Constituents of political cognition: Race, party politics, and the alliance detection system

Research on the Impact of an AI Voice Assistant's Gender and Self-Disclosure Strategies on User Self-Disclosure in Chinese Postpartum Follow-Up Phone Calls

This study examines the application of AI voice assistants in Chinese postpartum follow-up phone calls, with particular focus on how interaction design strategies influence users' self-disclosure intention. A 2 (voice gender: female/male) × 3 (self-disclosure strategies: normal conversation without additional disclosure/objective factual disclosure/emotional and opinion-based disclosure) mixed experimental design (n = 395) was conducted to analyze how the gender and self-disclosure strategies of voice assistants affect users' stereotypes (perceived warmth and competence), and how these stereotypes, mediated by privacy calculus dimensions (perceived risks and perceived benefits), influence self-disclosure intention. The experiment measured various indicators using a 7-point Likert scale and performed data analysis through analysis of variance (ANOVA) and structural equation modeling (SEM). The results demonstrate that female voice assistants significantly enhance users' perceived warmth and competence, while emotional self-disclosure strategies significantly improve perceived warmth. Stereotypes about the voice assistant positively affect users' self-disclosure intention through the mediating effects of perceived risk and benefit, with perceived benefit exerting a stronger effect than perceived risk. These findings provide valuable insights for the design and application of AI voice assistants in healthcare, offering actionable guidance for enhancing user interaction and promoting self-disclosure in medical contexts.

Historical myths as commitment devices

Sijilmassi et al. claim that historical myths are technologies of recruitment that mimic cues of fitness interdependence. Paradoxically, they also claim that people are vigilant and that these myths might not and do not have to convince others, which raises questions about how these myths become culturally successful. Thinking about historical myths as commitment devices helps overcome this paradox.

Racial Minorities Face Discrimination From Across the Political Spectrum When Seeking to Form Ties on Social Media: Evidence From a Field Experiment

We conducted a preregistered field experiment examining racial discrimination in tie formation on social media. We randomly assigned research accounts varying on race (Black, White) and politics (liberal/Democrat, conservative/Republican, neutral) to follow a politically balanced sample of Twitter (i.e., X) users (N = 5,951) who were unaware they were in a research study. We examined three predictions from the social and political psychology literatures: i) individuals favor White over Black targets, ii) this tendency is stronger for conservatives/Republicans than for liberals/Democrats, and iii) greater discrimination by conservatives/Republicans is explained by the assumption that racial minorities are liberal/Democrat. We found evidence that individuals were less likely to reciprocate social ties with Black accounts than White accounts. However, this tendency was not moderated by individuals' political orientation, shared partisanship, or partisan mismatch. In sum, this work provides field experimental evidence for racial discrimination in tie formation on social media by individuals across political backgrounds.

Why DON'T We "Say Her Name"? An Intersectional Model of the Invisibility of Police Violence Against Black Women and Girls

Racialized police violence is a profound form of systemic oppression affecting Black Americans, yet the narratives surrounding police brutality have disproportionately centered on Black men and boys, overshadowing the victimization of Black women and girls. In 2014, the #SayHerName campaign emerged to bring attention to the often-overlooked instances of police brutality against Black women and girls, including incidents of both nonsexual and sexual violence. Despite these efforts, mainstream discourse and psychological scholarship on police violence continue to marginalize the experiences of Black women and girls. This raises a critical question: Why DON'T we "Say Her Name"? This article employs intersectional frameworks to demonstrate how the historic and systemic factors that render Black women and girls particularly vulnerable to police violence also deny their legitimacy as victims, perpetuate their invisibility, and increase their susceptibility to state-sanctioned violence. We extend models of intersectional invisibility by arguing that ideologies related to age, in addition to racial and gender identities, contribute to their marginalization. Finally, we reflect on how psychological researchers can play a pivotal role in dismantling the invisibility of Black women and girls through scientific efforts and advocacy.

Social Categorization of Sexual Orientation via Verbal Cues: Evidence From a "Who Said What?" Study

Even though an abundant amount of research has demonstrated the ability to identify others' sexual orientation via minimal nonverbal cues, few studies, if any, have investigated the role of verbal information sources on the social cognition of sexual orientation. Herein, we aimed to explore whether verbal cues (gendered names) are adequate for triggering social categorization processes. Additionally, whether participant gender, target gender, and attributions toward homosexual targets differentiate sexual orientation-based categorization was examined. Our data showed that (1) participants categorized targets based on sexual orientation via semantic information, (2) female participants' categorization tendencies were marginally stronger than the males', and (3) negative attributions toward homosexual targets did not influence the categorization levels. Accordingly, the results contribute to the existing literature indicating the automatic detection of sexual orientation and clarify that perceivers not only use numerous nonverbal sources to extract categorical information about sexual orientation but also verbal cues.

