1
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Sehl CG, Friedman O, Denison S. Emotions before actions: When children see costs as causal. Cognition 2024; 247:105774. [PMID: 38574652 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.105774] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/22/2023] [Revised: 03/11/2024] [Accepted: 03/14/2024] [Indexed: 04/06/2024]
Abstract
Adults expect people to be biased by sunk costs, but young children do not. We tested between two accounts for why children overlook the sunk cost bias. On one account, children do not see sunk costs as causal. The other account posits that children see sunk costs as causal, but unlike adults, think future actions cannot make up for sunk costs. These accounts make opposing predictions about whether children should see sunk costs as affecting emotions. Across three experiments, 4-7-year-olds (total N = 320) and adults (total N = 429) saw stories about characters who collected items that were easy or difficult to obtain, and predicted characters' emotions and actions. At all ages, participants anticipated that characters would feel sadder about high-cost objects, but only adults predicted that characters would keep high-cost objects. Our findings show that children see incurred costs as causal, and that costs are integrated children's and adults' theory of emotions. Moreover, the findings suggest that developmental differences in sunk cost reasoning may rest in children's incomplete mental accounting. We also discuss children's reasoning about rational and irrational action.
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Affiliation(s)
- Claudia G Sehl
- Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Canada.
| | - Ori Friedman
- Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Canada
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2
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Woo BM, Liu S, Gweon H, Spelke ES. Toddlers Prefer Agents Who Help Those Facing Harder Tasks. Open Mind (Camb) 2024; 8:483-499. [PMID: 38665545 PMCID: PMC11045033 DOI: 10.1162/opmi_a_00129] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/26/2023] [Accepted: 02/05/2024] [Indexed: 04/28/2024] Open
Abstract
Capacities to understand and evaluate others' actions are fundamental to human social life. Infants and toddlers are sensitive to the costs of others' actions, infer others' values from the costs of the actions they take, and prefer those who help others to those who hinder them, but it is largely unknown whether and how cost considerations inform early understanding of third-party prosocial actions. In three experiments (N = 94), we asked whether 16-month-old toddlers value agents who selectively help those who need it most. Presented with two agents who attempted two tasks, toddlers preferentially looked to and touched someone who helped the agent in greater need, both when one agent's task required more effort and when the tasks were the same but one agent was weaker. These results provide evidence that toddlers engage in need-based evaluations of helping, applying their understanding of action utilities to their social evaluations.
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Affiliation(s)
- Brandon M. Woo
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
- The Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, Cambridge, MA, USA
| | - Shari Liu
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA
| | - Hyowon Gweon
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
| | - Elizabeth S. Spelke
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
- The Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, Cambridge, MA, USA
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3
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Vizmathy L, Begus K, Knoblich G, Gergely G, Curioni A. Better Together: 14-Month-Old Infants Expect Agents to Cooperate. Open Mind (Camb) 2024; 8:1-16. [PMID: 38419792 PMCID: PMC10898613 DOI: 10.1162/opmi_a_00115] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/09/2022] [Accepted: 12/09/2023] [Indexed: 03/02/2024] Open
Abstract
Humans engage in cooperative activities from early on and the breadth of human cooperation is unparalleled. Human preference for cooperation might reflect cognitive and motivational mechanisms that drive engagement in cooperative activities. Here we investigate early indices of humans' cooperative abilities and test whether 14-month-old infants expect agents to prefer cooperative over individual goal achievement. Three groups of infants saw videos of agents facing a choice between two actions that led to identical rewards but differed in the individual costs. Our results show that, in line with prior research, infants expect agents to make instrumentally rational choices and prefer the less costly of two individual action alternatives. In contrast, when one of the action alternatives is cooperative, infants expect agents to choose cooperation over individual action, even though the cooperative action demands more effort from each agent to achieve the same outcome. Finally, we do not find evidence that infants expect agents to choose the less costly alternative when both options entail cooperative action. Combined, these results indicate an ontogenetically early expectation of cooperation, and raise interesting implications and questions regarding the nature of infants' representations of cooperative actions and their utility.
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Affiliation(s)
- Liza Vizmathy
- Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Vienna, Austria
| | - Katarina Begus
- Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
| | - Gunther Knoblich
- Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Vienna, Austria
| | - György Gergely
- Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Vienna, Austria
| | - Arianna Curioni
- Institute of Computer Technology, Technische Universität Wien, Vienna, Austria
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4
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Bas J, Mascaro O. Infants are sensitive to the social signaling value of shared inefficient behaviors. Sci Rep 2023; 13:20034. [PMID: 37973834 PMCID: PMC10654565 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-023-46031-0] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/23/2023] [Accepted: 10/26/2023] [Indexed: 11/19/2023] Open
Abstract
Actions that are blatantly inefficient to achieve non-social goals are often used to convey information about agents' social affiliation, as in the case of rituals. We argue that when reproduced, actions that are individually inefficient acquire a social signaling value owing to the mechanisms that support humans' intuitive analysis of actions. We tested our hypothesis on 15-month-old infants who were familiarized with an agent that reproduced or merely observed the actions of efficient and inefficient individuals. Subsequently, we measured the infants' expectations of the agent's preferences for efficient and inefficient individuals. Our results confirmed that when agents act alone, infants expect a third-party to prefer efficient over inefficient agents. However, this pattern is entirely flipped if the third-party reproduces the agents' actions. In that case, infants expect inefficient agents to be preferred over efficient ones. Thus, reproducing actions whose rational basis is elusive can serve a critical social signaling function, accounting for why such behaviors are pervasive in human groups.
