Loss of the Kamin blocking effect in acute but not chronic schizophrenics

Overshadowing and salience attribution in relation to cannabis use

Aberrant attentional salience has been implicated in the cannabis-psychosis association. Here, history and frequency of cannabis use were examined against changes in overshadowing (OS), a cue competition paradigm that involves salience processing. Additionally, we examined the association between OS and alternative measures of aberrant salience, as well as schizotypy, in a non-clinical adult sample. 280 participants completed an online geometry learning-based OS task, while a subset (N = 149) also completed the Salience Attribution Task (SAT) measure of aberrant salience. All completed the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ), Aberrant Salience Inventory (ASI), and the modified Cannabis Experience Questionnaire (CEQmv). Differences across OS and SAT performance stages and between cannabis use groups were assessed using mixed ANOVAs. Multiple regression and correlational analyses assessed the relationships between OS and SAT task metrics and SPQ and ASI subscale scores. Current cannabis users had significantly lower OS scores during the testing phase relative to those who do not use cannabis, at medium effect sizes. Schizotypy or ASI scores did not mediate this relationship. In the SAT, current cannabis users presented significantly higher implicit aberrant salience relative to non-users. Scores in the first training phase of the OS task significantly predicted higher explicit aberrant and adaptive salience scores in the SAT. These data indicate an association between regular cannabis use and abnormalities in cue competition effects in a healthy adult sample. Comparisons of OS and SAT cast new light on putative overlapping mechanisms underlying performance across different measures of salience.

The prediction-error hypothesis of schizophrenia: new data point to circuit-specific changes in dopamine activity

Schizophrenia is a severe psychiatric disorder affecting 21 million people worldwide. People with schizophrenia suffer from symptoms including psychosis and delusions, apathy, anhedonia, and cognitive deficits. Strikingly, schizophrenia is characterised by a learning paradox involving difficulties learning from rewarding events, whilst simultaneously 'overlearning' about irrelevant or neutral information. While dysfunction in dopaminergic signalling has long been linked to the pathophysiology of schizophrenia, a cohesive framework that accounts for this learning paradox remains elusive. Recently, there has been an explosion of new research investigating how dopamine contributes to reinforcement learning, which illustrates that midbrain dopamine contributes in complex ways to reinforcement learning, not previously envisioned. This new data brings new possibilities for how dopamine signalling contributes to the symptomatology of schizophrenia. Building on recent work, we present a new neural framework for how we might envision specific dopamine circuits contributing to this learning paradox in schizophrenia in the context of models of reinforcement learning. Further, we discuss avenues of preclinical research with the use of cutting-edge neuroscience techniques where aspects of this model may be tested. Ultimately, it is hoped that this review will spur to action more research utilising specific reinforcement learning paradigms in preclinical models of schizophrenia, to reconcile seemingly disparate symptomatology and develop more efficient therapeutics.

Agency rescues competition for credit assignment among predictive cues from adverse learning conditions

A fundamental assumption of learning theories is that the credit assigned to predictive cues is not simply determined by their probability of reinforcement, but by their ability to compete with other cues present during learning. This assumption has guided behavioral and neural science research for decades, and tremendous empirical and theoretical advances have been made identifying the mechanisms of cue competition. However, when learning conditions are not optimal (e.g., when training is massed), cue competition is attenuated. This failure of the learning system exposes the individual’s vulnerability to form spurious associations in the real world. Here, we uncover that cue competition in rats can be rescued when conditions are suboptimal provided that the individual has agency over the learning experience. Our findings reveal a new effect of agency over learning on credit assignment among predictive cues, and open new avenues of investigation into the underlying mechanisms.

