Harleß' Apparatus of Will: 150 years later

Disentangling decision errors from action execution in mouse-tracking studies: The case of effect-based action control

Mouse-tracking is regarded as a powerful technique to investigate latent cognitive and emotional states. However, drawing inferences from this manifold data source carries the risk of several pitfalls, especially when using aggregated data rather than single-trial trajectories. Researchers might reach wrong conclusions because averages lump together two distinct contributions that speak towards fundamentally different mechanisms underlying between-condition differences: influences from online-processing during action execution and influences from incomplete decision processes. Here, we propose a simple method to assess these factors, thus allowing us to probe whether process-pure interpretations are appropriate. By applying this method to data from 12 published experiments on ideomotor action control, we show that the interpretation of previous results changes when dissociating online processing from decision and initiation errors. Researchers using mouse-tracking to investigate cognition and emotion are therefore well advised to conduct detailed trial-by-trial analyses, particularly when they test for direct leakage of ongoing processing into movement trajectories.

Learning and transfer of response-effect relations

Acting means changing the environment according to one's own goals, and this often requires bodily movements as responses. How these responses are selected is a central question in contemporary cognitive psychology. The ideomotor principle offers a simple answer based on two assumptions: An agent first learns an association between a response and its effects. Later, this association can be used in a reverse way: When the agent wants to achieve a desired effect and activates its representation, the associated response representation becomes activated as well. This reversed use of the learned association is considered the means to select the required response. In three experiments, we addressed two questions related to the first assumption: First, we tested whether effect representations generalise to more abstract conceptual knowledge. This is important, because outside the laboratory and in novel situations, effects are variable and not always exactly identical, such that generalisation is necessary for successful actions. Second, the nature of the response-effect relation has been debated recently, and more data are necessary to put theorising on firm empirical ground. Results of our experiments suggest that (a) abstraction to conceptual knowledge seems to occur only under very restricted situations, and (b) it seems that no (implicit) associations between responses and effects are learned, but rather (explicit) propositional knowledge in the form of rules.

Generalisation of unpredictable action-effect features: Large individual differences with little on-average effect

Ideomotor theory suggests that selecting a response is achieved by anticipating the consequences of that response. Evidence for this is the response-effect compatibility (REC) effect, that is, responding tends to be faster when the (anticipated) predictable consequences of a response (the action effects) are compatible rather than incompatible with the response. The present experiments investigated the extent to which the consequences must be exactly versus categorically predictable. According to the latter, an abstraction from particular instances to the categories of dimensional overlap might take place. For participants in one group of Experiment 1, left-hand and right-hand responses produced compatible or incompatible action effects in perfectly predictable positions to the left or right of fixation, and a standard REC effect was observed. For participants in another group of Experiment 1, as well as in Experiments 2 and 3, the responses also produced action effects to the left or right of fixation, but the eccentricity of the action effects (and thus their precise location) was unpredictable. On average, the data from the latter groups suggest that there is little, if any, tendency for participants to abstract the critical left/right features from spatially somewhat unpredictable action effects and use them for action selection, although there were large individual differences in these groups. Thus, at least on average across participants, it appears that the spatial locations of action effects must be perfectly predictable for these effects to have a strong influence on the response time.

Perception and action as viewed from the Theory of Event Coding: a multi-lab replication and effect size estimation of common experimental designs

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) has influenced research on action and perception across the past two decades. It integrates several seminal empirical phenomena and it has continued to stimulate novel experimental approaches on the representational foundations of action control and perceptual experience. Yet, many of the most notable results surrounding TEC originate from an era of psychological research that relied on rather small sample sizes as judged by today's standards. This state hampers future research aiming to build on previous phenomena. We, therefore, provide a multi-lab re-assessment of the following six classical observations: response-effect compatibility, action-induced blindness, response-effect learning, stimulus-response binding, code occupation, and short-term response-effect binding. Our major goal is to provide precise estimates of corresponding effect sizes to facilitate future scientific endeavors. These effect sizes turned out to be considerably smaller than in the original reports, thus allowing for informed decisions on how to address each phenomenon in future work. Of note, the most relevant results of the original observations were consistently obtained in the present experiments as well.

