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Felsche E, Völter CJ, Herrmann E, Seed AM, Buchsbaum D. How can I find what I want? Can children, chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys form abstract representations to guide their behavior in a sampling task? Cognition 2024; 245:105721. [PMID: 38262272 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105721] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/09/2023] [Revised: 12/23/2023] [Accepted: 01/10/2024] [Indexed: 01/25/2024]
Abstract
concepts are a powerful tool for making wide-ranging predictions in new situations based on little experience. Whereas looking-time studies suggest an early emergence of this ability in human infancy, other paradigms like the relational match to sample task often fail to detect abstract concepts until late preschool years. Similarly, non-human animals show difficulties and often succeed only after long training regimes. Given the considerable influence of slight task modifications, the conclusiveness of these findings for the development and phylogenetic distribution of abstract reasoning is debated. Here, we tested the abilities of 3 to 5-year-old children, chimpanzees, and capuchin monkeys in a unified and more ecologically valid task design based on the concept of "overhypotheses" (Goodman, 1955). Participants sampled high- and low-valued items from containers that either each offered items of uniform value or a mix of high- and low-valued items. In a test situation, participants should switch away earlier from a container offering low-valued items when they learned that, in general, items within a container are of the same type, but should stay longer if they formed the overhypothesis that containers bear a mix of types. We compared each species' performance to the predictions of a probabilistic hierarchical Bayesian model forming overhypotheses at a first and second level of abstraction, adapted to each species' reward preferences. Children and, to a more limited extent, chimpanzees demonstrated their sensitivity to abstract patterns in the evidence. In contrast, capuchin monkeys did not exhibit conclusive evidence for the ability of abstract knowledge formation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Elisa Felsche
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, Scotland, UK; Department of Comparative Cultural Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Germany.
| | - Christoph J Völter
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, Scotland, UK; Department of Comparative Cultural Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Germany; Comparative Cognition, Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna, Medical University of Vienna and University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria.
| | | | - Amanda M Seed
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, Scotland, UK.
| | - Daphna Buchsbaum
- The Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, USA.
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2
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Hodgetts CJ, Close JOE, Hahn U. Similarity and structured representation in human and nonhuman apes. Cognition 2023; 236:105419. [PMID: 37104894 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105419] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/23/2022] [Revised: 02/17/2023] [Accepted: 02/18/2023] [Indexed: 04/29/2023]
Abstract
How we judge the similarity between objects in the world is connected ultimately to how we represent those objects. It has been argued extensively that object representations in humans are 'structured' in nature, meaning that both individual features and the relations between them can influence similarity. In contrast, popular models within comparative psychology assume that nonhuman species appreciate only surface-level, featural similarities. By applying psychological models of structural and featural similarity (from conjunctive feature models to Tversky's Contrast Model) to visual similarity judgements from adult humans, chimpanzees, and gorillas, we demonstrate a cross-species sensitivity to complex structural information, particularly for stimuli that combine colour and shape. These results shed new light on the representational complexity of nonhuman apes, and the fundamental limits of featural coding in explaining object representation and similarity, which emerge strikingly across both human and nonhuman species.
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Affiliation(s)
- Carl J Hodgetts
- Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK; Cardiff University Brain Research Imaging Centre, School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Maindy Road, Cardiff CF24 4HQ, UK.
