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Samuel S, Cole GG, Eacott MJ, Edwardson R, Course H. Evidence for a Weak but Reliable Processing Advantage for False Beliefs Over Similar Nonmental States in Adults. Cogn Sci 2023; 47:e13364. [PMID: 37807678 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13364] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/03/2022] [Revised: 05/27/2023] [Accepted: 09/19/2023] [Indexed: 10/10/2023]
Abstract
The ability to understand the mental states of others has sometimes been attributed to a domain-specific mechanism which privileges the processing of these states over similar but nonmental representations. If correct, then others' beliefs should be processed more efficiently than similar information contained within nonmental states. We tested this by examining whether adults would be faster to process others' false beliefs than equivalent "false" photos. Additionally, we tested whether they would be faster to process others' true beliefs about something than their own (matched) personal knowledge about the same event. Across four experiments, we found a small but reliable effect in favor of the first prediction, but no evidence for the second. Results are consistent with accounts positing specialized processes for (false) mental states. The size of the effect does, however, suggest that alternative explanations such as practice effects cannot be ruled out.
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Affiliation(s)
- Steven Samuel
- Department of Psychology, School of Health & Psychological Sciences, City University of London
- School of Psychology, University of Plymouth
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2
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Can transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) of the cerebellum improve implicit social and cognitive sequence learning? Int J Clin Health Psychol 2023; 23:100355. [PMID: 36415612 PMCID: PMC9674896 DOI: 10.1016/j.ijchp.2022.100355] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/30/2022] [Accepted: 11/06/2022] [Indexed: 11/17/2022] Open
Abstract
Accumulating evidence shows that the posterior cerebellum is involved in mentalizing inferences of social events by detecting sequence information in these events, and building and updating internal models of these sequences. By applying anodal and sham cerebellar transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) on the posteromedial cerebellum of healthy participants, and using a serial reaction time (SRT) task paradigm, the current study examined the causal involvement of the cerebellum in implicitly learning sequences of social beliefs of others (Belief SRT) and non-social colored shapes (Cognitive SRT). Apart from the social or cognitive domain differences, both tasks were structurally identical. Results of anodal stimulation (i.e., 2 mA for 20 min) during the social Belief SRT task, did not show significant improvement in reaction times, however it did reveal generally faster responses for the Cognitive SRT task. This improved performance could also be observed after the cessation of stimulation after 30 min, and up to one week later. Our findings suggest a general positive effect of anodal cerebellar tDCS on implicit non-social Cognitive sequence learning, supporting a causal role of the cerebellum in this learning process. We speculate that the lack of tDCS modulation of the social Belief SRT task is due to the familiar and overlearned nature of attributing social beliefs, suggesting that easy and automatized tasks leave little room for improvement through tDCS.
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3
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Ma Q, Pu M, Haihambo NP, Baetens K, Heleven E, Deroost N, Baeken C, Van Overwalle F. The posterior cerebellum and temporoparietal junction support explicit learning of social belief sequences. COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE & BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 2022; 22:467-491. [PMID: 34811709 DOI: 10.3758/s13415-021-00966-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 10/16/2021] [Indexed: 06/13/2023]
Abstract
This study tests the hypothesis that the posterior cerebellum is involved in social cognition by identifying and automatizing sequences of social actions. We applied a belief serial reaction time task (Belief SRT task), which requires mentalizing about two protagonists' beliefs about how many flowers they receive. The protagonists' beliefs could either be true or false depending on their orientation (true belief: oriented towards and directly observing the flowers; or false belief: oriented away and knowing only prior information about flowers). A Control SRT task was created by replacing protagonists and their beliefs with shapes and colors. Participants were explicitly told that there was a standard sequence related to the two protagonists' belief orientations (Belief SRT task) or the shapes' colors (Control SRT task). Both tasks included a Training phase where the standard sequence was repeated and a Test phase where this standard sequence was interrupted by random sequences. As hypothesized, compared with the Control SRT task, the Belief SRT task recruited the posterior cerebellar Crus II and the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) more. Faster response times were correlated with less Crus II activation and with more TPJ activation, suggesting that the Crus II supported automatizing the belief sequence while the TPJ supported inferring the protagonists' beliefs. Also as hypothesized, compared with an implicit version of the Belief SRT task (i.e., participants did not know about the existence of sequences; Ma, Pu, et al., 2021b), the cerebellar Crus I &II was engaged less during initial training and automatic application of the sequence, and the cortical TPJ was activated more in processing random sequences.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qianying Ma
- Department of Psychology, Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, B -, 1050, Brussels, Belgium.