Cannabis Use, Schizotypy and Kamin Blocking Performance

Cannabis use has been associated with increased risk for a first episode of psychosis and inappropriate assignment of salience to extraneous stimuli has been proposed as a mechanism underlying this association. Psychosis-prone (especially schizotypal) personality traits are associated with deficits in associative learning tasks that measure salience allocation. The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between history of cannabis use and Kamin blocking (KB), a form of selective associative learning, in a non-clinical sample. Additionally, KB was examined in relation to self-reported schizotypy and aberrant salience scale profiles. A cross-sectional study was conducted in 307 healthy participants with no previous psychiatric or neurological history. Participants were recruited and tested using the Testable Minds behavioural testing platform. KB was calculated using Oades' "mouse in the house task", performance of which is disrupted in schizophrenia patients. Schizotypy was measured using the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ), and the Aberrant Salience Inventory (ASI) was used to assess self-reported unusual or inappropriate salience. The modified Cannabis Experience Questionnaire (CEQm) was used to collect detailed history of use of cannabis and other recreational drugs. Regression models and Bayesian t-tests or ANOVA (or non-parametric equivalents) examined differences in KB based on lifetime or current cannabis use (frequent use during previous year), as well as frequency of use among those who had previously used cannabis. Neither lifetime nor current cannabis use was associated with any significant change in total or trial-specific KB scores. Current cannabis use was associated with higher Disorganised SPQ dimension scores and higher total and sub-scale values for the ASI. A modest positive association was observed between total KB score and Disorganised SPQ dimension scores, but no relationships were found between KB and other SPQ measures. Higher scores on "Senses Sharpening" ASI sub-scale predicted decreased KB score only in participants who have not engaged in recent cannabis use. These results are discussed in the context of our understanding of the effects of long-term cannabis exposure on salience attribution, as well as inconsistencies in the literature with respect to both the relationship between KB and schizotypy and the measurement of KB associative learning phenomena.

Irrelevance by inhibition: Learning, computation, and implications for schizophrenia

Symptoms of schizophrenia may arise from a failure of cortical circuits to filter-out irrelevant inputs. Schizophrenia has also been linked to disruptions in cortical inhibitory interneurons, consistent with the possibility that in the normally functioning brain, these cells are in some part responsible for determining which sensory inputs are relevant versus irrelevant. Here, we develop a neural network model that demonstrates how the cortex may learn to ignore irrelevant inputs through plasticity processes affecting inhibition. The model is based on the proposal that the amount of excitatory output from a cortical circuit encodes the expected magnitude of reward or punishment ("relevance"), which can be trained using a temporal difference learning mechanism acting on feedforward inputs to inhibitory interneurons. In the model, irrelevant and blocked stimuli drive lower levels of excitatory activity compared with novel and relevant stimuli, and this difference in activity levels is lost following disruptions to inhibitory units. When excitatory units are connected to a competitive-learning output layer with a threshold, the relevance code can be shown to "gate" both learning and behavioral responses to irrelevant stimuli. Accordingly, the combined network is capable of recapitulating published experimental data linking inhibition in frontal cortex with fear learning and expression. Finally, the model demonstrates how relevance learning can take place in parallel with other types of learning, through plasticity rules involving inhibitory and excitatory components, respectively. Altogether, this work offers a theory of how the cortex learns to selectively inhibit inputs, providing insight into how relevance-assignment problems may emerge in schizophrenia.

Evidence of absence: no relationship between behaviourally measured prediction error response and schizotypy

INTRODUCTION

The predictive processing framework has attracted much interest in the field of schizophrenia research in recent years, with an increasing number of studies also carried out in healthy individuals with nonclinical psychosis-like experiences. The current research adopted a continuum approach to psychosis and aimed to investigate different types of prediction error responses in relation to psychometrically defined schizotypy.

METHODS

One hundred and two healthy volunteers underwent a battery of behavioural tasks including (a) a force-matching task, (b) a Kamin blocking task, and (c) a reversal learning task together with three questionnaires measuring domains of schizotypy from different approaches.

RESULTS

Neither frequentist nor Bayesian statistical methods supported the notion that alterations in prediction error responses were related to schizotypal traits in any of the three tasks.

CONCLUSIONS

These null results suggest that deficits in predictive processing associated with clinical states of psychosis are not always present in healthy individuals with schizotypal traits.

Validating the construct of aberrant salience in schizophrenia - Behavioral evidence for an automatic process

Suspecting significance behind ordinary events is a common feature in psychosis and it is assumed to occur due to aberrant salience attribution. The Salience Attribution Test (SAT; Roiser et al., 2009) measures aberrant salience as a bias towards one out of two equally reinforced cue features as opposed to adaptive salience towards features indicating high reinforcement. This is the first study to validate the latent constructs involved in salience attribution in patients. Forty-nine schizophrenia patients and forty-four healthy individuals completed the SAT, a novel implicit salience paradigm (ISP), a reversal learning task and a neuropsychological test battery. First, groups were compared on raw measures. Second and within patients, these were correlated and then used for a principal component analysis (PCA). Third, sum scores matching the correlation and component pattern were correlated with psychopathology. Compared to healthy individuals, patients exhibited more implicit aberrant salience in the SAT and ISP and less implicit and explicit adaptive salience attribution in the SAT. Implicit aberrant salience from the SAT and ISP positively correlated with each other and negatively with reversal learning. Whereas explicit aberrant salience was associated with cognition, implicit and explicit adaptive salience were positively correlated. A similar pattern emerged in the PCA and implicit aberrant salience was associated with negative symptoms. Taken together, implicit aberrant salience from the SAT and ISP seems to reflect an automatic process that is independent from deficient salience ascription to relevant events. Its positive correlation with negative symptoms might reflect motivational deficits present in chronic schizophrenia patients.

