Can infants attribute to an agent a disposition to perform a particular action?

Vicarious representation: A new theory of social cognition

Theory of mind, the attribution of mental states to others is one form of social cognition. The aim of this paper is to highlight the importance of another, much simpler, form of social cognition, which I call vicarious representation. Vicarious representation is the attribution of other-centered properties to objects. This mental capacity is different from, and much simpler than, theory of mind as it does not imply the understanding (or representation) of the mental (or even perceptual) states of another agents. I argue that the most convincing experiments that are supposed to show that non-human primates have theory of mind in fact demonstrate that they are capable of vicarious representation. The same is true for the experiments about the theory of mind of infants under 12 months.

Infants' understanding of the definite/indefinite article in a third-party communicative situation

The present study examines how infants use their emergent perspective-taking and language comprehension abilities to make sense of interactions between two human agents. In the study, one agent (Agent1) could see only one of two identical balls on an apparatus because of a screen obstructing her view while the infant and another agent (Agent2) could see both balls. 19-month-old English-learning monolingual infants seemed to expect Agent2 to grasp the ball visible to Agent1 when she said to Agent2 "Give me the ball" but not when she said "Give me a ball." 14-month-olds appeared to accept that Agent2 could grasp either ball when Agent1 said "Give me the ball." Therefore, by 19 months of age, English-learning infants seem to attend to the specific linguistic units used, e.g., the definite article, to identify the referent of others' speech. Possible reasons in connection with language acquisition processes and/or environmental factors for the two age groups' respective failures with the definite and the indefinite articles are discussed.

The development of infants' use of novel verbal information when reasoning about others' actions

How sophisticated are infants at using novel verbal information when reasoning about which of two objects an agent is likely to select? The present research examined the development of infants' ability to interpret a change from one novel word to another as signaling a possible change in which object the agent would choose next. In three experiments, 7- and 12-month-olds were familiarized to an event in which they heard a novel word ("A dax!") and then saw an agent reach for one of two distinct objects. During test, the infants heard a different novel word ("A pilk!") and then saw the agent grasp the same object or the other object. At 7 months, infants ignored the change in word and expected the agent to continue reaching for the same object. At 12 months, however, infants attended to the change in word: They realized that it signaled a possible change in the agent's upcoming actions, though they were unable to form a specific expectation about what these new actions might be, most likely due to their limited mutual-exclusivity assumption. Control conditions supported these interpretations. Together, these results suggest that by 12 months of age, infants understand not only that words are selected for communicative purposes, but also that a change from one novel word to another may signal a change in an agent's upcoming actions.

Theory of mind in the wild: toward tackling the challenges of everyday mental state reasoning

A complete understanding of the cognitive systems underwriting theory of mind (ToM) abilities requires articulating how mental state representations are generated and processed in everyday situations. Individuals rarely announce their intentions prior to acting, and actions are often consistent with multiple mental states. In order for ToM to operate effectively in such situations, mental state representations should be generated in response to certain actions, even when those actions occur in the presence of mental state content derived from other aspects of the situation. Results from three experiments with preschool children and adults demonstrate that mental state information is indeed generated based on an approach action cue in situations that contain competing mental state information. Further, the frequency with which participants produced or endorsed explanations that include mental states about an approached object decreased when the competing mental state information about a different object was made explicit. This set of experiments provides some of the first steps toward identifying the observable action cues that are used to generate mental state representations in everyday situations and offers insight into how both young children and adults processes multiple mental state representations.

Linguistic effects on the neural basis of theory of mind

"Theory of mind" (ToM) has been described as the ability to attribute and understand other people's desires and intentions as distinct from one's own. There has been a debate about the extent to which language influences ToM development. Although very few studies directly examined linguistic influence on the neural basis of ToM, results from these studies indicate at least moderate influence of language on ToM. In this review both behavioral and neurological studies that examined the relationship between language and ToM are selectively discussed. This review focuses on cross-linguistic / cultural studies (especially Japanese vs. American / English) since my colleagues and I found evidence of significant linguistic influence on the neural basis of ToM through a series of functional brain imaging experiments. Evidence from both behavioral and neurological studies of ToM (including ours) suggests that the pragmatic (not the constitutive) aspects of language influence ToM understanding more significantly.

Do you see what I see? Infants' reasoning about others' incomplete perceptions

Twelve-month-olds realize that when an agent cannot see an object, her incomplete perceptions still guide her goal-directed actions. What would happen if the agent had incomplete perceptions because she could see only one part of the object, for example one side of a screen? In the present research, 16-month-olds were first shown an agent who always pointed to a red object, as opposed to a black or a yellow object, suggesting that she preferred red over the other colours. Next, two screens were introduced while the agent was absent. The screens were (1) red or green on both sides; (2) red on the front (infants' side) but green on the back (the agent's side) or vice versa; or (3) only coloured red or green on the front. During test, the agent, who could see only the back of the screens, pointed to one of the two screens. The results revealed that while infants expected the agent to continue acting on her colour preference and point to the red rather than the green screen during test, they did so in accord with the agent's perception of the screens, rather than their own perceptions: they expected the agent to point to the red screen in (1), but to the green-front screen in (2), and they had no prediction of which screen the agent should point to in (3). The implications of the present findings for early psychological reasoning research are discussed.