Compatibility effects with touchless gestures

Human actions are suspect to various compatibility phenomena. For example, responding is faster to the side where a stimulus appears than to the opposite side, referred to as stimulus-response (S-R) compatibility. This is even true, if the response is given to a different stimulus feature, while location itself is irrelevant (Simon compatibility). In addition, responses typically produce perceivable effects on the environment. If they do so in a predictable way, responses are faster if they produce a (e.g., spatially) compatible effect on the same side than on the other side. That it, a left response is produced faster if it results predictably in a left effect than in a right effect. This effect is called response-effect (R-E) compatibility. Finally, compatibility could also exist between stimuli and the effects, which is accordingly called stimulus-effect (S-E) compatibility. Such compatibility phenomena are also relevant for applied purposes, be it in laparoscopic surgery or aviation. The present study investigates Simon and R-E compatibility for touchless gesture interactions. In line with a recent study, no effect of R-E compatibility was observed, yet irrelevant stimulus location yielded a large Simon effect. Touchless gestures thus seem to behave differently with regard to compatibility phenomena than interactions via (other) tools such as levers.

Is there hierarchical generalization in response-effect learning?

Ideomotor theory is an influential approach to understand goal-directed behavior. In this framework, response-effect (R-E) learning is assumed as a prerequisite for voluntary action: Once associations between motor actions and their effects in the environment have been formed, the anticipation of these effects will automatically activate the associated motor pattern. R-E learning is typically investigated with (induction) experiments that comprise an acquisition phase, where R-E associations are presumably learned, and a subsequent test phase, where the previous effects serve as stimuli for a response. While most studies used stimuli in the test phase that were identical to the effects in the acquisition phase, one study reported generalization from exemplars to their superordinate category (Hommel et al., Vis Cogn 10:965-986, 2003, Exp. 1). However, studies on so-called R-E compatibility did not report such generalization. We aimed to conceptually replicate Experiment 1 of Hommel et al. (Vis Cogn 10:965-986, 2003) with a free-choice test phase. While we did observe effects consistent with R-E learning when the effects in the acquisition phase were identical to the stimuli in the test phase, we did not observe evidence for generalization. We discuss this with regard to recent studies suggesting that individual response biases might rather reflect rapidly inferred propositional knowledge instead of learned R-E associations.

Ideomotor learning: Time to generalize a longstanding principle

The ideomotor principle holds that anticipating the sensory consequences of a movement triggers an associated motor response. Even though this framework dates back to the 19th century, it continues to lie at the heart of many contemporary approaches to human action control. Here we specifically focus on the ideomotor learning mechanism that has to precede action initiation via effect anticipation. Traditional approaches to this learning mechanism focused on establishing novel action-effect (or response-effect) associations. Here we apply the theoretical concept of common coding for action and perception to argue that the same learning principle should result in response-response and stimulus-stimulus associations just as well. Generalizing ideomotor learning in such a way results in a powerful and general framework of ideomotor action control, and it allows for integrating the two seemingly separate fields of ideomotor approaches and hierarchical learning.

Given the option, people avoid incongruent responses in a dual-tasking situation

While past work on how people can optimize dual-tasking has focused on strategic timing (i.e., when to select responses), little is known about the extent to which people can optimize dual-tasking by taking care of which responses they select. Here we test whether spatial (in)congruency influences response selection in free-choice trials. In two experiments, we combined two visual-manual tasks with spatial stimulus- and response characteristics: Participants responded to the stimulus words "left" and "right" in a forced choice task and responded "up", "down", "left" or "right" with an arrow-key to either a free choice prompt or an X located at the respective position. In Experiment 1, participants reduced the proportion of incongruent pairs of responses (i.e., left in one and right in the other task). In Experiment 2, we found that such flexibility in response selection also holds in more constrained environments: Within runs of four trials the free-choice options were continuously reduced based on the responses already given. The combined results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that response selection in free choice trials is driven by performance optimization beyond response conflict.