The Neurodevelopmental Impact of Prenatal Infections at Different Times of Pregnancy: The Earlier the Worse?

Environmental insults taking place in early brain development may have long-lasting consequences for adult brain functioning. There is a large body of epidemiological data linking maternal infections during pregnancy to a higher incidence of psychiatric disorders with a presumed neurodevelopmental origin in the offspring, including schizophrenia and autism. Although specific gestational windows may be associated with a differing vulnerability to infection-mediated disturbances in normal brain development, it still remains debatable whether and/or why certain gestation periods may confer maximal risk for neurodevelopmental disturbances following the prenatal exposure to infectious events. In this review, the authors integrate both epidemiological and experimental findings supporting the hypothesis that infection-associated immunological events in early fetal life may have a stronger neurodevelopmental impact compared to late pregnancy infections. This is because infections in early gestation may not only interfere with fundamental neurodevelopmental events such as cell proliferation and differentiation, but it may also predispose the developing nervous system to additional failures in subsequent cell migration, target selection, and synapse maturation, eventually leading to multiple brain and behavioral abnormalities in the adult offspring. The temporal dependency of the epidemiological link between maternal infections during pregnancy and a higher risk for brain disorders in the offspring may thus be explained by specific spatiotemporal events in the course of fetal brain development. NEUROSCIENTIST 13(3):241—256, 2007.

Altered basolateral amygdala encoding in an animal model of schizophrenia

It has been proposed that schizophrenia results, in part, from the inappropriate or spurious attribution of salience to cues in the environment. We have recently reported neural correlates of salience in the basolateral amygdala (ABL) of rats during learning in an odor-guided discrimination task. Here we tested whether this dopamine-dependent salience signal is altered in rats with neonatal ventral hippocampal lesions (NVHLs), a rodent model of schizophrenia. We found that ABL signals related to violations in reward prediction were only mildly affected by NVHL; however, neurons in rats with NVHLs showed significantly stronger selectivity during odor sampling, particularly for the more salient large-reward cue. The elevated cue-evoked activity in NVHL rats was correlated with heightened orienting behavior and also with changes in firing to the shifts in reward, suggesting that it reflected abnormal signaling of the large reward-predicting cue's salience. These results are broadly consistent with the proposal that schizophrenics suffer from enhanced signaling of salience.

Delusions and prediction error: re-examining the behavioural evidence for disrupted error signalling in delusion formation

INTRODUCTION

There is now significant evidence that prediction error signalling is mediated by dopamine in the midbrain, and that dopamine dysfunction is implicated in people experiencing psychotic symptoms, including delusions. There has also been significant theorizing and experimentation concerning the remaining link in this triad, namely that deviant prediction error signalling produces or maintains psychotic symptoms.

METHODS

The research supporting the link between prediction error signalling and delusional symptoms was reviewed. Numerous studies indirectly support this link, but only one set of studies claim to directly test this hypothesis by combining three crucial elements: a patient sample, a manipulation of prediction error and neuroimaging. This particular set of studies were examined in detail.

RESULTS

Important methodological limitations in these studies were observed, and a reinterpretation of their data was offered.

CONCLUSIONS

Methodological inconsistencies significantly weaken the claims made by these studies, but their data are consistent with current theorizing and they are instructive for future lines of inquiry in this field.

Selectivity in associative learning: a cognitive stage framework for blocking and cue competition phenomena

BLOCKING IS THE MOST IMPORTANT PHENOMENON IN THE HISTORY OF ASSOCIATIVE LEARNING THEORY: for over 40 years, blocking has inspired a whole generation of learning models. Blocking is part of a family of effects that are typically termed "cue competition" effects. Common amongst all cue competition effects is that a cue-outcome relation is poorly learned or poorly expressed because the cue is trained in the presence of an alternative predictor or cause of the outcome. We provide an overview of the cognitive processes involved in cue competition effects in humans and propose a stage framework that brings these processes together. The framework contends that the behavioral display of cue competition is cognitively construed following three stages that include (1) an encoding stage, (2) a retention stage, and (3) a performance stage. We argue that the stage framework supports a comprehensive understanding of cue competition effects.