| | - Min Pu
- Department of Psychology, Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, B -, 1050, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Naem P Haihambo
- Department of Psychology, Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, B -, 1050, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Kris Baetens
- Department of Psychology, Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, B -, 1050, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Elien Heleven
- Department of Psychology, Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, B -, 1050, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Natacha Deroost
- Department of Psychology, Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, B -, 1050, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Chris Baeken
- Department of Head and Skin, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, Ghent Experimental, Ghent, Belgium
- Psychiatry (GHEP) Laboratory, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
- Department of Psychiatry, University Hospital (UZBrussel), Brussels, Belgium
- Department of Electrical Engineering, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, the Netherlands
| | - Frank Van Overwalle
- Department of Psychology, Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, B -, 1050, Brussels, Belgium.
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Ma Q, Heleven E, Funghi G, Pu M, Baetens K, Deroost N, Van Overwalle F. Implicit Learning of True and False Belief Sequences. Front Psychol 2021; 12:643594. [PMID: 33841278 PMCID: PMC8032999 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.643594] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/18/2020] [Accepted: 02/26/2021] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
To investigate whether people can implicitly learn regularities in a social context, we developed a new implicit sequence learning task combining elements from classic false belief and serial reaction time tasks. Participants learned that protagonists were offered flowers at four locations. The protagonists' beliefs concerning the flowers were true or false, depending on their orientation, respectively, toward the scene (so that the flowers could be seen) or away from it. Unbeknown to the participants, there was a fixed belief-related sequence involving three dimensions (identity of the two protagonists, true-false belief orientation held by the protagonists, and flower location as believed by the protagonists). Participants had to indicate as fast as possible where the flowers were located (Experiment 1), or how many flowers were given (Experiment 2) according to the protagonists. Experiment 1 combined perceptual and motor processes (as both the belief-related sequence and motor responses referred to location), whereas Experiment 2 unconfounded the sequence and motor responses, allowing to investigate pure perceptual implicit learning. For reasons of comparison, two non-social conditions were created in Experiment 2 by replacing the protagonists with two non-social objects-colored cameras or shapes. Results revealed significant implicit sequence learning of all belief-related dimensions in Experiment 1, and of true-false belief orientation in Experiment 2, even without a motor confound. Importantly, there were faster reaction times and stronger sequence learning effects in the social than in the non-social conditions. The present findings demonstrate for the first time that people are able to implicitly learn belief-related sequences.
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Affiliation(s)
- Qianying Ma
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Elien Heleven
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Giulia Funghi
- Department of Psychology, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy
| | - Min Pu
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Kris Baetens
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Natacha Deroost
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
| | - Frank Van Overwalle
- Department of Psychology and Center for Neuroscience, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
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5
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Samuel S, Durdevic K, Legg EW, Lurz R, Clayton NS. Is Language Required to Represent Others' Mental States? Evidence From Beliefs and Other Representations. Cogn Sci 2019; 43. [PMID: 30648802 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12710] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/20/2018] [Revised: 11/28/2018] [Accepted: 12/10/2018] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
An important part of our Theory of Mind-the ability to reason about other people's unobservable mental states-is the ability to attribute false beliefs to others. We investigated whether processing these false beliefs, as well as similar but nonmental representations, is reliant on language. Participants watched videos in which a protagonist hides a gift and either takes a photo of it or writes a text about its location before a second person inadvertently moves the present to a different location, thereby rendering the belief and either the photo or text false. At the same time, participants performed either a concurrent verbal interference task (rehearsing strings of digits) or a visual interference task (remembering a visual pattern). Results showed that performance on false belief trials did not decline under verbal interference relative to visual interference. We interpret these findings as further support for the view that language does not form an essential part of the process of reasoning online ("in the moment") about false beliefs.
