Neural correlates of acoustic reasoning

Neural correlates of transitive inference: An SDM meta-analysis on 32 fMRI studies

Transitive inference (TI) is a critical capacity involving the integration of relevant information into prior knowledge structure for drawing novel inferences on unobserved relationships. To date, the neural correlates of TI remain unclear due to the small sample size and heterogeneity of various experimental tasks from individual studies. Here, the meta-analysis on 32 fMRI studies was performed to detect brain activation patterns of TI and its three paradigms (spatial inference, hierarchical inference, and associative inference). We found the hippocampus, prefrontal cortex (PFC), putamen, posterior parietal cortex (PPC), retrosplenial cortex (RSC), supplementary motor area (SMA), precentral gyrus (PreCG), and median cingulate cortex (MCC) were engaged in TI. Specifically, the RSC was implicated in the associative inference, whereas PPC, SMA, PreCG, and MCC were implicated in the hierarchical inference. In addition, the hierarchical inference and associative inference both evoked activation in the hippocampus, medial PFC, and PCC. Although the meta-analysis on spatial inference did not generate a reliable result due to insufficient amount of investigations, the present work still offers a new insight for better understanding the neural basis underlying TI.

Deductive-reasoning brain networks: A coordinate-based meta-analysis of the neural signatures in deductive reasoning

OBJECTIVE

Deductive reasoning is a complex and poorly understood concept in the field of psychology. Many cognitive neuroscience studies have been published on deductive reasoning but have yielded inconsistent findings.

METHODS

In this study, we analyzed collected data from 38 articles using a recently proposed activation likelihood estimation (ALE) approach and used conjunction analysis to better determine the intersection of the results of meta-analyses.

RESULTS

First, the left hemispheres in the inferior parietal lobule (Brodmann area 40 [BA40]), middle frontal gyrus (BA6), medial frontal gyrus (BA8), inferior frontal gyrus (BA45/46), caudate, and insula (BA47) were revealed to be significant brain regions via simple-effect analysis (deductive reasoning versus baseline). Furthermore, IFG, insula, and cingulate (the key neural hubs of the cingulo-opercular network) were highlighted in overlapped functional connectivity maps.

CONCLUSION

The findings of the current study are consistent with the view that deductive reasoning requires a succession of stages, which included decoding of linguistic information, conversion and correction of rules, and transformation of inferential results into conclusive outputs, all of which are putatively processed via a distributed network of brain regions encompassing frontal/parietal cortices, as well as the caudate and other subcortical structures, which suggested that in the process of deductive reasoning, the coding and integration of premise information is indispensable, and it is also crucial to the execution and monitoring of the cognitive processing of reasoning.

The Neural Correlates of Relational Reasoning: A Meta-analysis of 47 Functional Magnetic Resonance Studies

It is a core cognitive ability of humans to represent and reason about relational information, such as “the train station is north of the hotel” or “Charles is richer than Jim.” However, the neural processes underlying the ability to draw conclusions about relations are still not sufficiently understood. Central open questions are as follows: (1) What are the neural correlates of relational reasoning? (2) Where can deductive and inductive reasoning be localized? (3) What is the impact of different informational types on cerebral activity? For that, we conducted a meta-analysis of 47 neuroimaging studies. We found activation of the frontoparietal network during both deductive and inductive reasoning, with additional activation in an extended network during inductive reasoning in the basal ganglia and the inferior parietal cortex. Analyses revealed a double dissociation concerning the lateral and medial Brodmann's area 6 during deductive and inductive reasoning, indicating differences in terms of processing verbal information in deductive and spatial information in inductive tasks. During semantic and symbolic tasks, the frontoparietal network was found active, whereas geometric tasks only elicited prefrontal activation, which can be explained by the reduced demand for the construction of a mental representation in geometric tasks. Our study provides new insights into the cognitive mechanisms underlying relational reasoning and clarifies previous controversies concerning involved brain areas.

