Tooling

Evidence of self-care tooling and phylogenetic modeling reveal parrot tool use is not rare

Putatively rare behaviors like tool use are difficult to study because absence of evidence can arise from a species' inability to produce the behavior or from insufficient research. We combine data from digital platforms and phylogenetic modeling to estimate rates of tool use in parrots. Videos on YouTube revealed novel instances of self-care tooling in 17 parrot species, more than doubling the number of tool-using parrots from 11 (3%) to 28 (7%). Phylogenetic modeling suggests 11-17% of extant parrot species may be capable of tool use and identifies likely candidates. These discoveries impact our understanding of the evolution of tool use in parrots, revealing associations with relative brain size and feeding generalism and indicating likely ancestral tool use in several genera. Our findings challenge the assumption that current sampling efforts fully capture the distribution of putatively rare animal behaviors and offer a fruitful approach for investigating other rare behaviors.

Tool evolution as a prerequisite for consciousness

Within the concept of the extended mind, the active modification of external objects, externalizations, is seen as an auxiliary means to adapt to the environment. Toolmaking and use are advanced stages of externalizations that evolve. All past or present tools can, theoretically, be precisely assigned a location in an evolutionary tree with predecessors and progeny. Tools are reliably replicated, modified, and selected by their ability to facilitate human needs. Tool evolution, therefore, fulfills Darwinian criteria where the material tool is the phenotype and the instruction to build it is the code. The ostensive triangle consisting of a pointing individual, an observing individual, and a pointed-at object or tool is the germ cell of social transmission of instructions. Tool-building instructions ultimately can be reduced to distinct sequences of motor acts that can be recombined and are socially transmitted. When executed, they replicate tools for the reward of convenience or improved fitness. Tools elicit affordances relating to their use that synchronize different individuals' perceptions, result in psychological "understanding," and thereby modify social networks. Massive tool fabrication as present today in the "tool-sphere" has, therefore, accelerated prosociality and over time led to the acquisition of an individual's third person perspective. The entangled biological evolution accelerated the ongoing cumulative cultural evolution by selecting traits facilitating social transmission. In this context, tool evolution and the corresponding acquired individual instructional content is a precondition to the emergence of higher cognition and "consciousness." A neuroscience investigating externalizations as the starting point of this process is urgently needed.

Mechanical problem solving by plush-crested jays: are tools special after all?

Tool use is taxonomically associated with high behavioural flexibility and innovativeness, and its prevalence is greater in primates and some bird species. This association, however, is not known to be causally determinant of tool-related competence since flexibility and innovativeness are often observed in the absence of tool use and vice versa. For this reason, it is interesting to explore whether animals that can be loosely categorized as outstanding, or 'intelligent' physical problem solvers, are also remarkable using tools innovatively, rather than tool use presenting special constraints. We investigate this problem using plush-crested jays (Cyanocorax chrysops), a corvid new to cognitive research that shows highly flexible and inquisitive behaviour in the wild and has not been reported to use tools. We tested jays in two tasks of apparent similar manipulative complexity and incentive, one involving a tool (T) and the other not (NT). In the NT task birds had to open a box with a transparent lid blocked by a latch to get a reward, whereas in the T task, they had to use a rake to pull out the reward from the box. Eight out of nine subjects succeeded in the NT task, whereas none of them learned to solve the T task. This is consistent with tool use involving dedicated competencies, rather than just high problem-solving proficiency.

How smart was T. rex? Testing claims of exceptional cognition in dinosaurs and the application of neuron count estimates in palaeontological research