Tobacco smoking in schizophrenia: investigating the role of incentive salience

BACKGROUND

Smoking is highly prevalent in people diagnosed with schizophrenia, but the reason for this co-morbidity is currently unclear. One possible explanation is that a common abnormality underpins the development of psychosis and independently enhances the incentive motivational properties of drugs and their associated cues. This study aimed to investigate whether incentive salience attribution towards smoking cues, as assessed by attentional bias, is heightened in schizophrenia and associated with delusions and hallucinations.

METHOD

Twenty-two smokers diagnosed with schizophrenia and 23 control smokers were assessed for smoking-related attentional bias using a modified Stroop task. Craving, nicotine dependence, smoking behaviour and positive and negative symptoms of schizophrenia were also recorded.

RESULTS

Both groups showed similar craving scores and smoking behaviour according to self-report and expired carbon monoxide (CO), although the patient group had higher nicotine dependence scores. Attentional bias, as evidenced by significant interference from smoking-related words on the modified Stroop task, was similar in both groups and correlated with CO levels. Attentional bias was positively related to severity of delusions but not hallucinations or other symptoms in the schizophrenia group.

CONCLUSIONS

This study supports the hypothesis that the development of delusions and the incentive motivational aspects of smoking may share a common biological substrate. These findings may offer some explanation for the elevated rates of smoking and other drug use in people with psychotic illness.

Attention to irrelevant cues is related to positive symptoms in schizophrenia

Many modern learning theories assume that the amount of attention to a cue depends on how well that cue predicted important events in the past. Schizophrenia is associated with deficits in attention and recent theories of psychosis have argued that positive symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations are related to a failure of selective attention. However, evidence demonstrating that attention to irrelevant cues is related to positive symptoms in schizophrenia is lacking. We used a novel method of measuring attention to nonpredictive (and thus irrelevant) cues in a causal learning test (Le Pelley ME, McLaren IP. Learned associability and associative change in human causal learning. Q J Exp Psychol B. 2003;56:68-79) to assess whether healthy adults and people with schizophrenia discriminate previously predictive and nonpredictive cues. In a series of experiments with independent samples, we demonstrated: (1) when people with schizophrenia who had severe positive symptoms successfully distinguished between predictive and nonpredictive cues during training, they failed to discriminate between predictive and nonpredictive cues relative to healthy adults during subsequent testing and (2) learning about nonpredictive cues was correlated with more severe positive symptoms scores in schizophrenia. These results suggest that positive symptoms of schizophrenia are related to increased attention to nonpredictive cues during causal learning. This deficit in selective attention results in learning irrelevant causal associations and may be the basis of positive symptoms in schizophrenia.

Intrusions in trauma and psychosis: information processing and phenomenology

BACKGROUND

Intrusions are common symptoms of both post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and schizophrenia. It has been suggested that an information processing style characterized by weak trait contextual integration renders psychotic individuals vulnerable to intrusive experiences. This 'contextual integration hypothesis' was tested in individuals reporting anomalous experiences in the absence of a need for care.

METHOD

Twenty-six low schizotypes and 23 individuals reporting anomalous experiences were shown a traumatic film with and without a concurrent visuospatial task (VST). Participants rated post-traumatic intrusions for frequency and form, and completed self-report measures of information processing style. It was predicted that, because of their weaker trait contextual integration, the anomalous experiences (AE) group would (1) exhibit more intrusions following exposure to the trauma film, (2) display intrusions characterized by more PTSD qualities and (3) show a greater reduction of intrusions with the concurrent VST.

RESULTS

As predicted, the AE group reported a lower level of trait contextual integration and more intrusions than the low schizotypes, both immediately after watching the film and during the following 7 days. Their post-traumatic intrusive memories were more PTSD-like (more intrusive, vivid and associated with emotion). The VST had no effect on the number of intrusions in either group.

CONCLUSIONS

These findings provide some support for the proposal that weak trait contextual integration underlies the development of intrusions within both PTSD and psychosis.

