Dopamine and Proximity in Motivation and Cognitive Control

Dopamine Increases Accuracy and Lengthens Deliberation Time in Explicit Motor Skill Learning

Although animal research implicates a central role for dopamine in motor skill learning, a direct causal link has yet to be established in neurotypical humans. Here, we tested if a pharmacological manipulation of dopamine alters motor learning, using a paradigm which engaged explicit, goal-directed strategies. Participants (27 females; 11 males; aged 18-29 years) first consumed either 100 mg of levodopa (n = 19), a dopamine precursor that increases dopamine availability, or placebo (n = 19). Then, during training, participants learnt the explicit strategy of aiming away from presented targets by instructed angles of varying sizes. Targets jumped mid-movement by the instructed aiming angle. Task success was thus contingent upon aiming accuracy and not speed. The effect of the dopamine manipulations on skill learning was assessed during training and after an overnight follow-up. Increasing dopamine availability at training improved aiming accuracy and lengthened reaction times, particularly for larger, more difficult aiming angles, both at training and, importantly, at follow-up, despite prominent session-by-session performance improvements in both accuracy and speed. Exogenous dopamine thus seems to result in a learnt, persistent propensity to better adhere to task goals. Results support the proposal that dopamine is important in engagement of instrumental motivation to optimize adherence to task goals, particularly when learning to execute goal-directed strategies in motor skill learning.

Computational mechanisms underlying motivation to earn symbolic reinforcers

Reinforcement learning (RL) is a theoretical framework that describes how agents learn to select options that maximize rewards and minimize punishments over time. We often make choices, however, to obtain symbolic reinforcers (e.g. money, points) that can later be exchanged for primary reinforcers (e.g. food, drink). Although symbolic reinforcers are motivating, little is understood about the neural or computational mechanisms underlying the motivation to earn them. In the present study, we examined how monkeys learn to make choices that maximize fluid rewards through reinforcement with tokens. The question addressed here is how the value of a state, which is a function of multiple task features (e.g. current number of accumulated tokens, choice options, task epoch, trials since last delivery of primary reinforcer, etc.), drives value and affects motivation. We constructed a Markov decision process model that computes the value of task states given task features to capture the motivational state of the animal. Fixation times, choice reaction times, and abort frequency were all significantly related to values of task states during the tokens task (n=5 monkeys). Furthermore, the model makes predictions for how neural responses could change on a moment-by-moment basis relative to changes in state value. Together, this task and model allow us to capture learning and behavior related to symbolic reinforcement.

PET-measured human dopamine synthesis capacity and receptor availability predict trading rewards and time-costs during foraging

Foraging behavior requires weighing costs of time to decide when to leave one reward patch to search for another. Computational and animal studies suggest that striatal dopamine is key to this process; however, the specific role of dopamine in foraging behavior in humans is not well characterized. We use positron emission tomography (PET) imaging to directly measure dopamine synthesis capacity and D1 and D2/3 receptor availability in 57 healthy adults who complete a computerized foraging task. Using voxelwise data and principal component analysis to identify patterns of variation across PET measures, we show that striatal D1 and D2/3 receptor availability and a pattern of mesolimbic and anterior cingulate cortex dopamine function are important for adjusting the threshold for leaving a patch to explore, with specific sensitivity to changes in travel time. These findings suggest a key role for dopamine in trading reward benefits against temporal costs to modulate behavioral adaptions to changes in the reward environment critical for foraging.

