the planning tasks, whereas 5-year-olds passed both (Experiments 1 and 2). However, when the number of events in the sequence was reduced (Experiment 3), 4-year-olds were successful on the search task but not the planning task. Planning difficulties persisted even when relevant cues were provided (Experiments 4 and 5). Experiment 6 showed that improved performance on the search task found in Experiment 3 was not due to the removal of response ambiguity.