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Affiliation(s)
| | | | | | - Robert Lurz
- Department of Philosophy, Brooklyn College, City University New York
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Samuel S, Legg EW, Lurz R, Clayton NS. The unreliability of egocentric bias across self-other and memory-belief distinctions in the Sandbox Task. ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE 2018; 5:181355. [PMID: 30564420 PMCID: PMC6281948 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.181355] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/16/2018] [Accepted: 10/02/2018] [Indexed: 06/09/2023]
Abstract
Humans are often considered egocentric creatures, particularly (and ironically) when we are supposed to take another person's perspective over our own (i.e. when we use our theory of mind). We investigated the underlying causes of this phenomenon. We gave young adult participants a false belief task (Sandbox Task) in which objects were first hidden at one location by a protagonist and then moved to a second location within the same space but in the protagonist's absence. Participants were asked to indicate either where the protagonist remembered the item to be (reasoning about another's memory), believed it to be (reasoning about another's false belief), or where the protagonist would look for it (action prediction of another based on false belief). The distance away from Location A (the original one) towards Location B (the new location) was our measure of egocentric bias. We found no evidence that egocentric bias varied according to reasoning type, and no evidence that participants actually were more biased when reasoning about another person than when simply recalling the first location from memory. We conclude that the Sandbox Task paradigm may not be sensitive enough to draw out consistent effects related to mental state reasoning in young adults.
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Affiliation(s)
- Steven Samuel
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Edward W. Legg
- Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Robert Lurz
- Brooklyn College, City University New York, New York, NY, USA
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7
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Samuel S, Legg EW, Lurz R, Clayton NS. Egocentric bias across mental and non-mental representations in the Sandbox Task. Q J Exp Psychol (Hove) 2018; 71:2395-2410. [PMID: 30362406 DOI: 10.1177/1747021817742367] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
In the Sandbox Task, participants indicate where a protagonist who has a false belief about the location of an object will look for that object in a trough filled with a substrate that conceals the hidden object's location. Previous findings that participants tend to indicate a location closer to where they themselves know the object to be located have been interpreted as evidence of egocentric bias when attributing mental states to others. We tested the assumption that such biases occur as a result of reasoning about mental states specifically. We found that participants showed more egocentric bias when reasoning from a protagonist's false belief than from their own memory, but found equivalent levels of bias when they were asked to indicate where a false film would depict the object as when they were asked about a protagonist's false belief. Our findings suggest that that egocentric biases found in adult false belief tasks are more likely due to a general difficulty with reasoning about false representations than a specialised difficulty with reasoning about false mental states.
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Affiliation(s)
- Steven Samuel
- 1 Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Edward W Legg
- 1 Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
| | - Robert Lurz
- 2 Brooklyn College, The City University New York, New York, NY, USA
| | - Nicola S Clayton
- 1 Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
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8
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Dale R, Galati A, Alviar C, Contreras Kallens P, Ramirez-Aristizabal AG, Tabatabaeian M, Vinson DW. Interacting Timescales in Perspective-Taking. Front Psychol 2018; 9:1278. [PMID: 30250437 PMCID: PMC6139380 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01278] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/20/2017] [Accepted: 07/04/2018] [Indexed: 01/09/2023] Open
Abstract
Through theoretical discussion, literature review, and a computational model, this paper poses a challenge to the notion that perspective-taking involves a fixed architecture in which particular processes have priority. For example, some research suggests that egocentric perspectives can arise more quickly, with other perspectives (such as of task partners) emerging only secondarily. This theoretical dichotomy-between fast egocentric and slow other-centric processes-is challenged here. We propose a general view of perspective-taking as an emergent phenomenon governed by the interplay among cognitive mechanisms that accumulate information at different timescales. We first describe the pervasive relevance of perspective-taking to cognitive science. A dynamical systems model is then introduced that explicitly formulates the timescale interaction proposed. This model illustrates that, rather than having a rigid time course, perspective-taking can be fast or slow depending on factors such as task context. Implications are discussed, with ideas for future empirical research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Rick Dale