Evidence Accumulation Rate Moderates the Relationship between Enriched Environment Exposure and Age-Related Response Speed Declines

Older adults exposed to enriched environments (EEs) maintain relatively higher levels of cognitive function, even in the face of compromised markers of brain health. Response speed (RS) is often used as a simple proxy to measure the preservation of global cognitive function in older adults. However, it is unknown which specific selection, decision, and/or motor processes provide the most specific indices of neurocognitive health. Here, using a simple decision task with electroencephalography (EEG), we found that the efficiency with which an individual accumulates sensory evidence was a critical determinant of the extent to which RS was preserved in older adults (63% female, 37% male). Moreover, the mitigating influence of EE on age-related RS declines was most pronounced when evidence accumulation rates were shallowest. These results suggest that the phenomenon of cognitive reserve, whereby high EE individuals can better tolerate suboptimal brain health to facilitate the preservation of cognitive function, is not just applicable to neuroanatomical indicators of brain aging but can be observed in markers of neurophysiology. Our results suggest that EEG metrics of evidence accumulation may index neurocognitive vulnerability of the aging brain.Significance Statement Response speed in older adults is closely linked with trajectories of cognitive aging. Here, by recording brain activity while individuals perform a simple computer task, we identify a neural metric that is a critical determinant of response speed. Older adults exposed to greater cognitive and social stimulation throughout a lifetime could maintain faster responding, even when this neural metric was impaired. This work suggests EEG is a useful technique for interrogating how a lifetime of stimulation benefits brain health in aging.

A process model account of the role of dopamine in intertemporal choice

Theoretical accounts disagree on the role of dopamine in intertemporal choice and assume that dopamine either promotes delay of gratification by increasing the preference for larger rewards or that dopamine reduces patience by enhancing the sensitivity to waiting costs. Here, we reconcile these conflicting accounts by providing empirical support for a novel process model according to which dopamine contributes to two dissociable components of the decision process, evidence accumulation and starting bias. We re-analyzed a previously published data set where intertemporal decisions were made either under the D2 antagonist amisulpride or under placebo by fitting a hierarchical drift diffusion model that distinguishes between dopaminergic effects on the speed of evidence accumulation and the starting point of the accumulation process. Blocking dopaminergic neurotransmission not only strengthened the sensitivity to whether a reward is perceived as worth the delay costs during evidence accumulation (drift rate) but also attenuated the impact of waiting costs on the starting point of the evidence accumulation process (bias). In contrast, re-analyzing data from a D1 agonist study provided no evidence for a causal involvement of D1R activation in intertemporal choices. Taken together, our findings support a novel, process-based account of the role of dopamine for cost-benefit decision making, highlight the potential benefits of process-informed analyses, and advance our understanding of dopaminergic contributions to decision making.

Corticospinal Suppression Underlying Intact Movement Preparation Fades in Parkinson's Disease

BACKGROUND

In Parkinson's disease (PD), neurophysiological abnormalities within the primary motor cortex (M1) have been shown to contribute to bradykinesia, but exact modalities are still uncertain. We propose that such motor slowness could involve alterations in mechanisms underlying movement preparation, especially the suppression of corticospinal excitability-called "preparatory suppression"-which is considered to propel movement execution by increasing motor neural gain in healthy individuals.

METHODS

On two consecutive days, 29 PD patients (on and off medication) and 29 matched healthy controls (HCs) underwent transcranial magnetic stimulation over M1, eliciting motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) in targeted hand muscles, while they were either at rest or preparing a left- or right-hand response in an instructed-delay choice reaction time task. Preparatory suppression was assessed by expressing MEP amplitudes during movement preparation relative to rest.

RESULTS

Contrary to HCs, PD patients showed a lack of preparatory suppression when the side of the responding hand was analyzed, especially when the latter was the most affected one. This deficit, which did not depend on dopamine medication, increased with disease duration and also tended to correlate with motor impairment, as measured by the Movement Disorder Society Unified Parkinson's Disease Rating Scale, Part III (both total and bradykinesia scores).

CONCLUSIONS

Our novel findings indicate that preparatory suppression fades in PD, in parallel with worsening motor symptoms, including bradykinesia. Such results suggest that an alteration in this marker of intact movement preparation could indeed cause motor slowness and support its use in future studies on the relation between M1 alterations and motor impairment in PD. © 2022 International Parkinson and Movement Disorder Society.