Recent years have seen increasing scientific interest in whether neuron counts can act as correlates of diverse biological phenomena. Lately, Herculano-Houzel (2023) argued that fossil endocasts and comparative neurological data from extant sauropsids allow to reconstruct telencephalic neuron counts in Mesozoic dinosaurs and pterosaurs, which might act as proxies for behaviors and life history traits in these animals. According to this analysis, large theropods such as Tyrannosaurus rex were long-lived, exceptionally intelligent animals equipped with "macaque- or baboon-like cognition", whereas sauropods and most ornithischian dinosaurs would have displayed significantly smaller brains and an ectothermic physiology. Besides challenging established views on Mesozoic dinosaur biology, these claims raise questions on whether neuron count estimates could benefit research on fossil animals in general. Here, we address these findings by revisiting Herculano-Houzel's (2023) work, identifying several crucial shortcomings regarding analysis and interpretation. We present revised estimates of encephalization and telencephalic neuron counts in dinosaurs, which we derive from phylogenetically informed modeling and an amended dataset of endocranial measurements. For large-bodied theropods in particular, we recover significantly lower neuron counts than previously proposed. Furthermore, we review the suitability of neurological variables such as neuron numbers and relative brain size to predict cognitive complexity, metabolic rate and life history traits in dinosaurs, coming to the conclusion that they are flawed proxies for these biological phenomena. Instead of relying on such neurological estimates when reconstructing Mesozoic dinosaur biology, we argue that integrative studies are needed to approach this complex subject.

How bipedalism shapes humans' actions with hand tools

The task for an embodied cognitive understanding of humans' actions with tools is to elucidate how the human body, as a whole, supports the perception of affordances and dexterous action with objects in relation to other objects. Here, we focus on the relationship between humans' actions with handheld tools and bipedal posture. Posture plays a pivotal role in shaping animals' perception and action dynamics. While humans stand and locomote bipedally, other primates predominantly employ quadrupedal postures and locomotion, relying on both hands and feet to support the body. Drawing upon evidence from evolutionary biology, developmental psychology and performance studies, we elucidate the influence of bipedalism on our actions with objects and on our proficiency in using tools. We use the metaphor of cascades to capture the dynamic, nonlinear transformations in morphology and behaviour associated with posture and the use of tools across evolutionary and developmental timescales. Recent work illustrates the promise of multifractal cascade analysis to reveal nonlinear, cross-scale interactions across the entire body in real-time, supporting the perception of affordances for actions with tools. Cascade analysis enriches our comprehension of real-time performance and facilitates exploration of the relationships among whole-body coordination, individual development, and evolutionary processes.This article is part of the theme issue 'Minds in movement: embodied cognition in the age of artificial intelligence'.

Children's limited tooling ability in a novel concurrent tool use task supports the innovation gap

School-aged children have consistently shown a surprising developmental lag when attempting to innovate solutions to tool use tasks, despite being capable of learning to solve these problems from a demonstrator. We suggest that this "innovation gap" arises from tool tasks with more complex spatial relations. Following Fragaszy and Mangalam's new tooling theory, we predicted that innovating a new "sticker slide" task should be more challenging when two tools need to be used at the same time (concurrently) rather than one at a time (sequentially), despite the similarity of the other task elements. In line with previous work, both versions of the task were challenging for all ages of children (4-9 years) that we tested. However, the youngest group showed particularly extreme difficulties, which was marked by not a single child innovating the concurrent version. Although success significantly increased with age, even the oldest group failed to reach 50% success on the concurrent version of the task, whereas the majority of the two older groups could solve the sequential version. Thus, in this first study of concurrent tool use in children, we found support for the prediction that increasing the complexity of spatial relations in tooling exacerbates the innovation gap.

Object play and problem solving in infancy: Insights into tool use

Tool use is primarily, but not exclusively, present in species with otherwise advanced cognitive traits. However, the interaction between such traits and conspecific inter-individual variation in the presence, complexity, or intensity of tool use is far from being established. We addressed this matter among human infants, seeking factors that relate to differences in tool use. We examined, both correlationally and experimentally, whether the propensity to engage in object combinations predicts performance in means-end problem-solving tasks involving or not involving the use of a tool. We tested 71 infants aged 15, 18, 21, and 24 months, dividing them into two subgroups: one exposed to an adult demonstrating object-object combinations (i.e., "prompting" infants to combine objects together) and another with comparable social exposure but where the adult demonstrated single-object manipulations. We found a correlation between the combined level of spontaneous and prompted object combinations and problem-solving performance regardless of the involvement of tools in the problem. However, we did not find differences in tool-use performance between the two demonstration subgroups. The correlational analysis suggests that complexity of play, as measured by the frequency of combining objects, is linked to infants' problem-solving skills rather than being specifically associated with tool use, as previously suggested in the literature.