- Department of Communication, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States
- Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA, United States
| | - Alexia Galati
- Department of Communication, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States
- Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA, United States
- Department of Psychology, University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus
| | - Camila Alviar
- Department of Communication, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States
- Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA, United States
| | - Pablo Contreras Kallens
- Department of Communication, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States
- Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA, United States
- Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, United States
| | | | - Maryam Tabatabaeian
- Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA, United States
| | - David W. Vinson
- Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA, United States
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9
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Sasaki K, Ihaya K, Yamada Y. Avoidance of Novelty Contributes to the Uncanny Valley. Front Psychol 2017; 8:1792. [PMID: 29123490 PMCID: PMC5662646 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01792] [Citation(s) in RCA: 13] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/06/2017] [Accepted: 09/27/2017] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
A hypothesis suggests that objects with a high degree of visual similarity to real humans trigger negative impressions (i.e., the uncanny valley). Previous studies have suggested that difficulty in object categorization elicits negative emotional reactions to enable the avoidance of potential threats. The present study further investigated this categorization-difficulty hypothesis. In an experiment, observers categorized morphed images of photographs and human doll faces as "photograph" or "doll" and evaluated the perceived eeriness of the images. Additionally, we asked the observers to answer questionnaires on behavioral inhibition systems (BIS). The results indicated that individual differences in the BIS score were associated with enhanced eeriness in the objects with a specific human likeness. These findings suggest that the tendency to avoid a potentially threatening novel experience contributes to promoting the perceived eeriness of objects with some degree of visual similarity to real humans.
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Affiliation(s)
- Kyoshiro Sasaki
- Faculty of Science and Engineering, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
- Faculty of Arts and Science, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Tokyo, Japan
| | - Keiko Ihaya
- Admission Center, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan
| | - Yuki Yamada
- Faculty of Arts and Science, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan
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10
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Smith ER, Mackie DM. Representation and Incorporation of Close Others’ Responses. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 2016; 20:311-331. [DOI: 10.1177/1088868315598256] [Citation(s) in RCA: 27] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/15/2022]
Abstract
We propose a new model of social influence, which can occur spontaneously and in the absence of typically assumed motives. We assume that perceivers routinely construct representations of other people’s experiences and responses (beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and behaviors), when observing others’ responses or simulating the responses of unobserved others. Like representations made accessible by priming, these representations may then influence the process that generates perceivers’ own responses, without intention or awareness, especially when there is a strong social connection to the other. We describe evidence for the basic properties and important moderators of this process, which distinguish it from other mechanisms such as informational, normative, or social identity influence. The model offers new perspectives on the role of others’ values in producing cultural differences, the persistence and power of stereotypes, the adaptive reasons for being influenced by others’ responses, and the impact of others’ views about the self.
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11
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Theory-of-mind understanding and theory-of-mind use in unaffected first-degree relatives of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Psychiatry Res 2015; 230:735-7. [PMID: 26522824 DOI: 10.1016/j.psychres.2015.10.026] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/09/2015] [Revised: 08/04/2015] [Accepted: 10/23/2015] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
We assessed theory of mind (ToM) in unaffected first-degree relatives (FDR) of patients with schizophrenia (SC) and bipolar disorder (BD) compared to healthy controls with a revised computerized referential communication task. Results showed that FDR of SC performed worse than FDR of BD and controls on a task requiring ToM-use, but not on a task requiring ToM-understanding. This indicates that deficient ToM-use, rather than ToM-understanding impairments, may represent a potential candidate endophenotype for schizophrenia.
