Big cats as a model system for the study of the evolution of intelligence

Neuropil Variation in the Prefrontal, Motor, and Visual Cortex of Six Felids

INTRODUCTION

Felids have evolved a specialized suite of morphological adaptations for obligate carnivory. Although the musculoskeletal anatomy of the Felidae has been studied extensively, the comparative neuroanatomy of felids is relatively unexplored. Little is known about how variation in the cerebral anatomy of felids relates to species-specific differences in sociality, hunting strategy, or activity patterns.

METHODS

We quantitatively analyzed neuropil variation in the prefrontal, primary motor, and primary visual cortices of six species of Felidae (Panthera leo, Panthera uncia, Panthera tigris, Panthera leopardus, Acinonyx jubatus, Felis sylvestris domesticus) to investigate relationships with brain size, neuronal cell parameters, and select behavioral and ecological factors. Neuropil is the dense, intricate network of axons, dendrites, and synapses in the brain, playing a critical role in information processing and communication between neurons.

RESULTS

There were significant species and regional differences in neuropil proportions, with African lion, cheetah, and tiger having more neuropil in all three cortical regions in comparison to the other species. Based on regression analyses, we find that the increased neuropil fraction in the prefrontal cortex supports social and behavioral flexibility, while in the primary motor cortex, this facilitates the neural activity needed for hunting movements. Greater neuropil fraction in the primary visual cortex may contribute to visual requirements associated with diel activity patterns.

CONCLUSION

These results provide a cross-species comparison of neuropil fraction variation in the Felidae, particularly the understudied Panthera, and provide evidence for convergence of the neuroanatomy of Panthera and cheetahs.

Exploring innovative problem-solving in African lions (Panthera leo) and snow leopards (Panthera uncia)

Cognitive ability is likely linked to adaptive ability; animals use cognition to innovate and problem-solve in their physical and social environments. We investigated innovative problem-solving in two species of high conservation importance: African lions (Panthera leo; n = 6) and snow leopards (Panthera uncia; n = 9). We designed a custom multi-access puzzle box (MAB) to present a simple and effective behavioral test for the cats to explore. We measured Repeated Innovation, Persistence, Success, Contact Latency, and the Exploration Diversity of individuals interacting with the MAB. Of the six African lions, three (50%) solved one door to the box, one solved two doors (16.67%), and one solved three doors (16.67%). Of the nine snow leopards, one solved one door (11.11%), three solved two doors (33.33%), and none solved all three doors (0%). Persistence was a significant predictor of Success in African lions and snow leopards; more Persistent individuals were more likely to open a door. We also observed significant individual variation in Persistence for both species, but only snow leopards also exhibited differences in Contact Latency and Exploration Diversity. These results suggest individuals vary in their problem-solving approaches. Our findings support both species as successful, repeated innovators. Carnivores face ecological and social challenges and, presumably, benefit from cognitive abilities facilitating the successful navigation of these challenges in captivity and the wild.

Old and New Approaches to Animal Cognition: There Is Not "One Cognition"

Using the comparative approach, researchers draw inferences about the evolution of cognition. Psychologists have postulated several hypotheses to explain why certain species are cognitively more flexible than others, and these hypotheses assume that certain cognitive skills are linked together to create a generally "smart" species. However, empirical findings suggest that several animal species are highly specialized, showing exceptional skills in single cognitive domains while performing poorly in others. Although some cognitive skills may indeed overlap, we cannot a priori assume that they do across species. We argue that the term "cognition" has often been used by applying an anthropocentric viewpoint rather than a biocentric one. As a result, researchers tend to overrate cognitive skills that are human-like and assume that certain skills cluster together in other animals as they do in our own species. In this paper, we emphasize that specific physical and social environments create selection pressures that lead to the evolution of certain cognitive adaptations. Skills such as following the pointing gesture, tool-use, perspective-taking, or the ability to cooperate evolve independently from each other as a concrete result of specific selection pressures, and thus have appeared in distantly related species. Thus, there is not "one cognition". Our argument is founded upon traditional Darwinian thinking, which-although always at the forefront of biology-has sometimes been neglected in animal cognition research. In accordance with the biocentric approach, we advocate a broader empirical perspective as we are convinced that to better understand animal minds, comparative researchers should focus much more on questions and experiments that are ecologically valid. We should investigate nonhuman cognition for its own sake, not only in comparison to the human model.

Functionally distinct language and Theory of Mind networks are synchronized at rest and during language comprehension

Communication requires the abilities to generate and interpret utterances and to infer the beliefs, desires, and goals of others ("Theory of Mind"; ToM). These two abilities have been shown to dissociate: individuals with aphasia retain the ability to think about others' mental states; and individuals with autism are impaired in social reasoning, but their basic language processing is often intact. In line with this evidence from brain disorders, functional MRI (fMRI) studies have shown that linguistic and ToM abilities recruit distinct sets of brain regions. And yet, language is a social tool that allows us to share thoughts with one another. Thus, the language and ToM brain networks must share information despite being implemented in distinct neural circuits. Here, we investigated potential interactions between these networks during naturalistic cognition using functional correlations in fMRI. The networks were functionally defined in individual participants, in terms of preference for sentences over nonwords for language, and for belief inference over physical-event processing for ToM, with both a verbal and a nonverbal paradigm. Although, across experiments, interregion correlations within each network were higher than between-network correlations, we also observed above-baseline synchronization of blood oxygenation level-dependent signal fluctuations between the two networks during rest and story comprehension. This synchronization was functionally specific: neither network was synchronized with the executive control network (functionally defined in terms of preference for a harder over easier version of an executive task). Thus, coordination between the language and ToM networks appears to be an inherent and specific characteristic of their functional architecture. NEW & NOTEWORTHY Humans differ from nonhuman primates in their abilities to communicate linguistically and to infer others' mental states. Although linguistic and social abilities appear to be interlinked onto- and phylogenetically, they are dissociated in the adult human brain. Yet successful communication requires language and social reasoning to work in concert. Using functional MRI, we show that language regions are synchronized with social regions during rest and language comprehension, pointing to a possible mechanism for internetwork interaction.