Toward a general theory of momentum-like effects

Object persistence explains event completion

Our minds consistently distort memories of objects and events. Oftentimes, these distortions serve to transform incoherent memories into coherent ones, as when we misremember partial events as whole ("event completion"). What mechanisms drive these distortions? Whereas extant work shows that representations of causality, continuity, familiarity, physical coherence, or event coherence create memory distortions, we suggest that a simpler and more fundamental mechanism may be at play: object persistence. Merely seeing an object take part in an event can create a persisting memory of its presence throughout that event. In 8 pre-registered experiments (N = 317 adults), participants performed a simple task where they watched an animation, then chose whether or not a frame from the animation contained an object. Participants falsely remembered seeing an object when it was not there (E1). These effects persisted in the absence of causality (E2), continuity (E3), event familiarity (E4), object familiarity (E5), even when the events violated physical laws (E6), and when the events themselves were not coherent (E7). However, the effect disappeared when we abolished object persistence (E8). Thus, object persistence alone creates rich, enduring, and coherent representations of objects and events.

Grounded cognition and the representation of momentum: abstract concepts modulate mislocalization

Literature on grounded cognition argues that mental representations of concepts, even abstract concepts, involve modal simulations. These modalities are typically assumed to reside within the body, such as in the sensorimotor system. A recent proposal argues that physical invariants, such as momentum or gravity, can also be substrates in which concepts can be grounded, expanding the assumed limits of grounding beyond the body. We here experimentally assessed this proposal by exploiting the representational momentum effect and the abstract concept of success. If success is grounded in the physical invariant momentum, the representational momentum effect should be larger for successful targets. We tested this hypothesis across four experiments (three pre-registered). In a surprising finding, we find hints that large trial numbers may hinder being able to find a representational momentum effect, which should be further investigated in future research. Regarding the central hypothesis, although only one experiment found statistically significant support, the effect tended toward the same direction in the three others as well. In order to draw robust conclusions about the results, we performed a mini meta, which aggregates the effects and inference statistics across the N = 271 participants. Across the four experiments, this effect was statistically significant, suggesting evidence in favor of the central hypothesis. These results should be interpreted with caution as there was inconsistency across experiments, suggesting the magnitude of the effect is small, and when asked who they believe moved faster, participants did not reliably indicate the successful target.

Representational momentum of biological motion in full-body, point-light and single-dot displays

Observing the actions of others triggers, in our brain, an internal and automatic simulation of its unfolding in time. Here, we investigated whether the instantaneous internal representation of an observed action is modulated by the point of view under which an action is observed and the stimulus type. To this end, we motion captured the elliptical arm movement of a human actor and used these trajectories to animate a photorealistic avatar, a point-light stimulus or a single dot rendered either from an egocentric or an allocentric point of view. Crucially, the underlying physical characteristics of the movement were the same in all conditions. In a representational momentum paradigm, we then asked subjects to report the perceived last position of an observed movement at the moment in which the stimulus was randomly stopped. In all conditions, subjects tended to misremember the last configuration of the observed stimulus as being further forward than the veridical last showed position. This misrepresentation was however significantly smaller for full-body stimuli compared to point-light and single dot displays and it was not modulated by the point of view. It was also smaller when first-person full body stimuli were compared with a stimulus consisting of a solid shape moving with the same physical motion. We interpret these findings as evidence that full-body stimuli elicit a simulation process that is closer to the instantaneous veridical configuration of the observed movements while impoverished displays (both point-light and single-dot) elicit a prediction that is further forward in time. This simulation process seems to be independent from the point of view under which the actions are observed.

Agency and social affordance shape visual perception

Research on the sense of agency has shown that being the author of an action changes the way we estimate the timing and the intensity of the action-effect. Yet, there is a dearth of attempts to assess the influence of agency on perception per se. The present study used the Representational Momentum paradigm to measure participants' visual anticipation of movement while manipulating their agency. In line with previous literature emphasizing the impact of social factors on visual anticipation and on the sense of agency, we additionally investigated the modulating power of social affordances on the relationship between agency and visual anticipation. We conducted two experiments where participants viewed a virtual agent directing a handshake gesture toward a second virtual agent. In a first experiment, we addressed the role of agency on visual anticipation by comparing a condition in which participants triggered the virtual agent's gesture with a condition where the computer triggered the gesture. Results showed greater forward movement anticipation when participants triggered the gesture. The second experiment investigated how altering social interaction parameters (interindividual distance and body posture) modulated the relationship between agency and visual anticipation. The outcome contrasted with the first experiment, with participants anticipating a backward movement of the hand when the computer triggered the gesture and displaying a null anticipation when participants triggered the gesture. Those two experiments highlighted how active involvement and environmental affordance interact to shape perception and allowed us to propose an updated model of agency processing.