Cultural technologies for peace may have shaped our social cognition

Peace, the article shows, is achieved by culturally evolved institutions that incentivize positive-sum relationships. We propose that this insight has important consequences for the design of human social cognition. Cues that signal the existence of such institutions should play a prominent role in detecting group membership. We show how this accounts for previous findings and suggest avenues for future research.

Biracial Faces Offer Visual Cues of Successful Intergroup Contact: Genetic Admixture and Coalition Detection

This research explores how biracial facial cues affect racial perception and social judgment. We tested a coalition-signaling hypothesis of biracial cues in two studies conducted in the United States (n = 227) and China (n = 116). From the perspective of intergroup and interpersonal relations theories in social psychology, biracial features would likely be perceived as cues of threat or resource competition. In contrast, we propose an evolutionary hypothesis that biracial facial cues reveal the ancestral history of intergroup alliances between members of two races or ethnic groups. When racial cues are mixed, we predict that biracial individuals may be viewed more positively than other-race or even own-race members who often compete for limited ingroup resources. The participants observed facial images that ranged from 100% Asian to 100% Caucasian, including morphed biracial composites of 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, and 70% Caucasian or Asian. The participants evaluated each image regarding perceived Caucasianness (Asianness), attractiveness, trustworthiness, health, intelligence, and career prospects. The US and Chinese samples yielded a similar pattern of own-race bias in racial perception and biracial favoritism in social judgment. The social judgment ratings were not correlated with the racial perception scores and were independent of the sex of the participants or biracial images, indicating a coalitional motive, instead of a mating motive, underlying social perception of biracial individuals. Overall, the results suggest that biracial facial features signal a successful genetic admixture and coalition in parental generations and thus increase the trustworthiness and cooperative potential of a biracial person.

The puritanical moral contract: Purity, cooperation, and the architecture of the moral mind

Commentators raise fundamental questions about the notion of purity (sect. R1), the architecture of moral cognition (sect. R2), the functional relationship between morality and cooperation (sect. R3), the role of folk-theories of self-control in moral judgment (sect. R4), and the cultural variation of morality (sect. R5). In our response, we address all these issues by clarifying our theory of puritanism, responding to counter-arguments, and incorporating welcome corrections and extensions.

Do conspiracy theories efficiently signal coalition membership? An experimental test using the "Who Said What?" design

Theoretical work in evolutionary psychology have proposed that conspiracy theories may serve a coalitional function. Specifically, fringe and offensive statements such as conspiracy theories are expected to send a highly credible signal of coalition membership by clearly distinguishing the speaker's group from other groups. A key implication of this theory is that cognitive systems designed for alliance detection should intuitively interpret the endorsement of conspiracy theories as coalitional cues. To our knowledge, no previous studies have empirically investigated this claim. Taking the domain of environmental policy as our case, we examine the hypothesis that beliefs framed in a conspiratorial manner act as more efficient coalitional markers of environmental position than similar but non-conspiratorial beliefs. To test this prediction, quota sampled American participants (total N = 2462) completed two pre-registered Who-Said-What experiments where we measured if participants spontaneously categorize targets based on their environmental position, and if this categorization process is enhanced by the use of a conspiratorial frame. We find firm evidence that participants categorize by environmental position, but no evidence that the use of conspiratorial statements increases categorization strength and thus serves a coalitional function.

Motivations to reciprocate cooperation and punish defection are calibrated by estimates of how easily others can switch partners

Evolutionary models of dyadic cooperation demonstrate that selection favors different strategies for reciprocity depending on opportunities to choose alternative partners. We propose that selection has favored mechanisms that estimate the extent to which others can switch partners and calibrate motivations to reciprocate and punish accordingly. These estimates should reflect default assumptions about relational mobility: the probability that individuals in one’s social world will have the opportunity to form relationships with new partners. This prior probability can be updated by cues present in the immediate situation one is facing. The resulting estimate of a partner’s outside options should serve as input to motivational systems regulating reciprocity: Higher estimates should down-regulate the use of sanctions to prevent defection by a current partner, and up-regulate efforts to attract better cooperative partners by curating one’s own reputation and monitoring that of others. We tested this hypothesis using a Trust Game with Punishment (TGP), which provides continuous measures of reciprocity, defection, and punishment in response to defection. We measured each participant’s perception of relational mobility in their real-world social ecology and experimentally varied a cue to partner switching. Moreover, the study was conducted in the US (n = 519) and Japan (n = 520): societies that are high versus low in relational mobility. Across conditions and societies, higher perceptions of relational mobility were associated with increased reciprocity and decreased punishment: i.e., those who thought that others have many opportunities to find new partners reciprocated more and punished less. The situational cue to partner switching was detected, but relational mobility in one’s real social world regulated motivations to reciprocate and punish, even in the experimental setting. The current research provides evidence that motivational systems are designed to estimate varying degrees of partner choice in one’s social ecology and regulate reciprocal behaviors accordingly.