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Affiliation(s)
- Jesús Bas
- Center for Brain and Cognition, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 08005, Barcelona, Spain.
| | - Olivier Mascaro
- Université Paris Cité, CNRS, Integrative Neuroscience and Cognition Center, 75006, Paris, France
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5
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Cheng S, Zhao M, Tang N, Zhao Y, Zhou J, Shen M, Gao T. Intention beyond desire: Spontaneous intentional commitment regulates conflicting desires. Cognition 2023; 238:105513. [PMID: 37331323 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105513] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2023] [Revised: 05/30/2023] [Accepted: 06/06/2023] [Indexed: 06/20/2023]
Abstract
The human mind is a mosaic composed of multiple selves with conflicting desires. How can coherent actions emerge from such conflicts? Classical desire theory argues that rational action depends on maximizing the expected utilities evaluated by all desires. In contrast, intention theory suggests that humans regulate conflicting desires with an intentional commitment that constrains action planning towards a fixed goal. Here, we designed a series of 2D navigation games in which participants were instructed to navigate to two equally desirable destinations. We focused on the critical moments in navigation to test whether humans spontaneously commit to an intention and take actions that would be qualitatively different from those of a purely desire-driven agent. Across four experiments, we found three distinctive signatures of intentional commitment that only exist in human actions: "goal perseverance" as the persistent pursuit of an original intention despite unexpected drift making the intention suboptimal; "self-binding" as the proactive binding of oneself to a committed future by avoiding a path that could lead to many futures; and "temporal leap" as the commitment to a distant future even before reaching the proximal one. These results suggest that humans spontaneously form an intention with a committed plan to quarantine conflicting desires from actions, supporting intention as a distinctive mental state beyond desire. Additionally, our findings shed light on the possible functions of intention, such as reducing computational load and making one's actions more predictable in the eyes of a third-party observer.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shaozhe Cheng
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, China
| | | | - Ning Tang
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, China
| | - Yang Zhao
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, China
| | - Jifan Zhou
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, China.
| | - Mowei Shen
- Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Zhejiang University, China.
| | - Tao Gao
- Department of Communication, UCLA, USA; Department of Statistics, UCLA, USA; Department of Psychology, UCLA, USA.
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6
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Radovanovic M, Chao TWT, Onyshko E, Huynh QDT, Liu YL, Sommerville JA. Not just if, but how much: Children and adults use cost and need to make evaluations about generosity across contexts. Cognition 2023; 238:105533. [PMID: 37390606 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105533] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/04/2022] [Revised: 06/20/2023] [Accepted: 06/22/2023] [Indexed: 07/02/2023]
Abstract
Evaluations of others' generosity are critical for selecting quality social partners, yet the factors which systematically affect these evaluations and whether they vary across development are still relatively unclear. Here, we establish that two key dimensions adults and children (aged 4 to 7 years) consider are the cost associated with a giving action and the need of the recipient, through six pre-registered experiments with Canadian and U.S. American participants. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that adults' and children's third-party evaluations of generosity are sensitive to variations in each factor, across several operationalizations of cost and need in both comparative and standalone contexts, suggesting cost and need can be spontaneously evoked. However, children's responses were more consistent for need scenarios than cost scenarios. In Experiments 3 and 4, we modified our scenarios to evaluate whether variations in cost and need are considered simultaneously in both generosity evaluations and affiliative preferences. Adults' and older children's (ages 6 to 7) evaluations of generosity and affiliative preferences were sensitive to both factors, but younger children did not utilize this information systematically. Importantly, in Experiments 5 and 6, adults' and older children's generosity evaluations were only sensitive to information about cost and need when the giver's actions conferred utility to a recipient, but not when actions were self-serving. Taken together, we establish robust evidence that cost and need are considered in generosity evaluations by demonstrating that Canadian and U.S. American adults and children utilize this information consistently, spontaneously, and simultaneously.
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Affiliation(s)
- Mia Radovanovic
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G3, Canada.
| | - Tim Wei-Ting Chao
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G3, Canada
| | - Emily Onyshko
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G3, Canada; Department of Applied Psychology and Human Development, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1V6, Canada
| | | | - Yang Leona Liu
- Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G3, Canada
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7
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Chu J, Schulz LE. Not Playing by the Rules: Exploratory Play, Rational Action, and Efficient Search. Open Mind (Camb) 2023; 7:294-317. [PMID: 37416069 PMCID: PMC10320825 DOI: 10.1162/opmi_a_00076] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 11/03/2022] [Accepted: 02/06/2023] [Indexed: 07/08/2023] Open
Abstract
Recent studies suggest children's exploratory play is consistent with formal accounts of rational learning. Here we focus on the tension between this view and a nearly ubiquitous feature of human play: In play, people subvert normal utility functions, incurring seemingly unnecessary costs to achieve arbitrary rewards. We show that four-and-five-year-old children not only infer playful behavior from observed violations of rational action (Experiment 1), but themselves take on unnecessary costs during both retrieval (Experiment 2) and search (Experiments 3A-B) tasks, despite acting efficiently in non-playful, instrumental contexts. We discuss the value of such apparently utility-violating behavior and why it might serve learning in the long run.