| | - James O E Close
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Deutscher Platz 6, 04103 Leipzig, Germany; School of Psychology and Sport Science, Anglia Ruskin University, East Road, Cambridge CB1 1PT, UK
| | - Ulrike Hahn
- Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, UK
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3
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Dung L, Newen A. Profiles of animal consciousness: A species-sensitive, two-tier account to quality and distribution. Cognition 2023; 235:105409. [PMID: 36821996 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105409] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/16/2022] [Revised: 01/25/2023] [Accepted: 02/11/2023] [Indexed: 02/25/2023]
Abstract
The science of animal consciousness investigates (i) which animal species are conscious (the distribution question) and (ii) how conscious experience differs in detail between species (the quality question). We propose a framework which clearly distinguishes both questions and tackles both of them. This two-tier account distinguishes consciousness along ten dimensions and suggests cognitive capacities which serve as distinct operationalizations for each dimension. The two-tier account achieves three valuable aims: First, it separates strong and weak indicators of the presence of consciousness. Second, these indicators include not only different specific contents but also differences in the way particular contents are processed (by processes of learning, reasoning or abstraction). Third, evidence of consciousness from each dimension can be combined to derive the distinctive multi-dimensional consciousness profile of various species. Thus, the two-tier account shows how the kind of conscious experience of different species can be systematically compared.
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Affiliation(s)
- Leonard Dung
- Ruhr-University Bochum, Institut of Philosophy II, Universitätsstraße 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany.
| | - Albert Newen
- Ruhr-University Bochum, Institut of Philosophy II, Universitätsstraße 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany
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Felsche E, Stevens P, Völter CJ, Buchsbaum D, Seed AM. Evidence for abstract representations in children but not capuchin monkeys. Cogn Psychol 2023; 140:101530. [PMID: 36495840 DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2022.101530] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/10/2021] [Revised: 10/02/2022] [Accepted: 11/23/2022] [Indexed: 12/12/2022]
Abstract
The use of abstract higher-level knowledge (also called overhypotheses) allows humans to learn quickly from sparse data and make predictions in new situations. Previous research has suggested that humans may be the only species capable of abstract knowledge formation, but this remains controversial. There is also mixed evidence for when this ability emerges over human development. Kemp et al. (2007) proposed a computational model of how overhypotheses could be learned from sparse examples. We provide the first direct test of this model: an ecologically valid paradigm for testing two species, capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.) and 4- to 5-year-old human children. We presented participants with sampled evidence from different containers which suggested that all containers held items of uniform type (type condition) or of uniform size (size condition). Subsequently, we presented two new test containers and an example item from each: a small, high-valued item and a large but low-valued item. Participants could then choose from which test container they would like to receive the next sample - the optimal choice was the container that yielded a large item in the size condition or a high-valued item in the type condition. We compared performance to a priori predictions made by models with and without the capacity to learn overhypotheses. Children's choices were consistent with the model predictions and thus suggest an ability for abstract knowledge formation in the preschool years, whereas monkeys performed at chance level.
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Affiliation(s)
- Elisa Felsche
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, Scotland; Department of Comparative Cultural Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Germany.
| | | | - Christoph J Völter
- Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna, Medical University of Vienna and University of Vienna, Austria
| | - Daphna Buchsbaum
- Department of Cognitive, Linguistic and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, USA
| | - Amanda M Seed
- School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, Scotland
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5
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Abstract
Being able to abstract relations of similarity is considered one of the hallmarks of human cognition. While previous research has shown that other animals (e.g. primates) can attend to relational similarity, they struggle to focus on object similarity. This is in contrast with humans. And it is precisely the ability to attend to objects that it is argued to make relational reasoning uniquely human. What about invertebrates? Despite earlier studies indicating that bees are capable of learning abstract relationships (e.g. ‘same’ and ‘different’), no research has investigated whether bees can spontaneously attend to relational similarity and whether they can do so when relational matches compete with object matches. To test this, a spatial matching task (with and without competing object matches) previously used with children and great apes was adapted for use with wild-caught bumblebees. When object matches were not present, bumblebees spontaneously used relational similarity. Importantly, when competing object matches were present, bumblebees still focused on relations over objects. These findings indicate that the absence of object bias is also present in invertebrates and suggest that the relational gap between humans and other animals is due to their preference for relations over objects.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gema Martin-Ordas
