Anchoring, Activation, and the Construction of Values

Moral decision-making in context: Behavioral and neural processes underlying allocations based on need, merit, and equality

How to fairly allocate goods is a key issue of social decision-making. Extensive research demonstrates that people do not selfishly maximize their own benefits, but instead also consider how others are affected. However, most accounts of the psychological processes underlying fairness-related behavior implicitly assume that assessments of fairness are somewhat stable. In this paper, we present results of a novel task, the Re-Allocation Game, in which two players receive an allocation determined by the computer and, on half of the trials, one player has the subsequent possibility to change this allocation. Importantly, prior to the receipt of the allocation, players were shown either their respective financial situations, their respective performance on a previous simple task, or random information, while being scanned using functional neuroimaging. As expected, our results demonstrate when given the opportunity, participants allocated on average almost half the money to anonymous others. However, our findings further show that participants used the provided information in a dynamic manner, revealing the underlying principle based on which people re-allocate money - namely based on merit, need, or equality - switches dynamically. On the neural level, we identified activity in the right and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortices related to context-independent inequity and context-dependent fairness information respectively when viewing the computer-generated allocations. At the same time, activity in the temporoparietal and precuneus represented these different types of fairness-related information in adjacent and partially overlapping clusters. Finally, we observed that the activity pattern in the precuneus and putamen was most clearly related to participants' subsequent re-allocation decisions. Together, our findings suggest that participants judge an allocation as fair or unfair using a network associated with cognitive control and theory-of-mind, while dynamically switching between what might constitute a fair allocation in a particular context.

The power of past performance in multidimensional supplier evaluation and supplier selection: Debiasing anchoring bias and its knock-on effects

This research examines how anchoring bias affects managers' multi-dimensional evaluations of supplier performance, supplier selection, and the effectiveness of two debiasing techniques. We consider the supplier past performance in one performance dimension as the anchor and investigate whether and how this anchor would have a knock-on effects on evaluating a supplier's performance in other dimensions. We conducted two online experimental studies (Study 1, sample size = 104 and Study 2, sample size = 408). Study 1 adopts a 2 x 1 (high anchor vs. low anchor) between-subjects factorial experimental design, and Study 2 is a 3 (debiasing: no, consider-the-opposite, mental-mapping) x 2 (high anchor vs. low anchor) between-subjects factorial design. The results from Studies 1 and 2 suggest that when a supplier has received a low evaluation score in one dimension in the past, participants assign the same supplier lower scores in the other dimensions compared to a supplier that has obtained a high score in the past. We also find that anchoring has a knock-on effect on how likely participants are to choose the same supplier in the future. Our findings highlight the asymmetric effectiveness of 'consider-the-opposite' and 'mental-mapping' debiasing techniques. This research is the first study that examines how anchoring bias managers' evaluations in a multi-dimensional setting and its knock-on effects. It also explores the effectiveness of two low-cost debiasing techniques. A crucial practical implication is that suppliers' exceptionally good or disappointing past performance affects the judgement of supply managers. Hence, managers should use consider-the-opposite or mental-mapping techniques to debias the effect of high and low anchors, respectively.

Communicating risk: How relevant and irrelevant probabilistic information influences risk perception in medical decision-making

Patients rely on knowing potential risks before accepting medical treatments, but risk perception can be distorted by cognitive biases and irrelevant information. We examined the interactive effects of subjective processes, objective knowledge, and demographic characteristics on how individuals estimate risks when provided with relevant and irrelevant probabilistic information. Participants read medical scenarios describing potential adverse effects associated with declining and accepting preventative treatment, as well as the objective likelihood of experiencing adverse effects associated with one of these two courses of action. We found that the perceived negativity of outcomes influenced perceptions of risk regardless of whether relevant probabilities were available and that the use of affect heuristics to estimate risk increased with age. Introducing objective estimates ameliorated age-related increases in affective distortions. Sensitivity to relevant probabilities increased with greater perceived outcome severity and was greater for men than for women. We conclude that relevant objective information may reduce the propensity to conflate outcome severity with likelihood and that medical judgments of risk vary depending on exposure to relevant and irrelevant probabilities. Implications for how medical professionals should communicate risk information to patients are considered.

