Identifying Criteria for the Evaluation of the Implications of Brain Reading for Mental Privacy

Ethical considerations for integrating multimodal computer perception and neurotechnology

Background

Artificial intelligence (AI)-based computer perception technologies (e.g., digital phenotyping and affective computing) promise to transform clinical approaches to personalized care in psychiatry and beyond by offering more objective measures of emotional states and behavior, enabling precision treatment, diagnosis, and symptom monitoring. At the same time, passive and continuous nature by which they often collect data from patients in non-clinical settings raises ethical issues related to privacy and self-determination. Little is known about how such concerns may be exacerbated by the integration of neural data, as parallel advances in computer perception, AI, and neurotechnology enable new insights into subjective states. Here, we present findings from a multi-site NCATS-funded study of ethical considerations for translating computer perception into clinical care and contextualize them within the neuroethics and neurorights literatures.

Methods

We conducted qualitative interviews with patients (n = 20), caregivers (n = 20), clinicians (n = 12), developers (n = 12), and clinician developers (n = 2) regarding their perspective toward using PC in clinical care. Transcripts were analyzed in MAXQDA using Thematic Content Analysis.

Results

Stakeholder groups voiced concerns related to (1) perceived invasiveness of passive and continuous data collection in private settings; (2) data protection and security and the potential for negative downstream/future impacts on patients of unintended disclosure; and (3) ethical issues related to patients' limited versus hyper awareness of passive and continuous data collection and monitoring. Clinicians and developers highlighted that these concerns may be exacerbated by the integration of neural data with other computer perception data.

Discussion

Our findings suggest that the integration of neurotechnologies with existing computer perception technologies raises novel concerns around dignity-related and other harms (e.g., stigma, discrimination) that stem from data security threats and the growing potential for reidentification of sensitive data. Further, our findings suggest that patients' awareness and preoccupation with feeling monitored via computer sensors ranges from hypo- to hyper-awareness, with either extreme accompanied by ethical concerns (consent vs. anxiety and preoccupation). These results highlight the need for systematic research into how best to implement these technologies into clinical care in ways that reduce disruption, maximize patient benefits, and mitigate long-term risks associated with the passive collection of sensitive emotional, behavioral and neural data.

Eyes on the road: brain computer interfaces and cognitive distraction in traffic

Novel wearable neurotechnology is able to provide insight into its wearer's cognitive processes and offers ways to change or enhance their capacities. Moreover, it offers the promise of hands-free device control. These brain-computer interfaces are likely to become an everyday technology in the near future, due to their increasing accessibility and affordability. We, therefore, must anticipate their impact, not only on society and individuals broadly but also more specifically on sectors such as traffic and transport. In an economy where attention is increasingly becoming a scarce good, these innovations may present both opportunities and challenges for daily activities that require focus, such as driving and cycling. Here, we argue that their development carries a dual risk. Firstly, BCI-based devices may match or further increase the intensity of cognitive human-technology interaction over the current hands-free communication devices which, despite being widely accepted, are well-known for introducing a significant amount of cognitive load and distraction. Secondly, BCI-based devices will be typically harder than hands-free devices to both visually detect (e.g., how can law enforcement check when these extremely small and well-integrated devices are used?) and restrain in their use (e.g., how do we prevent users from using such neurotechnologies without breaching personal integrity and privacy?). Their use in traffic should be anticipated by researchers, engineers, and policymakers, in order to ensure the safety of all road users.

Use of Invasive Brain-Computer Interfaces in Pediatric Neurosurgery: Technical and Ethical Considerations

Invasive brain-computer interfaces hold promise to alleviate disabilities in individuals with neurologic injury, with fully implantable brain-computer interface systems expected to reach the clinic in the upcoming decade. Children with severe neurologic disabilities, like quadriplegic cerebral palsy or cervical spine trauma, could benefit from this technology. However, they have been excluded from clinical trials of intracortical brain-computer interface to date. In this manuscript, we discuss the ethical considerations related to the use of invasive brain-computer interface in children with severe neurologic disabilities. We first review the technical hardware and software considerations for the application of intracortical brain-computer interface in children. We then discuss ethical issues related to motor brain-computer interface use in pediatric neurosurgery. Finally, based on the input of a multidisciplinary panel of experts in fields related to brain-computer interface (functional and restorative neurosurgery, pediatric neurosurgery, mathematics and artificial intelligence research, neuroengineering, pediatric ethics, and pragmatic ethics), we then formulate initial recommendations regarding the clinical use of invasive brain-computer interfaces in children.

Speaker Responsibility for Synthetic Speech Derived from Neural Activity

This article provides analysis of the mechanisms and outputs involved in language-use mediated by a neuroprosthetic device. It is motivated by the thought that users of speech neuroprostheses require sufficient control over what their devices externalize as synthetic speech if they are to be thought of as responsible for it, but that the nature of this control, and so the status of their responsibility, is not clear.