Multiracial Race Self-Labeling Decisions: The Influence of Gender, Social Class, and Political Party Affiliation

The growing prominence of the multiracial population in the United States is prompting new questions about the importance of social identities on race self-labeling decisions. I review and expand on a growing body of research on this population that focuses on identifying and describing nonracial categories important to shaping racial identities. Specifically, I utilized a national survey of U.S. adults administered by the Pew Research Center to investigate how social identities defined by nonracial categories such as gender, social class, and political party affiliation impact the race self-labels of multiracial people. In addition, I consider factors of racial identity, discrimination, and social pressure and their potential influence on race self-labeling decisions. The findings indicate that gender, social class, and political party affiliation are potential predictors of race self-labeling decisions of multiracial people. After adding the factors of racial identity, discrimination, and social pressure, the results remain significant. In addition, the results for social class and political party affiliation reinforce the actuality that a pervasive racial hierarchy and social stratification system, situated in the context of White supremacy, is embedded within U.S. society.

The Efficiency of Demography in Face Perception

When we look at a face, we cannot help but "read" it: Beyond simply processing its identity, we also form robust impressions of both transient psychological states (e.g., surprise) and stable character traits (e.g., trustworthiness). But perhaps the most fundamental traits we extract from faces are their social demographics, for example, race, age, and gender. How much exposure is required to extract such properties? Curiously, despite extensive work on the temporal efficiency of extracting both higher-level social properties (such as competence and dominance) and more basic characteristics (such as identity and familiarity), this question remains largely unexplored for demography. We correlated observers' percepts of the race/age/gender of unfamiliar faces viewed at several brief durations (and then masked) with their judgments after unlimited exposure. Performance reached asymptote by 100 ms, was above chance by only 33.33 ms, and had a similar temporal profile to detecting faces in the first place. This was true even when the property to be reported wasn't revealed until after the face had disappeared, and when the faces were matched for several lower-level visual properties. Collectively, these results demonstrate that the extraction of demographic features from faces is highly efficient, and can truly be done at a glance.

The Language of Inequality: Evidence Economic Inequality Increases Wealth Category Salience

There is evidence that in more economically unequal societies, social relations are more strained. We argue that this may reflect the tendency for wealth to become a more fitting lens for seeing the world, so that in economically more unequal circumstances, people more readily divide the world into “the haves” and “have nots.” Our argument is supported by archival and experimental evidence. Two archival analyses reveal that at times of greater inequality, books in the United Kingdom and the United States and news media in English-speaking countries were more likely to mention the rich and poor. Three experiments, two preregistered, provided evidence for the causal role of economic inequality in people’s use of wealth categories when describing life in a fictional society; effects were weaker when examining real economic contexts. Thus, one way in which inequality changes the world may be by changing how we see it.

Towards a computational theory of social groups: A finite set of cognitive primitives for representing any and all social groups in the context of conflict

We don't yet have adequate theories of what the human mind is representing when it represents a social group. Worse still, many people think we do. This mistaken belief is a consequence of the state of play: Until now, researchers have relied on their own intuitions to link up the concept social group on the one hand, and the results of particular studies or models on the other. While necessary, this reliance on intuition has been purchased at considerable cost. When looked at soberly, existing theories of social groups are either (i) literal, but not remotely adequate (such as models built atop economic games), or (ii) simply metaphorical (typically a subsumption or containment metaphor). Intuition is filling in the gaps of an explicit theory. This paper presents a computational theory of what, literally, a group representation is in the context of conflict: it is the assignment of agents to specific roles within a small number of triadic interaction types. This "mental definition" of a group paves the way for a computational theory of social groups-in that it provides a theory of what exactly the information-processing problem of representing and reasoning about a group is. For psychologists, this paper offers a different way to conceptualize and study groups, and suggests that a non-tautological definition of a social group is possible. For cognitive scientists, this paper provides a computational benchmark against which natural and artificial intelligences can be held.

