Multilevel selection, cooperation, and altruism : Reflections on unto others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior

Contextualised strong reciprocity explains selfless cooperation despite selfish intuitions and weak social heuristics

Humans frequently cooperate for collective benefit, even in one-shot social dilemmas. This provides a challenge for theories of cooperation. Two views focus on intuitions but offer conflicting explanations. The Social Heuristics Hypothesis argues that people with selfish preferences rely on cooperative intuitions and predicts that deliberation reduces cooperation. The Self-Control Account emphasizes control over selfish intuitions and is consistent with strong reciprocity-a preference for conditional cooperation in one-shot dilemmas. Here, we reconcile these explanations with each other as well as with strong reciprocity. We study one-shot cooperation across two main dilemma contexts, provision and maintenance, and show that cooperation is higher in provision than maintenance. Using time-limit manipulations, we experimentally study the cognitive processes underlying this robust result. Supporting the Self-Control Account, people are intuitively selfish in maintenance, with deliberation increasing cooperation. In contrast, consistent with the Social Heuristics Hypothesis, deliberation tends to increase the likelihood of free-riding in provision. Contextual differences between maintenance and provision are observed across additional measures: reaction time patterns of cooperation; social dilemma understanding; perceptions of social appropriateness; beliefs about others' cooperation; and cooperation preferences. Despite these dilemma-specific asymmetries, we show that preferences, coupled with beliefs, successfully predict the high levels of cooperation in both maintenance and provision dilemmas. While the effects of intuitions are context-dependent and small, the widespread preference for strong reciprocity is the primary driver of one-shot cooperation. We advance the Contextualised Strong Reciprocity account as a unifying framework and consider its implications for research and policy.

Altruism, Environmental Concerns, and Pro-environmental Behaviors of Urban Residents: A Case Study in a Typical Chinese City

To investigate the relationships between altruism, environmental concerns, and ordinary people's pro-environmental behaviors that go beyond self-interested NIMBY-ism, we examined measurements of altruism and environmental concerns in a Chinese context and developed a scale that measured people's pro-environmental behaviors at the individual, organizational, and policy level. We then conducted a tailor-made, face-to-face survey (N = 603) and found, first, that old age, gender (being a woman), party affiliation, and education level are positively associated with pro-environmental behaviors at the individual, organizational, and policy levels. We next found that human domination worldviews are negatively associated with individual- and organizational-level pro-environmental behaviors and that eco-centric worldviews are positively associated with individual-level pro-environmental behaviors. Third, we found that altruistic behaviors (prosocial behaviors and/or donations) are positively associated with pro-environmental behaviors. In short, awareness of the ecological crisis and altruism can stimulate people's pro-environmental behaviors in China. Meanwhile, it is doubtful that people care more for the environment after their living standards have improved, because socioeconomic status indicators are not statistically significant for individual-level pro-environmental behaviors.

The cancellation effect at the group level

Group selection models combine selection pressure at the individual level with selection pressure at the group level. Cooperation can be costly for individuals, but beneficial for the group, and therefore, if individuals are sufficiently much assorted, and cooperators find themselves in groups with disproportionately many other cooperators, cooperation can evolve. The existing literature on group selection generally assumes that competition between groups takes place in a well-mixed population of groups, where any group competes with any other group equally intensely. Competition between groups however might very well occur locally; groups may compete more intensely with nearby than with far-away groups. We show that if competition between groups is indeed local, then the evolution of cooperation can be hindered significantly by the fact that groups with many cooperators will mostly compete against neighboring groups that are also highly cooperative, and therefore harder to outcompete. The existing empirical method for determining how conducive a group structured population is to the evolution of cooperation also implicitly assumes global between-group competition, and therefore gives (possibly very) biased estimates.

Group and individual selection during evolutionary transitions in individuality: meanings and partitions

The Price equation embodies the 'conditions approach' to evolution in which the Darwinian conditions of heritable variation in fitness are represented in equation form. The equation can be applied recursively, leading to a partition of selection at the group and individual levels. After reviewing the well-known issues with the Price partition, as well as issues with a partition based on contextual analysis, we summarize a partition of group and individual selection based on counterfactual fitness, the fitness that grouped cells would have were they solitary. To understand 'group selection' in multi-level selection models, we assume that only group selection can make cells suboptimal when they are removed from the group. Our analyses suggest that there are at least three kinds of selection that can be occurring at the same time: group-specific selection along with two kinds of individual selection, within-group selection and global individual selection. Analyses based on counterfactual fitness allow us to specify how close a group is to being a pseudo-group, and this can be a basis for quantifying progression through an evolutionary transition in individuality (ETI). During an ETI, fitnesses at the two levels, group and individual, become decoupled, in the sense that fitness in a group may be quite high, even as counterfactual fitness goes to zero. This article is part of the theme issue 'Fifty years of the Price equation'.

Beyond Value in Moral Phenomenology: The Role of Epistemic and Control Experiences

Many researchers in moral psychology approach the topic of moral judgment in terms of value—assessing outcomes of behaviors as either harmful or helpful, which makes the behaviors wrong or right, respectively. However, recent advances in motivation science suggest that other motives may be at work as well—namely truth (wanting to establish what is real) and control (wanting to manage what happens). In this review, we argue that the epistemic experiences of observers of (im)moral behaviors, and the perceived epistemic experiences of those observed, serve as a groundwork for understanding how truth and control motives are implicated in the moral judgment process. We also discuss relations between this framework and recent work from across the field of moral psychology, as well as implications for future research.

Cooperation in an Assortative Matching Prisoners Dilemma Experiment with Pro-Social Dummies

Assortative matching (AM) can be theoretically an effective means to facilitate cooperation. We designed a controlled lab experiment with three treatments on multi-round prisoner's dilemma. With matching based on weighted history (WH) as surrogate for AM, we show that adding pro-social dummies to the WH treatment may significantly improve cooperation, compared to both the random matching and the WH treatment. In society where assortative matching is effective and promoted by the underlying culture, institutional promotion of virtue role models can be interpreted as generating additional pro-social dummies, so as to move the initial state of cooperators into the basin of attraction for a highly cooperative polymorphic equilibrium.