Good scientific practice in EEG and MEG research: Progress and perspectives

Good scientific practice (GSP) refers to both explicit and implicit rules, recommendations, and guidelines that help scientists to produce work that is of the highest quality at any given time, and to efficiently share that work with the community for further scrutiny or utilization. For experimental research using magneto- and electroencephalography (MEEG), GSP includes specific standards and guidelines for technical competence, which are periodically updated and adapted to new findings. However, GSP also needs to be regularly revisited in a broader light. At the LiveMEEG 2020 conference, a reflection on GSP was fostered that included explicitly documented guidelines and technical advances, but also emphasized intangible GSP: a general awareness of personal, organizational, and societal realities and how they can influence MEEG research. This article provides an extensive report on most of the LiveMEEG contributions and new literature, with the additional aim to synthesize ongoing cultural changes in GSP. It first covers GSP with respect to cognitive biases and logical fallacies, pre-registration as a tool to avoid those and other early pitfalls, and a number of resources to enable collaborative and reproducible research as a general approach to minimize misconceptions. Second, it covers GSP with respect to data acquisition, analysis, reporting, and sharing, including new tools and frameworks to support collaborative work. Finally, GSP is considered in light of ethical implications of MEEG research and the resulting responsibility that scientists have to engage with societal challenges. Considering among other things the benefits of peer review and open access at all stages, the need to coordinate larger international projects, the complexity of MEEG subject matter, and today's prioritization of fairness, privacy, and the environment, we find that current GSP tends to favor collective and cooperative work, for both scientific and for societal reasons.

Limits of decoding mental states with fMRI

A growing number of studies claim to decode mental states using multi-voxel decoders of brain activity. It has been proposed that the fixed, fine-grained, multi-voxel patterns in these decoders are necessary for discriminating between and identifying mental states. Here, we present evidence that the efficacy of these decoders might be overstated. Across various tasks, decoder patterns were spatially imprecise, as decoder performance was unaffected by spatial smoothing; 90% redundant, as selecting a random 10% of a decoder's constituent voxels recovered full decoder performance; and performed similarly to brain activity maps used as decoders. We distinguish decoder performance in discriminating between mental states from performance in identifying a given mental state, and show that even when discrimination performance is adequate, identification can be poor. Finally, we demonstrate that simple and intuitive similarity metrics explain 91% and 62% of discrimination performance within- and across-subjects, respectively. These findings indicate that currently used across-subject decoders of mental states are superfluous and inappropriate for decision-making.

Neural decoding of semantic concepts: A systematic literature review

Objective Semantic concepts are coherent entities within our minds. They underpin our thought processes and are a part of the basis for our understanding of the world. Modern neuroscience research is increasingly exploring how individual semantic concepts are encoded within our brains and a number of studies are beginning to reveal key patterns of neural activity that underpin specific concepts. Building upon this basic understanding of the process of semantic neural encoding, neural engineers are beginning to explore tools and methods for semantic decoding: identifying which semantic concepts an individual is focused on at a given moment in time from recordings of their neural activity. In this paper we review the current literature on semantic neural decoding. Approach We conducted this review according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) guidelines. Specifically, we assess the eligibility of published peer-reviewed reports via a search of PubMed and Google Scholar. We identify a total of 74 studies in which semantic neural decoding is used to attempt to identify individual semantic concepts from neural activity. Results Our review reveals how modern neuroscientific tools have been developed to allow decoding of individual concepts from a range of neuroimaging modalities. We discuss specific neuroimaging methods, experimental designs, and machine learning pipelines that are employed to aid the decoding of semantic concepts. We quantify the efficacy of semantic decoders by measuring information transfer rates. We also discuss current challenges presented by this research area and present some possible solutions. Finally, we discuss some possible emerging and speculative future directions for this research area. Significance Semantic decoding is a rapidly growing area of research. However, despite its increasingly widespread popularity and use in neuroscientific research this is the first literature review focusing on this topic across neuroimaging modalities and with a focus on quantifying the efficacy of semantic decoders.