A cross-lagged panel analysis of second language achievement and enjoyment

Although self-perceived language proficiency has recently been found to influence foreign language enjoyment (FLE), rigorous assessment of the causal relationship between actual second language (L2) achievement and FLE has received relatively little attention. Based on control-value theory, this longitudinal study examined the causal antecedents of the relationship between the L2 achievement of 206 FL learners and their FLE from the perspective of dynamic systems theory and conducted a cross-lagged panel (CLP) analysis using Mplus 8.3 software. Both variables were measured two times over one academic year (10 months) in an English as a foreign language (EFL) course. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed significant changes in both variables over time. According to the CLP path model, L2 achievement at Time 1 (T1) appeared to affect subsequent FLE, while FLE at T1 failed to predict L2 achievement at Time 2 (T2). This study provides empirical evidence of the directional effect of L2 achievement on FLE regarding the hypothesized reciprocal effect of the two. Implications for stakeholders in the field of education are discussed.

Phasic alertness boosts representational momentum

The final location of a moving object is always misremembered in the direction of the object’s motion; this occurrence is called representational momentum. Three experiments were conducted to investigate the effects of phasic alertness on representational momentum by presenting a visual or auditory warning cue. In experiment 1, the mouse pointer paradigm was used, and the results showed that external warning cues increased forward displacement. Experiment 2 indicated that the effects of phasic alertness and speed of motion on representational momentum were independent. In experiment 3, the probe paradigm was used, and the results showed that external warning cues increased forward displacement as well as participants’ sensitivity to the difference between the target and probe positions. These findings prove that phasic alertness boosts rather than reduces representational momentum. We propose that phasic alertness might influence representational momentum by modulating the process of executive control in the retention interval.

Preschoolers prior formal mathematics education engage numerical magnitude representation rather than counting principles in symbolic +/-1 arithmetic: Evidence from the Operational Momentum effect

In numerical cognition research, the operational momentum (OM) phenomenon (tendency to overestimate the results of addition and/or binding addition to the right side and underestimating subtraction and/or binding it to the left side) can help illuminate the most basic representations and processes of mental arithmetic and their development. This study is the first to demonstrate OM in symbolic arithmetic in preschoolers. It was modeled on Haman and Lipowska's (2021) non-symbolic arithmetic task, using Arabic numerals instead of visual sets. Seventy-seven children (4-7 years old) who know Arabic numerals and counting principles, but without prior school math education, solved addition and subtraction problems presented as videos with 1 as the second operand. In principle, such problems may be difficult when involving a non-symbolic approximate number processing system, whereas in symbolic format they can be solved based solely on the successor/predecessor functions and knowledge of numerical orders, without reference to representation of numerical magnitudes. Nevertheless, participants made systematic errors, in particular, overestimating results of addition in line with the typical OM tendency. Moreover, subtraction and addition induced longer response times when primed with left- and right-directed movement, respectively, which corresponds to the reversed spatial form of OM. These results largely replicate those of non-symbolic task and show that children at early stages of mastering symbolic arithmetic may rely on numerical magnitude processing and spatial-numerical associations rather than newly-mastered counting principles and the concept of an exact number. Adding and subtracting 1 in a symbolic format formally requires only knowledge of numerical orders and the predecessor/successor function, but not numerical magnitude processing Preschoolers knowing the counting principles and Arabic numerals, but without prior mathematics education, demonstrated operational momentum by overestimating results of symbolic addition of 1 In the same arithmetic task children showed faster reactions for addition primed with an object moving leftward and in subtraction primed with rightward motion These effects replicate findings from non-symbolic ±1 arithmetic, indicating that preschoolers use magnitude representation and spatial-numerical associations for symbolic calculation This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

Developmental Changes in the Magnitude of Representational Momentum Among Nursery School Children: A Longitudinal Study

Representational momentum (RM) is a well-known phenomenon that occurs when a moving object vanishes suddenly and the memory of its final or vanishing position is displaced forward in the direction of its motion. Many studies have shown evidence of various perceptual and cognitive characteristics of RM in various daily aspects, sports, development, and aging. Here we examined the longitudinal developmental changes in the displacement magnitudes of RM among younger (5-year-old) and older (6-year-old) nursery school children for pointing and judging tasks. In our experiments, the children were asked to point at by their finger (pointing task) and judge the spatial location (judging task) of the vanishing point of a moving stimulus. Our results showed that the mean magnitudes of RM significantly decreased from 5- to 6-year-old children for the pointing and judging tasks, although the mean magnitude of RM was significantly greater in the 5-year-old children for the pointing task but not for the judging task. We further examined the developmental changes in RM for a wide range of ages based on data from the present study (5-year-old children) and our previous study (7- and 11-year-old children and 22-year-old adults). This ad hoc examination showed that the magnitude of RM was significantly greater in 5-year-old children than in adults for the pointing and judging tasks. Our findings suggest that the magnitude of RM was significantly greater in young children than in adults and significantly decreased in young children through adults for the pointing and judging tasks.