Examining charitable giving in real-world online donations

The current study uses big data to study prosocial behavior by analyzing donations made on the GoFundMe platform. In a dataset of more than $44 million in online donations, we find that 21% were made while opting to be anonymous to the public, with survey results indicating that 11% of these anonymous donations (2.3% of all donations) are not attributable to any egoistic goal. Additionally, we find that donors gave significantly more to recipients who had the same last name as them. We find evidence that men and women donated more when more donors of the opposite sex were visible on the screen at the time of donating. Our results suggest that men and women were both significantly affected by the average donation amounts visible at the time of their decisions, and men were influenced more. We find that women expressed significantly more empathy than men in messages accompanying their donations.

Questions related to human altruism are often studied through self-reported behavior or by measuring behavior in laboratory experiments. Here, the authors examine real-world prosocial behavior using charitable donations made online.

Mass killing by female soldier larvae is adaptive for the killed male larvae in a polyembryonic wasp

Self-sacrifice is very rare among organisms. Here, we report a new and astonishing case of adaptive self-sacrifice in a polyembryonic parasitic wasp, Copidosoma floridanum. This wasp is unique in terms of its larval cloning and soldier larvae. Male clone larvae have been found to be killed by female soldier larvae, which suggests intersexual conflict between male and female larvae. However, we show here that mass killing is adaptive to all the killed males as well as the female soldiers that have conducted the killing because the killing increases their indirect fitness by promoting the reproduction of their clone sibs. We construct a simple model that shows that the optimal number of surviving males for both male and female larvae is very small but not zero. We then compare this prediction with the field data. These data agree quite well with the model predictions, showing an optimal killing rate of approximately 94-98% of the males in a mixed brood. The underlying mechanism of this mass kill is almost identical to the local competition for mates that occurs in other wasp species. The maternal control of the sex ratio during oviposition, which is well known in other hymenopterans, is impossible in this polyembryonic wasp. Thus, this mass kill is necessary to maximize the fitness of the female killers and male victims, which can be seen as an analogy of programmed cell death in multicellular organisms.

Evolutionary transitions in heritability and individuality

With a few exceptions, the literature on evolutionary transitions in individuality (ETIs) has mostly focused on the relationships between lower-level (particle-level) and higher-level (collective-level) selection, leaving aside the question of the relationship between particle-level and collective-level inheritance. Yet, without an account of this relationship, our hope to fully understand the evolutionary mechanisms underlying ETIs is impeded. To that effect, I present a highly idealized model to study the relationship between particle-level and collective-level heritability both when a collective-level trait is a linear function and when it is a nonlinear function of a particle-level trait. I first show that when a collective trait is a linear function of a particle-level trait, collective-level heritability is a by-product of particle-level heritability. It is equal to particle-level heritability, whether the particles interact randomly or not to form collectives. Second, I show that one effect of population structure is the reduction in variance in offspring collective-level character for a given parental collective. I propose that this reduction in variance is one dimension of individuality. Third, I show that even in the simple case of a nonlinear collective-level character, collective-level heritability is not only weak but also highly dependent on the frequency of the different types of particles in the global population. Finally, I show that population structure, because one of its effects is to reduce the variance in offspring collective-level character, allows not only for an increase in collective-level character but renders it less context dependent. This in turn permits a stable collective-level response to selection. The upshot is that population structure is a driver for ETIs. These results are particularly significant in that the relationship between population structure and collective-level heritability has, to my knowledge, not been previously explored in the context of ETIs.

Compensate a little, but punish a lot: Asymmetric routes to restoring justice

Most people have a desire to live in a just world, a place where good things happen to good people and bad things happen to bad people. And yet, injustices do occur: good things happen to bad people and bad things happen to good people. Across four experiments, we show that people respond quite differently to correct these two types of injustices. When bad things happen to good people, individuals are eager to compensate a good person’s losses, but only do so to a small degree. In contrast, when a good thing happens to a bad person, because the only perceived appropriate act of punishment is to fully strip the bad actor of all his or her illegitimate gains, few people choose to punish in this costly way. However, when they do, they do so to very large degrees. Moreover, we demonstrate that differential psychological mechanisms drive this asymmetry.

Toward a Unification of the Arts

This article presents a manifesto for the scientific exploration of the arts in their totality, rather than conceiving of each artform independently on its own terms. In order to achieve this, I present an analytical procedure that is comprised of two related steps. The first step is to identify instances of sharing in the production mechanisms across artforms, for example the occurrence of rhythmic structure in music, dance, and poetry. The second is to examine how this sharing creates "affordances for combinations," making it possible for music to be set to a poem or for dance movements to be choreographed to music. By elucidating the neurocognitive mechanisms of sharing across arts domains and the affordances that they offer for creating combinations, it should be possible to achieve a unification of the arts.

Neural Basis of Dispositional Awe

Awe differs from common positive emotions, triggered by vast stimuli, and characterized by a need for accommodation (NFA). Although studies have revealed the downstream effects of awe experience, little is known about the neural basis of dispositional awe. In the current study, we determined the neural correlation of dispositional awe by using voxel-based morphometry (VBM) in 42 young healthy adults, as measured by the Dispositional Positive Emotion Scale (DPES). Results revealed that the dispositional awe score was negatively associated with the regional gray matter volume (rGMV) in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), middle/posterior cingulate cortex (MCC/PCC) and middle temporal gyrus (MTG). These results suggest that individual differences in dispositional awe involve multiple brain regions related to attention, conscious self-regulation, cognitive control and social emotion. This study is the first to provide evidence for the structural neural basis of individual differences in dispositional awe.