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Affiliation(s)
- Junyi Chu
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA
| | - Laura E. Schulz
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA
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8
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Ahl RE, Cook E, McAuliffe K. Having less means wanting more: Children hold an intuitive economic theory of diminishing marginal utility. Cognition 2023; 234:105367. [PMID: 36680975 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105367] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/16/2022] [Revised: 12/31/2022] [Accepted: 01/04/2023] [Indexed: 01/21/2023]
Abstract
Judgments surrounding resource acquisition and valuation are ubiquitous in daily life. How do humans decide what something is worth to themselves or someone else? One important cue to value is that of resource quantity. As described by economists, the principle of diminishing marginal utility (DMU) holds that as resource abundance increases, the value placed on each unit decreases; likewise, when resources become more scarce, the value placed on each unit rises. While prior research suggests that adults make judgments that align with this concept, it is unclear whether children do so. In Study 1 (n = 104), children (ages 5 through 8) were presented with scenarios involving losses or gains to others' resources and predicted the actions and emotions of the individuals involved. Participants made decisions that aligned with DMU, e.g., expecting individuals with fewer resources to expend more effort for an additional resource than individuals with greater resources. In Study 2 (n = 104), children incorporated information about preferences when inferring others' resource valuations, showing how quantity and preference are both included in children's inferences about others' utility. Our results indicate the early emergence of an intuitive economic theory that aligns with an important economic principle. Long before formal learning on this topic, children integrate quantity and preference information to sensibly predict others' resource valuations, with implications for economic decision-making, social preferences, and judgments of partner quality across the lifespan.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Emma Cook
- Boston College, United States of America
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9
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Stojnić G, Gandhi K, Yasuda S, Lake BM, Dillon MR. Commonsense psychology in human infants and machines. Cognition 2023; 235:105406. [PMID: 36801603 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105406] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/08/2022] [Revised: 02/08/2023] [Accepted: 02/09/2023] [Indexed: 02/18/2023]
Abstract
Human infants are fascinated by other people. They bring to this fascination a constellation of rich and flexible expectations about the intentions motivating people's actions. Here we test 11-month-old infants and state-of-the-art learning-driven neural-network models on the "Baby Intuitions Benchmark (BIB)," a suite of tasks challenging both infants and machines to make high-level predictions about the underlying causes of agents' actions. Infants expected agents' actions to be directed towards objects, not locations, and infants demonstrated default expectations about agents' rationally efficient actions towards goals. The neural-network models failed to capture infants' knowledge. Our work provides a comprehensive framework in which to characterize infants' commonsense psychology and takes the first step in testing whether human knowledge and human-like artificial intelligence can be built from the foundations cognitive and developmental theories postulate.
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Affiliation(s)
- Gala Stojnić
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, USA
| | - Kanishk Gandhi
- Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, USA
| | - Shannon Yasuda
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, USA
| | - Brenden M Lake
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, USA; Center for Data Science, New York University, New York, NY, USA
| | - Moira R Dillon
- Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, USA.
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10
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Should I learn from you? Seeing expectancy violations about action efficiency hinders social learning in infancy. Cognition 2023; 230:105293. [PMID: 36191356 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105293] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/14/2022] [Revised: 09/22/2022] [Accepted: 09/26/2022] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Infants generate basic expectations about their physical and social environment. This early knowledge allows them to identify opportunities for learning, preferring to explore and learn about objects that violate their prior expectations. However, less is known about how expectancy violations about people's actions influence infants' subsequent learning from others and about others. Here, we presented 18-month-old infants with an agent who acted either efficiently (expected action) or inefficiently (unexpected action) and then labeled an object. We hypothesized that infants would prefer to learn from the agent (label-object association) if she previously acted efficiently, but they would prefer to learn about the agent (voice-speaker association) if she previously acted inefficiently. As expected, infants who previously saw the agent acting efficiently showed greater attention to the demonstrated object and learned the new label-object association, but infants presented with the inefficient agent did not. However, there was no evidence that infants learned the voice-speaker association in any of the conditions. In summary, expectancy violations about people's actions may signal a situation to avoid learning from them. We discussed the results in relation to studies on surprise-induced learning, motionese, and selective social learning, and we proposed other experimental paradigms to investigate how expectancy violations influence infants' learning about others.
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11
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Zhao X, Kushnir T. When it's not easy to do the right thing: Developmental changes in understanding cost drive evaluations of moral praiseworthiness. Dev Sci 2023; 26:e13257. [PMID: 35301779 DOI: 10.1111/desc.13257] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/21/2021] [Revised: 02/28/2022] [Accepted: 03/02/2022] [Indexed: 12/15/2022]
Abstract
Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires. Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in contrast with other work showing that children incorporate notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning. Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016) vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving inner conflict. In two studies (N = 192 children, range = 4.00-9.95 years; and N = 193 adults), we contrasted a character who paid a personal cost (psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a moral action with another who acted morally without paying a cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and 9-year-old children and adults recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct motivational force on actions. They further suggest that costly choice-a hallmark of moral agency-is implicated in judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.
