Children’s developing understanding that even reliable sources need to verify their claims

Investigating Sensitivity to Shared Information and Personal Experience in Children's Use of Majority Information

Children and adults alike rely on others to learn about the world, but also need to be able to determine the strength of both their own evidence as well as the evidence that other people provide, particularly when different sources of information disagree. For example, if two informants agree on a belief but share the same evidence, their testimony is statistically dependent on each other, and may be weaker evidence for that belief than two informants who draw on different pieces of evidence to support that belief. Across three experiments (total N = 492), we examine how 4- and 5-year-old children evaluate statistical dependency on a task where they must determine which of two jars that toys were drawn from. A majority of informants, whose testimony could draw from the same evidence or different evidence, always endorsed one jar. Then, children were presented with a dissenting informant or their own personal data that was consistent with the other jar. Children showed no sensitivity to statistical dependency, choosing the majority with equal probability regardless of the independence of their testimony, but also systematically overweighted their own personal data, endorsing the jar consistent with their own evidence more often than would be predicted by an optimal Bayesian model. In contrast, children made choices consistent with this model on a similar task in which the data was presented to children without testimony. Our findings suggest that young children treat majorities as broadly informative, but that the challenges of inferring others' experiences may lead them to rely on concrete, visible evidence when it is available.

Children's developing ability to recognize deceptive use of true information

The strategic use of deliberate omissions, conveying true but selective information for deceptive purposes, is a prevalent and pernicious disinformation tactic. Crucially, its recognition requires engaging in a sophisticated, multi-part social cognitive reasoning process. In two preregistered studies, we investigated the development of children's ability to engage in this process and successfully recognize this form of deception, finding that children even as young as 5 years are capable of doing so, but only with sufficient scaffolding. This work highlights the key role that social cognition plays in the ability to recognize the manipulation techniques that underpin disinformation. It suggests that the interrelated development of pragmatic competence and epistemic vigilance can be harnessed in the design of tools and strategies to help bolster psychological resistance against disinformation in even our youngest citizens-children at the outset of formal education.

Don't throw the associative baby out with the Bayesian bathwater: Children are more associative when reasoning retrospectively under information processing demands

Causal reasoning is a fundamental cognitive ability that enables individuals to learn about the complex interactions in the world around them. However, the mechanisms that underpin causal reasoning are not well understood. For example, it remains unresolved whether children's causal inferences are best explained by Bayesian inference or associative learning. The two experiments and computational models reported here were designed to examine whether 5- and 6-year-olds will retrospectively reevaluate objects-that is, adjust their beliefs about the causal status of some objects presented at an earlier point in time based on the observed causal status of other objects presented at a later point in time-when asked to reason about 3 and 4 objects and under varying degrees of information processing demands. Additionally, the experiments and models were designed to determine whether children's retrospective reevaluations were best explained by associative learning, Bayesian inference, or some combination of both. The results indicated that participants retrospectively reevaluated causal inferences under minimal information-processing demands (Experiment 1) but failed to do so under greater information processing demands (Experiment 2) and that their performance was better captured by an associative learning mechanism, with less support for descriptions that rely on Bayesian inference. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Five- and 6-year-old children engage in retrospective reevaluation under minimal information-processing demands (Experiment 1). Five- and 6-year-old children do not engage in retrospective reevaluation under more extensive information-processing demands (Experiment 2). Across both experiments, children's retrospective reevaluations were better explained by a simple associative learning model, with only minimal support for a simple Bayesian model. These data contribute to our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms by which children make causal judgements.

The role of accuracy in children's judgments of experts' knowledge

Across two studies, children ages 6-9 (N = 160, 82 boys, 78 girls; 75% White, 91% non-Hispanic) rated an inaccurate expert's knowledge and provided explanations for the expert's inaccurate statements. In Study 1, children's knowledge ratings decreased as he provided more inaccurate information. Ratings were predicted by age (i.e., older children gave lower ratings than younger children) and how children explained the error. Children's ratings followed similar patterns in Study 2. However, children delegated new questions to the inaccurate expert, even after rating him as having little to no knowledge. These results suggest that 6- to 9-year-olds weigh accuracy over expertise when making epistemic judgments, but, when they need assistance, they will still seek out information from a previously inaccurate expert.

From outcome to process: A developmental shift in judgments of good reasoning

What does it mean to reason well? One might argue that good reasoning means that the outcome of the reasoning process is correct: reaching the right belief. Alternatively, good reasoning might refer to the reasoning process itself: following the right epistemic procedures. In a preregistered study, we investigated children's (4-9-year-olds) and adults' judgments of reasoning in China and the US (N = 256). Participants of all age groups evaluated the outcome when the process was kept constant - they favored agents who reached correct over incorrect beliefs, and they evaluated the process when the outcome was kept constant - they preferred agents who formed their beliefs using valid over invalid procedures. Developmental changes emerged when we pitted outcome against process: young children weighed outcome more heavily than process; older children and adults showed the reverse preference. This pattern was constant across the two cultural contexts, with the switch from outcome to process happening earlier in development in China. These results suggest that children initially value what someone believes, but, with development, come to increasingly value how beliefs are formed.

Understanding the value of telescopic testimony: With age, a predominantly White Midwestern sample of children credits knowledge to speakers whose statements go beyond the evidence

One primary value of testimony lies in its ability to extend our powers of observation. Do children credit more knowledge to speakers whose testimony goes beyond firsthand observation? The current study investigated 3- to 8-year-old children's (N = 180) and adults' (N = 20) knowledge attributions to speakers who made claims regarding perceptually evident features of a novel animal (e.g., "is brown") or claims regarding perceptually absent features (e.g., "eats insects"). By 7 years of age, children and adults attributed more knowledge to speakers who discussed telescopic information and generalized their knowledge to other domains. Because the knowledge base of child listeners expands with age, they place increased value on telescopic information and the speakers who provide it.

Older children verify adult claims because they are skeptical of those claims

We investigated children's information seeking in response to a surprising claim (Study 1, N = 109, 54 Female, Range = 4.02-6.94 years, 49% White, 21% Mixed Ethnicity, 19% Southeast Asian, September 2019-March 2020; Study 2, N = 154, 74 Female, Range = 4.09-7.99, 50% White, 20% Mixed Ethnicity, 17% Southeast Asian, September 2020-December 2020). Relative to younger children, older children more often expressed skepticism about the adult's surprising claims (1-year increase, OR = 2.70) and more often suggested exploration strategies appropriate for testing the specific claim they heard (1-year increase, OR = 1.42). Controlling for age, recommending more targeted exploration strategies was associated with a greater likelihood of expressing skepticism about the adult's claim.

Claims of wrongdoing by outgroup members heighten children's ingroup biases

Little is known about how group bias may impact children's acceptance of unsubstantiated claims. Most children view cheating as unfair. However, in competitive situations, when ambiguity surrounds the potential intention to cheat, group affiliation may lead children to support claims of cheating based solely on the team affiliation of the claimant, even when those claims are not clearly substantiated. Therefore, it may be particularly important to consider the role ingroup bias may play in children's accusations of cheating in a competitive intergroup context. The current study investigated 4-10 year old children's (N = 137, M_Age = 6.71 years, SD_Age = 1.49; 47 % female) evaluations of ambiguous acts and unverified claims about those acts in a competitive, intergroup context. Results showed that children initially viewed an ambiguous act similarly, regardless of team affiliation, but demonstrated increasing ingroup biases after claims of wrongdoing were introduced. Implications for how unsubstantiated claims may impact intergroup interactions more broadly will be discussed.