- Division of Psychology, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, UK.,Department of Psychology, University of Oviedo, 33003 Asturias, Spain
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6
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Hartmann S, Pleyer M. Constructing a protolanguage: reconstructing prehistoric languages in a usage-based construction grammar framework. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200200. [PMID: 33745320 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0200] [Citation(s) in RCA: 3] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/06/2023] Open
Abstract
Construction grammar is an approach to language that posits that units and structures in language can be exhaustively described as pairings between form and meaning. These pairings are called constructions and can have different degrees of abstraction, i.e. they span the entire range from very concrete (armadillo, avocado) to very abstract constructions such as the ditransitive construction (I gave her a book). This approach has been applied to a wide variety of different areas of research in linguistics, such as how new constructions emerge and change historically. It has also been applied to investigate the evolutionary emergence of modern fully fledged language, i.e. the question of how systems of constructions can arise out of prelinguistic communication. In this paper, we review the contribution of usage-based construction grammar approaches to language change and language evolution to the questions of (i) the structure and nature of prehistoric languages and (ii) how constructions in prehistoric languages emerged out of non-linguistic or protolinguistic communication. In particular, we discuss the possibilities of using constructions as the main unit of analysis both in reconstructing predecessors of existing languages (protolanguages) and in formulating theories of how a potential predecessor of human language in general (protolanguage) must have looked like. This article is part of the theme issue 'Reconstructing prehistoric languages'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Stefan Hartmann
- Germanistische Sprachwissenschaft, University of Düsseldorf, Universitätsstrasse 1, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany
| | - Michael Pleyer
- Centre for Language Evolution Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, ul. Gagarina 11, 87-100 Toruń, Poland.,University Centre of Excellence IMSErt-Interacting Minds, Societies, Environments, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, ul. Gagarina 11, 87-100 Toruń, Poland
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8
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Dual systems for all: Higher-order, role-based relational reasoning as a uniquely derived feature of human cognition. Behav Brain Sci 2019; 42:e271. [DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x19000451] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/07/2022]
Abstract
Abstract
Hoerl and McCormack demonstrate that although animals possess a sophisticated temporal updating system, there is no evidence that they also possess a temporal reasoning system. This important case study is directly related to the broader claim that although animals are manifestly capable of first-order (perceptually-based) relational reasoning, they lack the capacity for higher-order, role-based relational reasoning. We argue this distinction applies to all domains of cognition.
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Anderson EM, Chang YJ, Hespos S, Gentner D. Comparison within pairs promotes analogical abstraction in three-month-olds. Cognition 2018; 176:74-86. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2018.03.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/03/2017] [Revised: 03/04/2018] [Accepted: 03/06/2018] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
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10
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Güntürkün O, Bugnyar T. Cognition without Cortex. Trends Cogn Sci 2016; 20:291-303. [DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2016.02.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 142] [Impact Index Per Article: 17.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/01/2015] [Revised: 02/09/2016] [Accepted: 02/09/2016] [Indexed: 10/22/2022]
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Christie S, Gentner D, Call J, Haun DBM. Sensitivity to Relational Similarity and Object Similarity in Apes and Children. Curr Biol 2016; 26:531-5. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2015.12.054] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/13/2015] [Revised: 11/12/2015] [Accepted: 12/21/2015] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
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12
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Ferry AL, Hespos SJ, Gentner D. Prelinguistic Relational Concepts: Investigating Analogical Processing in Infants. Child Dev 2015; 86:1386-405. [PMID: 25994818 DOI: 10.1111/cdev.12381] [Citation(s) in RCA: 52] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
This research asks whether analogical processing ability is present in human infants, using the simplest and most basic relation-the same-different relation. Experiment 1 (N = 26) tested whether 7- and 9-month-olds spontaneously detect and generalize these relations from a single example, as previous research has suggested. The attempted replication failed. Experiment 2 asked whether infants could abstract the relation via analogical processing (Experiment 2, N = 64). Indeed, with four exemplars, 7- and 9-month-olds could abstract the same-different relation and generalize it to novel pairs. Furthermore, prior experience with the objects disrupted learning. Facilitation from multiple exemplars and disruption by individual object salience are signatures of analogical learning. These results indicate that analogical ability is present by 7 months.