Clinical features and power spectral entropy of electroencephalography in Wilson's disease with dystonia

OBJECTIVE

To study the clinical features and power spectral entropy (PSE) of electroencephalography signals in Wilson's disease (WD) patients with dystonia.

METHODS

Several scale evaluations were performed to assess the clinical features of WD patients. Demographic information and electroencephalography signals were obtained in all subjects.

RESULTS

34 WD patients with dystonia were recruited in the case group and 24 patients without dystonia were recruited in the control group. 20 healthy individuals were included in the healthy control group. The mean body mass index (BMI) in the case group was significantly lower than that in the controls (p < .05). The case group had significantly higher SAS, SDS, and Bucco-Facial-Apraxia Assessment scores (p < .05). Total BADS scores in the case group were lower than those in the control group (p < .01). Note that 94.11% of the case group presented with dysarthria and 70.59% of them suffered from dysphagia. Dysphagia was mainly related to the oral preparatory stage and oral stage. Mean power spectral entropy (PSE) values in the case group were significantly different (p < .05) from those in the control group and the healthy group across the different tasks.

CONCLUSIONS

The patients with dystonia were usually accompanied with low BMI, anxiety, depression, apraxia, executive dysfunction, dysarthria and dysphagia. The cortical activities of the WD patients with dystonia seemed to be more chaotic during the eyes-closed and reading tasks but lower during the swallowing stages than those in the control group.

Tonic activity in lateral habenula neurons acts as a neutral valence brake on reward-seeking behavior

Survival requires both the ability to persistently pursue goals and the ability to determine when it is time to stop, an adaptive balance of perseverance and disengagement. Neural activity in the lateral habenula (LHb) has been linked to negative valence, but its role in regulating the balance between engaged reward seeking and disengaged behavioral states remains unclear. Here, we show that LHb neural activity is tonically elevated during minutes-long periods of disengagement from reward-seeking behavior, both when due to repeated reward omission (negative valence) and when sufficient reward has been consumed (positive valence). Furthermore, we show that LHb inhibition extends ongoing reward-seeking behavioral states but does not prompt task re-engagement. We find no evidence for similar tonic activity changes in ventral tegmental area dopamine neurons. Our findings support a framework in which tonic activity in LHb neurons suppresses engagement in reward-seeking behavior in response to both negatively and positively valenced factors.

Nucleus accumbens D1-receptors regulate and focus transitions to reward-seeking action

It is well established that dopamine transmission is integral in mediating the influence of reward expectations on reward-seeking actions. However, the precise causal role of dopamine transmission in moment-to-moment reward-motivated behavioral control remains contentious, particularly in contexts where it is necessary to refrain from responding to achieve a beneficial outcome. To examine this, we manipulated dopamine transmission pharmacologically as rats performed a Go/No-Go task that required them to either make or withhold action to gain either a small or large reward. D1R Stimulation potentiated cue-driven action initiation, including fast impulsive actions on No-Go trials. By contrast, D1R blockade primarily disrupted the successful completion of Go trial sequences. Surprisingly, while after global D1R blockade this was characterized by a general retardation of reward-seeking actions, nucleus accumbens core (NAcC) D1R blockade had no effect on the speed of action initiation or impulsive actions. Instead, fine-grained analyses showed that this manipulation decreased the precision of animals' goal-directed actions, even though they usually still followed the appropriate response sequence. Strikingly, such "unfocused" responding could also be observed off-drug, particularly when only a small reward was on offer. These findings suggest that the balance of activity at NAcC D1Rs plays a key role in enabling the rapid activation of a focused, reward-seeking state to enable animals to efficiently and accurately achieve their goal.