Perceptual and Cognitive Judgments Show Both Anchoring and Repulsion

One of the most robust effects in cognitive psychology is anchoring, in which judgments show a bias toward previously viewed values. However, in what is essentially the same task as used in anchoring research, a perceptual illusion demonstrates the opposite effect of repulsion. Here, we united these two literatures, testing in two experiments with adults (total N = 200) whether prior comparative decisions bias cognitive and perceptual judgments in opposing directions or whether anchoring and repulsion are two domain-general biases whose co-occurrence has so far gone undetected. We found that in both perceptual and cognitive tasks, anchoring and repulsion co-occur. Further, the direction of the bias depends on the comparison value: Distant values attract judgments, whereas nearby values repulse judgments. Because none of the leading theories for either effect account for both biases, theoretical integration is needed. As a starting point, we describe one such joint theory based on sampling models of cognition.

The Interval Anchoring Effect

The anchoring effect refers to a decision bias that initial irrelevant information can influence late judgment. So far, most (if not all) studies on the anchoring effect adopted only point anchors (e.g., "Do you want to buy a computer with a price higher or lower than $1,000?"). In reality, people also use interval anchors (e.g., "Do you want to buy a computer with a price within $800-1,200?"). Can interval anchors also produce anchoring effect? Which kind of anchors have stronger anchoring effect? To answer these questions, we conducted four experiments involving quite different content. In each experiment, we found extremely significant anchoring effects for point anchors and interval anchors, respectively, but no significant difference between them. The results suggest that rarely researched interval anchors can be as powerful as intensively investigated point anchors and thus deserve more research and applications henceforth.

Consciously Uncertain: A Bayesian Analysis of Preferences Formation

We investigate experimentally whether players deliberately use irrelevant market cues to shape their evaluations of a traded item. We implement a repeated Vickrey median price selling auction of an unusual bad where players are informed on the market price and on the three lowest or highest asks. We elicited players’ consideration of market signals through a questionnaire at the end of the auction. We find that extreme information has a stronger influence on players’ evaluations than the market price. However, players’ consideration of the market signals explains their behavioral reactivity to the market price but not to the extremes. Hence, players deliberately use an unbiased estimator of the central tendency of the appraisals distribution, while extreme asks’ influence is consistent with a priming effect.

Top Ten Behavioral Biases in Project Management: An Overview

Behavioral science has witnessed an explosion in the number of biases identified by behavioral scientists, to more than 200 at present. This article identifies the 10 most important behavioral biases for project management. First, we argue it is a mistake to equate behavioral bias with cognitive bias, as is common. Cognitive bias is half the story; political bias the other half. Second, we list the top 10 behavioral biases in project management: (1) strategic misrepresentation, (2) optimism bias, (3) uniqueness bias, (4) the planning fallacy, (5) overconfidence bias, (6) hindsight bias, (7) availability bias, (8) the base rate fallacy, (9) anchoring, and (10) escalation of commitment. Each bias is defined, and its impacts on project management are explained, with examples. Third, base rate neglect is identified as a primary reason that projects underperform. This is supported by presentation of the most comprehensive set of base rates that exist in project management scholarship, from 2,062 projects. Finally, recent findings of power law outcomes in project performance are identified as a possible first stage in discovering a general theory of project management, with more fundamental and more scientific explanations of project outcomes than found in conventional theory.

What Influences People's Tradeoff Decisions Between CO2 Emissions and Travel Time? An Experiment With Anchors and Normative Messages

One of the today's greatest challenges is to adjust our behavior so that we can avoid a major climate disaster. To do so, we must make sacrifices for the sake of the environment. The study reported here investigates how anchors (extrinsic motivational-free information) and normative messages (extrinsic motivational information) influence people's tradeoffs between travel time and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the context of car travel and whether any interactions with environmental concern (an intrinsic motivational factor) can be observed. In this study, people received either a CO2, health or no normative message together with either a high anchor, a low anchor, or no anchor. People that received both a high anchor and a CO2 emission normative message were willing to travel for a longer time than those that only received a high anchor. If a low anchor was presented, no differences in willingness to travel for a longer time were found between the three different conditions of normative message groups, i.e., CO2 normative message, health normative message, or no normative message. People with higher concern for the environment were found to be willing to travel for a longer time than those with lower concern for the environment. Further, this effect was strongest when a high anchor was presented. These results suggest that anchors and normative messages are among the many factors that can influence people's tradeoffs between CO2 emission and travel time, and that various factors may have to be combined to increase their influence over pro-environmental behavior and decisions.