Reciprocity and exclusion in informal financial institutions: An experimental study of rotating savings and credit associations

Group cooperation is fundamental to human society. The public goods game is often used to describe the difficulty of group cooperation. However, there are other structures of institutions to maintain group cooperation such as Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). ROSCAs are informal financial institutions that exist worldwide, in which all participants contribute to a common fund and take turns to receive a return. ROSCAs are common in developing countries and among migrant groups in developed countries. There are various types of ROSCAs, and they share a crucial problem in that participants whose turn to receive a return has passed have an incentive to default on their contributions. We conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate the mechanisms that can prevent default in a fixed ROSCA, in which the order of receipt of returns is determined before starting and is also known to members. The findings are as follows. (i) Excluding low contributors from ROSCA groups by voting increased contribution rates both before and after the receipt of returns. (ii) ROSCA members exhibited reciprocity and a sense of revenge: that is, members contributed to the returns payments of other members who had contributed to them, and did not contribute to the returns payments of non-contributors. Voluntary behaviors thus sustained ROSCAs. Meanwhile, an exogenous punishment whereby subjects were prevented from receiving returns payments unless they had themselves contributed previously did not increase contribution rates.

Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation Altered Voluntary Cooperative Norms Compliance Under Equal Decision-Making Power

Social norms play an essential role in human interactions and the development of the evolution of human history. Extensive studies corroborate that compliance with social norms typically requires a punishment threat as almost always specific individuals have self-interests that tempt them to violate the norm. Neural imaging studies demonstrate that lateral orbitofrontal cortex (LOFC) and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) are activated when individuals decide to increase social norm compliance when punishment is possible. Moreover, rDLPFC is affirmed to be involved in social norm compliance with or without external punishment threats in a series of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) research. However, these neuroscience studies are based on the ultimatum game (UG) in which the decision-making power between the proposer and the responder is unequal, and no studies support the causal relationship between rDLPFC and voluntary cooperative norms compliance among the equal decision-making power of subjects. Whether modulating the excitability of rDLPFC, which plays a role in norm compliance, alters the extent of compliance with voluntary cooperative norms under equal decision-making power and how norms from different types with asymmetric endowment influence compliance remain unknown. The present study aimed to provide evidence of a direct link between the neural and behavioral results through the application of tDCS over rDLPFC on compliance with voluntary cooperative norms under equal decision-making power. Results verified that activating rDLPFC altered voluntary cooperative norms compliance of all our participants and significant effect over different initial endowments was observed. The role of norm.own and norm.other in compliance was changed in the anodal treatment. Findings validate that enhancing the excitability of the rDLPFC using tDCS leads to high compliance in voluntary cooperation and this effect is specific to equal decision-making power rather than unequal decision-making power.

Processes and patterns of interaction as units of selection: An introduction to ITSNTS thinking

Many practicing biologists accept that nothing in their discipline makes sense except in the light of evolution, and that natural selection is evolution's principal sense-maker. But what natural selection actually is (a force or a statistical outcome, for example) and the levels of the biological hierarchy (genes, organisms, species, or even ecosystems) at which it operates directly are still actively disputed among philosophers and theoretical biologists. Most formulations of evolution by natural selection emphasize the differential reproduction of entities at one or the other of these levels. Some also recognize differential persistence, but in either case the focus is on lineages of material things: even species can be thought of as spatiotemporally restricted, if dispersed, physical beings. Few consider-as "units of selection" in their own right-the processes implemented by genes, cells, species, or communities. "It's the song not the singer" (ITSNTS) theory does that, also claiming that evolution by natural selection of processes is more easily understood and explained as differential persistence than as differential reproduction. ITSNTS was formulated as a response to the observation that the collective functions of microbial communities (the songs) are more stably conserved and ecologically relevant than are the taxa that implement them (the singers). It aims to serve as a useful corrective to claims that "holobionts" (microbes and their animal or plant hosts) are aggregate "units of selection," claims that often conflate meanings of that latter term. But ITSNS also seems broadly applicable, for example, to the evolution of global biogeochemical cycles and the definition of ecosystem function.

Conditional punishment is a double-edged sword in promoting cooperation

Punishment is widely recognized as an effective approach for averting from exploitation by free-riders in human society. However, punishment is costly, and thus rational individuals are unwilling to take the punishing action, resulting in the second-order free-rider problem. Recent experimental study evidences that individuals prefer conditional punishment, and their punishing decision depends on other members' punishing decisions. In this work, we thus propose a theoretical model for conditional punishment and investigate how such conditional punishment influences cooperation in the public goods game. Considering conditional punishers only take the punishing action when the number of unconditional punishers exceeds a threshold number, we demonstrate that such conditional punishment induces the effect of a double-edged sword on the evolution of cooperation both in well-mixed and structured populations. Specifically, when it is relatively easy for conditional punishers to engage in the punishment activity corresponding to a low threshold value, cooperation can be promoted in comparison with the case without conditional punishment. Whereas when it is relatively difficult for conditional punishers to engage in the punishment activity corresponding to a high threshold value, cooperation is inhibited in comparison with the case without conditional punishment. Moreover, we verify that such double-edged sword effect exists in a wide range of model parameters and can be still observed in other different punishment regimes.

The metaphysics of evolution

This paper briefly describes process metaphysics, and argues that it is better suited for describing life than the more standard thing, or substance, metaphysics. It then explores the implications of process metaphysics for conceptualizing evolution. After explaining what it is for an organism to be a process, the paper takes up the Hull/Ghiselin thesis of species as individuals and explores the conditions under which a species or lineage could constitute an individual process. It is argued that only sexual species satisfy these conditions, and that within sexual species the degree of organization varies. This, in turn, has important implications for species' evolvability. One important moral is that evolution will work differently in different biological domains.

Evolving a More Nurturing Society to Prevent Adverse Childhood Experiences

This article presents a framework for evolving a society that nurtures the health and well-being of its population. We review evidence that adverse social conditions, including poverty, conflict, discrimination, and other forms of social rejection, contribute immensely to our most ubiquitous psychological, behavioral, and health problems. We then enumerate the ways that effective family and school prevention programs could ameliorate much of the social adversity leading to these problems. The widespread and effective implementation of these programs-in primary care, social services, and education-must be a high priority. Beyond the implementation of specific programs, however, we must also make a more concerted effort to promote prosocial values that support nurturing families and schools. Our society's priorities must be to generate specific policies that reduce poverty and discrimination and, in so doing, reduce the risk for negative health-related outcomes.