Towards a Unifying Account of Dopamine’s Role in Cost-Benefit Decision Making

Dopamine is thought to play a crucial role in cost-benefit decision making, but so far there is no consensus on the precise role of dopamine in decision making. Here, we review the literature on dopaminergic manipulations of cost-benefit decision making in humans and evaluate how well different theoretical accounts explain the existing body of evidence. Reduced D₂ stimulation tends to increase the willingness to bear delay and risk costs (i.e., wait for later rewards, take riskier options), while increased D₁ and D₂ receptor stimulation increases willingness to bear effort costs. We argue that the empirical findings can best be explained by combining the strengths of two theoretical accounts: in cost-benefit decision making, dopamine may play a dual role both in promoting the pursuit of psychologically close options (e.g., sooner and safer rewards) and in computing which costs are acceptable for a reward at stake. Moreover, we identify several limiting factors in the study designs of previous investigations that prevented a fuller understanding of dopamine's role in value-based choice. Together, the proposed theoretical framework and the methodological suggestions for future studies may bring us closer to a unifying account of dopamine in healthy and impaired cost-benefit decision making.

Sleep Restriction Reduces Cognitive but Not Physical Motivation

PURPOSE

Motivation is an important driver of behaviour, and several frameworks distinguish the willingness of individuals to invest cognitive versus physical effort to achieve a goal. One outstanding question is whether sleep loss lowers motivation within specific domains of effort, or has a global effect on motivation across multiple domains. Here, we investigated the effects of sleep restriction on the motivation to invest cognitive or physical effort in return for reward.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

24 healthy young adults (11 females) completed an effort-based decision-making task over two laboratory sessions - once while sleep restricted (three consecutive nights with a three-hour sleep opportunity), and the other while fully rested (nine-hour sleep opportunity on each night). In an initial reinforcement phase, participants were trained to ceiling performance across six levels of effort on separate cognitively and physically demanding tasks. Then, in the critical decision-making phase, participants revealed their preference for how much cognitive or physical effort they would be willing to invest for reward.

RESULTS

Sleep restriction reduced the willingness to exert cognitive effort, but spared motivation in the physical domain. Furthermore, the reduction in cognitive motivation appeared to be a primary motivational deficit, which could not be attributed to differences in reward-likelihood of different levels of effort or the temporal structure of the task.

CONCLUSION

The results suggest that sleep restriction has a selective effect on cognitive over physical motivation, which has significant implications for real-world settings in which individuals must maintain high levels of cognitive motivation in the face of chronic sleep loss.

Negative urgency as a risk factor for hazardous alcohol use: Dual influences of cognitive control and reinforcement processing

Negative Urgency (NU) is a prominent risk factor for hazardous alcohol use. While research has helped elucidate how NU relates to neurobiological functioning with respect to alcohol use, no known work has contextualized such functioning within existing neurobiological theories in addiction. Therefore, we elucidated mechanisms contributing to the NU-hazardous alcohol use relationship by combining NU theories with neurobiological dual models of addiction, which posit addiction is related to cognitive control and reinforcement processing. Fifty-five undergraduates self-reported NU and hazardous alcohol use. We recorded EEG while participants performed a reinforced flanker task. We measured cognitive control using N2 activation time-locked to the incongruent flanker stimulus, and we measured reinforcement processing using the feedback-related negativity (FRN) time-locked to better-than-expected negative reinforcement feedback. We modeled hazardous drinking using hierarchical regression, with NU, N2, and FRN plus their interactions as predictors. The regression model significantly predicted hazardous alcohol use, and the three-way interaction (NU × N2 × FRN) significantly improved model fit. In the context of inefficient processing (i.e., larger N2s and FRNs), NU demonstrated a strong relationship with hazardous alcohol use. In the context of efficient processing (i.e., smaller N2s and FRNs), NU was unrelated to hazardous alcohol use. Control analyses ruled out the potential impact of other impulsivity subscales, individual differences in dimensional negative affect or anxiety, and use of substances other than alcohol, and post hoc specificity analyses showed that this effect was driven primarily by heavy drinking, rather than frequency of drinking. This analysis provides preliminary evidence that brain mechanisms of cognitive control and reinforcement processing influence the relationship between NU and hazardous alcohol use, and confirms a specific influence of negative reinforcement processing. Future clinical research could leverage these neurobiological moderators for substance misuse treatment.