“Worse Than What I Read?” The External Effect of Review Ratings on the Online Review Generation Process: An Empirical Analysis of Multiple Product Categories Using Amazon.com Review Data

In this paper, we study the online consumer review generation process by analyzing 37.12 million online reviews across nineteen product categories obtained from Amazon.com. This study revealed that the discrepancy between ratings by others and consumers’ post-purchasing evaluations significantly influenced both the valence and quantity of the reviews that consumers generated. Specifically, a negative discrepancy (‘worse than what I read’) significantly accelerates consumers to write negative reviews (19/19 categories supported), while a positive discrepancy (‘better than what I read’) accelerates consumers to write positive reviews (16/19 categories supported). This implies that others’ ratings play an important role in influencing the review generation process by consumers. More interestingly, we found that this discrepancy significantly influences consumers’ neutral review generation, which is known to amplify the effect of positive or negative reviews by affecting consumers’ search behavior or the credibility of the information. However, this effect is asymmetric. While negative discrepancies lead consumers to write more neutral reviews, positive discrepancies help reduce neutral review generation. Furthermore, our findings provide important implications for marketers who tend to generate fake reviews or selectively generate reviews favorable to their products to increase sales. Doing so may backfire on firms because negative discrepancies can accelerate the generation of objective or negative reviews.

Anchoring and Judgment Bias: Disregarding Under Uncertainty

The current investigation examined the nature of the cognitive processes that underlie decision-making behavior. The focus of this project centered on the effects of utilizing heuristics that pertain to the availability of information stored in memory. Anchoring effects demonstrate that people will use any available information sampled from memory as a reference for making judgments of frequency. The specific aim of the experiment was to examine whether people exhibit patterns of behavior consistent with anchoring effects, revealed by corrupted subjective judgments, despite explicit notice of instruction to disregard the experimenter-supplied information (the anchor). Subjects failed to demonstrate an ability to disregard a relatively high anchor even when the instruction to do so was explicit. However, in contrast, subjects demonstrated an ability to disregard a relatively low anchor. More broadly, subjects instructed to disregard demonstrated a reduced effect of anchoring. Implications are considered within the context of the availability heuristic and the directly related effects of anchoring. The results may be interpreted within the framework of a dual-process model, two-system view that distinguishes intuition from reasoning. The present findings fit with well-supported theoretical explanations of anchoring effects, such as selective accessibility and numerical priming.

The moderating role of childhood socioeconomic status on the impact of nudging on the perceived threat of coronavirus and stockpiling intention

Communications that include nudges and framing strategies are ubiquitous in our daily lives. In this paper, we investigate how different nudging strategies during a public health campaign, particularly supplementary information and statistics, influence perceptions of threat and stockpiling intentions, while also considering the role of childhood socioeconomic status. Specifically, building upon prior work in behavioral economics, we hypothesize that the presence of additional statistics elicits lower perceived threat and intention to stockpile. In addition, we predict find that the childhood socioeconomic status of individuals influences these effects. Three studies offer evidence for those predictions and demonstrate the importance of message framing in uncertain circumstances. Overall, this work contributes to the literature on nudging and life history theory by investigating how communication strategies can be used to increase or decrease perceived threat in order to achieve desired outcomes (e.g., limiting stockpiling or respecting social distancing).

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The information presented and the design of health campaigns significantly influence perceived threats and irrational behaviors such as stockpiling intentions.

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Childhood socioeconomic status of individuals has an impact on the effectiveness of these advertising strategies.

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Health campaign design about COVID-19 and childhood SES influence perceived threat and stockpiling intentions.

Anchoring without scale distortion

The scale distortion theory of anchoring argues that people are influenced by a previously considered numeric value, an anchor, because the anchor distorts the scale on which a subsequent judgment is made. The distortion of the scale due to the anchor is a momentary effect that would be overridden if the scale was distorted again, for example, by consideration of a different value on the same scale. In the present study, participants compared thirteen random anchors on the same scale to thirteen different objects. Subsequent numeric estimates of objects’ attributes were influenced by the corresponding anchors even though the anchors were divided from the estimates by twelve questions pertaining to different values on the same scale. The numeric value considered immediately before the estimate did not have a considerable effect on the judgment. While the anchoring effect was robust, it cannot be easily explained by scale distortion. Other possible theories of the anchoring effect are compatible with the results.

Retrospective metamemory monitoring of semantic memory in community-dwelling older adults with subjective cognitive decline and mild cognitive impairment