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Vendetti MS, Bunge SA. Evolutionary and developmental changes in the lateral frontoparietal network: a little goes a long way for higher-level cognition. Neuron 2015; 84:906-17. [PMID: 25475185 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2014.09.035] [Citation(s) in RCA: 83] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/21/2022]
Abstract
Relational thinking, or the ability to represent the relations between items, is widespread in the animal kingdom. However, humans are unparalleled in their ability to engage in the higher-order relational thinking required for reasoning and other forms of abstract thought. Here we propose that the versatile reasoning skills observed in humans can be traced back to developmental and evolutionary changes in the lateral frontoparietal network (LFPN). We first identify the regions within the LFPN that are most strongly linked to relational thinking, and show that stronger communication between these regions over the course of development supports improvements in relational reasoning. We then explore differences in the LFPN between humans and other primate species that could explain species differences in the capacity for relational reasoning. We conclude that fairly small neuroanatomical changes in specific regions of the LFPN and their connections have led to big ontogenetic and phylogenetic changes in cognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Michael S Vendetti
- Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720, USA.
| | - Silvia A Bunge
- Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720, USA; Department of Psychology, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720, USA.
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14
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Hagmann CE, Cook RG. Endpoint distinctiveness facilitates analogical mapping in pigeons. Behav Processes 2014; 112:72-80. [PMID: 25447511 DOI: 10.1016/j.beproc.2014.11.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/08/2014] [Revised: 10/10/2014] [Accepted: 11/09/2014] [Indexed: 11/25/2022]
Abstract
Analogical thinking necessitates mapping shared relations across two separate domains. We investigated whether pigeons could learn faster with ordinal mapping of relations across two physical dimensions (circle size & choice spatial position) relative to random mapping of these relations. Pigeons were trained to relate six circular samples of different sizes to horizontally positioned choice locations in a six alternative matching-to-sample task. Three pigeons were trained in a mapped condition in which circle size mapped directly onto choice spatial position. Three other pigeons were trained in a random condition in which the relations between size and choice position were arbitrarily assigned. The mapped group showed an advantage over the random group in acquiring this task. In a subsequent second phase, relations between the dimensions were ordinally reversed for the mapped group and re-randomized for the random group. There was no difference in how quickly matching accuracy re-emerged in the two groups, although the mapped group eventually performed more accurately. Analyses suggested this mapped advantage was likely due to endpoint distinctiveness and the benefits of proximity errors during choice responding rather than a conceptual or relational advantage attributable to the common or ordinal mapping of the two dimensions. This potential difficulty in mapping relations across dimensions may limit the pigeons' capacity for more advanced types of analogical reasoning. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled: Tribute to Tom Zentall.
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15
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Mayer C, Call J, Albiach-Serrano A, Visalberghi E, Sabbatini G, Seed A. Abstract knowledge in the broken-string problem: evidence from nonhuman primates and pre-schoolers. PLoS One 2014; 9:e108597. [PMID: 25272161 PMCID: PMC4182709 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0108597] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/14/2014] [Accepted: 08/01/2014] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
There is still large controversy about whether abstract knowledge of physical problems is uniquely human. We presented 9 capuchin monkeys, 6 bonobos, 6 chimpanzees and 48 children with two versions of a broken-string problem. In the standard condition, participants had to choose between an intact and a broken string as means to a reward. In the critical condition, the functional parts of the strings were covered up and replaced by perceptually similar, but non-functional cues. Apes, monkeys and young children performed significantly better in the standard condition in which the cues played a functional role, indicating knowledge of the functional properties involved. Moreover, a control experiment with chimpanzees and young children ruled out that this difference in performance could be accounted for by differences of perceptual feedback in the two conditions. We suggest that, similar to humans, nonhuman primates partly rely on abstract concepts in physical problem-solving.