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12
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Herschbach M. Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading. Conscious Cogn 2015; 36:483-97. [DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2015.04.001] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.9] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/21/2014] [Revised: 02/21/2015] [Accepted: 04/07/2015] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
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13
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Hyde DC, Aparicio Betancourt M, Simon CE. Human temporal-parietal junction spontaneously tracks others' beliefs: A functional near-infrared spectroscopy study. Hum Brain Mapp 2015; 36:4831-46. [PMID: 26368326 DOI: 10.1002/hbm.22953] [Citation(s) in RCA: 28] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/29/2015] [Revised: 08/12/2015] [Accepted: 08/13/2015] [Indexed: 11/11/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans have the unique capacity to actively reflect on the thoughts, beliefs, and knowledge of others, but do we also track mental states spontaneously when observing other people? We asked this question by monitoring brain activity in belief-sensitive cortex using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) during free-viewing of social videos. More specifically, we identified a portion of the right temporal-parietal junction (rTPJ) selective for mental state processing using an established, explicit theory of mind task, and then analyzed the brain response in that region of interest (ROI) during free-viewing of video clips involving people producing goal-directed actions. We found a significant increase in oxygenated hemoglobin concentration in our rTPJ ROI during free-viewing for all of our test videos. Activity in this region was further modulated by the extent to which the knowledge state, or beliefs, of the protagonist regarding the location of an object contrasted with the reality of where the object was hidden. Open-ended questioning suggested our participants were not explicitly focusing on belief states of the characters during free-viewing. Further analyses ruled out lower-level details of the video clips or general attentional differences between conditions as likely explanations for the results. As such, these results call into question the traditional characterization of theory of mind as a resource intensive, deliberate process, and, instead, support an emerging view of theory of mind as a foundation for, rather than the pinnacle of, human social cognition.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel C Hyde
- Department of Psychology, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, Illinois
| | | | - Charline E Simon
- Department of Psychology, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, Illinois
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14
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Oker A, Prigent E, Courgeon M, Eyharabide V, Urbach M, Bazin N, Amorim MA, Passerieux C, Martin JC, Brunet-Gouet E. How and why affective and reactive virtual agents will bring new insights on social cognitive disorders in schizophrenia? An illustration with a virtual card game paradigm. Front Hum Neurosci 2015; 9:133. [PMID: 25870549 PMCID: PMC4378306 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00133] [Citation(s) in RCA: 12] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/25/2014] [Accepted: 02/26/2015] [Indexed: 11/16/2022] Open
Abstract
In recent decades, many studies have shown that schizophrenia is associated with severe social cognitive impairments affecting key components, such as the recognition of emotions, theory of mind, attributional style, and metacognition. Most studies investigated each construct separately, precluding analysis of the interactive and immersive nature of real-life situation. Specialized batteries of tests are under investigation to assess social cognition, which is thought now as a link between neurocognitive disorders and impaired functioning. However, this link accounts for a limited part of the variance of real-life functioning. To fill this gap, advances in virtual reality and affective computing have made it possible to carry out experimental investigations of naturalistic social cognition, in controlled conditions, with good reproducibility. This approach is illustrated with the description of a new paradigm based on an original virtual card game in which subjects interpret emotional displays from a female virtual agent, and decipher her helping intentions. Independent variables concerning emotional expression in terms of valence and intensity were manipulated. We show how several useful dependant variables, ranging from classic experimental psychology data to metacognition or subjective experiences records, may be extracted from a single experiment. Methodological issues about the immersion into a simulated intersubjective situation are considered. The example of this new flexible experimental setting, with regards to the many constructs recognized in social neurosciences, constitutes a rationale for focusing on this potential intermediate link between standardized tests and real-life functioning, and also for using it as an innovative media for cognitive remediation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ali Oker
- HANDIReSP EA4047, Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin , Versailles , France
| | - Elise Prigent
- CIAMS EA4532, UFR STAPS, Université Paris-Sud , Orsay , France
| | | | | | - Mathieu Urbach
- HANDIReSP EA4047, Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin , Versailles , France ; Pôle de Psychiatrie, Centre Hospitalier de Versailles , Versailles , France
| | - Nadine Bazin
- HANDIReSP EA4047, Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin , Versailles , France ; Pôle de Psychiatrie, Centre Hospitalier de Versailles , Versailles , France
| | | | - Christine Passerieux
- HANDIReSP EA4047, Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin , Versailles , France ; Pôle de Psychiatrie, Centre Hospitalier de Versailles , Versailles , France