In neurodegenerative conditions, better memory/cognitive awareness, indexed by greater "metamemory monitoring accuracy", is linked to stronger cognitive remediation outcomes. Differences in metamemory monitoring accuracy in predementia conditions, which could inform treatment effectiveness, have not been systematically investigated. We utilized a retrospective confidence judgment (RCJ) task for general knowledge recognition in community-dwelling older adults: 106 cognitively healthy (HC), 68 subjective cognitive decline (SCD) despite intact neuropsychological function, 14 amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI), and 31 non-amnestic mild cognitive impairment (naMCI). Participants gave confidence ratings after making recognition responses to general knowledge questions. Recognition accuracy, confidence levels, and absolute and relative RCJ accuracy (i.e., metamemory monitoring accuracy) were analysed. Compared to HC and SCD, absolute RCJ accuracy was significantly poorer in both MCI groups but relative RCJ accuracy was significantly poorer in naMCI, but not aMCI. This novel result may be driven by lower confidence for correct recognition responses in naMCI and suggests that poorer RCJ accuracy in naMCI may be attributable to poorer performance monitoring. We discuss results in relation to the possibility that individuals in distinct preclinical dementia conditions, who have different levels of memory/cognitive awareness, may differentially benefit from cognitive remediation strategies tailored to their levels of memory/cognitive awareness.

Strategic Decision Facilitation: Supporting Critical Assumptions of the Human in Empirical Modeling of Pairwise Value Comparisons

Modeling human decision-making is difficult. Decision-makers are typically primed with unique biases that widen the confidence interval of judgment. Therefore, it is important that the human process in the system being modeled is designed to alleviate damaging biases and assumptions in an effort to increase process consistency between decision-makers. In this experiment, it is hypothesized that coupling specific decision-facilitation methods with a specific scale range will affect the consistency between decision-makers. This article presents a multiphase experiment that examines a varying presentation mode as well as scale range to determine how value is determined in subsequent pairwise comparisons of alternatives against specific requirements. When considering subject value ratings of the expected rank order of alternative subgroups (indicating strong criteria independence), results show that subjects used consistent comparison ratios regardless of the scale range. Furthermore, when comparing the subgroups of expected rank order responses to the subgroups of biased responses, although ratios were different, the same general trend of comparison existed within subgroups. Providing evidence that careful selection of the presentation mode can facilitate more consistent value comparisons between compatible decision-makers allows for the identification of and adjustment of disparities due to bias and potential lack of incremental scaling detail. Furthermore, by creating decision processes that render more consistent cognitive behavior between decision-makers, tighter confidence intervals can be obtained, and critical assumptions can be validated.

Can genes modulate anchoring effect?

The anchoring effect is a well-known decision bias, referring that initial irrelevant number (anchor) can impact late estimation. Anchoring effect can be explained as people starting from the anchor and stopping incremental adjustment too early-in other words, jumping into the conclusion impulsively. High impulsivity is associated with AA genotype of rs806379. Therefore, we hypothesized that rs806379 polymorphism can exert an influence on the anchoring effect. The subjects completed an experimental task of anchoring effect and provided saliva for genotyping. As expected, we found that subjects with AA genotype of rs806379 demonstrated stronger anchoring effect. This is the first article that explores the anchoring effect from the gene perspective. Our finding suggests that nature plays a role in anchoring effect.

The effect of anchors and social information on behaviour

We use a ‘multi-player dictator game’ (MDG), with ‘social information’ about the monetary transfer made by a previous dictator to a recipient, to examine whether average contributions as well as the behavioural strategy adopted are affected by the first amount presented (the ‘anchor’) using a sequential strategy elicitation method. We find that average contributions are positively affected by the anchor. The anchor is also found to influence the behavioural strategy that individuals adopt, such that low anchors significantly increase the likelihood that players will adopt unconditional self-interested strategies, whereas high anchors increase the likelihood of adopting giving strategies. The distribution of strategies–and hence, the distribution of behavioural ‘types’—is therefore affected by the initial conditions of play, lending support to the notion that behavioural strategies are context dependent.

Anchoring in international merger and acquisition equity decisions: evidence from Chinese firms

Purpose

In uncertain environments, top managers may be inadvertently affected by the anchor information and make sticky decisions. The purpose of this paper is to examine how anchoring influences international merger and acquisition (M&A) equity decisions.

Design/methodology/approach

Based on the data of Chinese international M&A deals from 2007 to 2018, this paper uses the Tobit regression method to examine the anchoring effects on international M&A equity decisions.

Findings

The study shows that the acquiring firm's previous international M&A equity level as a self-generated anchor has a positive impact on the focal international M&A equity level. The local market's previous international M&A equity level as an externally provided anchor has a positive impact on the focal international M&A equity level. When there are self-generated anchors and externally provided anchors, the self-generated anchoring effect is stronger than the externally provided anchoring effect. The anchoring effect is stronger when the acquiring firm enters less stable host countries.

Research limitations/implications

The acquirers in a single-country context may limit the generalizability of the results, and this study does not explicitly determine whether managers' decisions are unintentional or deliberate.