The possibility of an impetus heuristic

Evidence consistent with a belief in impetus is drawn from studies of naïve physics, perception of causality, perception of force, and representational momentum, and the possibility of an impetus heuristic is discussed. An impetus heuristic suggests the motion path of an object that was previously constrained or influenced by an external source (e.g., object, force) appears to exhibit the same constraint or influence even after that constraint or influence is removed. Impetus is not a valid physical principle, but use of an impetus heuristic can in some circumstances provide approximately correct predictions regarding future object motion, and such predictions require less cognitive effort and resources than would predictions based upon objective physical principles. The relationship of an impetus heuristic to naïve impetus theory and to objective physical principles is discussed, and use of an impetus heuristic significantly challenges claims that causality or force can be visually perceived. Alternatives to an impetus heuristic are considered, and potential boundary conditions and falsification of the impetus notion are discussed. Overall, use of an impetus heuristic offers a parsimonious explanation for findings across a wide range of perceptual domains and could potentially be extended to more metaphorical types of motion.

Melting Ice With Your Mind: Representational Momentum for Physical States

When a log burns, it transforms from a block of wood into a pile of ash. Such state changes are among the most dramatic ways objects change, going beyond mere changes of position or orientation. How does the mind represent changes of state? A foundational result in visual cognition is that memory extrapolates the positions of moving objects-a distortion called representational momentum. Here, five experiments (N = 400 adults) exploited this phenomenon to investigate mental representations in state space. Participants who viewed objects undergoing state changes (e.g., ice melting, logs burning, or grapes shriveling) remembered them as more changed (e.g., more melted, burned, or shriveled) than they actually were. This pattern extended to several types of state changes, went beyond their low-level properties, and even adhered to their natural trajectories in state space. Thus, mental representations of objects actively incorporate how they change-not only in their relation to their environment, but also in their essential qualities.

The implicit sense of agency is not a perceptual effect but is a judgment effect

The sense of agency (SoA) is characterized as the sense of being the causal agent of one's own actions, and it is measured in two forms: explicit and implicit. In the explicit SoA experiments, the participants explicitly report whether they have a sense of control over their actions or whether they or somebody else is the causal agent of seen actions; the implicit SoA experiments study how do participants' agentive or voluntary actions modify perceptual processes (like time, vision, tactility, and audition) without directly asking the participants to explicitly think about their causal agency or sense of control. However, recent implicit SoA literature reported contradictory findings of the relationship between implicit SoA reports and agency states. Thus, I argue that the purported implicit SoA reports are not agency-driven perceptual effects per se but are judgment effects, by showing that (a) the typical operationalizations in implicit SoA domain lead to perceptual uncertainty on the part of the participants, (b) under uncertainty, participants' implicit SoA reports are due to heuristic judgments which are independent of agency states, and (c) under perceptual certainty, the typical implicit SoA reports might not have occurred at all. Thus, I conclude that the instances of implicit SoA are judgments (or response biases)-under uncertainty-rather than perceptual effects.

Perceived Motion and Operational Momentum: How Speed, Distance, and Time Influence Two-Digit Arithmetic

Operational momentum was originally defined as a bias toward underestimating outcomes of subtraction and overestimating outcomes of addition. It was suggested that these estimation biases are due to leftward attentional shift along the mental number-line (spatially organized internal representation of number) in subtraction and rightward shift in addition. This assumes the use of “recycled” mechanisms of spatial attention, including “representational momentum” – a tendency to overestimate future position of a moving object, which compensates for the moving object’s shift during preparation of a reaction. We tested a strong version of this assumption directly, priming two-digit addition and subtraction problems with leftward and rightward motion of varied velocity, as velocity of the tracked object was found to be a factor in determining representational momentum effect size. Operands were subsequently moving across the computer screen, and the participants’ task was to validate an outcome proposed at the end of the event, which was either too low, correct, or too high. We found improved accuracy in detecting too-high outcomes of addition, as well as complex patterns of interactions involving arithmetic operation, outcome option, speed, and direction of motion, in the analysis of reaction times. These results significantly extend previous evidence for the involvement of spatial attention in mental arithmetic, showing movement of the external attention focus as a factor directing internal attention in processing numerical information. As a whole, however, the results are incompatible with expectations derived from the strong analogy between operational and representational momenta. We suggest that the full model may be more complex than simply “moving attention along the mental number-line” as a direct counterpart of attention directed at a moving object.