The effect of irrelevant response dimension on stimulus response compatibility

The well-known Stroop, Simon, and Eriksen flanker effects reflect the influence of an irrelevant dimension of a stimulus on task performance. In contrast, this study investigated the effect of an irrelevant (color) dimension of a response on performance. In Experiment 1, participants performed a color-discrimination Simon task with left and right responses. The novel feature of the experiment was that two-colored labels were presented at the bottom of the display, on the left and right side respectively, which were irrelevant to the task and had nothing to do with response keys. The results revealed a Color Compatibility effect. Participants responded faster and more accurately when the color of the label appearing on the same side (left or right) as the correct response matched the color of the stimulus than when it did not. Experiment 2A replicated the Color Compatibility effect. Experiment 2B showed that the Color Compatibility effect in reaction times disappeared when color was irrelevant to both the stimulus and the response. The results suggest that the presence of an irrelevant color dimension at response may result in a stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) effect as long as the color is represented in working memory. These studies have implications for the dimensional overlap model and the broader understanding of stimulus-response compatibility effects.

Examination of a Response–Effect Compatibility Task With Continuous Mouse Movements: Free- Versus Forced-Choice Tasks and Sequential Modulations

According to ideomotor theory, we select actions by recalling and anticipating their sensory consequences, that is, their action effects. Compelling evidence for this theory comes from response–effect compatibility (REC) experiments, in which a response produces an effect with which it is either compatible or incompatible. For example, pressing a left/right response key is faster if it is predictably followed by an action effect on the same, compatible side compared with the other, incompatible side, even though the effect itself appears only after response time is measured. Recent studies investigated this effect with continuous responses (i.e., computer mouse movements) and reported an REC effect in a forced-choice but not in a free-choice task. From the keypressing literature, the opposite result pattern or no differences would have been expected. To clarify this issue, we report 3 experiments with mouse movement responses. Experiment 1 used a simpler scenario than in prior studies and found a similar result: The REC effect was evident in a forced- but not in a free-choice task. Also, sequential modulations of the REC effect were exploratorily analyzed and replicated with higher power in Experiment 2. However, Experiment 3 demonstrated that at least part of the REC effect with mouse movements can be attributed to stimulus–response compatibility (SRC), with a much smaller compatibility effect evident with a procedure for which SRC was reduced. We conclude that a sequentially modulated compatibility effect can be observed with mouse movements, but previous studies may have underestimated the contribution from SRC. The results are also discussed in terms of why the compatibility effect was observed in forced- but not free-choice tasks with mouse movement responses.

Anticipating the magnitude of response outcomes can induce a potentiation effect for manipulable objects

Merely seeing large objects (e.g., apples) potentiates power grip whereas seeing small objects (e.g., strawberries) potentiates precision grip. According to the embodied cognition account, this potentiation effect reflects automatic access to object representation, including the grip usually associated with the object. Alternatively, this effect might be due to an overlap between magnitude codes used to code manipulable objects and magnitude codes used to code responses outcomes. In Experiment 1, participants saw objects usually grasped with a power or precision grip and had to press keys either with their forefinger or with their palm, each response generating a low or high tone (i.e., a large vs. small perceptual outcome, respectively). Tones were automatically delivered by headphones after the responses have been made in line with the ideomotor theories according to which voluntary actions are carried out due to the anticipation of their outcomes. Consistent with the magnitude-coding hypothesis, response times were shorter when the object and the anticipated response outcome were of the same magnitude than when they were not. These results were also consistent with a between-experiment analysis. In Experiments 2 and 3, we investigated to what extent removing or switching the outcomes during the experiment influence the potentiation effect. Our results support that the potentiation effect of grasping behaviours could be due to the compatibility between magnitude codes rather than to the involvement of motor representations. Our results also suggest a spontaneous use of the magnitude of response outcomes to code responses, as well as the flexibility of this coding processes when responses outcomes are altered.

Are freely chosen actions generated by stimulus codes or effect codes?

A long-standing debate revolves around which mental codes allow humans to control behavior. The internal stimulus model (going back to Rudolf Hermann Lotze) proposes that behavior is controlled by codes of stimuli that had previously preceded corresponding motor activities. The internal effect model (going back to Emil Harleß) proposes that behavior is controlled by codes of perceptual effects that had previously resulted from corresponding motor activities. Here, we present a test of these two control models. We observed evidence for both models with stronger evidence for the internal stimulus model. We suggest that the proposed experimental setup might be a useful tool to study the relative strengths of stimulus control and effect control of behavior in various contexts.