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Affiliation(s)
- Xin Zhao
- Department of Educational Psychology, East China Normal University, Shanghai, China
| | - Tamar Kushnir
- Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
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12
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Societal institutions echo evolved human nature: An analysis of the Western criminal justice system and its relation to anger. EVOL HUM BEHAV 2023. [DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2023.01.007] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/15/2023]
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13
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Choi K, Schlesinger MA, Franchak JM, Richert RA. Preschoolers' attention to and learning from on-screen characters that vary by effort and efficiency: An eye-tracking study. Front Psychol 2022; 13:1011172. [PMID: 36591107 PMCID: PMC9798126 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1011172] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/03/2022] [Accepted: 11/21/2022] [Indexed: 12/23/2022] Open
Abstract
Prior findings are mixed regarding the extent to which children understand others' effort in early childhood. Especially, little is known about how character effort impacts children's selective attention and learning. This study examined preschoolers' visual attention to and learning from two on-screen characters: One character exerting high effort with low efficiency and another character exerting low effort with high efficiency in solving problems successfully. Children between 3.5 and 6.5 years of age (N = 70) watched a video of the two on-screen characters successfully solving problems. Children's eye movements were recorded during viewing. Each of the two on-screen characters consistently displayed either high effort/low efficiency or low effort/high efficiency to solve four problems (familiarization). For the final problem (testing), the two characters exerted the same level of effort as each other and used unique solutions to solve the problem. Children then solved the final problem themselves using real objects. Children could selectively use either character's solution demonstrated in the video. Lastly, children explicitly judged how good the characters were at solving problems. Younger children were more likely to use the solution demonstrated by the character with high effort/low efficiency, whereas older children were more likely to use the solution provided by another character with low effort/high efficiency. Younger children allocated more attention to the high effort/low efficiency character than the low effort/high efficiency character, but this pattern was modified by age such that children's gaze to the low effort/high efficiency character increased with age. Children's explicit credibility judgments did not differ by character or child age. The findings are discussed with respect to preschoolers' understanding of effort and implications for children's learning from screen media.
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Affiliation(s)
- Koeun Choi
- Department of Human Development and Family Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA, United States,*Correspondence: Koeun Choi,
| | - Molly A. Schlesinger
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA, United States
| | - John M. Franchak
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA, United States
| | - Rebekah A. Richert
- Department of Psychology, University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA, United States
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14
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Liu S, Pepe B, Ganesh Kumar M, Ullman TD, Tenenbaum JB, Spelke ES. Dangerous Ground: One-Year-Old Infants are Sensitive to Peril in Other Agents' Action Plans. Open Mind (Camb) 2022; 6:211-231. [PMID: 36439074 PMCID: PMC9692054 DOI: 10.1162/opmi_a_00063] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/15/2022] [Accepted: 08/31/2022] [Indexed: 06/16/2023] Open
Abstract
Do infants appreciate that other people's actions may fail, and that these failures endow risky actions with varying degrees of negative utility (i.e., danger)? Three experiments, including a pre-registered replication, addressed this question by presenting 12- to 15-month-old infants (N = 104, 52 female, majority White) with an animated agent who jumped over trenches of varying depth towards its goals. Infants expected the agent to minimize the danger of its actions, and they learned which goal the agent preferred by observing how much danger it risked to reach each goal, even though the agent's actions were physically identical and never failed. When we tested younger, 10-month-old infants (N = 102, 52 female, majority White) in a fourth experiment, they did not succeed consistently on the same tasks. These findings provide evidence that one-year-old infants use the height that other agents could fall from in order to explain and predict those agents' actions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Shari Liu
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, MIT
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins University
- Center for Brains, Minds and Machines, MIT
| | - Bill Pepe
- Department of Psychology, University of California San Diego
- Center for Brains, Minds and Machines, MIT
| | | | - Tomer D. Ullman
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University
- Center for Brains, Minds and Machines, MIT
| | - Joshua B. Tenenbaum
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, MIT
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins University
| | - Elizabeth S. Spelke
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University
- Center for Brains, Minds and Machines, MIT
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15
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Mascaro O, Csibra G. Infants expect agents to minimize the collective cost of collaborative actions. Sci Rep 2022; 12:17088. [PMID: 36224340 PMCID: PMC9556639 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-022-21452-5] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/23/2022] [Accepted: 09/27/2022] [Indexed: 01/04/2023] Open
Abstract
This paper argues that human infants address the challenges of optimizing, recognizing, and interpreting collaborative behaviors by assessing their collective efficiency. This hypothesis was tested by using a looking-time study. Fourteen-month-olds (N = 32) were familiarized with agents performing a collaborative action in computer animations. During the test phase, the looking times were measured while the agents acted with various efficiency parameters. In the critical condition, the agents' actions were individually efficient, but their combination was either collectively efficient or inefficient. Infants looked longer at test events that violated expectations of collective efficiency (p = .006, d = 0.79). Thus, preverbal infants apply expectations of collective efficiency to actions involving multiple agents.