Moving attention along the mental number line in preschool age: Study of the operational momentum in 3- to 5-year-old children's non-symbolic arithmetic

People tend to underestimate subtraction and overestimate addition outcomes and to associate subtraction with the left side and addition with the right side. These two phenomena are collectively labeled 'operational momentum' (OM) and thought to have their origins in the same mechanism of 'moving attention along the mental number line'. OM in arithmetic has never been tested in children at the preschool age, which is critical for numerical development. In this study, 3-5 years old were tested with non-symbolic addition and subtraction tasks. Their level of understanding of counting principles (CP) was assessed using the give-a-number task. When the second operand's cardinality was 5 or 6 (Experiment 1), the child's reaction time was shorter in addition/subtraction tasks after cuing attention appropriately to the right/left. Adding/subtracting one element (Experiment 2) revealed a more complex developmental pattern. Before acquiring CP, the children showed generalized overestimation bias. Underestimation in addition and overestimation in subtraction emerged only after mastering CP. No clear spatial-directional OM pattern was found, however, the response time to rightward/leftward cues in addition/subtraction again depended on stage of mastering CP. Although the results support the hypothesis about engagement of spatial attention in early numerical processing, they point to at least partial independence of the spatial-directional and magnitude OM. This undermines the canonical version of the number line-based hypothesis. Mapping numerical magnitudes to space may be a complex process that undergoes reorganization during the period of acquisition of symbolic representations of numbers. Some hypotheses concerning the role of spatial-numerical associations in numerical development are proposed.

Perceiving affordances in sports through a momentum lens

In this experimental study, we tested whether athletes' judgments of affordances and of environmental features vary with psychological momentum (PM). We recruited golf, hockey, and tennis players, who were assigned to a positive or negative momentum condition. We designed a golf course on which participants made practice putts, after which they were asked to place the ball at their maximum "puttable" distance and to judge the hole size. Next, participants played a golf match against an opponent, in which the first to take a lead of 5 points would win the match. Participants were told that they could win a point by making the putt or by being closest to the hole. They wore visual occlusion goggles to prevent them from seeing the actual result, and the experimenter manipulated the scoring pattern to induce positive or negative PM. Participants in the positive momentum condition came back from a four-point lag to a four-point lead, whereas those in the negative momentum condition underwent the opposite scenario. We then asked the participants again to indicate their maximum puttable distance from the hole and to judge the hole size. After the manipulation, participants judged the maximum puttable distance to be longer in the positive momentum condition and shorter in the negative momentum condition. For the hole-size judgments, there were no significant effects. These results provide first indications for the idea that athletes' affordances change when they experience positive PM compared to negative PM. This sheds a new light on the dynamics of perception-action processes and PM in sports.

Reproducibility in Psychological Science: When Do Psychological Phenomena Exist?

Scientific evidence has recently been used to assert that certain psychological phenomena do not exist. Such claims, however, cannot be made because (1) scientific method itself is seriously limited (i.e., it can never prove a negative); (2) non-existence of phenomena would require a complete absence of both logical (theoretical) and empirical support; even if empirical support is weak, logical and theoretical support can be strong; (3) statistical data are only one piece of evidence and cannot be used to reduce psychological phenomena to statistical phenomena; and (4) psychological phenomena vary across time, situations and persons. The human mind is unreproducible from one situation to another. Psychological phenomena are not particles that can decisively be tested and discovered. Therefore, a declaration that a phenomenon is not real is not only theoretically and empirically unjustified but runs counter to the propositional and provisional nature of scientific knowledge. There are only "temporary winners" and no "final truths" in scientific knowledge. Psychology is a science of subtleties in human affect, cognition and behavior. Its phenomena fluctuate with conditions and may sometimes be difficult to detect and reproduce empirically. When strictly applied, reproducibility is an overstated and even questionable concept in psychological science. Furthermore, statistical measures (e.g., effect size) are poor indicators of the theoretical importance and relevance of phenomena (cf. "deliberate practice" vs. "talent" in expert performance), not to mention whether phenomena are real or unreal. To better understand psychological phenomena, their theoretical and empirical properties should be examined via multiple parameters and criteria. Ten such parameters are suggested.