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Affiliation(s)
- Carolina Mayer
- University of St Andrews, School of Psychology and Neuroscience, St Andrews, Fife, Scotland, United Kingdom
- * E-mail:
| | - Josep Call
- University of St Andrews, School of Psychology and Neuroscience, St Andrews, Fife, Scotland, United Kingdom
- Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Department of Comparative and Developmental Psychology, Leipzig, Germany
| | - Anna Albiach-Serrano
- Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Department of Comparative and Developmental Psychology, Leipzig, Germany
- Ethology and Animal Welfare Section, Universidad CEU Cardenal Herrera, Valencia, Spain
| | - Elisabetta Visalberghi
- Unit of Cognitive Primatology and Primate Centre, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Roma, Italy
| | - Gloria Sabbatini
- Unit of Cognitive Primatology and Primate Centre, Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Roma, Italy
| | - Amanda Seed
- University of St Andrews, School of Psychology and Neuroscience, St Andrews, Fife, Scotland, United Kingdom
- Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Department of Comparative and Developmental Psychology, Leipzig, Germany
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Hahn U. Similarity. WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEWS. COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2014; 5:271-80. [DOI: 10.1002/wcs.1282] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/27/2013] [Revised: 01/08/2014] [Accepted: 01/12/2014] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Ulrike Hahn
- Department of Psychological Sciences; Birkbeck, University of London; London UK
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17
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Analogical reasoning in baboons (Papio papio): flexible reencoding of the source relation depending on the target relation. Learn Behav 2014; 41:229-37. [PMID: 23354955 DOI: 10.3758/s13420-012-0101-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Abstract
Analogical reasoning is a cornerstone of human cognition, but the extent and limits of analogical reasoning in animals remains unclear. Recent studies have demonstrated that apes and monkeys can match relations with relations, suggesting that these species have the basic abilities for analogical reasoning. However, analogical reasoning in humans entails two additional cognitive processes that remain unexplored in animals. These include the ability to (1) flexibly reencode the relations instantiated by the source domain as a function of the relational properties of the target domain, and (2) to match relations across different stimulus dimensions. Using a two-dimensional relational matching-to-sample task, the present study demonstrates that these two abilities are in the scope of baboons, given appropriate training. These findings unveil the richness of the cognitive processes implicated during analogical reasoning in nonhuman primates and further reduce the apparent gap between animal and human cognition.
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18
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Christie S, Gentner D. Language helps children succeed on a classic analogy task. Cogn Sci 2013; 38:383-97. [PMID: 24215433 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12099] [Citation(s) in RCA: 66] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/04/2012] [Revised: 04/01/2013] [Accepted: 04/04/2013] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
Adult humans show exceptional relational ability relative to other species. In this research, we trace the development of this ability in young children. We used a task widely used in comparative research-the relational match-to-sample task, which requires participants to notice and match the identity relation: for example, AA should match BB instead of CD. Despite the simplicity of this relation, children under 4 years of age failed to pass this test (Experiment 1), and their performance did not improve even with initial feedback (Experiment 2). In Experiments 3 and 4, we found that two kinds of symbolic-linguistic experience can facilitate relational reasoning in young children. Our findings suggest that children learn to become adept analogical thinkers, and that language fosters this learning in at least two distinct ways.
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Abstract
Human cognition is striking in its brilliance and its adaptability. How do we get that way? How do we move from the nearly helpless state of infants to the cognitive proficiency that characterizes adults? In this paper I argue, first, that analogical ability is the key factor in our prodigious capacity, and, second, that possession of a symbol system is crucial to the full expression of analogical ability.