Disentangling stimulus and response compatibility as potential sources of backward crosstalk

In two experiments (N= 60 each), we investigated the locus of backward crosstalk effects in dual tasking. Specifically, we embedded the typical flanker task within a dual-task paradigm by assigning stimulus-response (S-R) rules to the flankers. In Experiment 1, participants were instructed to first respond to the center letter and only respond to the flanker if the center was a no-go stimulus (i.e., prioritized processing paradigm). Mapping condition was varied between-subjects to be either matched (i.e., same S-R rule for flankers as for center letters), reversed (i.e., opposite S-R rule for flankers), or neutral (i.e., different letters for flankers with separate S-R rules). The results indicated that the backward crosstalk effect was mainly driven by a stimulus-based compatibility, as indicated by a significant S₂-R₁ compatibility effect in the matched and reversed conditions, with little change in this effect between the matched and reversed conditions. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings to a psychological refractory period paradigm. The present findings suggest that in the matched and reversed conditions, there was only one S-R rule active at a time.

Stimulus-Response and Response-Effect Compatibility With Touchless Gestures and Moving Action Effects

OBJECTIVE

To determine whether response-effect (R-E) compatibility or stimulus-response (S-R) compatibility is more critical for touchless gesture responses.

BACKGROUND

Content on displays can be moved in the same direction (S-R incompatible but R-E compatible) or opposite direction (S-R compatible but R-E incompatible) as the touchless gesture that produces the movement. Previous studies suggested that it is easier to produce a button-press response when it is R-E compatible (and S-R incompatible). However, whether this R-E compatibility effect also occurs for touchless gesture responses is unknown.

METHOD

Experiments 1 and 2 employed an R-E compatibility manipulation in which participants made responses with an upward or downward touchless gesture that resulted in the display content moving in the same (compatible) or opposite (incompatible) direction. Experiment 3 employed an S-R compatibility manipulation in which the stimulus occurred at the upper or lower location on the screen.

RESULTS

Overall, only negligible influences of R-E compatibility on performing the touchless gestures were observed (in contrast to button-press responses), whereas S-R compatibility heavily affected the gestural responses.

CONCLUSION

The R-E compatibility obtained in many previous studies with various types of responses appears not to hold for touchless gestures as responses.

APPLICATION

The results suggest that in the design of touchless interfaces, unique factors may contribute to determining which mappings of gesture and display movements are preferred by users.

How does simulation of an observed external body state influence categorisation of an easily graspable object?

Several works have provided evidence of a resonant motor effect while observing a hand interacting with painful stimuli. The aim of this work is to show that participants are sensitive to the observation of an injured hand when they have to categorise an easily graspable object with their own hand. In Experiment 1, participants indicated whether or not photographs of objects (graspable or non-graspable, left or right oriented) could be grasped with their dominant hand, by tapping a key on a keyboard. Target objects were preceded by primes consisting of photographs of hands (injured vs healthy) in a grasping posture (power grasp). Experiment 2 consisted of two phases: In the first phase, participants had to categorise square or circle shapes. After their response (Group 1: tapping a key vs Group 2: constricting a hand grip), photograph of two types of hand (injured vs healthy) was displayed on the computer screen. In the second phase, participants had to indicate whether objects could be easily grasped with their dominant hand. Target objects were preceded by primes (square and circle) as shown in the first phase. Results show that response times were slower when the graspable target objects were right oriented and preceded by the photograph or a geometric shape associated with an injured hand. This response delay was accentuated in the handgrip condition. These results highlight that the view of an injured hand activates motor programme and pain mechanisms associated with participants relative to the consequences of the simulated grasping action.

Action effect features, but not anatomical features, determine the Backward Crosstalk Effect: evidence from crossed-hands experiments

The Backward Crosstalk Effect (BCE) indicates that response features of Task 2 in a dual-task paradigm influence even Task 1 performance. However, it can be assumed that responses are represented with multiple features in the cognitive system. In this regard, Ideomotor Theory suggests action effects as one central response feature in human action control and an earlier study by Janczyk, Pfister, Hommel, and Kunde (Cognition 132: 30-43, 2014) already provided some evidence that action effects are a crucial determinant of the BCE. The present study aimed to further investigate which response features are critical for the BCE. Therefore, a crossed-hands manipulation was implemented in two experiments to examine whether the spatial position of the actual response and thus its associated action effects or the body-side of the effectors' anatomical connection determine the BCE. Analyses revealed that even when participants press a left response key with the right hand and vice versa, the usual BCE occurs. These results indicate that the BCE depends on spatial features of the action effects rather than on anatomical features and thus provide additional support for the assumption that action effects have an important influence on the BCE and on action control in general.