Flexible tool set transport in Goffin's cockatoos

The use of tool sets constitutes one of the most elaborate examples of animal technology, and reports of it in nature are limited to chimpanzees and Goffin's cockatoos. Although tool set use in Goffin's was only recently discovered, we know that chimpanzees flexibly transport tool sets, depending on their need. Flexible tool set transport can be considered full evidence for identification of a genuine tool set, as the selection of the second tool is not just a response to the outcomes of the use of the first tool but implies recognizing the need for both tools before using any of them (thus, categorizing both tools together as a tool set). In three controlled experiments, we tested captive Goffin's in tasks inspired by the termite fishing of Goualougo Triangle's chimpanzees. Thereby, we show that some Goffin's can innovate the use and flexibly use and transport a new tool set for immediate future use; therefore, their sequential tool use is more than the sum of its parts. VIDEO ABSTRACT.

Stone tools improve diet quality in wild monkeys

Tool use is a fundamental feature of human evolution. Stone tools are in the archaeological record from 3.4 Ma, even before Homo,¹ and the use of stone tools probably predated the split between hominins and panins.² Using tools (hereafter, tooling cf Fragaszy and Mangalam³) is hypothesized to have improved hominins' foraging efficiency or access to high-quality foods.^4-7 This hypothesis is supported if feeding with tools positively contributes to diet quality in extant non-human primates or if foraging efficiency is increased by tooling. However, the contribution of tooling to non-human primates' foraging success has never been investigated through a direct analysis of nutritional ecology.^8,9 We used multi-dimensional nutritional geometry to analyze energy and macronutrients (nonstructural carbohydrates, lipids, and protein) in the diets of wild capuchin monkeys (Sapajus libidinous) that routinely crack palm nuts with stone hammers.^10,11 We show that eating nuts obtained through tooling helps monkeys to achieve more consistent dietary intakes. Tooling increased the net energy gain by 50% and decreased the proportion of fiber ingested by 7%. Tooling also increased the daily non-protein energy intake. By contrast, protein intake remained constant across foraging days, suggesting a pattern of macronutrient regulation called protein prioritization, which is also found in contemporary humans.^8,9 In addition, tooling reduced dispersion in the ratio of protein to non-protein energy, suggesting a role in macronutrient balancing. Our findings suggest that tooling prior to tool making could have substantially increased the nutritional security of ancestral hominins, sowing the seeds for cultural development.^5,7 VIDEO ABSTRACT.

A Generative View of Rationality and Growing Awareness†

In this paper we contrast bounded and ecological rationality with a proposed alternative, generative rationality. Ecological approaches to rationality build on the idea of humans as "intuitive statisticians" while we argue for a more generative conception of humans as "probing organisms." We first highlight how ecological rationality's focus on cues and statistics is problematic for two reasons: (a) the problem of cue salience, and (b) the problem of cue uncertainty. We highlight these problems by revisiting the statistical and cue-based logic that underlies ecological rationality, which originate from the misapplication of concepts in psychophysics (e.g., signal detection, just-noticeable-differences). We then work through the most popular experimental task in the ecological rationality literature-the city size task-to illustrate how psychophysical assumptions have informally been linked to ecological rationality. After highlighting these problems, we contrast ecological rationality with a proposed alternative, generative rationality. Generative rationality builds on biology-in contrast to ecological rationality's focus on statistics. We argue that in uncertain environments cues are rarely given or available for statistical processing. Therefore we focus on the psychogenesis of awareness rather than psychophysics of cues. For any agent or organism, environments "teem" with indefinite cues, meanings and potential objects, the salience or relevance of which is scarcely obvious based on their statistical or physical properties. We focus on organism-specificity and the organism-directed probing that shapes awareness and perception. Cues in teeming environments are noticed when they serve as cues-for-something, requiring what might be called a "cue-to-clue" transformation. In this sense, awareness toward a cue or cues is actively "grown." We thus argue that perception might more productively be seen as the presentation of cues and objects rather than their representation. This generative approach not only applies to relatively mundane organism (including human) interactions with their environments-as well as organism-object relationships and their embodied nature-but also has significant implications for understanding the emergence of novelty in economic settings. We conclude with a discussion of how our arguments link with-but modify-Herbert Simon's popular "scissors" metaphor, as it applies to bounded rationality and its implications for decision making in uncertain, teeming environments.