Kamin blocking is associated with reduced medial-frontal gyrus activation: implications for prediction error abnormality in schizophrenia

The following study used 3-T functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the neural signature of Kamin blocking. Kamin blocking is an associative learning phenomenon seen where prior association of a stimulus (A) with an outcome blocks subsequent learning to an added stimulus (B) when both stimuli are later presented together (AB) with the same outcome. While there are a number of theoretical explanations of Kamin blocking, it is widely considered to exemplify the use of prediction error in learning, where learning occurs in proportion to the difference between expectation and outcome. In Kamin blocking as stimulus A fully predicts the outcome no prediction error is generated by the addition of stimulus B to form the compound stimulus AB, hence learning about it is "blocked". Kamin blocking is disrupted in people with schizophrenia, their relatives and healthy individuals with high psychometrically-defined schizotypy. This disruption supports suggestions that abnormal prediction error is a core deficit that can help to explain the symptoms of schizophrenia. The present study tested 9 healthy volunteers on an f-MRI adaptation of Oades' "mouse in the house task", the only task measuring Kamin blocking that shows disruption in schizophrenia patients that has been independently replicated. Participant's Kamin blocking scores were found to inversely correlate with Kamin-blocking-related activation within the prefrontal cortex, specifically the medial frontal gyrus. The medial frontal gyrus has been associated with the psychological construct of uncertainty, which we suggest is consistent with disrupted Kamin blocking and demonstrated in people with schizophrenia. These data suggest that the medial frontal gyrus merits further investigation as a potential locus of reduced Kamin blocking and abnormal prediction error in schizophrenia.

When to hold that thought: an experimental study showing reduced inhibition of pre-trained associations in schizophrenia

Schizophrenia encompasses a wide variety of cognitive dysfunctions, a number of which can be understood as deficits of inhibition. To date, no research has examined ‘conditioned inhibition’ in schizophrenia - the ability of a stimulus that signals the absence of an expected outcome to counteract the conditioned response produced by a signal for that outcome (a conditioned excitor). A computer-based task was used to measure conditioned excitation and inhibition in the same discrimination procedure, in 25 patients with a confirmed diagnosis of schizophrenia and a community-based comparison sample. Conditioned inhibition was measured by a ratio score, which compared the degree to which the inhibitory stimulus and a neutral control stimulus reduced conditioned responding to the excitatory cue: the lower the ratio, the greater the inhibitory learning. At test the ratios were 0.45 and 0.39 for patient and control groups respectively, and the relevant interaction term of the ANOVA confirmed that the degree of inhibition was reduced in the patient group, with an effect size of r = 0.28.

These results demonstrate for the first time that inhibitory learning is impaired in schizophrenia. Such an impairment provides an attractive framework for the interpretation of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. However, we were unable to demonstrate any relationship between the level of conditioned inhibition and medication. Similarly, in the present study it must be emphasised that the available data did not demonstrate any relationship between individual variation in inhibitory learning and the level of positive symptoms as measured by the PANSS. In fact inhibitory learning impairment was relatively greater in participants with a predominantly negative symptom profile and their excitatory learning was also reduced. Accordingly the next step will be to investigate such relationships in a larger sample with a priori defined sub-groups displaying predominantly positive versus predominantly negative symptoms.

Behavioral animal models of antipsychotic drug actions

Basic research in animals represents a fruitful approach to study the neurobiological basis of brain and behavioral disturbances relevant to neuropsychiatric disease and to establish and evaluate novel pharmacological therapies for their treatment. In the context of schizophrenia, there are models employing specific experimental manipulations developed according to specific pathophysiological or etiological hypotheses. The use of selective lesions in adult animals and the acute administration of psychotomimetic agents are indispensable tools in the elucidation of the contribution of specific brain regions or neurotransmitters to the genesis of a specific symptom or collection of symptoms and enjoy some degrees of predictive validity. However, they may be inaccurate, if not inadequate, in capturing the etiological mechanisms or ontology of the disease needed for a complete understanding of the disease and may be limited in the discovery of novel compounds for the treatment of negative and cognitive symptoms of schizophrenia. Under the prevailing consensus of schizophrenia as a disease of neurodevelopmental origin, we have seen the establishment of neurodevelopmental animal models which aim to identify the etiological processes whereby the brain, following specific triggering events, develops into a "schizophrenia-like brain" over time. Many neurodevelopmental models such as the neonatal ventral hippocampus (vHPC) lesion, methylazoxymethanol (MAM), and prenatal immune activation models can mimic a broad spectrum of behavioral, cognitive, and pharmacological abnormalities directly implicated in schizophrenic disease. These models allow pharmacological screens against multiple and coexisting schizophrenia-related dysfunctions while incorporating the disease-relevant concept of abnormal brain development. The multiplicity of existing models is testimonial to the multifactorial nature of schizophrenia, and there are ample opportunities for their integration. Indeed, one ultimate goal must be to incorporate the successes of distinct models into one unitary account of the complex disorder of schizophrenia and to use such unitary approaches in the further development and evaluation of novel antipsychotic treatment strategies.