Reduced orbitofrontal cortical volume is associated with interdependent self-construal

Interdependent self-construal refers to a view of the self as embedded in relationships with others. Prior work suggests that this construal is linked to a strong value placed on social obligations and duties. Interdependent people are therefore cognitively attuned to others and various social events in their surroundings while down-regulating their personal goals. In the present work, we examined whether structural properties of the brain predict interdependent self-construal. We performed a structural magnetic resonance imaging on 135 Japanese young adults while assessing (i) independent and interdependent self-construals and (ii) the degree to which individuals form vivid images of external objects (object imagery). The cortical volume of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (a core cortical region responsible for value-based decisionmaking and, thus, inherently involved in personal goals and desires) inversely predicted interdependent self-construal. Further analysis found that the highest level of interdependent self-construal is achieved when those who are relatively low in the OFC volume are simultaneously high in object imagery, consistent with previous evidence that interdependence, as realized via obligation and duty, requires both the reduced self-interest and vigilant cognitive attunement to environmental context.

Multilevel mutation-selection systems and set-valued duals

A class of measure-valued processes which model multilevel multitype populations undergoing mutation, selection, genetic drift and spatial migration is considered. We investigate the qualitative behaviour of models with multilevel selection and the interaction between the different levels of selection. The basic tools in our analysis include the martingale problem formulation for measure-valued processes and a generalization of the function-valued and set-valued dual representations introduced in Dawson-Greven (Spatial Fleming-Viot models with selection and mutation. Lecture notes in mathematics, vol 2092. Springer, Cham, 2014). The dual is a powerful tool for the analysis of the long-time behaviour of these processes and the study of evolutionary systems which model phenomena including altruism, the emergence of cooperation and more complex interactions.

Intergroup Biases in Fear-induced Aggression

Using a recently created preemptive strike game (PSG) with 176 participants, we investigated if the motivations of spite and/or fear promotes aggression that requires a small cost to the aggressor and imposes a larger cost on the opponent, and confirmed the earlier finding that fear does but spite does not promote intergroup aggression when the groups are characterized as minimal groups; additionally, the rate of intergroup aggression did not vary according to the group membership of the opponent. The PSG represents a situation in which both the motivations of spite and of fear can logically drive players to choose an option of aggression against an opponent. Participants decide whether or not to attack another participant, who also has the same capability. The decision is made in real time, using a computer. We discuss theoretical implications of our findings on the evolutionary foundations of intragroup cooperation and intergroup aggression. The evolutionary model of intergroup aggression, or the parochial altruism model, posits that intragroup cooperation and intergroup aggression have co-evolved, and thus it predicts both intragroup cooperation and intergroup aggression to emerge even in a minimal group devoid of a history of intergroup relationships. The finding that only intragroup cooperation but not intergroup aggression emerged in the minimal group experiments strongly suggests that intergroup aggression involves a psychological mechanism that is independent from that of intragroup cooperation. We further discuss the implications of these findings on real-world politics and military strategy.

Selfish genetic elements and the gene's-eye view of evolution

During the last few decades, we have seen an explosion in the influx of details about the biology of selfish genetic elements. Ever since the early days of the field, the gene's-eye view of Richard Dawkins, George Williams, and others, has been instrumental to make sense of new empirical observations and to the generation of new hypotheses. However, the close association between selfish genetic elements and the gene's-eye view has not been without critics and several other conceptual frameworks have been suggested. In particular, proponents of multilevel selection models have used selfish genetic elements to criticize the gene's-eye view. In this paper, I first trace the intertwined histories of the study of selfish genetic elements and the gene's-eye view and then discuss how their association holds up when compared with other proposed frameworks. Next, using examples from transposable elements and the major transitions, I argue that different models highlight separate aspects of the evolution of selfish genetic elements and that the productive way forward is to maintain a plurality of perspectives. Finally, I discuss how the empirical study of selfish genetic elements has implications for other conceptual issues associated with the gene's-eye view, such as agential thinking, adaptationism, and the role of fitness maximizing models in evolution.

Group-Level Selection Increases Cooperation in the Public Goods Game

When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less successful groups. Group-level selection is the most extreme form of group competition, where the weaker group ceases to exist, becoming extinct. We implement group-level selection in a controlled laboratory experiment in order to study its impact on human cooperation. The experiment uses variations on the standard linear public goods game. Group-level selection operates through competition for survival: the least successful, lowest-earning groups become extinct, in the sense that they no longer are able to play the game. Additional control treatments include group comparison without extinction, and extinction of the least successful individuals across groups. We find that group-level extinction produces very high contributions to the provision of the public good, while group comparison alone or individual extinction fail to cause higher contributions. Our results provide stark evidence that group-level selection enhances within-group cooperation.

The Need for a More Effective Science of Cultural Practices

Behavior analysis has produced a robust theoretical analysis of the contingencies involved in cultural evolution. Yet, thus far, the empirical yield of this work remains quite limited. With this paper, I attempt to provide specific examples of the ways to advance an experimental analysis of the contingencies involved in cultural evolution. I begin with a review of the theoretical analyses developed by behavior analysts and other contextually oriented scientists. Next, I submit that, if the goal of our science is both predicting and influencing cultural phenomena, we must produce experimental analyses of the impact of meta-contingencies on organizations' practices. There is no more pressing reason for doing this than the threat of climate change posed by the continuing growth in human use of fossil fuels. Therefore, the paper provides an analysis of the contingencies influencing organizational practices now affecting continued use of fossil fuels and the contingencies for organizations seeking to prevent their use. One concrete step to advance a science of cultural change relevant to climate change would be to create a database of organizations that are promoting vs. working to prevent fossil fuel consumption and the consequences that seem to maintain their practices. I call for experimental analysis of the impact of altering consequences for these practices and for experimental analyses of interventions intended to change the norms, values, and behavior of organizational leaders who can influence fossil fuel consumption. I then discuss the role of prosocial behavior and values in affecting behavior relevant to reducing fossil fuel consumption because the empirical evidence shows that prosociality favors more "green" behavior. Recent advances in prevention research have identified interventions to promote prosociality, but we need experimental analyses of how advocacy organizations can be more effective in getting these interventions widely adopted.