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Sabbatini G, Truppa V, Hribar A, Gambetta B, Call J, Visalberghi E. Understanding the functional properties of tools: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) attend to tool features differently. Anim Cogn 2012; 15:577-90. [PMID: 22466753 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-012-0486-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/20/2011] [Revised: 03/14/2012] [Accepted: 03/15/2012] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
We examined whether eight capuchins and eight chimpanzees were able to retrieve a reward placed inside a tube, of varying length, by selecting the correct stick from different sets of three sticks differing in length (functional feature) and handle (non-functional feature). Moreover, to investigate whether seeing the stick inside the tube (visual feedback) improves performance, half of the subjects were tested with a transparent apparatus and the other half with an opaque apparatus. Phase 1 included (a) Training 1 in which each stick had a different handle and (b) Transfer 1 in which the handles were switched among sticks, so that the functional tool had the same length but a different handle than before. The seven chimpanzees and one capuchin that passed Transfer 1 received Transfer 2. The other subjects received (a) Training 2, which used the same sticks from Phase 1 with handles switched in every trial, and (b) Transfer 2 in which the tube was longer, all sticks had the same new handle, and the formerly longest tool became intermediate in length. Eight chimpanzees and three capuchins passed Transfer 2. Results showed that (1) chimpanzees applied relational structures in tool using tasks more quickly than capuchins and (2) capuchins required more varied experience to attend to the functional feature of the tool. Interestingly, visual feedback did not improve performance in either species.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gloria Sabbatini
- Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Via Ulisse Aldrovandi 16/B, Rome, Italy.
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21
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Hribar A, Haun DBM, Call J. Children's reasoning about spatial relational similarity: the effect of alignment and relational complexity. J Exp Child Psychol 2011; 111:490-500. [PMID: 22154959 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2011.11.004] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/06/2011] [Revised: 11/07/2011] [Accepted: 11/08/2011] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
We investigated 4- and 5-year-old children's mapping strategies in a spatial task. Children were required to find a picture in an array of three identical cups after observing another picture being hidden in another array of three cups. The arrays were either aligned one behind the other in two rows or placed side by side forming one line. Moreover, children were rewarded for two different mapping strategies. Half of the children needed to choose a cup that held the same relative position as the rewarded cup in the other array; they needed to map left-left, middle-middle, and right-right cups together (aligned mapping), which required encoding and mapping of two relations (e.g., the cup left of the middle cup and left of the right cup). The other half needed to map together the cups that held the same relation to the table's spatial features-the cups at the edges, the middle cups, and the cups in the middle of the table (landmark mapping)-which required encoding and mapping of one relation (e.g., the cup at the table's edge). Results showed that children's success was constellation dependent; performance was higher when the arrays were aligned one behind the other in two rows than when they were placed side by side. Furthermore, children showed a preference for landmark mapping over aligned mapping.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alenka Hribar
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, D-04103 Leipzig, Germany.
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22
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Hribar A, Call J. Great apes use landmark cues over spatial relations to find hidden food. Anim Cogn 2011; 14:623-35. [PMID: 21503688 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-011-0397-2] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/24/2011] [Revised: 03/15/2011] [Accepted: 03/31/2011] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
We investigated whether chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans encoded the location of a reward hidden underneath one of three identical cups in relation to (1) the other cups in the array-i.e., the relative position of the baited cup within the array; or (2) the landmarks surrounding the cups-e.g., the edge of the table. Apes witnessed the hiding of a food reward under one of three cups forming a straight line on a platform. After 30 s, they were allowed to search for the reward. In three different experiments, we varied the distance of the cups to the edge of the platform and the distance between the cups. Results showed that both manipulated variables affected apes' retrieval accuracy. Subjects' retrieval accuracy was higher for the outer cups compared with the Middle cup, especially if the outer cups were located next to the platform's edge. Additionally, the larger the distance between the cups, the better performance became.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alenka Hribar
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.