To poly(I:C) or not to poly(I:C): advancing preclinical schizophrenia research through the use of prenatal immune activation models

The neurodevelopmental hypothesis of schizophrenia has been highly influential in shaping our current thinking about modeling the disease in animals. Based on the findings provided by human epidemiological studies, a great deal of recent interest has been centered upon the establishment of neurodevelopmental rodent models in which the basic experimental manipulation takes the form of prenatal exposure to infection and/or immune activation. One such model is based on prenatal treatment with the inflammatory agent poly(I:C) (=polyriboinosinic-polyribocytidilic acid), a synthetic analog of double-stranded RNA. Since its initial establishment and application to basic schizophrenia research, the poly(I:C) model has made a great impact on researchers concentrating on the neurodevelopmental and neuroimmunological basis of complex human brain disorders such as schizophrenia, and as a consequence, the model now enjoys wide recognition in the international scientific community. The present article emphasizes that the poly(I:C) model has gained such impact because it successfully accounts for several aspects of schizophrenia epidemiology, pathophysiology, symptomatology, and treatment. The numerous features of this experimental system make the poly(I:C) model a very powerful neurodevelopmental animal model of schizophrenia-relevant brain disease which is expected to be capable of critically advancing our knowledge of how the brain, following an (immune-associated) triggering event in early life, can develop into a "schizophrenia-like brain" over time. Furthermore, the poly(I:C) model seems highly suitable for the exploration of novel pharmacological and neuro-immunomodulatory strategies for both symptomatic and preventive treatments against psychotic disease, as well as for the identification of neurobiological mechanisms underlying gene-environment and environment-environment interactions presumably involved in the etiology of schizophrenia and related disorders.

Variations in selective and nonselective prediction error with the negative dimension of schizotypy

Two human associative-learning experiments investigated the relationship between the negative dimension of schizotypy and selective and nonselective prediction-error learning. Experiment 1 demonstrates that individuals low, but not high, on the introvertive anhedonia dimension of schizotypy demonstrate Kamin blocking, which has been taken to reflect the operation of selective learning (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). In complement, Experiment 2 demonstrates that individuals high, but not low, on the same dimension demonstrate asymmetrical learning about the components of a compound stimulus that differ in their associative history, which has been suggested to reflect the operation of nonselective learning (Rescorla, 2000). The implications of this double dissociation for understanding the nature of the cognitive deficit in schizophrenia and for theories of learning are considered.

Intact associative learning in patients with schizophrenia: evidence from a Go/NoGo paradigm

OBJECTIVE

Schizophrenia is associated with deficits in executive control and associative learning. In the present study, we investigated the effect of associative learning during a Go/NoGo task in healthy controls subjects and patients with schizophrenia.

METHODS

Thirty patients with schizophrenia and 30 age-and-gender matched healthy control subjects performed 15 blocks of training and 3 blocks of test trials. The trials consisted of responding to words denoting either living or non-living objects. In the training condition, subjects were instructed to respond by pressing the space bar (Go-task) to one of the word types (living or non-living objects), but not the other. In the test phase, the Go/NoGo mapping was reversed. Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. Reaction times (RT) and accuracy were recorded for each trial and all subjects were debriefed upon completion of the test trials.

RESULTS

Patients with schizophrenia had significantly longer Go RTs when compared to the control group, during both training and test trials. However, the two groups did not differ on any measure of associative learning.

CONCLUSIONS

Our findings suggest that associative learning is intact in schizophrenia patients during the performance of a relational Go/NoGo paradigm.

Disentangling the attentional deficit in schizophrenia: pointers from schizotypy

It has been argued that schizophrenia is associated with abnormalities in the allocation of attention, and that such abnormalities extend to members of the healthy population who are high in schizotypy; however, alternative interpretations of previous experimental evidence relating to this issue are possible. We present a learned irrelevance paradigm that provides a less equivocal measure of attentional processing during learning, and demonstrate a reliable reduction in learned irrelevance among healthy participants with high scores on a dimension of schizotypy corresponding to the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. These results support the suggestion that high schizotypy (and, by extension, schizophrenia) is associated with deficits in the appropriate allocation of attention.

On giving a more active and selective role to consciousness

An active role for conscious processes in the production of behaviour is proposed, involving top level controls in a hierarchy of behavioural control. It is suggested that by inhibiting or sensitizing lower levels in the hierarchy conscious processes can play a role in the organization of ongoing behaviour. Conscious control can be more or less evident, according to prevailing circumstances.

The control of consciousness via a neuropsychological feedback loop

Gray's neuropsychological model of consciousness uses a hierarchical feedback loop framework that has been extensively discussed by many others in psychology. This commentary therefore urges Gray to integrate with, or at least acknowledge previous models. It also points out flaws in his feedback model and suggests directions for further theoretical work.