| | | | - Eric Brunet-Gouet
- HANDIReSP EA4047, Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin , Versailles , France ; Pôle de Psychiatrie, Centre Hospitalier de Versailles , Versailles , France
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15
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Cohen AS, Sasaki JY, German TC. Specialized mechanisms for theory of mind: are mental representations special because they are mental or because they are representations? Cognition 2014; 136:49-63. [PMID: 25490129 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2014.11.016] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/30/2012] [Revised: 09/30/2014] [Accepted: 11/17/2014] [Indexed: 11/16/2022]
Abstract
Does theory of mind depend on a capacity to reason about representations generally or on mechanisms selective for the processing of mental state representations? In four experiments, participants reasoned about beliefs (mental representations) and notes (non-mental, linguistic representations), which according to two prominent theories are closely matched representations because both are represented propositionally. Reaction times were faster and accuracies higher when participants endorsed or rejected statements about false beliefs than about false notes (Experiment 1), even when statements emphasized representational format (Experiment 2), which should have favored the activation of representation concepts. Experiments 3 and 4 ruled out a counterhypothesis that differences in task demands were responsible for the advantage in belief processing. These results demonstrate for the first time that understanding of mental and linguistic representations can be dissociated even though both may carry propositional content, supporting the theory that mechanisms governing theory of mind reasoning are narrowly specialized to process mental states, not representations more broadly. Extending this theory, we discuss whether less efficient processing of non-mental representations may be a by-product of mechanisms specialized for processing mental states.
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Affiliation(s)
- Adam S Cohen
- Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London, ON N6A 3K7, Canada; The Brain and Mind Institute, University of Western Ontario, London, ON N6A 5B7, Canada.
| | - Joni Y Sasaki
- Department of Psychology, York University, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
| | - Tamsin C German
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA
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16
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Nonspecificity and theory of mind: New evidence from a nonverbal false-sign task and children with autism spectrum disorders. J Exp Child Psychol 2014; 122:1-20. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2013.11.017] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/14/2013] [Revised: 11/19/2013] [Accepted: 11/28/2013] [Indexed: 11/17/2022]
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Wertz AE, German TC. Theory of mind in the wild: toward tackling the challenges of everyday mental state reasoning. PLoS One 2013; 8:e72835. [PMID: 24069160 PMCID: PMC3771964 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0072835] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/03/2013] [Accepted: 07/15/2013] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
A complete understanding of the cognitive systems underwriting theory of mind (ToM) abilities requires articulating how mental state representations are generated and processed in everyday situations. Individuals rarely announce their intentions prior to acting, and actions are often consistent with multiple mental states. In order for ToM to operate effectively in such situations, mental state representations should be generated in response to certain actions, even when those actions occur in the presence of mental state content derived from other aspects of the situation. Results from three experiments with preschool children and adults demonstrate that mental state information is indeed generated based on an approach action cue in situations that contain competing mental state information. Further, the frequency with which participants produced or endorsed explanations that include mental states about an approached object decreased when the competing mental state information about a different object was made explicit. This set of experiments provides some of the first steps toward identifying the observable action cues that are used to generate mental state representations in everyday situations and offers insight into how both young children and adults processes multiple mental state representations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Annie E. Wertz
- Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California, United States of America
| | - Tamsin C. German
- Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, University of California Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, California, United States of America
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Zhang T, Zhang Q, Li Y, Long C, Li H. Belief and sign, true and false: the unique of false belief reasoning. Exp Brain Res 2013; 231:27-36. [PMID: 23975150 DOI: 10.1007/s00221-013-3661-7] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/31/2012] [Accepted: 07/29/2013] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