Is Your Neural Data Part of Your Mind? Exploring the Conceptual Basis of Mental Privacy

It has been argued that neural data (ND) are an especially sensitive kind of personal information that could be used to undermine the control we should have over access to our mental states (i.e. our mental privacy), and therefore need a stronger legal protection than other kinds of personal data. The Morningside Group, a global consortium of interdisciplinary experts advocating for the ethical use of neurotechnology, suggests achieving this by treating legally ND as a body organ (i.e. protecting them through bodily integrity). Although the proposal is currently shaping ND-related policies (most notably, a Neuroprotection Bill of Law being discussed by the Chilean Senate), it is not clear what its conceptual and legal basis is. Treating legally something as something else requires some kind of analogical reasoning, which is not provided by the authors of the proposal. In this paper, I will try to fill this gap by addressing ontological issues related to neurocognitive processes. The substantial differences between ND and body organs or organic tissue cast doubt on the idea that the former should be covered by bodily integrity. Crucially, ND are not constituted by organic material. Nevertheless, I argue that the ND of a subject s are analogous to neurocognitive properties of her brain. I claim that (i) s’ ND are a ‘medium independent’ property that can be characterized as natural semantic personal information about her brain and that (ii) s’ brain not only instantiates this property but also has an exclusive ontological relationship with it: This information constitutes a domain that is unique to her neurocognitive architecture.

Forensic Brain-Reading and Mental Privacy in European Human Rights Law: Foundations and Challenges

A central question in the current neurolegal and neuroethical literature is how brain-reading technologies could contribute to criminal justice. Some of these technologies have already been deployed within different criminal justice systems in Europe, including Slovenia, Italy, England and Wales, and the Netherlands, typically to determine guilt, legal responsibility, or recidivism risk. In this regard, the question arises whether brain-reading could permissibly be used against the person's will. To provide adequate legal protection from such non-consensual brain-reading in the European legal context, ethicists have called for the recognition of a novel fundamental legal right to mental privacy. In this paper, we explore whether these ethical calls for recognising a novel legal right to mental privacy are necessary in the European context. We argue that a right to mental privacy could be derived from, or at least developed within in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and that introducing an additional fundamental right to protect against (forensic) brain-reading is not necessary. What is required, however, is a specification of the implications of existing rights for particular neurotechnologies and purposes.

Brain Recording, Mind-Reading, and Neurotechnology: Ethical Issues from Consumer Devices to Brain-Based Speech Decoding

Brain reading technologies are rapidly being developed in a number of neuroscience fields. These technologies can record, process, and decode neural signals. This has been described as 'mind reading technology' in some instances, especially in popular media. Should the public at large, be concerned about this kind of technology? Can it really read minds? Concerns about mind-reading might include the thought that, in having one's mind open to view, the possibility for free deliberation, and for self-conception, are eroded where one isn't at liberty to privately mull things over. Themes including privacy, cognitive liberty, and self-conception and expression appear to be areas of vital ethical concern. Overall, this article explores whether brain reading technologies are really mind reading technologies. If they are, ethical ways to deal with them must be developed. If they are not, researchers and technology developers need to find ways to describe them more accurately, in order to dispel unwarranted concerns and address appropriately those that are warranted.

Wired Emotions: Ethical Issues of Affective Brain-Computer Interfaces

Ethical issues concerning brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) have already received a considerable amount of attention. However, one particular form of BCI has not received the attention that it deserves: Affective BCIs that allow for the detection and stimulation of affective states. This paper brings the ethical issues of affective BCIs in sharper focus. The paper briefly reviews recent applications of affective BCIs and considers ethical issues that arise from these applications. Ethical issues that affective BCIs share with other neurotechnologies are presented and ethical concerns that are specific to affective BCIs are identified and discussed.

Ten challenges for EEG-based affective computing

The emerging field of affective computing focuses on enhancing computers’ ability to understand and appropriately respond to people’s affective states in human-computer interactions, and has revealed significant potential for a wide spectrum of applications. Recently, the electroencephalography (EEG) based affective computing has gained increasing interest for its good balance between mechanistic exploration and real-world practical application. The present work reviewed ten theoretical and operational challenges for the existing affective computing researches from an interdisciplinary perspective of information technology, psychology, and neuroscience. On the theoretical side, we suggest that researchers should be well aware of the limitations of the commonly used emotion models, and be cautious about the widely accepted assumptions on EEG-emotion relationships as well as the transferability of findings based on different research paradigms. On the practical side, we propose several operational recommendations for the challenges about data collection, feature extraction, model implementation, online system design, as well as the potential ethical issues. The present review is expected to contribute to an improved understanding of EEG-based affective computing and promote further applications.

Transcending the brain: is there a cost to hacking the nervous system?

Great advancements have recently been made to understand the brain and the potential that we can extract out of it. Much of this has been centred on modifying electrical activity of the nervous system for improved physical and cognitive performance in those with clinical impairment. However, there is a risk of going beyond purely physiological performance improvements and striving for human enhancement beyond traditional human limits. Simple ethical guidelines and legal doctrine must be examined to keep ahead of technological advancement in light of the impending mergence between biology and machine. By understanding the role of modern ethics, this review aims to appreciate the fine boundary between what is considered ethically justified for current neurotechnology.