The Culture-Transmission Motive in Immigrants: A World-Wide Internet Survey

A world-wide internet survey was conducted to test central assumptions of a recent theory of cultural transmission in minorities proposed by the authors. 844 1st to 2nd generation immigrants from a wide variety of countries recruited on a microjob platform completed a questionnaire designed to test eight hypotheses derived from the theory. Support was obtained for all hypotheses. In particular, evidence was obtained for the continued presence, in the immigrants, of the culture-transmission motive postulated by the theory: the desire to maintain the culture of origin and transmit it to the next generation. Support was also obtained for the hypothesized anchoring of the culture-transmission motive in more basic motives fulfilled by cultural groups, the relative intra- and intergenerational stability of the culture-transmission motive, and its motivating effects for action tendencies and desires that support cultural transmission under the difficult conditions of migration. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the assumption that people have a culture-transmission motive belongs to the folk psychology of sociocultural groups, and that immigrants regard the fulfillment of this desire as a moral right.

Multilevel selection, cooperation, and altruism : Reflections on unto others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior

Unto Others (Sober and Wilson 1998) shows how the general principles of Multi-Level Selection (MLS) theory apply to selection at multiple levels of the biological hierarchy. It also argues for the existence of "genuine" evolutionary and psychological altruism. The authors' views on altruism do not follow logically from principles of MLS, and their failure do disentangle these two themes undermines their otherwise excellent presentation of MLS theory. Rebuttal of the view that human nature is completely selfish depends not on the prevalence of altruism but on the importance of group-advantageous traits that benefit both self and other group members without necessarily inflicting direct costs on outsiders.

Prosocial values and group assortation : Within an N-person prisoner's dilemma game

Ninety-five freshmen each recruited three peers to play a "group bidding game," an N-person prisoner's dilemma in which anyone could win movie tickets depending on their scores in the game. Prior to playing, all participants completed a measure of prosocial value orientation. Replicating and extending earlier findings (Sheldon and McGregor 2000), our results show that prosocial participants were at a disadvantage within groups. Despite this vulnerability, prosocial participants did no worse overall than asocial participants because a counteracting group-level advantage arose for prosocials, who tended to be concentrated in groups. Implications of this assortative process for the egoism/altruism debate, and for hierarchical selection theory, are discussed.

Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms

This paper provides strong evidence challenging the self-interest assumption that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary thinking. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish noncooperators. We call this behavioral propensity "strong reciprocity" and show empirically that it can lead to almost universal cooperation in circumstances in which purely self-interested behavior would cause a complete breakdown of cooperation. In addition, we show that people are willing to punish those who behaved unfairly towards a third person or who defected in a Prisoner's Dilemma game with a third person. This suggests that strong reciprocity is a powerful device for the enforcement of social norms involving, for example, food sharing or collective action. Strong reciprocity cannot be rationalized as an adaptive trait by the leading evolutionary theories of human cooperation (in other words, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, and costly signaling theory). However, multilevel selection theories of cultural evolution are consistent with strong reciprocity.

Pro-community altruism and social status in a Shuar village

Reciprocity theory (RT) and costly signaling theory (CST) provide different explanations for the high status of pro-community altruists: RT proposes that altruists are positively and negatively sanctioned by others, whereas CST proposes that altruists are attractive to others. Only RT, however, is beset by first- and higher-order free rider problems, which must be solved in order for RT to explain status allocations. In this paper, several solutions to RT's free rider problems are proposed, and data about status allocations to Ecuadorian Shuar pro-community altruists are analyzed in light of RT and CST. These data confirm that perceived pro-community altruists are indeed high status and suggest that (1) community residents skillfully monitor the altruism of coresidents, (2) residents who engage in opportunities to broadcast desirable qualities are high status only to the extent that they are considered altruistic, and (3) individuals who sanction coresidents based on coresidents' contributions to the community are themselves relatively high status. To a greater extent than CST, RT straightforwardly predicts all of these results.

Food sharing at meals : Kinship, reciprocity, and clustering in the taimyr autonomous okrug, northern Russia

The presence of a kinship link between nuclear families is the strongest predictor of interhousehold sharing in an indigenous, predominantly Dolgan food-sharing network in northern Russia. Attributes such as the summed number of hunters in paired households also account for much of the variation in sharing between nuclear families. Differences in the number of hunters in partner households, as well as proximity and producer/consumer ratios of households, were investigated with regard to cost-benefit models. The subset of households involved in reciprocal meal sharing is 26 of 84 household host-guest pairs. The frequency of reciprocal meal sharing between families in this subset is positively correlated with average household relatedness. The evolution of cooperation through clustering may illuminate the relationship between kinship and reciprocity at this most intimate level of food sharing.

Norm enforcement among the Ju/'hoansi Bushmen : A case of strong reciprocity?

The concept of cooperative communities that enforce norm conformity through reward, as well as shaming, ridicule, and ostracism, has been central to anthropology since the work of Durkheim. Prevailing approaches from evolutionary theory explain the willingness to exert sanctions to enforce norms as self-interested behavior, while recent experimental studies suggest that altruistic rewarding and punishing-"strong reciprocity"-play an important role in promoting cooperation. This paper will use data from 308 conversations among the Ju/'hoansi (!Kung) Bushmen (a) to examine the dynamics of norm enforcement, (b) to evaluate the costs of punishment in a forager society and understand how they are reduced, and

Cognitive cooperation : When the going gets tough, think as a group

Cooperation can evolve in the context of cognitive activities such as perception, attention, memory, and decision making, in addition to physical activities such as hunting, gathering, warfare, and childcare. The social insects are well known to cooperate on both physical and cognitive tasks, but the idea of cognitive cooperation in humans has not received widespread attention or systematic study. The traditional psychological literature often gives the impression that groups are dysfunctional cognitive units, while evolutionary psychologists have so far studied cognition primarily at the individual level. We present two experiments that demonstrate the superiority of thinking in groups, but only for tasks that are sufficiently challenging to exceed the capacity of individuals. One of the experiments is in a brain-storming format, where advantages of real groups over nominal groups have been notoriously difficult to demonstrate. Cognitive cooperation might often operate beneath conscious awareness and take place without the need for overt training, as evolutionary psychologists have stressed for individual-level cognitive adaptations. In general, cognitive cooperation should be a central subject in human evolutionary psychology, as it already is in the study of the social insects.