Originality/value

The study contributes to the discussion of equity-based foreign entry mode decisions by exploring anchoring behavior in strategic decisions. It provides an empirical investigation of the different anchoring effects and draws attention to the boundary conditions surrounding anchoring.

Influencing Pain Inferences Using Random Numerical Anchoring: Randomized Controlled Trial

Background

Numerical anchoring occurs when exposure to a numeric quantity influences a person’s subsequent judgment involving other quantities. This could be applicable to the evaluation of pain, where exposure to an unrelated number before the evaluation of pain could influence pain ratings.

Objective

This study aimed to determine whether exposure to a random numeric anchor influences subsequent pain intensity ratings of a hypothetical patient.

Methods

In this study, 385 participants read a vignette describing a patient with chronic pain before being randomly assigned to one of four groups. Groups 1 and 2 spun an 11-wedge number wheel (0-10), which was, unbeknown to the participants, programmed to stop on a high number (8) or a low number (2), respectively. Group 3 spun a similar letter wheel (A-K), which was programmed to stop on either the letter C or I (control 1). Group 4 did not spin a wheel (control 2). Participants were then asked to rate the patient’s pain intensity using a 0 to 10 numeric rating scale.

Results

The high-number group rated the patient’s pain (median 8, IQR 2) significantly higher than the letter wheel control (median 7, IQR 2; P=.02) and the low-number group (median 6, IQR 2; P<.001). The low-number group rated the pain significantly lower than controls 1 and 2 (median 7, IQR 2; both P=.045).

Conclusions

Pain ratings were influenced by prior exposure to a random number with no relevant information about the patient’s pain, indicating anchoring had occurred. However, contrary to the traditional definition of anchoring where anchoring occurs even when participants are unaware of the anchor’s influence, in this study, the anchoring effect was seen only in participants who believed that the anchor had influenced them. This suggests that anchoring effects could potentially occur among health care providers tasked with evaluating a patient’s pain and should be evaluated further.

Interventions to Mitigate Cognitive Biases in the Decision Making of Eye Care Professionals: A Systematic Review

SIGNIFICANCE

Cognitive biases, systematic errors in thinking that impact a person's choices and judgments, can influence decision making at various points during patient care provision. These biases can potentially result in misdiagnoses, delayed clinical care, and/or patient mismanagement. A range of interventions exists to mitigate cognitive biases. There is a need to understand the relative efficacy of these interventions within the context of eye care practice.

PURPOSE

The aim of this systematic review was to synthesize the evidence relating to interventions for mitigating cognitive biases associated with clinical decision making by eye care professionals.

DATA SOURCES

Electronic databases (including Ovid MEDLINE, Embase, Scopus, PsycINFO) were searched from inception to October 2017 for studies investigating interventions intended to mitigate cognitive biases in the clinical decision making of eye care professionals. This review was undertaken in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses reporting guidelines.

STUDY ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA

To ensure inclusion of all relevant literature, a wide range of study designs was eligible for inclusion, such as randomized controlled trials, nonrandomized trials, interrupted time series and repeated measures, controlled before-after studies, and qualitative studies that were a component of any of these quantitative study designs.

STUDY APPRAISAL AND SYNTHESIS METHODS

Two review authors independently screened titles, abstracts, and full-text articles in duplicate, applying a priori eligibility criteria.

RESULTS

After screening 2759 nonduplicate records, including full-text screening of 201 articles, no relevant studies were identified.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS

Given that cognitive biases can significantly impact the accuracy of clinical decision making and thus can have major effects on clinical care and patient health outcomes, the lack of studies identified in this systematic review indicates a critical need for research within the area of cognitive bias mitigation for decision making within eye care practice.

Impact of the starting point chromaticity on memory color matching accuracy

In this study, the impact of starting point chromaticity and number of observers on memory color matching results was investigated. Matching data were obtained for 3 objects (neutral grey cube, yellow lemon and green apple) under a neutral white and a yellow background illumination. Memory color matchings were made for ten starting points of which eight chromaticities were symmetrically distributed along the hue circle and centered at the equal energy white (EEW) chromaticity of the neutral white background illumination; one starting point at the EEW chromaticity and one with the same chromaticity as the background. The matching track from starting point to the memory matched chromaticity was also recorded. It did not tend to cross over the central region towards the complementary hue, especially for experienced observers. The results also demonstrated a significant starting point bias, whereby the matched chromaticities were biased towards the chromaticity of the starting point. Starting point bias can be minimized by selecting three starting points symmetrically distributed around the expected memory color chromaticity. Furthermore, at least, ten observers are needed to achieve stable results for the grey cube and yellow lemon. For the green apple, the results are less conclusive and around 40 observers would be needed to obtain a stable average estimate for the chromaticity of the memory color. The large inter-observer variation may result from cultural differences or from natural variations in the "green" apple appearance. This study provides a well-founded guidance for future application of the memory color matching method.