Don't leave the “un” off “consciousness”

Gray extrapolates from circuit models of psychopathology to propose neural substrates for the contents of consciousness. I raise three concerns: (1) knowledge of synaptic arrangements may be inadequate to fully support his model; (2) latent inhibition deficits in schizophrenia, a focus of this and related models, are complex and deserve replication; and (3) this conjecture omits discussion of the neuropsychological basis for the contents of the unconscious.

Consciousness is for other people

Gray has expanded his account of schizophrenia to explain consciousness as well. His theory explains neither phenomenon adequately because he treats individual minds (and brains) in isolation. The primary function of consciousness is to permit high level interactions with other conscious beings. The key symptoms of schizophrenia reflect a failure of this mechanism.

Comparators, functions, and experiences

The comparator model is insufficient for three reasons. First, consciousness is involved in the process of comparison as well as in the output. Second, we still do not have enough neurophysiological information to match the events of consciousness, although such knowledge is growing. Third, the anatomical localisation proposed can be damaged bilaterally but consciousness will persist.

Possible roles for a predictor plus comparator mechanism in human episodic recognition memory and imitative learning

This commentary is divided into two parts. The first considers a possible role for Gray's predictor plus comparator mechanism in human episodic recognition memory. It draws on the computational specifications of recognition outlined in Humphreys et al. (1994) to demonstrate how the logically necessary components of recognition tasks might be mapped onto the mechanism. The second part demonstrates how the mechanism outlined by Gray might be implicated in a form of imitative learning suitable for the acquisition of complex tasks.

Consciousness does not seem to be linked to a single neural mechanism

On the basis of neuropsychological evidence, it is clear that attention should be given a role in any model (or conjecture) of consciousness. What is known about the many instances of dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge after brain damage suggests that conscious experience might not be linked to a restricted area of the brain. Even if it were true that there is a single brain area devoted to consciousness, the subicular area would seem to be an unlikely possibility.

Segmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia

Segmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia reflects a loss of the normal Gestalt organization and contextualization of perception. Grays model explains such segmentalization in terms of septohippocampal dysfunction, which is consistent with known neuropsychological impairment in schizophrenia. However, other considerations suggest that everyday perception and its failure in schizophrenia also involve prefrontal executive mechanisms, which are only minimally elaborated by Gray.

Unitary consciousness requires distributed comparators and global mappings

Gray, like other recent authors, seeks a scientific approach to consciousness, but fails to provide a biologically convincing description, partly because he implicitly bases his model on a computationalist foundation that embeds the contents of thought in irreducible symbolic representations. When patterns of neural activity instantiating conscious thought are shorn of homuncular observers, it appears most likely that these patterns and the circuitry that compares them with memories and plans should be found distributed over large regions of neocortex.

On seeking the mythical fountain of consciousness

Because consciousness has an organizational, or functional, center, Gray supposes that there must be a corresponding physical center in the brain. He proposes further that since this center generates consciousness, ablating it would eliminate consciousness, while leaving behavior intact. But the center of consciousness is simply the product of the functional linkages among sensory input, memory, inner speech, and so on, and behavior.

Prospects for a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness

In this commentary, I point out some weaknesses in Gray's target article and, in the light of that discussion, I attempt to delineate the kinds of problem a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness faces on its way to a scientific understanding of subjective experience.

Septohippocampal comparator: Consciousness generator or attention feedback loop?

As Gray insists, his comparator model proposes a brute correlation only – of consciousness with septohippocampal output. I suggest that the comparator straddles a feedback loop that boosts the activation ofnovelrepresentations, thus helping them feature in present or recollected experience. Such a role in organizing conscious contents would transcend correlation and help explain how consciousness emerges from brain function.

Perspective, reflection, transparent explanation, and other minds

Perspective and reflection (whether involving conceptual or nonconceptual content) have each been considered in some way basic to phenomenal consciousness. Each has possible evolutionary value, though neither seems sufficient for consciousness. Consider an account of consciousness in terms of the combination of perspective and reflection, its relationship to the problem of other minds, and its capacity to inherit evolutionary explanation from its components.

Psychopathology and the discontinuity of conscious experience

It is accepted that “primary awareness” may emerge from the integration of two classes of information. It is unclear, however, why this cannot take place within the comparator rather than in conjunction with feedback to the perceptual systems. The model has plausibility in relation to the continuity of conscious experience in the normal waking state and may be extended to encompass certain aspects of the “sense of self” which are frequently disrupted in psychotic patients.