Uncertain relational reasoning in the parietal cortex

The psychology of reasoning is currently transitioning from the study of deductive inferences under certainty to inferences that have degrees of uncertainty in both their premises and conclusions; however, only a few studies have explored the cortical basis of uncertain reasoning. Using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we show that areas in the right superior parietal lobe (rSPL) are necessary for solving spatial relational reasoning problems under conditions of uncertainty. Twenty-four participants had to decide whether a single presented order of objects agreed with a given set of indeterminate premises that could be interpreted in more than one way. During the presentation of the order, 10-Hz TMS was applied over the rSPL or a sham control site. Right SPL TMS during the inference phase disrupted performance in uncertain relational reasoning. Moreover, we found differences in the error rates between preferred mental models, alternative models, and inconsistent models. Our results suggest that different mechanisms are involved when people reason spatially and evaluate different kinds of uncertain conclusions.

Factors and processes in children's transitive deductions

Transitive tasks are important for understanding how children develop socio-cognitively. However, developmental research has been restricted largely to questions surrounding maturation. We asked 6-, 7- and 8-year-olds (N = 117) to solve a composite of five different transitive tasks. Tasks included conditions asking about item-C (associated with the marked relation) in addition to the usual case of asking only about item-A (associated with the unmarked relation). Here, children found resolving item-C much easier than resolving item-A, a finding running counter to long-standing assumptions about transitive reasoning. Considering gender perhaps for the first time, boys exhibited higher transitive scores than girls overall. Finally, analysing in the context of one recent and well-specified theory of spatial transitive reasoning, we generated the prediction that reporting the full series should be easier than deducing any one item from that series. This prediction was not upheld. We discuss amendments necessary to accommodate all our earlier findings.

Hemispheric lateralization in reasoning

A growing body of evidence suggests that reasoning in humans relies on a number of related processes whose neural loci are largely lateralized to one hemisphere or the other. A recent review of this evidence concluded that the patterns of lateralization observed are organized according to two complementary tendencies. The left hemisphere attempts to reduce uncertainty by drawing inferences or creating explanations, even at the cost of ignoring conflicting evidence or generating implausible explanations. Conversely, the right hemisphere aims to reduce conflict by rejecting or refining explanations that are no longer tenable in the face of new evidence. In healthy adults, the hemispheres work together to achieve a balance between certainty and consistency, and a wealth of neuropsychological research supports the notion that upsetting this balance results in various failures in reasoning, including delusions. However, support for this model from the neuroimaging literature is mixed. Here, we examine the evidence for this framework from multiple research domains, including an activation likelihood estimation analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging studies of reasoning. Our results suggest a need to either revise this model as it applies to healthy adults or to develop better tools for assessing lateralization in these individuals.

Syllogisms delivered in an angry voice lead to improved performance and engagement of a different neural system compared to neutral voice

Despite the fact that most real-world reasoning occurs in some emotional context, very little is known about the underlying behavioral and neural implications of such context. To further understand the role of emotional context in logical reasoning we scanned 15 participants with fMRI while they engaged in logical reasoning about neutral syllogisms presented through the auditory channel in a sad, angry, or neutral tone of voice. Exposure to angry voice led to improved reasoning performance compared to exposure to sad and neutral voice. A likely explanation for this effect is that exposure to expressions of anger increases selective attention toward the relevant features of target stimuli, in this case the reasoning task. Supporting this interpretation, reasoning in the context of angry voice was accompanied by activation in the superior frontal gyrus-a region known to be associated with selective attention. Our findings contribute to a greater understanding of the neural processes that underlie reasoning in an emotional context by demonstrating that two emotional contexts, despite being of the same (negative) valence, have different effects on reasoning.

Reasoning from transitive premises: an EEG study

Neuroimaging studies have contributed to a major advance in understanding the neural and cognitive mechanisms underpinning deductive reasoning. However, the dynamics of cognitive events associated with inference making have been largely neglected. Using electroencephalography, the present study aims at describing the rapid sequence of processes involved in performing transitive inference (A B; B C therefore "A C"; with AB meaning "A is to the left of B"). The results indicate that when the second premise can be integrated into the first one (e.g. A B; B C) its processing elicits a P3b component. In contrast, when the second premise cannot be integrated into the first premise (e.g. A B; D C), a P600-like components is elicited. These ERP components are discussed with respect to cognitive expectations.