The correct way to test the hypothesis that racial categorization is a byproduct of an evolved alliance-tracking capacity

The project of identifying the cognitive mechanisms or information-processing functions that cause people to categorize others by their race is one of the longest-standing and socially-impactful scientific issues in all of the behavioral sciences. This paper addresses a critical issue with one of the few hypotheses in this area that has thus far been successful-the alliance hypothesis of race-which had predicted a set of experimental circumstances that appeared to selectively target and modify people's implicit categorization of others by their race. Here, we will show why the evidence put forward in favor of this hypothesis was not in fact evidence in support of the hypothesis, contrary to common understanding. We will then provide the necessary and crucial tests of the hypothesis in the context of conflictual alliances, determining if the predictions of the alliance hypothesis of racial categorization in fact hold up to experimental scrutiny. When adequately tested, we find that indeed categorization by race is selectively reduced when crossed with membership in antagonistic alliances-the very pattern predicted by the alliance hypothesis. This finding provides direct experimental evidence that the human mind treats race as proxy for alliance membership, implying that racial categorization does not reflect attention to physical features per se, but rather to social relationships.

The evolutionary psychology of mass mobilization: how disinformation and demagogues coordinate rather than manipulate

Large-scale mobilization is often accompanied by the emergence of demagogic leaders and the circulation of unverified rumors, especially if the mobilization happens in support of violent or disruptive projects. In those circumstances, researchers and commentators frequently explain the mobilization as a result of mass manipulation. Against this view, evolutionary psychologists have provided evidence that human psychology contains mechanisms for avoiding manipulation and new studies suggest that political manipulation attempts are, in general, ineffective. Instead, we can understand decisions to follow demagogic leaders and circulate fringe rumors as attempts to solve a social problem inherent to mobilization processes: The coordination problem. Essentially, these decisions reflect attempts to align the attention of individuals already disposed for conflict.

Collective directional movement and the perception of social cohesion

We argue that perceivers associate collective directional movement – groups moving from one place to the next – with higher levels of social cohesion. Study 1 shows that pairs are rated as being more cohesive when described as engaging in directional movement compared to non‐directional activities. Study 2 replicates this finding using film clips. Study 3 reveals that the proximity of directionally moving dyads is a better predictor of perceived cohesion than behavioural synchrony. Study 4 replicates the original finding and reveals that perceptions of common fate and shared goals both contribute to the effect, with the former having more predictive power than the latter. We suggest that collective directional movement is an invariant part of social environments and is utilized by perceivers to make inferences about social dynamics.

Tribalism Is Human Nature

Humans evolved in the context of intense intergroup competition, and groups comprised of loyal members more often succeeded than groups comprised of nonloyal members. Therefore, selective pressures have sculpted human minds to be tribal, and group loyalty and concomitant cognitive biases likely exist in all groups. Modern politics is one of the most salient forms of modern coalitional conflict and elicits substantial cognitive biases. The common evolutionary history of liberals and conservatives gives little reason to expect protribe biases to be higher on one side of the political spectrum than the other. This evolutionarily plausible null hypothesis has been supported by recent research. In a recent meta-analysis, liberals and conservatives showed similar levels of partisan bias, and several protribe cognitive tendencies often ascribed to conservatives (e.g., intolerance toward dissimilar other people) were found in similar degrees in liberals. We conclude that tribal bias is a natural and nearly ineradicable feature of human cognition and that no group—not even one’s own—is immune.

Conspiracy Theories: Evolved Functions and Psychological Mechanisms

Belief in conspiracy theories—such as that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were an inside job or that the pharmaceutical industry deliberately spreads diseases—is a widespread and culturally universal phenomenon. Why do so many people around the globe believe conspiracy theories, and why are they so influential? Previous research focused on the proximate mechanisms underlying conspiracy beliefs but ignored the distal, evolutionary origins and functions. We review evidence pertaining to two competing evolutionary hypotheses: (a) conspiracy beliefs are a by-product of a suite of psychological mechanisms (e.g., pattern recognition, agency detection, threat management, alliance detection) that evolved for different reasons, or (b) conspiracy beliefs are part of an evolved psychological mechanism specifically aimed at detecting dangerous coalitions. This latter perspective assumes that conspiracy theories are activated after specific coalition cues, which produce functional counterstrategies to cope with suspected conspiracies. Insights from social, cultural and evolutionary psychology provide tentative support for six propositions that follow from the adaptation hypothesis. We propose that people possess a functionally integrated mental system to detect conspiracies that in all likelihood has been shaped in an ancestral human environment in which hostile coalitions—that is, conspiracies that truly existed—were a frequent cause of misery, death, and reproductive loss.