The robustness of anchoring effects on preferential judgments

Anchoring has been shown to influence numeric judgments in various domains, including preferential judgment tasks. Whereas many studies and a recent Many Labs project have shown robust effects in classic anchoring tasks, studies of anchoring effects on preferential judgments have had inconsistent results. In this paper, we investigate the replicability and robustness of anchoring on willingness-to-pay, which is a widely used measure for consumer preference. We employ a combination of approaches, aggregating data from previous studies and also contributing additional replication studies designed to reconcile inconsistent previous results. We examine the effect of differing experimental procedures used in prior studies, and test whether publication bias could contribute to the inconsistent findings. We find that different experimental procedures used in previous studies do not explain the divergent results, and that anchoring effects are generally robust to differences in procedures, participant populations, and experimental settings.

Cognitive Biases of Consumers' Risk Perception of Foodborne Diseases in China: Examining Anchoring Effect

Consumer cognitive biases arise from judgment and decision-making due to their limitations in information processing. As one of the important cognitive biases, the anchoring effect plays a significant role in interfering with consumers’ risk perception. With a stratified random approach, we collected survey data from 375 consumers in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, China. Based on these data, this study attempted to analyze the anchoring effect in consumers’ risk perception of foodborne diseases (FBDs) and the differences in their perception before and after intervention in a contrast experiment using the anchoring index and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The results confirm the existence of the proposed anchoring effect. Moreover, the experimenter-provided anchor value, a history of FBD, and familiarity with FBD were found to be important factors influencing this anchoring effect. Therefore, improving consumers’ risk perception of FBD is critical to the long-term prevention of FBD risks by the government and consumers. The government should strengthen active monitoring, publicity, and education about FBD.

The Subjective Value of Cognitive Effort is Encoded by a Domain-General Valuation Network

Cognitive control is necessary for goal-directed behavior, yet people treat cognitive control demand as a cost, which discounts the value of rewards in a similar manner as other costs, such as delay or risk. It is unclear, however, whether the subjective value (SV) of cognitive effort is encoded in the same putatively domain-general brain valuation network implicated in other cost domains, or instead engages a distinct frontoparietal network, as implied by recent studies. Here, we provide rigorous evidence that the valuation network, with core foci in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum, also encodes SV during cognitive effort-based decision-making in healthy, male and female adult humans. We doubly dissociate this network from frontoparietal regions that are instead recruited as a function of decision difficulty. We show that the domain-general valuation network jointly and independently encodes both reward benefits and cognitive effort costs. We also demonstrate that cognitive effort SV signals predict choice and are influenced by state and trait motivation, including sensitivity to reward and anticipated task performance. These findings unify cognitive effort with other cost domains, and suggest candidate neural mechanisms underlying state and trait variation in willingness to expend cognitive effort.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Subjective effort costs are increasingly understood to diminish cognitive control over task performance and can thus undermine functioning across health and disease. Yet, we are only beginning to understand how decisions about cognitive effort are made. A key question is how subjective values are computed. Recent work suggests that the value of cognitive effort might be computed by networks that are distinct from those involved in other domains like intertemporal and risky decision-making, implying distinct mechanisms. Here we demonstrate that the domain-general network also encodes effort-discounted value, linking cognitive effort closely with other domains. Our results thus elucidate key mechanisms supporting decisions about cognitive effort, and point to candidate neural targets for intervention in disorders involving impaired cognitive motivation.

Individual Differences in Anchoring Effect: Evidence for the Role of Insufficient Adjustment

Although the anchoring effect is one of the most reliable results of experimental psychology, researchers have only recently begun to examine the role of individual differences in susceptibility to this cognitive bias. Yet, first correlational studies yielded inconsistent results, failing to identify any predictors that have a systematic effect on anchored decisions. The present research seeks to remedy methodological shortcomings of foregoing research by employing modified within-subject anchoring procedure. Results confirmed the robustness of phenomenon in extended paradigm and replicated previous findings on anchor's direction and distance as significant experimental factors of the anchoring effect size. Obtained measures of individual differences in susceptibility to anchoring were fairly reliable but shared only small portion of variability with intelligence, cognitive reflection, and basic personality traits. However, in a group of more reflective subjects, substantial negative correlation between intelligence and anchoring was detected. This finding indicates that, at least for some subjects, effortful cognitive process of adjustment plays role in the emergence of the anchoring effect, which is in line with expectations of dual-process theories of human reasoning.