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Affiliation(s)
- Olivier Mascaro
- grid.4444.00000 0001 2112 9282Université Paris Cité, CNRS, Integrative Neuroscience and Cognition Center, F-75006 Paris, France
| | - Gergely Csibra
- grid.5146.60000 0001 2149 6445Cognitive Development Center, Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Vienna, Austria ,grid.4464.20000 0001 2161 2573Department of Psychological Sciences, University of London, Birkbeck, UK
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16
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Abstract
Infants use statistical information in their environment, as well as others' emotional communication, to understand the intentions of social partners. However, rarely do researchers consider these two sources of social information in tandem. This study assessed 2-year-olds' attributions of intentionality from non-random sampling events and subsequent discrete emotion reactions. Infants observed an experimenter remove five objects from either the non-random minority (18%) or random majority (82%) of a sample and express either joy, disgust, or sadness after each selection. Two-year-olds inferred the experimenter's intentionality by giving her the object that she had previously selected when she expressed joy or disgust after non-random sampling events, but not when she expressed sadness or sampled at random. These findings demonstrate that infants use both statistical regularities and discrete emotion communication to infer an agent's intentions. In particular, the present findings show that 2-year-olds infer that an agent can intentionally select a preferred or an undesired object from a sample as a function of the discrete emotion. Implications for the development of inferring intentionality from statistical sampling events and discrete emotion communication are discussed.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lukas D Lopez
- Jeannine Rainbolt College of Education, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, United States
| | - Eric A Walle
- Psychological Sciences, University of California Merced, Merced, CA, United States
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17
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Royka A, Chen A, Aboody R, Huanca T, Jara-Ettinger J. People infer communicative action through an expectation for efficient communication. Nat Commun 2022; 13:4160. [PMID: 35851397 PMCID: PMC9293910 DOI: 10.1038/s41467-022-31716-3] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/28/2021] [Accepted: 06/30/2022] [Indexed: 11/09/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans often communicate using body movements like winks, waves, and nods. However, it is unclear how we identify when someone’s physical actions are communicative. Given people’s propensity to interpret each other’s behavior as aimed to produce changes in the world, we hypothesize that people expect communicative actions to efficiently reveal that they lack an external goal. Using computational models of goal inference, we predict that movements that are unlikely to be produced when acting towards the world and, in particular, repetitive ought to be seen as communicative. We find support for our account across a variety of paradigms, including graded acceptability tasks, forced-choice tasks, indirect prompts, and open-ended explanation tasks, in both market-integrated and non-market-integrated communities. Our work shows that the recognition of communicative action is grounded in an inferential process that stems from fundamental computations shared across different forms of action interpretation. Humans can quickly infer when someone’s body movements are meant to be communicative. Here, the authors show that this capacity is underpinned by an expectation that communicative actions will efficiently reveal that they lack an external goal.
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Affiliation(s)
- Amanda Royka
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA.
| | - Annie Chen
- Department of Computer Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
| | - Rosie Aboody
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
| | - Tomas Huanca
- Centro Boliviano de Desarrollo Socio-Integral, La paz, Bolivia
| | - Julian Jara-Ettinger
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA. .,Department of Computer Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA. .,Wu Tsai Institute, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA.
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18
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Bettinsoli ML, Formanowicz M. A Cross-Cultural Replication on Humanness Attribution. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1027/1864-9335/a000494] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/06/2022]
Abstract
Abstract. Previous research showed that targets achieving (vs. not) a goal were ascribed more humanness. We conceptually replicate previous studies by involving a population of English and Arabic speakers to test cross-cultural replicability of the effect and the contribution of sensorimotor systems in agency representation. Participants ( Ntot = 637) saw animations, where goal achievement and trajectory were manipulated. They evaluated agency, communion, humanness, and attitudes (respect and liking) toward presented targets. Goal achievement versus failure but not movement trajectory increased agency and communion ratings, which in turn affected humanness, respect, and liking (Study 1 and Study 2). Goal manipulation also directly affected humanness ratings (Study 2). Altogether, our findings suggest a superior role of success over trajectory manipulation in perceiving inanimate objects as having humanness.
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Affiliation(s)
- Maria Laura Bettinsoli
- Department of Psychology, Center for Research on Social Relations, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Warsaw, Poland
- New York University Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
| | - Magdalena Formanowicz
- Department of Psychology, Center for Research on Social Relations, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Warsaw, Poland
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19
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Schultz J, Frith CD. Animacy and the prediction of behaviour. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2022; 140:104766. [DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2022.104766] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/19/2022] [Revised: 06/24/2022] [Accepted: 07/01/2022] [Indexed: 10/17/2022]
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20
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Butz MV. Resourceful Event-Predictive Inference: The Nature of Cognitive Effort. Front Psychol 2022; 13:867328. [PMID: 35846607 PMCID: PMC9280204 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.867328] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/01/2022] [Accepted: 04/13/2022] [Indexed: 11/29/2022] Open
Abstract
Pursuing a precise, focused train of thought requires cognitive effort. Even more effort is necessary when more alternatives need to be considered or when the imagined situation becomes more complex. Cognitive resources available to us limit the cognitive effort we can spend. In line with previous work, an information-theoretic, Bayesian brain approach to cognitive effort is pursued: to solve tasks in our environment, our brain needs to invest information, that is, negative entropy, to impose structure, or focus, away from a uniform structure or other task-incompatible, latent structures. To get a more complete formalization of cognitive effort, a resourceful event-predictive inference model (REPI) is introduced, which offers computational and algorithmic explanations about the latent structure of our generative models, the active inference dynamics that unfold within, and the cognitive effort required to steer the dynamics-to, for example, purposefully process sensory signals, decide on responses, and invoke their execution. REPI suggests that we invest cognitive resources to infer preparatory priors, activate responses, and anticipate action consequences. Due to our limited resources, though, the inference dynamics are prone to task-irrelevant distractions. For example, the task-irrelevant side of the imperative stimulus causes the Simon effect and, due to similar reasons, we fail to optimally switch between tasks. An actual model implementation simulates such task interactions and offers first estimates of the involved cognitive effort. The approach may be further studied and promises to offer deeper explanations about why we get quickly exhausted from multitasking, how we are influenced by irrelevant stimulus modalities, why we exhibit magnitude interference, and, during social interactions, why we often fail to take the perspective of others into account.