Action selection by temporally distal goal states

In line with ideomotor theory, numerous response-effect compatibility (REC) studies have revealed evidence that action effects are anticipated prior to action initiation, as indicated by an REC effect: For example, a response is given faster when its effect occurs on the same rather than on the opposite side. So far, REC studies have only investigated immediate effects-that is, effects occurring immediately after the response is given. However, it may be argued that in everyday life many actions cause effects that do not occur immediately. Additionally, because actions can have more than one effect, desired effects occurring in the future may only be arrived at if fundamental effects are achieved first. In the present study, we investigated whether temporally more distal effects are anticipated in order to initiate actions, and how multiple, serially occurring effects are represented. To this end, a spatial REC paradigm was extended in such a way that a first, immediate effect (i.e., immediately following the response; E1) was followed 500 ms later by another visual effect (E2). An REC effect was only observed for the temporally more distal E2, and this result suggests that temporally more distal effects can also be anticipated during action selection.

Die Rolle von Handlungszielen bei der Entstehung von Doppelaufgabenkosten

Zusammenfassung. Mehrere Dinge gleichzeitig zu tun, funktioniert oft nicht ohne Leistungseinbußen. Solche Probleme und deren Ursachen werden im Rahmen der Multitasking-Forschung untersucht. Der vorliegende Artikel thematisiert, inwiefern den Zielen von Handlungen bei der Entstehung solcher Leistungseinbußen eine kritische Rolle zukommt. Handlungsziele in Form sensorisch wahrnehmbarer Umweltveränderungen („Handlungseffekte“) spielen in der Ideomotorischen Theorie der Handlungssteuerung eine wichtige Rolle, da ihre Antizipation als der Prozess der Handlungsauswahl gesehen wird. Nach einer kurzen Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Evidenz für diese Annahme, werden Studien berichtet, die (a) dafür sprechen, dass keinerlei Leistungseinbußen entstehen, wenn eine motorische Bewegung nicht Teil einer Handlung ist, und (b) dass Handlungsziele das Ausmaß der Doppelaufgaben-Probleme bedeutend (mit–)bestimmen. Abschließend wird auf dieser Grundlage die Frage diskutiert, ob es mehrere Arten von Handlungen gibt, wie es verschiedentlich vorgeschlagen wurde. Zusammenfassend weisen die Befunde auf die wichtige Rolle von Zielen sowohl als mentale Vorläufer einer Körperbewegung im Rahmen von Handlungen, als auch bei der Entstehung von Problemen in Multitasking-Situationen hin.

Linking perception and action by structure or process? Toward an integrative perspective

Over the past decades cognitive neuroscience's renewed interest in action has intensified the search of principles explaining how the cognitive system links perception to action and vice versa. To date, at least two seemingly alternative approaches can be distinguished. Perception and action might be linked either by common representational structures, as assumed by the ideomotor approach, or by common attentional processes, as assumed by the attention approach. This article first reviews the evidence from different paradigms supporting each approach. It becomes clear that most studies selectively focus either on actions directed at goals outside the actors' perceptual range (supporting the ideomotor approach) or on actions directed at targets within the actors' perceptual range (supporting the attention approach). In a second step, I will try to reconcile both approaches by reviewing recent eye movement studies that abolish the classical combination of approach and goals under study. Demonstrating that both approaches cover target- as well as goal-directed actions, it is proposed that operations addressed in both conceptual frameworks interact with each other.

The role of effect grouping in free-choice response selection

Which motor actions are preferred to replace an initially planned but momentary not executable action? Previous research (Khan, Mourton, Buckolz, Adams, & Hayes, 2010, Acta Psychologica) suggests that anatomical constraints seem to be a major determinant for such choices: For example, participants more frequently chose to respond with the finger homologous to the prepared one. We argue that in this case finger homology is confounded with action effect similarity, and action effects have been ascribed a crucial role in action selection. We report two experiments. Experiment 1 replicated the results obtained by Khan et al. In Experiment 2, we introduced visual action effects in the paradigm. Results from this experiment clearly point to a role of effect similarity in addition to mere finger homology status for the choice frequency effect.