Seeing beyond political affiliations: The mediating role of perceived moral foundations on the partisan similarity-liking effect

Decades of research have demonstrated that we like people who are more similar to us. The present research tested a potential mechanism for this similarity-liking effect in the domain of politics: the stereotype that people's political orientation reflects their morals. People believe that Democrats are more likely to endorse individualizing morals like fairness and Republicans are more likely to endorse binding morals like obedience to authority. Prior to the 2016 election, American participants (N = 314) viewed an ostensible Facebook profile that shared an article endorsing conservative ideals (pro-Trump or pro-Republican), or liberal ideals (pro-Clinton or pro-Democrat). Participants rated the favorability of the profile-owner, and completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire for the profile-owner and themselves. As predicted, participants liked the profile-owner more when they shared political beliefs, and used political stereotypes to infer the moral foundations of the profile-owner. Additionally, the perceived moral foundation endorsement of the profile owner differentially mediated the relationship between the ideology and evaluations of the profile owner based on the party affiliation of the participant: perceived individualizing foundations mediated the relationship for Democratic participants and perceived binding foundations mediated the relationship for Republican participants. In other words, people liked their in-group members more because they thought that the profile-owner endorsed a specific type of morals. In Study 2 (N = 486), we ruled out the potential explanation that any political stereotype can account for the similarity-liking effect, replicating the results of Study 1 even when controlling for perceptions of other personality differences. Taken together, these studies highlight that there may be something unique about the perceived type of morality of political in-group and out-group members that may be contributing to the similarity-liking effect in politics.

What is seen and what is not seen in the economy: An effect of our evolved psychology

Specific features of our evolved cognitive architecture explain why some aspects of the economy are "seen" and others are "not seen." Drawing from the commentaries of economists, psychologists, and other social scientists on our original proposal, we propose a more precise model of the acquisition and spread of folk-beliefs about the economy. In particular, we try to provide a clearer delimitation of the field of folk-economic beliefs (sect. R2) and to dispel possible misunderstandings of the role of variation in evolutionary psychology (sect. R3). We also comment on the difficulty of explaining folk-economic beliefs in terms of domain-general processes or biases (sect. R4), as developmental studies show how encounters with specific environments calibrate domain-specific systems (sect. R5). We offer a more detailed description of the connections between economic beliefs and political psychology (sect. R6) and of the probable causes of individual variation in that domain (sect. R7). Taken together, these arguments point to a better integration or consilience between economics and human evolution (sect. R8).

The interplay of social group biases in social threat learning

Learning from other individuals (e.g. social learning) is subjected to biases affecting whom to learn from. Consistent with research in animals, showing similarity-based learning biases and a general tendency to display pro-social responses to in-group individuals, we recently demonstrated that social learning of both fear and safety was enhanced when information was transmitted between same-race individuals. Here, we addressed how two different social group categories jointly affect the transmission of fears by investigating the interplay between racial and supporter group membership. We demonstrate that supporter group membership differentially influenced learning from a racial in-group vs. racial out-group individual. Thus, conditioned skin conductance responses in the same-race condition were significantly higher when fear was transmitted by an in-group (same team) vs. an out-group (rival team) individual, and were related to supporter team identification. However, supporter group membership did not influence learning from a racial out-group demonstrator, suggesting that the presence of an alternative alliance does not necessary reduce the influence of racial biases on social fear learning.

Priming Race

Recent research shows that racial categorization can be reduced by contexts in which race does not predict how people interact and get along—a manipulation with little to no effect on sex and age. This suggests that our minds attend to race as an implicit cue to how people are likely to get along. However, the underlying mechanism of how these contexts reduce race is not yet known. Is race not encoded? Or, is race encoded, but then inhibited? The present study arbitrates between these possibilities. Results demonstrate that the reduction in racial categorization is happening at recall. Participants are still encoding targets’ race, but this information is locked away or inhibited. This clarifies how the mind switches away from previously relevant, but now irrelevant, social cues: it does not immediately abandon them, rather, it encodes them but inhibits their use.

Physiological responses and partisan bias: beyond self-reported measures of party identification

People are biased partisans: they tend to agree with policies from political parties they identify with, independent of policy content. Here, we investigate how physiological reactions to political parties shape bias. Using changes in galvanic skin conductance responses to the visual presentation of party logos, we obtained an implicit and physiological measure of the affective arousal associated with political parties. Subsequently, we exposed subjects to classical party cue experiments where the party sponsors of specific policies were experimentally varied. We found that partisan bias only obtains among those exhibiting a strong physiological reaction to the party source; being a self-reported party identifier is not sufficient on its own. This suggests that partisan bias is rooted in implicit, affective reactions.