Similarity, multiple estimations, and the anchoring effect

This paper compares the Selective Accessibility and Scale Distortion theories of anchoring as explanations for anchoring tasks involving (1) perceived dissimilarity between comparison and estimation objects and (2) successive estimation tasks. We begin by describing the two theories of anchoring and what each would predict for these conditions. Two studies are presented in which multiple estimates are made following a single comparison task and the effect sizes of these estimates are correlated to operationalizations of similarity. In the first study, the stimuli varied with respect to how well they fit within an existing category reasonably familiar to the participant population: aircraft. In the second study, the stimuli varied with respect to external features that did not define the category: the brand and location of hotels. In both studies, we find that the anchoring effect size has a positive correlation with the semantic similarity between the comparison and estimation objects, a finding consistent with Selective Accessibility.

Cognitive biases in orbital mass lesions - Lessons learned

Purpose

A patient’s presentation and clinical diagnosis can at times be clouded by their past medical history. Clinicians’ anchoring bias towards initial information, such as a history of cancer, may lead them astray when creating a differential diagnosis for a patient who presents with new signs and symptoms of a mass lesion, assuming metastatic disease without seeking tissue confirmation.

Methods

The presentation, workup, diagnosis, and treatment of two patients who presented with orbital masses in the context of a primary prostate cancer are presented in this report.

Results

In both cases, prostate cancer metastasis to the orbit was top on the differential. Ultimately, histopathological examination of biopsies taken from the orbital masses revealed orbital lymphoma in both patients.

Conclusion

With mounting rates of patients who have survived a previous cancer, multiple primary cancers within one patient are becoming increasingly common. While prostate cancer metastasis to the orbit is a relatively rare event, orbital lymphoma is a more common diagnosis in orbital masses. Therefore, when patients present with orbital masses in the context of prostate cancer, the conclusion should not immediately be metastasis and a tissue diagnosis should be sought; especially given that the treatment of these entities is different.

Not all Anchors Weigh Equally

The anchoring bias is a reliable effect wherein a person's judgments are affected by initially presented information, but it is unknown specifically why this effect occurs. Research examining this bias suggests that elements of both numeric and semantic priming may be involved. To examine this, the present research used a phenomenon wherein people treat numeric information presented differently in Arabic numeral or verbal formats. We presented participants with one of many forms of an anchor that represented the same value (e.g., twelve hundred or 1,200). Thus, we could examine how a concept's meaning and its absolute numeric value affect anchoring. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that people respond to Arabic and verbal anchors differently. Experiment 3 showed that these differences occurred largely because people tend to think of numbers in digit format. This suggests that one's conceptual understanding of the anchored information matters more than its strict numeric value.

The anchoring effect in metamemory monitoring

Judgments about future memory performance (metamemory judgments) are known to be susceptible to illusions and bias. Here we asked whether metamemory judgments are affected, like many other forms of judgment, by numerical anchors. Experiment 1 confirmed previous research showing an effect of informative anchors (e.g., past peer performance) on metamemory monitoring. In four further experiments, we then explored the effects of uninformative anchors. All of the experiments obtained significant anchoring effects on metamemory monitoring; in contrast, the anchors had no effect on recall itself. We also explored the anchoring effect on metamemory control (restudy choices) in Experiment 4. The results suggested that anchors can affect metamemory monitoring, which in turn affects metamemory control. The present research reveals that informative and, more importantly, uninformative numbers that have no influence on recall itself can bias metamemory judgments. On the basis of the current theoretical understanding of the anchoring effect and metamemory monitoring, these results offer insight into the processes that trigger metacognitive biases.

Supply chain management: the elusive concept and definition

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to gather the current definitions of supply chain management in practical and analytical usage, to develop standards for assessing definitions and to apply these standards to the most readily available definitions of the term.

Design/methodology/approach

In this research, the authors gathered the current definitions of supply chain management in practical and analytical usage from journals, textbooks, universities, and industry associations and online.

Findings

The research ends with proposed definitions for consideration. Discussion and areas for future research are included.

Research limitations/implications

Involved organizations, supply chain management programs in higher education, and professional and certifying organizations in the field need to meet and work together to research consensus on the final definition of the field, realizing that definitions can evolve, but also recognizing that a starting point is needed in this rapidly growing area.

Practical implications

The authors argue, quite simply, that a consensus definition of supply chain management is unlikely as long as we continue offering and accepting definitions that are technically unsound. Many of the current definitions violate several principles of good definitions. For these reasons, they are either empty, too restrictive, or too expansive. Until we come across or develop a definition that overcomes these limitations and agree on it, then we will still search for “the” definition without finding it. The field will become more crowded with definitions, but less certain, and progress will be restricted.