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Affiliation(s)
- Martin V. Butz
- Neuro-Cognitive Modeling Group, Department of Computer Science, University of Tübingen, Tubingen, Germany
- Department of Psychology, Faculty of Science, University of Tübingen, Tubingen, Germany
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21
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22
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Bass I, Bonawitz E, Hawthorne-Madell D, Vong WK, Goodman ND, Gweon H. The effects of information utility and teachers' knowledge on evaluations of under-informative pedagogy across development. Cognition 2022; 222:104999. [PMID: 35032868 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104999] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/07/2021] [Revised: 11/12/2021] [Accepted: 12/22/2021] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
Abstract
Teaching is a powerful way to transmit knowledge, but with this power comes a hazard: When teachers fail to select the best set of evidence for the learner, learners can be misled to draw inaccurate inferences. Evaluating others' failures as teachers, however, is a nontrivial problem; people may fail to be informative for different reasons, and not all failures are equally blameworthy. How do learners evaluate the quality of teachers, and what factors influence such evaluations? Here, we present a Bayesian model of teacher evaluation that considers the utility of a teacher's pedagogical sampling given their prior knowledge. In Experiment 1 (N=1168), we test the model predictions against adults' evaluations of a teacher who demonstrated all or a subset of the functions on a novel device. Consistent with the model predictions, participants' ratings integrated information about the number of functions taught, their values, as well as how much the teacher knew. Using a modified paradigm for children, Experiments 2 (N=48) and 3 (N=40) found that preschool-aged children (2a, 3) and adults (2b) make nuanced judgments of teacher quality that are well predicted by the model. However, after an unsuccessful attempt to replicate the results with preschoolers (Experiment 4, N=24), in Experiment 5 (N=24) we further investigate the development of teacher evaluation in a sample of seven- and eight-year-olds. These older children successfully distinguished teachers based on the amount and value of what was demonstrated, and their ability to evaluate omissions relative to the teacher's knowledge state was related to their tendency to spontaneously reference the teacher's knowledge when explaining their evaluations. In sum, our work illustrates how the human ability to learn from others supports not just learning about the world but also learning about the teachers themselves. By reasoning about others' informativeness, learners can evaluate others' teaching and make better learning decisions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ilona Bass
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States.
| | - Elizabeth Bonawitz
- Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States.
| | | | - Wai Keen Vong
- Center for Data Science, New York University, New York, NY 10011, United States.
| | - Noah D Goodman
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, United States.
| | - Hyowon Gweon
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, United States.
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23
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Chuey A, Asaba M, Bridgers S, Carrillo B, Dietz G, Garcia T, Leonard JA, Liu S, Merrick M, Radwan S, Stegall J, Velez N, Woo B, Wu Y, Zhou XJ, Frank MC, Gweon H. Moderated Online Data-Collection for Developmental Research: Methods and Replications. Front Psychol 2021; 12:734398. [PMID: 34803813 PMCID: PMC8595939 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.734398] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/01/2021] [Accepted: 10/06/2021] [Indexed: 11/24/2022] Open
Abstract
Online data collection methods are expanding the ease and access of developmental research for researchers and participants alike. While its popularity among developmental scientists has soared during the COVID-19 pandemic, its potential goes beyond just a means for safe, socially distanced data collection. In particular, advances in video conferencing software has enabled researchers to engage in face-to-face interactions with participants from nearly any location at any time. Due to the novelty of these methods, however, many researchers still remain uncertain about the differences in available approaches as well as the validity of online methods more broadly. In this article, we aim to address both issues with a focus on moderated (synchronous) data collected using video-conferencing software (e.g., Zoom). First, we review existing approaches for designing and executing moderated online studies with young children. We also present concrete examples of studies that implemented choice and verbal measures (Studies 1 and 2) and looking time (Studies 3 and 4) across both in-person and online moderated data collection methods. Direct comparison of the two methods within each study as well as a meta-analysis of all studies suggest that the results from the two methods are comparable, providing empirical support for the validity of moderated online data collection. Finally, we discuss current limitations of online data collection and possible solutions, as well as its potential to increase the accessibility, diversity, and replicability of developmental science.
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Affiliation(s)
- Aaron Chuey
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, United States
| | - Mika Asaba
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, United States
| | - Sophie Bridgers
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, United States
| | - Brandon Carrillo
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, United States
| | - Griffin Dietz
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, United States
| | - Teresa Garcia
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, United States
| | - Julia A Leonard
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, United States
| | - Shari Liu
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, United States
| | - Megan Merrick
- Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, United States
| | - Samaher Radwan
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, United States
| | - Jessa Stegall
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, United States
| | - Natalia Velez
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, United States
| | - Brandon Woo
- Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, United States
| | - Yang Wu
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, United States
| | - Xi J Zhou
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, United States
| | - Michael C Frank
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, United States
| | - Hyowon Gweon
- Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, United States
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24
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Sehl CG, Friedman O, Denison S. Blind to Bias? Young Children Do Not Anticipate that Sunk Costs Lead to Irrational Choices. Cogn Sci 2021; 45:e13063. [PMID: 34762743 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.13063] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/27/2021] [Revised: 09/28/2021] [Accepted: 10/08/2021] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