Who is talking in backward crosstalk? Disentangling response- from goal-conflict in dual-task performance

Responses in the second of two subsequently performed tasks can speed up compatible responses in the temporally preceding first task. Such backward crosstalk effects (BCEs) represent a challenge to the assumption of serial processing in stage models of human information processing, because they indicate that certain features of the second response have to be represented before the first response is emitted. Which of these features are actually relevant for BCEs is an open question, even though identifying these features is important for understanding the nature of parallel and serial response selection processes in dual-task performance. Motivated by effect-based models of action control, we show in three experiments that the BCE to a considerable degree reflects features of intended action effects, although features of the response proper (or response-associated kinesthetic feedback) also seem to play a role. These findings suggest that the codes of action effects (or action goals) can become activated simultaneously rather than serially, thereby creating BCEs.

The neural substrate of the ideomotor principle revisited: evidence for asymmetries in action-effect learning

Ideomotor theory holds that the perception or anticipatory imagination of action effects activates motor tendencies toward the action that is known to produce these effects, herein referred to as ideomotor response activation (IRA). IRA presupposes that the agent has previously learned which action produces which effects, and that this learning process has created bidirectional associations between the sensory effect codes and the motor codes producing the sensory effects. Here, we refer to this process as ideomotor learning. In the presented fMRI study, we adopted a standard two-phase ideomotor learning paradigm; a mixed between/within-subjects design allowed us to assess the neural substrate of both, IRA and ideomotor learning. We replicated earlier findings of a hand asymmetry in ideomotor processing with significantly stronger IRA by left-hand than right-hand action effects. Crucially, we traced this effect back to more pronounced associative learning for action-contingent effects of the left hand compared with effects of the right hand. In this context, our findings point to the caudate nucleus and the angular gyrus as central structures of the neural network underlying ideomotor learning.

Investigating ideomotor cognition with motorvisual priming paradigms: key findings, methodological challenges, and future directions

Ideomotor theory claims that perceptual representations of action-effects are functionally involved in the planning of actions. Strong evidence for this claim comes from a phenomenon called motorvisual priming. Motorvisual priming refers to the finding that action planning directly affects perception, and that the effects are selective for stimuli that share features with the planned action. Motorvisual priming studies have provided detailed insights into the processing of perceptual representations in action planning. One important finding is that such representations in action planning have a categorical format, whereas metric representations are not anticipated in planning. Further essential findings regard the processing mechanisms and the time course of ideomotor cognition. Perceptual representations of action-effects are first activated by action planning and then bound into a compound representation of the action plan. This compound representation is stabilized throughout the course of the action by the shielding of all involved representations from other cognitive processes. Despite a rapid growth in the number of motorvisual priming studies in the current literature, there are still many aspects of ideomotor cognition which have not yet been investigated. These aspects include the scope of ideomotor processing with regard to action types and stimulus types, as well as the exact nature of the binding and shielding mechanisms involved.

On the influence of reward on action-effect binding

Ideomotor theory states that the formation of anticipatory representations about the perceptual consequences of an action [i.e., action-effect (A-E) binding] provides the functional basis of voluntary action control. A host of studies have demonstrated that A-E binding occurs fast and effortlessly, yet little is known about cognitive and affective factors that influence this learning process. In the present study, we sought to test whether the motivational value of an action modulates the acquisition of A-E associations. To this end, we linked specific actions with monetary incentives during the acquisition of novel A-E mappings. In a subsequent test phase, the degree of binding was assessed by presenting the former effect stimuli as task-irrelevant response primes in a forced-choice response task, absent reward. Binding, as indexed by response priming through the former action-effects, was only found for reward-related A-E mappings. Moreover, the degree to which reward associations modulated the binding strength was predicted by individuals’ trait sensitivity to reward. These observations indicate that the association of actions and their immediate outcomes depends on the motivational value of the action during learning, as well as on the motivational disposition of the individual. On a larger scale, these findings also highlight the link between ideomotor theories and reinforcement-learning theories, providing an interesting perspective for future research on anticipatory regulation of behavior.