A mosaic of cost-benefit control over cortico-striatal circuitry

Dopamine contributes to cognitive control through well-established effects in both the striatum and cortex. Although earlier work suggests that dopamine affects cognitive control capacity, more recent work suggests that striatal dopamine may also impact on cognitive motivation. We consider the emerging perspective that striatal dopamine boosts control by making people more sensitive to the benefits versus the costs of cognitive effort, and we discuss how this sensitivity shapes competition between controlled and prepotent actions. We propose that dopamine signaling in distinct cortico-striatal subregions mediates different types of cost-benefit tradeoffs, and also discuss mechanisms for the local control of dopamine release, enabling selectivity among cortico-striatal circuits. In so doing, we show how this cost-benefit mosaic can reconcile seemingly conflicting findings about the impact of dopamine signaling on cognitive control.

Rewards that are near increase impulsive action

In modern society, the natural drive to behave impulsively in order to obtain rewards must often be curbed. A continued failure to do so is associated with a range of outcomes including drug abuse, pathological gambling, and obesity. Here, we used virtual reality technology to investigate whether spatial proximity to rewards has the power to exacerbate the drive to behave impulsively toward them. We embedded two behavioral tasks measuring distinct forms of impulsive behavior, impulsive action, and impulsive choice, within an environment rendered in virtual reality. Participants responded to three-dimensional cues representing food rewards located in either near or far space. Bayesian analyses revealed that participants were significantly less able to stop motor actions when rewarding cues were near compared with when they were far. Since factors normally associated with proximity were controlled for, these results suggest that proximity plays a distinctive role in driving impulsive actions for rewards.

Dopamine Modulates Dynamic Decision-Making during Foraging

The mesolimbic dopaminergic system exerts a crucial influence on incentive processing. However, the contribution of dopamine in dynamic, ecological situations where reward rates vary, and decisions evolve over time, remains unclear. In such circumstances, current (foreground) reward accrual needs to be compared continuously with potential rewards that could be obtained by traveling elsewhere (background reward rate), to determine the opportunity cost of staying versus leaving. We hypothesized that dopamine specifically modulates the influence of background, but not foreground, reward information when making a dynamic comparison of these variables for optimal behavior. On a novel foraging task based on an ecological account of animal behavior (marginal value theorem), human participants of either sex decided when to leave locations in situations where foreground rewards depleted at different rates, either in rich or poor environments with high or low background reward rates. In line with theoretical accounts, people's decisions to move from current locations were independently modulated by changes in both foreground and background reward rates. Pharmacological manipulation of dopamine D2 receptor activity using the agonist cabergoline significantly affected decisions to move on, specifically modulating the effect of background reward rates. In particular, when on cabergoline, people left patches in poor environments much earlier. These results demonstrate a role of dopamine in signaling the opportunity cost of rewards, not value per se. Using this ecologically derived framework, we uncover a specific mechanism by which D2 dopamine receptor activity modulates decision-making when foreground and background reward rates are dynamically compared.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Many decisions, across economic, political, and social spheres, involve choices to "leave". Such decisions depend on a continuous comparison of a current location's value, with that of other locations you could move on to. However, how the brain makes such decisions is poorly understood. Here, we developed a computerized task, based around theories of how animals make decisions to move on when foraging for food. Healthy human participants had to decide when to leave collecting financial rewards in a location, and travel to collect rewards elsewhere. Using a pharmacological manipulation, we show that the activity of dopamine in the brain modulates decisions to move on, with people valuing other locations differently depending on their dopaminergic state.