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Hribar A, Haun D, Call J. Great apes' strategies to map spatial relations. Anim Cogn 2011; 14:511-23. [PMID: 21359655 DOI: 10.1007/s10071-011-0385-6] [Citation(s) in RCA: 10] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/25/2010] [Revised: 11/18/2010] [Accepted: 02/14/2011] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
We investigated reasoning about spatial relational similarity in three great ape species: chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans. Apes were presented with three spatial mapping tasks in which they were required to find a reward in an array of three cups, after observing a reward being hidden in a different array of three cups. To obtain a food reward, apes needed to choose the cup that was in the same relative position (i.e., on the left) as the baited cup in the other array. The three tasks differed in the constellation of the two arrays. In Experiment 1, the arrays were placed next to each other, forming a line. In Experiment 2, the positioning of the two arrays varied each trial, being placed either one behind the other in two rows, or next to each other, forming a line. Finally, in Experiment 3, the two arrays were always positioned one behind the other in two rows, but misaligned. Results suggested that apes compared the two arrays and recognized that they were similar in some way. However, we believe that instead of mapping the left-left, middle-middle, and right-right cups from each array, they mapped the cups that shared the most similar relations to nearby landmarks (table's visual boundaries).
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Affiliation(s)
- Alenka Hribar
- Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany.
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Garlick D, Gant DJ, Brakel LAW, Blaisdell AP. Attributional and relational processing in pigeons. Front Psychol 2011; 2:14. [PMID: 21713177 PMCID: PMC3111252 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00014] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/04/2010] [Accepted: 01/16/2011] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Six pigeons were trained using a matching-to-sample procedure where sample and rewarded comparisons matched on both attributional (color) and relational (horizontal or vertical orientation) dimensions. Probes then evaluated the pigeons' preference to comparisons that varied in these dimensions. A strong preference was found for the attribute of color. The discrimination was not found to transfer to novel colors, however, suggesting that a general color rule had not been learned. Further, when color could not be used to guide responding, some influence of other attributional cues such as shape, but not relational cues, was found. We conclude that pigeons based their performance on attributional properties of but not on relational properties between elements in our matching-to-sample procedure. Future studies should look at examining other attributes to compare attributional versus relational processing.
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Affiliation(s)
- Dennis Garlick
- Department of Psychology, University of California Los Angeles, CA, USA
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25
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Origins of spatial, temporal and numerical cognition: Insights from comparative psychology. Trends Cogn Sci 2010; 14:552-60. [PMID: 20971031 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.09.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 45] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/21/2010] [Revised: 09/27/2010] [Accepted: 09/27/2010] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Contemporary comparative cognition has a large repertoire of animal models and methods, with concurrent theoretical advances that are providing initial answers to crucial questions about human cognition. What cognitive traits are uniquely human? What are the species-typical inherited predispositions of the human mind? What is the human mind capable of without certain types of specific experiences with the surrounding environment? Here, we review recent findings from the domains of space, time and number cognition. These findings are produced using different comparative methodologies relying on different animal species, namely birds and non-human great apes. The study of these species not only reveals the range of cognitive abilities across vertebrates, but also increases our understanding of human cognition in crucial ways.
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Abstract
AbstractOur response takes advantage of the wide-ranging commentary to clarify some aspects of our original proposal and augment others. We argue against the generative critics of our coevolutionary program for the language sciences, defend the use of close-to-surface models as minimizing cross-linguistic data distortion, and stress the growing role of stochastic simulations in making generalized historical accounts testable. These methods lead the search for general principles away from idealized representations and towards selective processes. Putting cultural evolution central in understanding language diversity makes learning fundamental in the cognition of language: increasingly powerful models of general learning, paired with channelled caregiver input, seem set to manage language acquisition without recourse to any innate “universal grammar.” Understanding why human language has no clear parallels in the animal world requires a cross-species perspective: crucial ingredients are vocal learning (for which there are clear non-primate parallels) and an intention-attributing cognitive infrastructure that provides a universal base for language evolution. We conclude by situating linguistic diversity within a broader trend towards understanding human cognition through the study of variation in, for example, human genetics, neurocognition, and psycholinguistic processing.
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