What MEG can reveal about inference making: the case of if...then sentences

Characterizing the neural substrate of reasoning has been investigated with regularity over the last 10 years or so while relying on measures that come primarily from positron emission tomography and functional magnetic resonance imaging. To some extent, these techniques—as well as those from electroencephalography—have shown that time course is equally worthwhile for revealing the way reasoning processes work in the brain. In this work, we employ magnetoencephalography while investigating Modus Ponens (If P then Q; P//Therefore, Q) in order to simultaneously derive time course and the source of this fundamental logical inference. The present results show that conditional reasoning involves several successive cognitive processes, each of which engages a distinct cerebral network over the course of inference making, and as soon as a conditional sentence is processed.

Transitive inference reasoning is impaired by focal lesions in parietal cortex rather than rostrolateral prefrontal cortex

Transitive inference reasoning involves the examination and comparison of a given number of relational pairs in order to understand overall group hierarchy (e.g., A>B, B>C, C>D; therefore is A>D?). A number of imaging studies have demonstrated the role of the parietal cortex for resolving transitive inferences. Some studies also identify the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex as being critical for "relational integration" processes supporting transitive reasoning. To clarify this issue, we carried out a transitive inference study involving neurological patients with focal lesions to the rostrolateral prefrontal (n=5) or parietal cortices (n=7), as well as normal controls (n=6). The patients and controls were statistically matched on age, education, pre-injury IQ, general memory, working memory, and performance/full IQ, though the rostrolateral patients did score significantly higher than the normal controls on verbal IQ. Results indicate that patients with focal lesions to the parietal cortex were impaired in the task relative to both the patients with focal lesions to rostrolateral prefrontal cortex and the control group, and there was no difference in task performance between the rostrolateral prefrontal and the control groups. This result continued to hold after controlling for verbal IQ as a covariate. These findings point to a critical role for the parietal cortex, rather than the rostrolateral prefrontal, in transitive inference. Since the groups performed similarly on a working memory task, working memory cannot fully account for the result, suggesting a specific role of parietal cortex in transitive inference.

Logic, language and the brain

What is the role of language in human cognition? Within the domain of deductive reasoning, the issue has been the focus of numerous investigations without the emergence of a consensus view. Here we consider some of the reasons why neuroimaging studies of deductive reasoning have generated mixed results. We then review recent evidence suggesting that the role of language in deductive reasoning is confined to an initial stage in which verbally presented information is encoded as non-verbal representations. These representations are then manipulated by mental operations that are not based on the neural mechanisms of natural language. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled "The Cognitive Neuroscience".

The brain network for deductive reasoning: a quantitative meta-analysis of 28 neuroimaging studies

Over the course of the past decade, contradictory claims have been made regarding the neural bases of deductive reasoning. Researchers have been puzzled by apparent inconsistencies in the literature. Some have even questioned the effectiveness of the methodology used to study the neural bases of deductive reasoning. However, the idea that neuroimaging findings are inconsistent is not based on any quantitative evidence. Here, we report the results of a quantitative meta-analysis of 28 neuroimaging studies of deductive reasoning published between 1997 and 2010, combining 382 participants. Consistent areas of activations across studies were identified using the multilevel kernel density analysis method. We found that results from neuroimaging studies are more consistent than what has been previously assumed. Overall, studies consistently report activations in specific regions of a left fronto-parietal system, as well as in the left BG. This brain system can be decomposed into three subsystems that are specific to particular types of deductive arguments: relational, categorical, and propositional. These dissociations explain inconstancies in the literature. However, they are incompatible with the notion that deductive reasoning is supported by a single cognitive system relying either on visuospatial or rule-based mechanisms. Our findings provide critical insight into the cognitive organization of deductive reasoning and need to be accounted for by cognitive theories.

A dissociation between social mentalizing and general reasoning

It has recently been suggested that brain areas crucial for mentalizing, including the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), are not activated exclusively during mentalizing about the intentions, beliefs, morals or traits of the self or others, but also more generally during cognitive reasoning including relational processing about objects. Contrary to this notion, a meta-analysis of cognitive reasoning tasks demonstrates that the core mentalizing areas are not systematically recruited during reasoning, but mostly when these tasks describe some human agency or general evaluative and enduring traits about humans, and much less so when these social evaluations are absent. There is a gradient showing less mPFC activation as less mentalizing content is contained in the stimulus material used in reasoning tasks. Hence, it is more likely that cognitive reasoning activates the mPFC because inferences about social agency and mind are involved.