Continuity in social cognition from infancy to childhood

Research examining the development of social cognition has largely been divided into two areas: infant perception of intentional agents, and preschoolers' understanding of others' mental states and beliefs (theory of mind). Many researchers have suggested that there is continuity in social cognitive development such that the abilities observed in infancy are related to later preschool ability, yet little empirical evidence exists for this claim. Here, we present preliminary evidence that capacities specific to the social domain contribute to performance in social cognition tasks both during infancy and in early childhood. Specifically, looking time patterns in an infant social cognition task correlated with preschool theory of mind; however, no such relationship was found for infants in a nonsocial cognition task.

Ten-month-old infants use prior information to identify an actor's goal

For adults, prior information about an individual's likely goals, preferences or dispositions plays a powerful role in interpreting ambiguous behavior and predicting and interpreting behavior in novel contexts. Across two studies, we investigated whether 10-month-old infants' ability to identify the goal of an ambiguous action sequence was facilitated by seeing prior instances in which the actor directly pursued and obtained her goal, and whether infants could use this prior information to understand the actor's behavior in a new context. Experiment 1 demonstrated that the goal preview impacted infants' subsequent action understanding, but only if the preview was delivered in the same room as the subsequent action sequence. Experiment 2 demonstrated that infants' failure to transfer prior goal information across situations arose from a change in the room per se and not other features of the task. Our results suggest that infants may use their understanding of simple actions as a leverage point for understanding novel or ambiguous actions, but that their ability to do so is limited to certain types of contextual changes.

Infants' reasoning about others' false perceptions

Prior research suggests that children younger than age 3 or 4 do not understand that an agent may be deceived by an object's misleading appearance. The authors asked whether 14.5-month-olds would give evidence in a violation-of-expectation task that they understand that agents may form false perceptions. Infants first watched events in which an agent faced a stuffed skunk and a doll with blue pigtails; the agent consistently reached for the doll, suggesting that she preferred it over the skunk. Next, while the agent was absent, the doll was hidden in a plain box, and the skunk was hidden in a box with a tuft of blue hair protruding from under its lid. Infants expected the agent to be misled by the tuft's resemblance to the doll's hair and to falsely perceive it as belonging to the doll. These and other results indicate that 14.5-month-old infants can already reason about agents' false perceptions.

Ontogeny, phylogeny, and the relational reinterpretation hypothesis

If our knowledge of human cognition were based solely on research with participants younger than the age of 2 years, there would be no basis for the relational reinterpretation hypothesis, and Darwin's continuity theory would be safe as houses. Because many of the shortcomings cited apply to human infants, we propose how a consideration of cognitive development would inform the relational reinterpretation hypothesis.

Do 12.5-month-old infants consider what objects others can see when interpreting their actions?

The present research examined whether 12.5-month-old infants take into account what objects an agent knows to be present in a scene when interpreting the agent's actions. In two experiments, the infants watched a female human agent repeatedly reach for and grasp object-A as opposed to object-B on an apparatus floor. Object-B was either (1) visible to the agent through a transparent screen; (2) hidden from the agent (but not the infants) by an opaque screen; or (3) placed by the agent herself behind the opaque screen, so that even though she could no longer see object-B, she knew of its presence there. The infants interpreted the agent's repeated actions toward object-A as revealing a preference for object-A over object-B only when she could see object-B (1) or was aware of its presence in the scene (3). These results indicate that, when watching an agent act on objects in a scene, 12.5-month-old infants keep track of the agent's representation of the physical setting in which these actions occur. If the agent's representation is incomplete, because the agent is ignorant about some aspect of the setting, infants use the agent's representation, rather than their own more complete representation, to interpret the agent's actions.

Can 9.5-month-old infants attribute to an agent a disposition to perform a particular action on objects?

The present research examined whether 9.5-month-old infants can attribute to an agent a disposition to perform a particular action on objects, and can then use this disposition to predict which of two new objects - one that can be used to perform the action and one that cannot - the agent is likely to reach for next. The infants first received familiarization trials in which they watched an agent slide either three (Experiments 1 and 3) or six (Experiment 2) different objects forward and backward on an apparatus floor. During test, the infants saw two new identical objects placed side by side: one stood inside a short frame that left little room for sliding, and the other stood inside a longer frame that left ample room for sliding. The infants who saw the agent slide six different objects attributed to her a disposition to slide objects: they expected her to select the "slidable" as opposed to the "unslidable" test object, and they looked reliably longer when she did not. In contrast, the infants who saw the agent slide only three different objects looked about equally when she selected either test object. These results add to recent evidence that infants in the first year of life can attribute dispositions to agents, and can use these dispositions to help predict agents' actions in new contexts.