Utilities of gossip across organizational levels : Multilevel selection, free-riders, and teams

Gossip is a subject that has been studied by researchers from an array of disciplines with various foci and methods. We measured the content of language use by members of a competitive sports team across 18 months, integrating qualitative ethnographic methods with quantitative sampling and analysis. We hypothesized that the use of gossip will vary significantly depending on whether it is used for self-serving or group-serving purposes. Our results support a model of gossip derived from multilevel selection theory that expects gossip to serve group-beneficial rules when rewards are partitioned at the group level on a scale that permits mutual monitoring. We integrate our case study with earlier studies of gossip conducted by anthropologists, psychologists, and management researchers.

The emergence of cooperation from a single mutant during microbial life cycles

Cooperative behaviour is widespread in nature, even though cooperating individuals always run the risk of being exploited by free-riders. Population structure effectively promotes cooperation given that a threshold in the level of cooperation was already reached. However, the question how cooperation can emerge from a single mutant, which cannot rely on a benefit provided by other cooperators, is still puzzling. Here, we investigate this question for a well-defined but generic situation based on typical life cycles of microbial populations where individuals regularly form new colonies followed by growth phases. We analyse two evolutionary mechanisms favouring cooperative behaviour and study their strength depending on the inoculation size and the length of a life cycle. In particular, we find that population bottlenecks followed by exponential growth phases strongly increase the survival and fixation probabilities of a single cooperator in a free-riding population.

Heritability of decisions and outcomes of public goods games

Prosociality is one of the most distinctive features of human beings but there are individual differences in cooperative behavior. Employing the twin method, we examined the heritability of cooperativeness and its outcomes on public goods games using a strategy method. In two experiments (Study 1 and Study 2), twin participants were asked to indicate (1) how much they would contribute to a group when they did not know how much the other group members were contributing, and (2) how much they would contribute if they knew the contributions of others. Overall, the heritability estimates were relatively small for each type of decision, but heritability was greater when participants knew that the others had made larger contributions. Using registered decisions in Study 2, we conducted seven Monte Carlo simulations to examine genetic and environmental influences on the expected game payoffs. For the simulated one-shot game, the heritability estimates were small, comparable to those of game decisions. For the simulated iterated games, we found that the genetic influences first decreased, then increased as the numbers of iterations grew. The implication for the evolution of individual differences in prosociality is discussed.

Primate sociality to human cooperation. Why us and not them?

Developmental psychologists identify propensities for social engagement in human infants that are less evident in other apes; Sarah Hrdy links these social propensities to novel features of human childrearing. Unlike other ape mothers, humans can bear a new baby before the previous child is independent because they have help. This help alters maternal trade-offs and so imposes new selection pressures on infants and young children to actively engage their caretakers' attention and commitment. Such distinctive childrearing is part of our grandmothering life history. While consequences for other cooperative activities must surely follow, the novel rearing environments set up by helpful grandmothering can explain why natural selection escalated preferences and motivations for interactivity in our lineage in the first place, and why, unlike other aspects of infant development, social sensitivities are not delayed in humans compared with genus Pan.

Intranasal administration of oxytocin increases compassion toward women

It has been suggested that the degree of compassion-the feeling of warmth, understanding and kindness that motivates the desire to help others, is modulated by observers' views regarding the target's vulnerability and suffering. This study tested the hypothesis that as compassion developed to protect vulnerable kinships, hormones such as oxytocin, which have been suggested as playing a key role in 'tend-and-befriend' behaviors among women, will enhance compassion toward women but not toward men. Thirty subjects participated in a double-blind, placebo-controlled, within-subject study. Following administration of oxytocin/placebo, participants listened to recordings of different female/male protagonists describing distressful emotional conflicts and were then asked to provide compassionate advice to the protagonist. The participants' responses were coded according to various components of compassion by two clinical psychologists who were blind to the treatment. The results showed that in women and men participants oxytocin enhanced compassion toward women, but did not affect compassion toward men. These findings indicate that the oxytocinergic system differentially mediates compassion toward women and toward men, emphasizing an evolutionary perspective that views compassion as a caregiving behavior designed to help vulnerable individuals.

The genetical theory of multilevel selection

The theory of multilevel selection (MLS) is beset with conceptual difficulties. Although it is widely agreed that covariance between group trait and group fitness may arise in the natural world and drive a response to ‘group selection’, ambiguity exists over the precise meaning of group trait and group fitness and as to whether group selection should be defined according to changes in frequencies of different types of individual or different types of group. Moreover, the theory of MLS has failed to properly engage with the problem of class structure, which greatly limits its empirical application to, for example, social insects whose colonies are structured into separate age, sex, caste and ploidy classes. Here, I develop a genetical theory of MLS, to address these problems. I show that taking a genetical approach facilitates a decomposition of group-level traits – including reproductive success – into the separate contributions made by each constituent individual, even in the context of so-called emergence. However, I uncover a novel problem with the group-oriented approach: in many scenarios, it may not be possible to express a meaningful covariance between trait and fitness at the level of the social group, because the group's constituents belong to separate, irreconcilable classes.

Nascent multicellular life and the emergence of individuality

The evolution of multicellular organisms from unicellular ancestors involves a shift in the level at which selection operates. It is usual to think about this shift in terms of the emergence of traits that cause heritable differences in reproductive output at the level of nascent collectives. Defining these traits and the causes of their origin lies at the heart of understanding the evolution of multicellular life. In working toward a mechanistic, take-nothing-for-granted account, we begin by recognizing that the standard Lewontin formulation of properties necessary and sufficient for evolution by natural selection does not necessarily encompass Darwinian evolution in primitive collectives where parent-offspring relationships may have been poorly defined. This, we suggest, limits the ability to conceptualize and capture the earliest manifestations of Darwinian properties. By way of solution we propose a relaxed interpretation of Lewontin's conditions and present these in the form of a set of necessary requirements for evolution by natural selection based upon the establishment of genealogical connections between recurrences of collectives. With emphasis on genealogy - as opposed to reproduction - it is possible to conceive selection acting on collectives prior to any manifestation of heritable variance in fitness. Such possibility draws attention to the evolutionary emergence of traits that strengthen causal relationships between recurrences - traits likely to underpin the emergence of forms of multiplication that establish parent-offspring relationships. Application of this framework to collectives of marginal status, particularly those whose recurrence is not defined by genealogy, makes clear that change at the level of collectives need not arise from selection acting at the higher level. We conclude by outlining applicability of our framework to loosely defined collectives of cells, such as those comprising the slugs of social amoeba and microbes that constitute the human microbiome.