Young children anticipate that others act rationally in light of their beliefs and desires, and environmental constraints. However, little is known about whether children anticipate others' irrational choices. We investigated young children's ability to predict that sunk costs can lead to irrational choices. Across four experiments, 5- to 6-year-olds (total N = 185) and adults (total N = 117) judged which of two identical objects an agent would keep, one obtained at a high cost or one obtained at a low cost. In Experiment 1, adults predicted that the agent would choose the high-cost object over the low-cost one, whereas children responded at chance. Experiment 2 replicated these findings in children, but also included another condition which showed they were sensitive to future costs. They predicted that an agent would be more likely to seek out a low-cost item than a high-cost item. Experiments 3 and 4 then found that children do not anticipate the sunk cost bias in first person scenarios, or in interpersonal sunk cost scenarios, where costs are sunk by others. Taken together, our findings suggest that young children may struggle to understand and predict irrational behavior. The findings also reveal an asymmetry between how they consider sunk costs and future costs in understanding actions. We propose that this asymmetry might arise because children do not consider sunk costs as wasted.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Ori Friedman
- Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo
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25
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Choi Y, Luo Y, Baillargeon R. Can 5-month-old infants consider the perspective of a novel eyeless agent? New evidence for early mentalistic reasoning. Child Dev 2021; 93:571-581. [PMID: 34766636 DOI: 10.1111/cdev.13707] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 09/13/2020] [Revised: 10/04/2021] [Accepted: 10/06/2021] [Indexed: 11/29/2022]
Abstract
Is early reasoning about an agent's knowledge best characterized by a mentalistic stance, a teleological stance, or both? In this research, 5-month-old infants (N = 64, 50% female, 83% White) saw a novel eyeless agent consistently approach object-A as opposed to object-B. Although infants could always see both objects, a screen separated object-B from the agent. When object-B protruded above the screen, infants interpreted the agent's actions as revealing a preference for object-A over object-B. When object-B did not protrude above the screen, however, infants refrained from attributing such a preference: Consistent with mentalistic accounts, they reasoned that the agent's representation of the scene did not include object-B, and they used the agent's incomplete representation, non-egocentrically, to interpret its actions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Youjung Choi
- School of Psychological & Behavioral Sciences, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois, USA
| | - Yuyan Luo
- Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri at Columbia, Columbia, Missouri, USA
| | - Renée Baillargeon
- Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, Illinois, USA
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26
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Solby H, Radovanovic M, Sommerville JA. A New Look at Infant Problem-Solving: Using DeepLabCut to Investigate Exploratory Problem-Solving Approaches. Front Psychol 2021; 12:705108. [PMID: 34819894 PMCID: PMC8606407 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.705108] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/04/2021] [Accepted: 10/18/2021] [Indexed: 12/22/2022] Open
Abstract
When confronted with novel problems, problem-solvers must decide whether to copy a modeled solution or to explore their own unique solutions. While past work has established that infants can learn to solve problems both through their own exploration and through imitation, little work has explored the factors that influence which of these approaches infants select to solve a given problem. Moreover, past work has treated imitation and exploration as qualitatively distinct, although these two possibilities may exist along a continuum. Here, we apply a program novel to developmental psychology (DeepLabCut) to archival data (Lucca et al., 2020) to investigate the influence of the effort and success of an adult's modeled solution, and infants' firsthand experience with failure, on infants' imitative versus exploratory problem-solving approaches. Our results reveal that tendencies toward exploration are relatively immune to the information from the adult model, but that exploration generally increased in response to firsthand experience with failure. In addition, we found that increases in maximum force and decreases in trying time were associated with greater exploration, and that exploration subsequently predicted problem-solving success on a new iteration of the task. Thus, our results demonstrate that infants increase exploration in response to failure and that exploration may operate in a larger motivational framework with force, trying time, and expectations of task success.
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27
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Achimova A, Scontras G, Stegemann-Philipps C, Lohmann J, Butz MV. Learning about others: Modeling social inference through ambiguity resolution. Cognition 2021; 218:104862. [PMID: 34634532 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104862] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/31/2020] [Revised: 07/02/2021] [Accepted: 07/20/2021] [Indexed: 11/03/2022]
Abstract
Bayesian accounts of social cognition successfully model the human ability to infer goals and intentions of others on the basis of their behavior. In this paper, we extend this paradigm to the analysis of ambiguity resolution during brief communicative exchanges. In a reference game experimental setup, we observed that participants were able to infer listeners' preferences when analyzing their choice of object given referential ambiguity. Moreover, a subset of speakers was able to strategically choose ambiguous over unambiguous utterances in an epistemic manner, although a different group preferred unambiguous utterances. We show that a modified Rational Speech Act model well-approximates the data of both the inference of listeners' preferences and their utterance choices. In particular, the observed preference inference is modeled by Bayesian inference, which computes posteriors over hypothetical, behavior-influencing inner states of conversation partners-such as their knowledge, beliefs, intentions, or preferences-after observing their utterance-interpretation behavior. Utterance choice is modeled by anticipating social information gain, which we formalize as the expected knowledge change, when choosing a particular utterance and watching the listener's response. Taken together, our results demonstrate how social conversations allow us to (sometimes strategically) learn about each other when observing interpretations of ambiguous utterances.
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Affiliation(s)
- Asya Achimova
- GRK 1808 Ambiguity-Perception and Production, Neuro-Cognitive Modeling Group, Department of Computer Science, University of Tübingen, Sand 14, 72076 Tübingen, Germany; Neuro-Cognitive Modeling Group, Department of Computer Science, University of Tübingen, Sand 14, 72076 Tübingen, Germany.
| | - Gregory Scontras
- School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, 3151 Social Sciences Plaza, Irvine, CA 92697, United States of America.
| | - Christian Stegemann-Philipps
- GRK 1808 Ambiguity-Perception and Production, Neuro-Cognitive Modeling Group, Department of Computer Science, University of Tübingen, Sand 14, 72076 Tübingen, Germany; Neuro-Cognitive Modeling Group, Department of Computer Science, University of Tübingen, Sand 14, 72076 Tübingen, Germany.
| | - Johannes Lohmann
- Neuro-Cognitive Modeling Group, Department of Computer Science, University of Tübingen, Sand 14, 72076 Tübingen, Germany.
| | - Martin V Butz
- GRK 1808 Ambiguity-Perception and Production, Neuro-Cognitive Modeling Group, Department of Computer Science, University of Tübingen, Sand 14, 72076 Tübingen, Germany; Neuro-Cognitive Modeling Group, Department of Computer Science, University of Tübingen, Sand 14, 72076 Tübingen, Germany.