Dynamic resource allocation during reinforcement learning accounts for ramping and phasic dopamine activity

For an animal to learn about its environment with limited motor and cognitive resources, it should focus its resources on potentially important stimuli. However, too narrow focus is disadvantageous for adaptation to environmental changes. Midbrain dopamine neurons are excited by potentially important stimuli, such as reward-predicting or novel stimuli, and allocate resources to these stimuli by modulating how an animal approaches, exploits, explores, and attends. The current study examined the theoretical possibility that dopamine activity reflects the dynamic allocation of resources for learning. Dopamine activity may transition between two patterns: (1) phasic responses to cues and rewards, and (2) ramping activity arising as the agent approaches the reward. Phasic excitation has been explained by prediction errors generated by experimentally inserted cues. However, when and why dopamine activity transitions between the two patterns remain unknown. By parsimoniously modifying a standard temporal difference (TD) learning model to accommodate a mixed presentation of both experimental and environmental stimuli, we simulated dopamine transitions and compared them with experimental data from four different studies. The results suggested that dopamine transitions from ramping to phasic patterns as the agent focuses its resources on a small number of reward-predicting stimuli, thus leading to task dimensionality reduction. The opposite occurs when the agent re-distributes its resources to adapt to environmental changes, resulting in task dimensionality expansion. This research elucidates the role of dopamine in a broader context, providing a potential explanation for the diverse repertoire of dopamine activity that cannot be explained solely by prediction error.

Dopamine restores cognitive motivation in Parkinson's disease

Disorders of motivation, such as apathy, are common in Parkinson's disease, and a key feature of such disorders is a greater aversion to effort. In humans, the experience of cognitive effort is ubiquitous, and cognitive apathy has traditionally been considered distinct and separable from other subtypes. Surprisingly, however, the neurobiology of cognitive motivation is poorly understood. In particular, although dopamine has a well-characterized role in incentivizing physically effortful behaviour, a critical, unresolved issue is whether its facilitatory role generalizes to other domains. Here, we asked how dopamine modulates the willingness of patients with Parkinson's disease to invest cognitive effort in return for reward. We tested 20 patients with idiopathic Parkinson's disease across two counterbalanced sessions-ON and OFF their usual dopaminergic medication-and compared their performance to 20 healthy age-matched controls. We applied a novel task in which we manipulated cognitive effort as the number of rapid serial visual presentation streams to which participants had to attend. After training participants to ceiling performance, we then asked them to choose between a low-effort/low-reward baseline option, and a higher-effort/higher-reward offer. Computational models of choice behaviour revealed four key results. First, patients OFF medication were significantly less cognitively motivated than controls, as manifest by steeper cognitive effort discounting functions in the former group. Second, dopaminergic therapy improved this deficit, such that choices in patients ON medication were indistinguishable from controls. Third, differences in motivation were also accompanied by independent changes in the stochasticity of individuals' decisions, such that dopamine reduced the variability in choice behaviour. Finally, choices on our task correlated uniquely with the subscale of the Dimensional Apathy Scale that specifically indexes cognitive motivation, which suggests a close relationship between our laboratory measure of cognitive effort discounting and subjective reports of day-to-day cognitive apathy. Importantly, participants' choices were not confounded by temporal discounting, probability discounting, physical demand, or varying task performance. These results are the first to reveal the central role of dopamine in overcoming cognitive effort costs. They provide an insight into the computational mechanisms underlying cognitive apathy in Parkinson's disease, and demonstrate its amenability to dopaminergic therapy. More broadly, they offer important empirical support for prominent frameworks proposing a domain-general role for dopamine in value-based decision-making, and provide a critical link between dopamine and multidimensional theories of apathy.