Originality/value

Theoreticians, researchers, and practitioners in a discipline require key terms in a field to share a nominal definition and prefer to have a shared real or essential definition. Yet in supply chain management, we find no such shared definition, real or nominal. Even the Council of Supply Chain Management Professional offers its definition with the caveat: “The supply chain management (SCM) profession has continued to change and evolve to fit the needs of the growing global supply chain. With the supply chain covering a broad range of disciplines, the definition of what is a supply chain can be unclear” (CSCMP, 2016).

When your anchor sinks your boat: Information asymmetry in distributive negotiations and the disadvantage of making the first offer

The literature on behavioral decision-making and negotiations to date usually advocates first-mover advantage in distributive negotiations, and bases this preference on the anchoring heuristic. In the following paper, we suggest that the preference for moving first vs. moving second in negotiations may not be as clear-cut as presumed, especially in situations characterized by information asymmetry between negotiating counterparts. In Study 1, we examined people’s initiation preferences and found that unless taught otherwise, people intuitively often prefer to move second. In Studies 2–4, we experimentally tested the suggested advantage of moving second, and demonstrated that in information-asymmetry scenarios – when one party has perfect background information and the other has none — it is actually preferable for both counterparts not to give the first offer while negotiating. We discuss the implications of our findings on the field of negotiation and decision-making, and lay the groundwork for future studies examining this issue.

Controlling the Anchoring Effect through Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) to the Right Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex

Selective accessibility mechanisms indicate that anchoring effects are results of selective retrieval of working memory. Neuroimaging studies have revealed that the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is closely related to memory retrieval and performance. However, no research has investigated the effect of changing the cortical excitability in right DLPFC on anchoring effects. Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) can modulate the excitability of the human cerebral cortex, while anodal and cathodal tDCS are postulated to increase or decrease cortical activity, respectively. In this study, we used tDCS to investigate whether effects of increased or decreased right DLPFC excitability influence anchoring effects in willingness to pay (WTP) experiments. Ninety participants were first randomly assigned to receive either anodal, cathodal, or sham stimulation of 15 min, then they performed a valuation task regarding WTP. The results showed that anchoring effects were negatively related to activities of right DLPFC: the anodal stimulation diminished anchoring effects while the cathodal stimulation increased anchoring effects. These outcomes provide one of the first instances of neural evidence for the role of the right DLPFC in anchoring effects and support psychological explanations of the selective accessibility mechanisms and cognitive sets.

Motivated Use of Numerical Anchors for Judgments Relevant to the Self

The anchoring effect has been replicated so extensively that it is generally thought to be ubiquitous. However, anchoring has primarily been tested in domains in which people are motivated to reach accurate conclusions rather than biased conclusions. Is the anchoring effect robust even when the anchors are threatening? In three studies, participants made a series of probability judgments about their own futures paired with either optimistic anchors (e.g., “Do you think that the chances that your current relationship will last a lifetime are more or less than 95%?”), pessimistic anchors (e.g., “more or less than 10%?”), or no anchors. A fourth study experimentally manipulated motivation to ignore the anchor with financial incentives. Across studies, anchors that implied high probabilities of unwanted events occurring were ineffective. Together, these studies suggest that anchoring has an important boundary condition: Personally threatening anchors are ignored as a result of motivated reasoning processes.

Mona Lisa is always happy - and only sometimes sad

The worldwide fascination of da Vinci's Mona Lisa has been dedicated to the emotional ambiguity of her face expression. In the present study we manipulated Mona Lisa's mouth curvature as one potential source of ambiguity and studied how a range of happier and sadder face variants influences perception. In two experimental conditions we presented different stimulus ranges with different step sizes between stimuli along the happy-sad axis of emotional face expressions. Stimuli were presented in random order and participants indicated the perceived emotional face expression (first task) and the confidence of their response (second task). The probability of responding 'happy' to the original Mona Lisa was close to 100%. Furthermore, in both conditions the perceived happiness of Mona Lisa variants described sigmoidal functions of the mouth curvature. Participants' confidence was weakest around the sigmoidal inflection points. Remarkably, the sigmoidal functions, as well as confidence values and reaction times, differed significantly between experimental conditions. Finally, participants responded generally faster to happy than to sad faces. Overall, the original Mona Lisa seems to be less ambiguous than expected. However, perception of and reaction to the emotional face content is relative and strongly depends on the used stimulus range.