Evaluation of gamma-spectrometry equipment for on-site inspection

Investigating the detection of underground nuclear explosions by radon displacement

A novel approach is proposed to detect underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) through the displacement of natural radon isotopes (²²²Rn and ²²⁰Rn). Following an explosion, it is hypothesized that the disturbance and pressurization of the sub-surface would facilitate the movement of radon from the depth of the UNE towards the surface resulting in increased soil gas activity. The resulting signal may be magnified by a factor of 2.0-4.9 by the decay of radon to its short-lived progeny. Increases in background activity may be useful for identifying locations to perform additional measurements, or as a detectable signal at monitoring stations. To validate this hypothesis, radon detection instrumentation was deployed at the Dry Alluvium Geology (DAG) site of the Source Physics Experiment (SPE) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Natural fluctuations in the soil gas activity due to barometric pumping, and the lower yield of the chemical explosions (1-50 t) made it difficult to confirm a displacement of radon from the explosions, and further study to validate the proposed hypothesis is recommended.

Radionuclide observables of underwater nuclear explosive tests

There remain technical challenges for an On-site Inspection (OSI) in the high seas environment, which gathers evidence of a violation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). For terrestrial nuclear explosions, the radionuclide observables are well defined and States Parties have chosen 17 particulate radionuclides that allow discrimination from other nuclear events. However, an underwater nuclear explosion generates induced radionuclides from the neutron activation of seawater, which has the potential to interfere with the measurement of the radionuclide observables using gamma-spectrometry techniques. To understand these effects the inventory of OSI relevant (6.0 × 10¹⁶ Bq) and activation (1.6 × 10¹⁹ Bq) radionuclides has been calculated for a 1 kT underwater nuclear explosion. The activation products consist predominantly of ³⁸Cl and ²⁴Na, which decay to 5.56% and 0.0007% of their initial activity within 1 and 14 days. Monte Carlo techniques have been used to assess spectral interferences within this timeframe. It is demonstrated that during this period they do not interfere with the measurement of the existing radionuclide observables. Additionally, ²⁴Na has been identified as useful for inspection purposes.

The 2014 Integrated Field Exercise of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty revisited: The case for data fusion

The International Monitoring System of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) uses a global network of radionuclide monitoring stations to detect evidence of a nuclear explosion. The two radionuclide technologies employed-particulate and noble gas (radioxenon) detection-have applications for data fusion to improve detection of a nuclear explosion. Using the hypothetical 0.5 kT nuclear explosive test scenario of the CTBTO 2014 Integrated Field Exercise, the intrinsic relationship between particulate and noble gas signatures has been examined. This study shows that, depending upon the time of the radioxenon release, the particulate progeny can produce the more detectable signature. Thus, as both particulate and noble gas signatures are inherently coupled, the authors recommend that the sample categorization schemes should be linked.