Cost-benefit trade-offs in decision-making and learning

Value-based decision-making involves trading off the cost associated with an action against its expected reward. Research has shown that both physical and mental effort constitute such subjective costs, biasing choices away from effortful actions, and discounting the value of obtained rewards. Facing conflicts between competing action alternatives is considered aversive, as recruiting cognitive control to overcome conflict is effortful. Moreover, engaging control to proactively suppress irrelevant information that could conflict with task-relevant information would presumably also be cognitively costly. Yet, it remains unclear whether the cognitive control demands involved in preventing and resolving conflict also constitute costs in value-based decisions. The present study investigated this question by embedding irrelevant distractors (flanker arrows) within a reversal-learning task, with intermixed free and instructed trials. Results showed that participants learned to adapt their free choices to maximize rewards, but were nevertheless biased to follow the suggestions of irrelevant distractors. Thus, the perceived cost of investing cognitive control to suppress an external suggestion could sometimes trump internal value representations. By adapting computational models of reinforcement learning, we assessed the influence of conflict at both the decision and learning stages. Modelling the decision showed that free choices were more biased when participants were less sure about which action was more rewarding. This supports the hypothesis that the costs linked to conflict management were traded off against expected rewards. During the learning phase, we found that learning rates were reduced in instructed, relative to free, choices. Learning rates were further reduced by conflict between an instruction and subjective action values, whereas learning was not robustly influenced by conflict between one’s actions and external distractors. Our results show that the subjective cognitive control costs linked to conflict factor into value-based decision-making, and highlight that different types of conflict may have different effects on learning about action outcomes.

Value-based decision-making involves trading off the cost associated with an action–such as physical or mental effort–against its expected reward. Although facing conflicts between competing action alternatives is considered aversive and effortful, it remains unclear whether conflict also constitutes a cost in value-based decisions. We tested this hypothesis by combining a classic conflict (flanker) task with a reinforcement-learning task. Results showed that participants learned to maximise their earnings, but were nevertheless biased to follow irrelevant suggestions. Computational model-based analyses showed a greater choice bias with more uncertainty about the best action to make, supporting the hypothesis that the costs linked to conflict management were traded off against expected rewards. We additionally found that learning rates were reduced when following instructions, relative to when choosing freely what to do. Learning was further reduced by conflict between instructions and subjective action values. In short, we found that the subjective cognitive control costs linked to conflict factor into value-based decision-making, and that different types of conflict may have different effects on learning about action outcomes.

A randomized controlled study of whether setting specific goals improves the effectiveness of therapy in people with Parkinson's disease

OBJECTIVE:

To evaluate the effects of an intervention based on a specific set of goals on goal attainment, manual dexterity, hand grip strength and finger prehension force compared to a standardized approach in patients with Parkinson's disease.

DESIGN:

Randomized controlled trial.

SETTING:

Home-based.

PARTICIPANTS:

Fifty patients with a clinical diagnosis of Parkinson's disease acknowledging impaired manual ability were randomized into two groups.

INTERVENTIONS:

Patients in the experimental group ( n = 25) were included in an intervention focused on task components that involved goals proposed by participants. Patients in the control group ( n = 25) received a standard intervention focused on impairments in range of motion, grasp and manipulation. Home condition and duration (four weeks, twice a week) were similar in both groups.

MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES:

The primary outcome measure was goal achievement assessed with the Goal Attainment Scaling. Secondary outcomes were manual dexterity evaluated with the Purdue Pegboard Test and hand grip strength and finger prehension force assessed using a dynamometer.

RESULTS:

After four weeks, significant between-group improvement in goal attainment was observed in the experimental group (change 17.36 ± 7.48 vs. 4.03 ± 6.43, P < 0.001). Compared to the control group, the experimental group also showed a significant improvement ( P < 0.05) in manual dexterity (postintervention values in the most affected arm 10.55 ± 1.95 vs. 7.33 ± 3.63 pins, P < 0.001) and finger prehension force (postintervention values in the most affected arm 8.03 ± 1.93 vs. 6.31 ± 1.85 kg, P = 0.010).

CONCLUSIONS:

Targeting therapy toward specific goals leads to greater changes in arm function than a standardized approach in people with Parkinson's disease.