On the psychological origins of tool use

The ubiquity of tool use in human life has generated multiple lines of scientific and philosophical investigation to understand the development and expression of humans' engagement with tools and its relation to other dimensions of human experience. However, existing literature on tool use faces several epistemological challenges in which the same set of questions generate many different answers. At least four critical questions can be identified, which are intimately intertwined-(1) What constitutes tool use? (2) What psychological processes underlie tool use in humans and nonhuman animals? (3) Which of these psychological processes are exclusive to tool use? (4) Which psychological processes involved in tool use are exclusive to Homo sapiens? To help advance a multidisciplinary scientific understanding of tool use, six author groups representing different academic disciplines (e.g., anthropology, psychology, neuroscience) and different theoretical perspectives respond to each of these questions, and then point to the direction of future work on tool use. We find that while there are marked differences among the responses of the respective author groups to each question, there is a surprising degree of agreement about many essential concepts and questions. We believe that this interdisciplinary and intertheoretical discussion will foster a more comprehensive understanding of tool use than any one of these perspectives (or any one of these author groups) would (or could) on their own.

Editors' Introduction to Tasks, Tools, and Techniques

Tasks, tools, and techniques that we perform, use, and acquire, define the elements of expertise which we value as the hallmarks of goal-driven behavior. Somehow, the creation of tools enables us to define new tasks, or is it that the envisioning of new tasks drives us to invent new tools? Or maybe it is that new tools engender new techniques which then result in new tasks? This jumble of issues will be explored and discussed in this diverse collection of papers. Individually, few of the papers are related to each other by topic or by techniques of analysis. Collectively, all focus on tasks performed using tools and discuss the techniques of tool use which enable differences in performance and expertise across individuals, societies, and (even) species.

An anecdotal observation of anti-predatory tool use in a New Zealand parrot

I observed a wild kākā (Nestor meridionalis) excavate a piece of deadwood from the branch it was perched on and carry it to a new position immediately above a perched predatory falcon (Falco novaeseelandiae). It then raised its head upwards, and in a single downward motion with its head, released the piece of wood towards the falcon below. The piece of wood stuck the falcon in the back, which immediately took flight and disappeared from view. I conclude my description of this anecdotal observation of anti-predatory tool use with caveats and alternative interpretations.

Extending the Reach of Tooling Theory: A Neurocognitive and Phylogenetic Perspective

Tool use research has suffered from a lack of consistent theoretical frameworks. There is a plethora of tool use definitions and the most widespread ones are so inclusive that the behaviors that fall under them arguably do not have much in common. The situation is aggravated by the prevalence of anecdotes, which have played an undue role in the literature. In order to provide a more rigorous foundation for research and to advance our understanding of the interrelation between tool use and cognition, we suggest the adoption of Fragaszy and Mangalam's (2018) tooling framework, which is characterized by the creation of a body-plus-object system that manages a mechanical interface between tool and surface. Tooling is limited to a narrower suite of behaviors than tool use, which might facilitate its neurocognitive investigation. Indeed, evidence in the literature indicates that tooling has distinct neurocognitive underpinnings not shared by other activities typically classified as tool use, at least in primates. In order to understand the extent of tooling incidences in previous research, we systematically surveyed the comprehensive tool use catalog by Shumaker et al. (2011). We identified 201 tool use submodes, of which only 81 could be classified as tooling, and the majority of the tool use examples across species were poorly supported by evidence. Furthermore, tooling appears to be phylogenetically less widespread than tool use, with the greatest variability found in the primate order. However, in order to confirm these findings and to understand the evolution and neurocognitive mechanisms of tooling, more systematic research will be required in the future, particularly with currently underrepresented taxa.