For a long time, a controversy has been proposed that whether the process of theory of mind is a result of domain-specific or domain-general changes (Wellman in The handbook of childhood cognitive development. Blackwell Publication, New Jersey, 2011). This event-related potential study explored the neural time course of domain-general and domain-specific components in belief reasoning. Fourteen participants completed location transfer false belief (FB), true belief (TB), false sign (FS) and true sign (TS) tasks, in which two pictures told a story related to a dog that ran from a green into a red box. In the TB and FB tasks, a boy saw or did not see the transfer of the dog, respectively. In the FS and TS tasks, an arrow that pointed to the green box either altered its direction to the red box or did not alter following the transfer of the dog. Participants then inferred where the boy thought of, or the arrow indicated the location of the dog. FB and TB reasoning elicited lower N2 amplitudes than FS and TS reasoning, which is associated with domain-general components, the detection, and classification. The late slow wave (LSW) for FB was more positive at frontal, central, and parietal sites than FS because of the domain-specific component involved in FB reasoning. However, the LSW was less positive for TB than for FB but did not differ from the TS condition, which implies that mental representation might not be involved in TB reasoning.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ting Zhang
- Faculty of Psychology, Southwest University, Chongqing, 400715, China,
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Wang YG, Roberts DL, Xu BH. Dissociation of understanding from applying others' false beliefs in remitted schizophrenia: evidence from a computerized referential communication task. BMC Psychiatry 2013; 13:141. [PMID: 23683146 PMCID: PMC3680038 DOI: 10.1186/1471-244x-13-141] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 01/26/2013] [Accepted: 05/15/2013] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Abstract
BACKGROUND In research on theory of mind (ToM), false belief paradigms are commonly used. Previous studies have reported that there is heterogeneity in the magnitude of impairment on false belief tasks. Moreover, intact ability to attribute others' false beliefs has been widely reported in patients with remitted schizophrenia. Increasingly, evidence suggests that there may be different cognitive mechanisms underlying the understanding others' false beliefs versus applying one's knowledge of others' false beliefs. Since the role of psychotic symptoms in ToM impairments is an important issue in the study of ToM deficits in schizophrenia, we examined both remitted schizophrenia and non-remitted schizophrenia, with the aim to investigate whether psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia are associated with deficits in understanding others' mental states or difficulties in applying this understanding. METHODS The present study investigated 29 patients with non-remitted schizophrenia, 19 patients with remitted schizophrenia, and 22 healthy controls with a revised computerized referential communication task. The ability to understand others' false beliefs and the ability to apply others' false beliefs were measured separately. RESULTS Patients with non-remitted schizophrenia performed significantly worse than patients with remitted schizophrenia and healthy controls on a task of understanding others' false beliefs, whereas no significant difference was found between the patients with remitted schizophrenia and healthy controls. Both the patients with non-remitted schizophrenia and patients with remitted schizophrenia performed significantly worse than healthy controls on a task of applying others' false beliefs. CONCLUSIONS Our findings suggested a dissociation of understanding others' false beliefs from applying others' false beliefs in remitted schizophrenia. We preliminarily conclude that deficits in the ToM ability of applying knowledge of others' mental states might be state-dependent.
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Affiliation(s)
- Yong-guang Wang
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, 148 Tianmushan Road, Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province 310028, China,Department of Mental Health, Hangzhou Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, China
| | - David L Roberts
- Department of Psychiatry, University of Texas Health Science Center, San Antonio, USA
| | - Bai-hua Xu
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, 148 Tianmushan Road, Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province 310028, China
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Ramsey R, Hansen P, Apperly I, Samson D. Seeing it my way or your way: frontoparietal brain areas sustain viewpoint-independent perspective selection processes. J Cogn Neurosci 2012; 25:670-84. [PMID: 23249349 DOI: 10.1162/jocn_a_00345] [Citation(s) in RCA: 69] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 02/03/2023]
Abstract
A hallmark of human social interaction is the ability to consider other people's mental states, such as what they see, believe, or desire. Prior neuroimaging research has predominantly investigated the neural mechanisms involved in computing one's own or another person's perspective and largely ignored the question of perspective selection. That is, which brain regions are engaged in the process of selecting between self and other perspectives? To address this question, the current fMRI study used a behavioral paradigm that required participants to select between competing visual perspectives. We provide two main extensions to current knowledge. First, we demonstrate that brain regions within dorsolateral prefrontal and parietal cortices respond in a viewpoint-independent manner during the selection of task-relevant over task-irrelevant perspectives. More specifically, following the computation of two competing visual perspectives, common regions of frontoparietal cortex are engaged to select one's own viewpoint over another's as well as select another's viewpoint over one's own. Second, in the absence of conflict between the content of competing perspectives, we showed a reduced engagement of frontoparietal cortex when judging another's visual perspective relative to one's own. This latter finding provides the first brain-based evidence for the hypothesis that, in some situations, another person's perspective is automatically and effortlessly computed, and thus, less cognitive control is required to select it over one's own perspective. In doing so, we provide stronger evidence for the claim that we not only automatically compute what other people see but also, in some cases, we compute this even before we are explicitly aware of our own perspective.