Neural basis of increased costly norm enforcement under adversity

Humans are willing to punish norm violations even at a substantial personal cost. Using fMRI and a variant of the ultimatum game and functional magnetic resonance imaging, we investigated how the brain differentially responds to fairness in loss and gain domains. Participants (responders) received offers from anonymous partners indicating a division of an amount of monetary gain or loss. If they accept, both get their shares according to the division; if they reject, both get nothing or lose the entire stake. We used a computational model to derive perceived fairness of offers and participant-specific inequity aversion. Behaviorally, participants were more likely to reject unfair offers in the loss (vs gain) domain. Neurally, the positive correlation between fairness and activation in ventral striatum was reduced, whereas the negative correlations between fairness and activations in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were enhanced in the loss domain. Moreover, rejection-related dorsal striatum activation was higher in the loss domain. Furthermore, the gain-loss domain modulates costly punishment only when unfair behavior was directed toward the participants and not when it was directed toward others. These findings provide neural and computational accounts of increased costly norm enforcement under adversity and advanced our understanding of the context-dependent nature of fairness preference.

The effect of ostracism and optional participation on the evolution of cooperation in the voluntary public goods game

Not only animals, plants and microbes but also humans cooperate in groups. The evolution of cooperation in a group is an evolutionary puzzle, because defectors always obtain a higher benefit than cooperators. When people participate in a group, they evaluate group member's reputations and then decide whether to participate in it. In some groups, membership is open to all who are willing to participate in the group. In other groups, a candidate is excluded from membership if group members regard the candidate's reputation as bad. We developed an evolutionary game model and investigated how participation in groups and ostracism influence the evolution of cooperation in groups when group members play the voluntary public goods game, by means of computer simulation. When group membership is open to all candidates and those candidates can decide whether to participate in a group, cooperation cannot be sustainable. However, cooperation is sustainable when a candidate cannot be a member unless all group members admit them to membership. Therefore, it is not participation in a group but rather ostracism, which functions as costless punishment on defectors, that is essential to sustain cooperation in the voluntary public goods game.

The role of cognitive and emotional perspective taking in economic decision making in the ultimatum game

We conducted a simple resource allocation game known as the ultimatum game (UG) with preschoolers to examine the role of cognitive and emotional perspective-taking ability on allocation and rejection behavior. A total of 146 preschoolers played the UG and completed a false belief task and an emotional perspective-taking test. Results showed that cognitive perspective taking ability had a significant positive effect on the proposer's offer and a negative effect on the responder's rejection behavior, whereas emotional perspective taking ability did not impact either the proposer's or responder's behavior. These results imply that the ability to anticipate the responder's beliefs, but not their emotional state, plays an important role in the proposer's choice of a fair allocation in an UG, and that children who have not acquired theory of mind still reject unfair offers.

The effect of conflicting pressures on the evolution of division of labor

Within nature, many groups exhibit division of labor. Individuals in these groups are under seemingly antagonistic pressures to perform the task most directly beneficial to themselves and to potentially perform a less desirable task to ensure the success of the group. Performing experiments to study how these pressures interact in an evolutionary context is challenging with organic systems because of long generation times and difficulties related to group propagation and fine-grained control of within-group and between-group pressures. Here, we use groups of digital organisms (i.e., self-replicating computer programs) to explore how populations respond to antagonistic multilevel selection pressures. Specifically, we impose a within-group pressure to perform a highly-rewarded role and a between-group pressure to perform a diverse suite of roles. Thus, individuals specializing on highly-rewarded roles will have a within-group advantage, but groups of such specialists have a between-group disadvantage. We find that digital groups could evolve to be either single-lineage or multi-lineage, depending on experimental parameters. These group compositions are reminiscent of different kinds of major evolutionary transitions that occur within nature, where either relatives divide labor (fraternal transitions) or multiple different organisms coordinate activities to form a higher-level individual (egalitarian transitions). Regardless of group composition, organisms embraced phenotypic plasticity as a means for genetically similar individuals to perform different roles. Additionally, in multi-lineage groups, organisms from lineages performing highly-rewarded roles also employed reproductive restraint to ensure successful coexistence with organisms from other lineages.

Evolving the future: toward a science of intentional change

Humans possess great capacity for behavioral and cultural change, but our ability to manage change is still limited. This article has two major objectives: first, to sketch a basic science of intentional change centered on evolution; second, to provide examples of intentional behavioral and cultural change from the applied behavioral sciences, which are largely unknown to the basic sciences community. All species have evolved mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity that enable them to respond adaptively to their environments. Some mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity count as evolutionary processes in their own right. The human capacity for symbolic thought provides an inheritance system having the same kind of combinatorial diversity as does genetic recombination and antibody formation. Taking these propositions seriously allows an integration of major traditions within the basic behavioral sciences, such as behaviorism, social constructivism, social psychology, cognitive psychology, and evolutionary psychology, which are often isolated and even conceptualized as opposed to one another. The applied behavioral sciences include well-validated examples of successfully managing behavioral and cultural change at scales ranging from individuals to small groups to large populations. However, these examples are largely unknown beyond their disciplinary boundaries, for lack of a unifying theoretical framework. Viewed from an evolutionary perspective, they are examples of managing evolved mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity, including open-ended processes of variation and selection. Once the many branches of the basic and applied behavioral sciences become conceptually unified, we are closer to a science of intentional change than one might think.