Testing boundary conditions of the ideomotor hypothesis using a delayed response task

Ideomotor theory accounts for how an action's consequence is incorporated into an action concept in the form of a perceptual image that, when retrieved, serves to initiate the action. The ideomotor idea is compelling, because the ultimate purpose of an action is to bring about a certain change in the environment. This study investigated the time-course of response-effect compatibility (REC), which produces a shorter reaction-time when response effects are compatible with the responses than when they are not. We used a delayed choice-reaction task that required the response to be withheld until a Go signal occurred. In Experiment 1 an effect was delivered by the location of a square in either a spatially compatible or incompatible relation to the keypress action. A significant REC effect for reaction time was found only when an effect-achieving instruction was used, for which evidence indicated a locus in an early action phase. In Experiment 2 a cursor effect occurred causally, continuously and simultaneously with the movement of a computer mouse. No matter whether instructions in terms of cursor or mouse movement were used, a strong REC effect was found that preserved its power from the early to later parts of motor planning until execution ended. The results provide evidence that an action concept incorporates the action's consequent changes more strongly when they are goal-satisfying or highly causal events.

Action-effect bindings and ideomotor learning in intention- and stimulus-based actions

According to ideomotor theory, action-effect associations are crucial for voluntary action control. Recently, a number of studies started to investigate the conditions that mediate the acquisition and application of action-effect associations by comparing actions carried out in response to exogenous stimuli (stimulus-based) with actions selected endogenously (intention-based). There is evidence that the acquisition and/or application of action-effect associations is boosted when acting in an intention-based action mode. For instance, bidirectional action-effect associations were diagnosed in a forced choice test phase if participants previously experienced action-effect couplings in an intention-based but not in a stimulus-based action mode. The present study aims at investigating effects of the action mode on action-effect associations in more detail. In a series of experiments, we compared the strength and durability of short-term action-effect associations (binding) immediately following intention- as well as stimulus-based actions. Moreover, long-term action-effect associations (learning) were assessed in a subsequent test phase. Our results show short-term action-effect associations of equal strength and durability for both action modes. However, replicating previous results, long-term associations were observed only following intention-based actions. These findings indicate that the effect of the action mode on long-term associations cannot merely be a result of accumulated short-term action-effect bindings. Instead, only those episodic bindings are selectively perpetuated and retrieved that integrate action-relevant aspects of the processing event, i.e., in case of intention-based actions, the link between action and ensuing effect.

Instant attraction: immediate action-effect bindings occur for both, stimulus- and goal-driven actions

Flexible behavior is only possible if contingencies between own actions and following environmental effects are acquired as quickly as possible; and recent findings indeed point toward an immediate formation of action-effect bindings already after a single coupling of an action and its effect. The present study explored whether these short-term bindings occur for both, stimulus- and goal-driven actions ("forced-choice actions" vs. "free-choice actions"). Two experiments confirmed that immediate action-effect bindings are formed for both types of actions and affect upcoming behavior. These findings support the view that action-effect binding is a ubiquitous phenomenon which occurs for any type of action.

Frontostriatal mechanisms in instruction-based learning as a hallmark of flexible goal-directed behavior

The present review intends to provide a neuroscientific perspective on the flexible (here: almost instantaneous) adoption of novel goal-directed behaviors. The overarching goal is to sketch the emerging framework for examining instruction-based learning and how this can be related to more established research approaches to instrumental learning and goal-directed action. We particularly focus on the contribution of frontal and striatal brain regions drawing on studies in both, animals and humans, but with an emphasize put on human neuroimaging studies. In section one, we review and integrate a selection of previous studies that are suited to generally delineate the neural underpinnings of goal-directed action as opposed to more stimulus-based (i.e., habitual) action. Building on that the second section focuses more directly on the flexibility to rapidly implement novel behavioral rules as a hallmark of goal-directed action with a special emphasis on instructed rules. In essence, the current neuroscientific evidence suggests that the prefrontal cortex and associative striatum are able to selectively and transiently code the currently relevant relationship between stimuli, actions, and the effects of these actions in both, instruction-based learning as well as in trial-and-error learning. The premotor cortex in turn seems to form more durable associations between stimuli and actions or stimuli, actions and effects (but not incentive values) thus representing the available action possibilities. Together, the central message of the present review is that instruction-based learning should be understood as a prime example of goal-directed action, necessitating a closer interlacing with basic mechanisms of goal-directed action on a more general level.