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Affiliation(s)
- Richard Ramsey
- School of Psychology, Bangor University, Brigantia Building, Bangor, Gwynedd, United Kingdom.
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Pedersen A, Koelkebeck K, Brandt M, Wee M, Kueppers KA, Kugel H, Kohl W, Bauer J, Ohrmann P. Theory of mind in patients with schizophrenia: is mentalizing delayed? Schizophr Res 2012; 137:224-9. [PMID: 22406281 DOI: 10.1016/j.schres.2012.02.022] [Citation(s) in RCA: 51] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Submit a Manuscript] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/21/2011] [Revised: 02/03/2012] [Accepted: 02/19/2012] [Indexed: 10/28/2022]
Abstract
OBJECTIVE Functional imaging studies have used numerous neurocognitive designs to investigate brain activation during theory of mind (ToM) tasks in patients with schizophrenia. The majority of studies asks participants to retrospectively attribute mental states to others. We used a novel animated task to investigate implicit mentalizing online. Because behavioral studies have revealed slower ToM performance reaction times in patients with schizophrenia, we hypothesized that time would influence functional MRI (fMRI) activation patterns also. METHODS We applied the "Moving Shapes" paradigm, which involves two interacting triangles, to a functional MRI block design and investigated the neural activation patterns of 15 patients with schizophrenia and 14 healthy controls. We additionally analyzed the first and second halves of each video separately to assess time-related differences. RESULTS Overall, patients with schizophrenia showed increased activation in the inferior and middle frontal gyri, the superior temporal gyrus, the precuneus and the cerebellum compared with controls during ToM versus non-ToM videos. Most importantly, patients with schizophrenia had predominantly increased activation in ToM-related brain areas during the second half of the ToM paradigm, whereas the activation in areas of the ToM-network in healthy controls occurred during the first half of the presentation. CONCLUSIONS Our results confirm recent findings of significantly stronger neural activations that encompass the fronto-temporo-parietal cerebral areas in patients with schizophrenia compared with controls during ToM tasks. The observation of slower cognitive processing in patients with schizophrenia during mentalizing might explain some of the contradictory imaging findings in these patients and have implications for cognitive remediation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Anya Pedersen
- Department of Psychology, University of Muenster, Germany
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Begeer S, Bernstein DM, van Wijhe J, Scheeren AM, Koot HM. A continuous false belief task reveals egocentric biases in children and adolescents with autism spectrum disorders. AUTISM : THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 2012; 16:357-66. [PMID: 22399450 DOI: 10.1177/1362361311434545] [Citation(s) in RCA: 25] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.1] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/27/2022]
Abstract
This study reports on a new false belief measure in a sample of 124 children and adolescents with or without high functioning autism (HFASD). In the classic paradigm, a participant predicts in which of two discrete locations a deceived protagonist will look for an object. In the current Sandbox task, the object is buried and reburied in a sandbox, thus creating a continuum between locations. Compared to typically developing individuals (n=62), those with HFASD (n=62) showed a larger egocentric bias on the Sandbox task. They failed to take the protagonist's false belief into account, despite their adequate ability to infer advanced mental states. This indicates that sensitive measures can reveal subtle first order Theory of Mind impairments in HFASD individuals.
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Affiliation(s)
- Sander Begeer
- Vu University Amsterdam, the Netherlands and University of Sydney, Australia.
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German TC, Cohen AS. A cue-based approach to ‘theory of mind’: Re-examining the notion of automaticity. BRITISH JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 2011; 30:45-58. [PMID: 22429032 DOI: 10.1111/j.2044-835x.2011.02055.x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 11] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Tamsin C German
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA.
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