Context-dependent social evaluation in 4.5-month-old human infants: the role of domain-general versus domain-specific processes in the development of social evaluation

The ability to distinguish friends from foes allows humans to engage in mutually beneficial cooperative acts while avoiding the costs associated with cooperating with the wrong individuals. One way to do so effectively is to observe how unknown individuals behave toward third parties, and to selectively cooperate with those who help others while avoiding those who harm others. Recent research suggests that a preference for prosocial over antisocial individuals emerges by the time that infants are 3 months of age, and by 8 months, but not before, infants evaluate others' actions in context: they prefer those who harm, rather than help, individuals who have previously harmed others. Currently there are at least two reasons for younger infants' failure to show context-dependent social evaluations. First, this failure may reflect fundamental change in infants' social evaluation system over the first year of life, in which infants first prefer helpers in any situation and only later evaluate prosocial and antisocial actors in context. On the other hand, it is possible that this developmental change actually reflects domain-general limitations of younger infants, such as limited memory and processing capacities. To distinguish between these possibilities, 4.5-month-olds in the current studies were habituated, rather than familiarized as in previous work, to one individual helping and another harming a third party, greatly increasing infants' exposure to the characters' actions. Following habituation, 4.5-month-olds displayed context-dependent social preferences, selectively reaching for helpers of prosocial and hinderers of antisocial others. Such results suggest that younger infants' failure to display global social evaluation in previous work reflected domain-general rather than domain-specific limitations.

The evolutionary origin of somatic cells under the dirty work hypothesis

Experimental evolution of digital organisms suggests that mutagenic side effects associated with performing valuable metabolic work can produce germ-soma differentiation in multicellular organisms.

Reproductive division of labor is a hallmark of multicellular organisms. However, the evolutionary pressures that give rise to delineated germ and somatic cells remain unclear. Here we propose a hypothesis that the mutagenic consequences associated with performing metabolic work favor such differentiation. We present evidence in support of this hypothesis gathered using a computational form of experimental evolution. Our digital organisms begin each experiment as undifferentiated multicellular individuals, and can evolve computational functions that improve their rate of reproduction. When such functions are associated with moderate mutagenic effects, we observe the evolution of reproductive division of labor within our multicellular organisms. Specifically, a fraction of the cells remove themselves from consideration as propagules for multicellular offspring, while simultaneously performing a disproportionately large amount of mutagenic work, and are thus classified as soma. As a consequence, other cells are able to take on the role of germ, remaining quiescent and thus protecting their genetic information. We analyze the lineages of multicellular organisms that successfully differentiate and discover that they display unforeseen evolutionary trajectories: cells first exhibit developmental patterns that concentrate metabolic work into a subset of germ cells (which we call “pseudo-somatic cells”) and later evolve to eliminate the reproductive potential of these cells and thus convert them to actual soma. We also demonstrate that the evolution of somatic cells enables phenotypic strategies that are otherwise not easily accessible to undifferentiated organisms, though expression of these new phenotypic traits typically includes negative side effects such as aging.

Cells within an organism are categorized as “germ” if they are able to grow into a whole new offspring organism or as “soma” if they contribute to the body's functionality but cannot produce an offspring themselves. From an evolutionary perspective, it is important to ask why and how a multicellular organism would demarcate the reproductive potential of its cells. Here we propose the “dirty work hypothesis,” which argues that germ–soma differentiation is an adaptation to allow metabolic work that damages a cell's DNA. Soma can afford to perform this “dirty work,” while germ cells must keep their DNA pristine for future multicellular offspring. We use digital organisms to provide experimental evidence in support of this hypothesis and present an unexpected evolutionary trajectory: multicellular organisms first evolve to confine damaging metabolic work to a subset of cells (which we label “pseudo-soma”) before more complex developmental patterns arise that allow for reproductive division of labor with a proper soma. Finally, we demonstrate that somatic cells allow organisms to evolve valuable functions that are otherwise too damaging to cells; however, they come with the side effect of rapid aging. Similar pressures may have produced reproductive division of labor in other contexts, such as the differentiation of reproductive queens and sterile workers in eusocial insect colonies.

A comparative analysis of spatial Prisoner's Dilemma experiments: conditional cooperation and payoff irrelevance

We have carried out a comparative analysis of data collected in three experiments on Prisoner's Dilemmas on lattices available in the literature. We focus on the different ways in which the behavior of human subjects can be interpreted, in order to empirically narrow down the possibilities for behavioral rules. Among the proposed update dynamics, we find that the experiments do not provide significant evidence for non-innovative game dynamics such as imitate-the-best or pairwise comparison rules, whereas moody conditional cooperation is supported by the data from all three experiments. This conclusion questions the applicability of many theoretical models that have been proposed to understand human behavior in spatial Prisoner's Dilemmas. A rule compatible with all our experiments, moody conditional cooperation, suggests that there is no detectable influence of interaction networks on the emergence of cooperation in behavioral experiments.

Utility rate equations of group population dynamics in biological and social systems

We present a novel system of equations to describe the evolution of self-organized structured societies (biological or human) composed of several trait groups. The suggested approach is based on the combination of ideas employed in the theory of biological populations, system theory, and utility theory. The evolution equations are defined as utility rate equations, whose parameters are characterized by the utility of each group with respect to the society as a whole and by the mutual utilities of groups with respect to each other. We analyze in detail the cases of two groups (cooperators and defectors) and of three groups (cooperators, defectors, and regulators) and find that, in a self-organized society, neither defectors nor regulators can overpass the maximal fractions of about [Formula: see text] each. This is in agreement with the data for bee and ant colonies. The classification of societies by their distance from equilibrium is proposed. We apply the formalism to rank the countries according to the introduced metric quantifying their relative stability, which depends on the cost of defectors and regulators as well as their respective population fractions. We find a remarkable concordance with more standard economic ranking based, for instance, on GDP per capita.

The neurobiology of collective action

This essay introduces a neurologically-informed mathematical model of collective action (CA) that reveals the role for empathy and distress in motivating costly helping behaviors. We report three direct tests of model with a key focus on the neuropeptide oxytocin as well as a variety of indirect tests. These studies, from our lab and other researchers, show support for the model. Our findings indicate that empathic concern, via the brain's release of oxytocin, is a trigger for CA. We discuss the implications from this model for our understanding why human beings engage in costly CA.