Self-care tooling innovation in a disabled kea (Nestor notabilis)

Tooling is associated with complex cognitive abilities, occurring most regularly in large-brained mammals and birds. Among birds, self-care tooling is seemingly rare in the wild, despite several anecdotal reports of this behaviour in captive parrots. Here, we show that Bruce, a disabled parrot lacking his top mandible, deliberately uses pebbles to preen himself. Evidence for this behaviour comes from five lines of evidence: (i) in over 90% of instances where Bruce picked up a pebble, he then used it to preen; (ii) in 95% of instances where Bruce dropped a pebble, he retrieved this pebble, or replaced it, in order to resume preening; (iii) Bruce selected pebbles of a specific size for preening rather than randomly sampling available pebbles in his environment; (iv) no other kea in his environment used pebbles for preening; and (v) when other individuals did interact with stones, they used stones of different sizes to those Bruce preened with. Our study provides novel and empirical evidence for deliberate self-care tooling in a bird species where tooling is not a species-specific behaviour. It also supports claims that tooling can be innovated based on ecological necessity by species with sufficiently domain-general cognition.

The Cognitive Science of Technology

Technology is central to human life but hard to define and study. This review synthesizes advances in fields from anthropology to evolutionary biology and neuroscience to propose an interdisciplinary cognitive science of technology. The foundation of this effort is an evolutionarily motivated definition of technology that highlights three key features: material production, social collaboration, and cultural reproduction. This broad scope respects the complexity of the subject but poses a challenge for theoretical unification. Addressing this challenge requires a comparative approach to reduce the diversity of real-world technological cognition to a smaller number of recurring processes and relationships. To this end, a synthetic perceptual-motor hypothesis (PMH) for the evolutionary-developmental-cultural construction of technological cognition is advanced as an initial target for investigation.

The long developmental trajectory of body representation plasticity following tool use

Humans evolution is distinctly characterized by their exquisite mastery of tools, allowing them to shape their environment in more elaborate ways compared to other species. This ability is present ever since infancy and most theories indicate that children become proficient with tool use very early. In adults, tool use has been shown to plastically modify metric aspects of the arm representation, as indexed by changes in movement kinematics. To date, whether and when the plastic capability of updating the body representation develops during childhood remains unknown. This question is particularly important since body representation plasticity could be impacted by the fact that the human body takes years to achieve a stable metric configuration. Here we assessed the kinematics of 90 young participants (8-21 years old) required to reach for an object before and after tool use, as a function of their pubertal development. Results revealed that tool incorporation, as indexed by the adult typical kinematic pattern, develops very slowly and displays a u-shaped developmental trajectory. From early to mid puberty, the changes in kinematics following tool use seem to reflect a shortened arm representation, opposite to what was previously reported in adults. This pattern starts reversing after mid puberty, which is characterized by the lack of any kinematics change following tool use. The typical adult-like pattern emerges only at late puberty, when body size is stable. These findings reveal the complex dynamics of tool incorporation across development, possibly indexing the transition from a vision-based to a proprioception-based body representation plasticity.

Innovative problem solving in macaws

Behavioural innovations with tool-like objects in non-habitually tool-using species are thought to require complex physical understanding, but the underlying cognitive processes remain poorly understood. A few parrot species are capable of innovating tool-use and borderline tool-use behaviours. We tested this capacity in two species of macaw (Ara ambiguus, n = 9; Ara glaucogularis, n = 8) to investigate if they could solve a problem-solving task through manufacture of a multi-stone construction. Specifically, after having functional experience with a pre-inserted stick tool to push a reward out of a horizontal tube, the subjects were required to insert five stones consecutively from one side to perform the same function as the stick tool with the resulting multi-component construction. One Ara glaucogularis solved the task and innovated the stone construction after the experience with the stick tool. Two more subjects (one of each species) did so after having further functional experience of a single stone pushing a reward out of a shortened tube. These subjects were able to consistently solve the task, but often made errors, for example counter-productive stone insertions from the opposing end, even in some of the successful trials. Conversely, multiple trials without errors also suggested a strong goal direction. Their performance in the follow-up tasks was inconclusive since they sometimes inserted stones into un-baited or blocked ‘dummy tubes’, but this could have been an attention-deficit behaviour as subjects had not encountered these ‘dummy tubes’ before. Overall, the successful subjects’ performance was so erratic that it proved difficult to conclude whether they had functional understanding of their multi-stone constructions.