Consciousness, memory, and the hippocampal system: What kind of connections can we make?

Gray's account is remarkable in its depth and scope but too little attention is paid to poor correspondences with the literature on hippocampal/subicular damage, the theta rhythm, and novelty detection. An alternative account, focusing on hippocampal involvement in organizing memories in a way that makes them accessible to conscious recollection but not in access to consciousness per se, avoids each of these limitations.

Communication and consciousness: A neural network conjecture

The communicative aspects of the contents of consciousness are analyzed in the framework of a neural network model of animal communication. We discuss some issues raised by Gray, such as the control of the contents of consciousness, the adaptive value of consciousness, conscious and unconscious behaviors, and the nature of a model's consciousness.

Overworking the hippocampus

The postulated hippocampal comparator, like any other subsystem, must rely on “syntactic” patterns in its “input,” and hence could not have the extraordinary powers Gray supposes. It may play a more modest role, but it is not the place “where it all comes together” for consciousness.

Consciousness and its (dis)contents

The first claim in the target article was that there is as yet no transparent, causal account of the relations between consciousness and brain-and-behaviour. That claim remains firm. The second claim was that the contents of consciousness consist, psychologically, of the outputs of a comparator system; the third consisted of a description of the brain mechanisms proposed to instantiate the comparator. In order to defend these claims against criticism, it has been necessary to clarify the distinction between consciousness-as-such and the contents of consciousness, to widen the description of the neural machinery instantiating the comparator system, and to clarify the relationship between the contents of consciousness in the here-and-now and episodic memory.

The contents of consciousness: A neuropsychological conjecture

Drawing on previous models of anxiety, intermediate memory, the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, and goal-directed behaviour, a neuropsychological hypothesis is proposed for the generation of the contents of consciousness. It is suggested that these correspond to the outputs of a comparator that, on a moment-by-moment basis, compares the current state of the organism's perceptual world with a predicted state. An outline is given of the information-processing functions of the comparator system and of the neural systems which mediate them. The hypothesis appears to be able to account for a number of key features of the contents of consciousness. However, it is argued that neitherthis nor any existing comparable hypothesis is yet able to explain why the brain should generate conscious experience of any kind at all.

The elusive quale

If sensations were behaviorally conceived, as they should be, as complex functional patterns of interaction between overt behavior and the environment, there would be no point in searching for them as instantaneous psychic elements (qualia) within the brain or as internal products of the brain.

Information synthesis in cortical areas as an important link in brain mechanisms of mind

To explore the mechanism of sensation correlations between EP (evoked potential) component amplitude and signal detection indices (d' and criterion) were studied. The time of sensation coincided with the peak latency of those EP components that showed a correlation with both indices. The components presumably reflected information synthesis in projection cortical neurons. A mechanism providing the synthesis process is proposed.

The limits of neurophysiological models of consciousness

This commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other thirdperson perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the brain.

Reticular-thalamic activation of the cortex generates conscious contents

Gray hypothesizes that the contents of consciousness correspond to the outputs of a subicular (hippocampal/temporal lobe) comparator that compares the current state of the organism's perceptual world with a predicted state. I argue that Gray has identified a key contributing system to conscious awareness, but that his model is inadequate for explaining how conscious contents are generated in the brain. An alternative model is offered.

Hunting for consciousness in the brain: What is (the name of) the game?

Robust theories concerning the connection between consciousness and brain function should derive not only from empirical evidence but also from a well grounded inind-body ontology. In the case of the comparator hypothesis, Gray develops his ideas relying extensively on empirical evidence, but he bounces irresolutely among logically incompatible metaphysical theses which, in turn, leads him to excessively skeptical conclusions concerning the naturalization of consciousness.

Mind – your head!

Gray takes an information-processing paradigm as his departure point, invoking a comparator as part of the system. He concludes that consciousness is to be found “in” the comparator but is unable to point to how the comparison takes place. Thus, the comparator turns out not to be an entity arising out of brain research per se, but out of the logic of the paradigm. In this way, Gray both reinvents dualism and remains trapped in the language game of his own model – ending up dealing with the unknowable.

The homunculus at home

In Gray's conjecture, mismatches in the subicular comparator (needing problem resolution) and matches (during appetitive approach) have equal prominence in consciousness. In rival cognitive views novelty and difficulty (i.e., information-processing mismatches) especially elicit more conscious modes of cognition and higher levels of self-regulation. The mismatch between Gray's conjecture and these views is discussed.