Neural Processes Underlying Tool Use in Humans, Macaques, and Corvids

It was thought that tool use in animals is an adaptive specialization. Recent studies, however, have shown that some non-tool-users, such as rooks and jays, can use and manufacture tools in laboratory settings. Despite the abundant evidence of tool use in corvids, little is known about the neural mechanisms underlying tool use in this family of birds. This review summarizes the current knowledge on the neural processes underlying tool use in humans, macaques and corvids. We suggest a possible neural network for tool use in macaques and hope this might inspire research to discover a similar brain network in corvids. We hope to establish a framework to elucidate the neural mechanisms that supported the convergent evolution of tool use in birds and mammals.

Sense of ownership and not the sense of agency is spatially bounded within the space reachable with the unaugmented hand

While reaching for a coffee cup, we are aware that the hand we see belongs to us and it moves at our will (reflecting our senses of ownership and agency, respectively), and that the cup is within our hand's reach rather than beyond it (i.e., in reachable space, RS, rather than in non-reachable space, NRS). Accepted psychological explanations of our sense of ownership, sense of agency, and our perception of space surrounding the body as RS or NRS propose a unitary dependence on Euclidean distance from the body. Here, we propose an alternate, affordance-based explanation of experienced ownership, agency, and perception of space surrounding the body as RS and NRS. Adult participants experienced the static rubber hand illusion (RHI) and its dynamic variant, while the rubber hand was either within their arm's reach (i.e., in self-identified RS) or beyond it (i.e., in self-identified NRS). We found that when the participants experienced synchronous visual and tactile signals in the static RHI, and synchronous visual and kinesthetic signals in the dynamic RHI, they felt illusory ownership when the rubber hand was in RS but not when it was in NRS. Conversely, when the participants experienced synchronous visual and kinesthetic signals in the dynamic RHI, they felt agency, regardless of the rubber hand's location. In addition, illusory ownership was accompanied by proprioceptive drift, a feeling that their hand was closer to the rubber hand than it actually was, but agency was not accompanied by proprioceptive drift. Together, these results indicate that our sense of ownership, while malleable enough to incorporate visible non-corporeal objects resembling a body part, is spatially constrained by proprioceptive signals specifying that body part's actual location. In contrast, our sense of agency can incorporate a visible non-corporeal object, independent of its location with respect to the body. We propose that the psychological processes mediating our sense of ownership are closely linked with our perception of space surrounding the body, and that the spatial independence of our sense of agency reflects the coupling between our actions and perception of the environment, such as while using handheld tools as extensions of our body.

Extraction without tooling around — The first comprehensive description of the foraging- and socio-ecology of wild Goffin’s cockatoos (Cacatua goffiniana)

When tested under laboratory conditions, Goffin’s cockatoos (Cacatua goffiniana) demonstrate numerous sophisticated cognitive skills. Most importantly, this species has shown the ability to manufacture and use tools. However, little is known about the ecology of these cockatoos, endemic to the Tanimbar Islands in Indonesia. Here we provide first insights into the feeding- and socio-ecology of the wild Goffin’s cockatoos and propose potential links between their behaviour in natural settings and their advanced problem-solving capacities shown in captivity. Observational data suggests that Goffin’s cockatoos rely on a large variety of partially seasonal resources. Furthermore, several food types require different extraction techniques. These ecological and behavioural characteristics fall in line with current hypotheses regarding the evolution of complex cognition and innovativeness. We discuss how the efficiency of (extractive) foraging may preclude tool use in wild Goffin’s cockatoos, even though the corresponding cognitive and ecological prerequisites seem to be present.

Location of a grasped object's effector influences perception of the length of that object via dynamic touch

Perception of properties of a grasped object via dynamic touch (wielding) contributes to dexterity in tool use (e.g., using a hammer, screwdriver) and sports (e.g., hockey, tennis). These activities differ from simple object manipulation in that they involve making contact with an intended target. In the present study, we examined whether and how making (percussive) contact with a target influences perception of the length of a grasped object via dynamic touch. Making contact with a target by the tip resulted in a more accurate perception of the length than simple wielding. However, making contact with the target at a point along the length did not influence the accuracy of perception. These findings suggest that the location of a grasped object's effector influences perception of properties of that object via dynamic touch. We discuss these findings in terms of time-varying properties of vibrations generated by the percussive contact of the grasped object and target.