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28
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Green A, Siposova B, Kita S, Michael J. Stopping at nothing: Two-year-olds differentiate between interrupted and abandoned goals. J Exp Child Psychol 2021; 209:105171. [PMID: 33962107 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2021.105171] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/19/2020] [Revised: 03/05/2021] [Accepted: 03/29/2021] [Indexed: 10/21/2022]
Abstract
Previous research has established that goal tracking emerges early in the first year of life and rapidly becomes increasingly sophisticated. However, it has not yet been shown whether young children continue to update their representations of others' goals over time. The current study investigated this by probing young children's (24- to 30-month-olds; N = 24) ability to differentiate between goal-directed actions that have been halted because the goal was interrupted and those that have been halted because the goal was abandoned. To test whether children are sensitive to this distinction, we manipulated the experimenter's reason for not completing a goal-directed action; his initial goal was either interrupted by an obstacle or abandoned in favor of an alternative. We measured whether children's helping behavior was sensitive to the experimenter's reason for not completing his goal-directed action by recording whether children completed the experimenter's initial goal or the alternative goal. The results showed that children helped to complete the experimenter's initial goal significantly more often after this goal had been interrupted than after it had been abandoned. These results support the hypothesis that children continue to update their representations of others' goals over time by 2 years of age and specifically that they differentiate between abandoned and interrupted goals.
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Affiliation(s)
- Alexander Green
- Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
| | - Barbora Siposova
- Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
| | - Sotaro Kita
- Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
| | - John Michael
- Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest 1051, Hungary.
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29
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Vélez N, Gweon H. Learning from other minds: an optimistic critique of reinforcement learning models of social learning. Curr Opin Behav Sci 2021; 38:110-115. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cobeha.2021.01.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/26/2023]
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30
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Aboody R, Zhou C, Jara-Ettinger J. In Pursuit of Knowledge: Preschoolers Expect Agents to Weigh Information Gain and Information Cost When Deciding Whether to Explore. Child Dev 2021; 92:1919-1931. [PMID: 33739438 DOI: 10.1111/cdev.13557] [Citation(s) in RCA: 4] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/30/2022]
Abstract
When deciding whether to explore, agents must consider both their need for information and its cost. Do children recognize that exploration reflects a trade-off between action costs and expected information gain, inferring epistemic states accordingly? In two experiments, 4- and 5-year-olds (N = 144; of diverse race and ethnicity) judge that an agent who refuses to obtain low-cost information must have already known it, and an agent who incurs a greater cost to gain information must have a greater epistemic desire. Two control studies suggest that these findings cannot be explained by low-level associations between competence and knowledge. Our results suggest that preschoolers' theory of mind includes expectations about how costs interact with epistemic desires and states to produce exploratory action.
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31
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Jara-Ettinger J, Schulz LE, Tenenbaum JB. The Naïve Utility Calculus as a unified, quantitative framework for action understanding. Cogn Psychol 2020; 123:101334. [PMID: 32738590 DOI: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2020.101334] [Citation(s) in RCA: 32] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/06/2019] [Revised: 05/22/2020] [Accepted: 07/17/2020] [Indexed: 11/24/2022]
Abstract
The human ability to reason about the causes behind other people' behavior is critical for navigating the social world. Recent empirical research with both children and adults suggests that this ability is structured around an assumption that other agents act to maximize some notion of subjective utility. In this paper, we present a formal theory of this Naïve Utility Calculus as a probabilistic generative model, which highlights the role of cost and reward tradeoffs in a Bayesian framework for action-understanding. Our model predicts with quantitative accuracy how people infer agents' subjective costs and rewards based on their observable actions. By distinguishing between desires, goals, and intentions, the model extends to complex action scenarios unfolding over space and time in scenes with multiple objects and multiple action episodes. We contrast our account with simpler model variants and a set of special-case heuristics across a wide range of action-understanding tasks: inferring costs and rewards, making confidence judgments about relative costs and rewards, combining inferences from multiple events, predicting future behavior, inferring knowledge or ignorance, and reasoning about social goals. Our work sheds light on the basic representations and computations that structure our everyday ability to make sense of and navigate the social world.
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Affiliation(s)
- Julian Jara-Ettinger
- Department of Psychology, Yale University, United States; Department of Computer Science, Yale University, United States.
| | - Laura E Schulz
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States; Center for Brains, Minds and Machines, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States
| | - Joshua B Tenenbaum
- Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States; Center for Brains, Minds and Machines, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States
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32
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Colomer M, Bas J, Sebastian-Galles N. Efficiency as a principle for social preferences in infancy. J Exp Child Psychol 2020; 194:104823. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2020.104823] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/05/2019] [Revised: 01/29/2020] [Accepted: 01/29/2020] [Indexed: 10/24/2022]
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33
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Cognitive bots and algorithmic humans: toward a shared understanding of social intelligence. Curr Opin Behav Sci 2019. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cobeha.2019.04.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
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34
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Origins of the concepts cause, cost, and goal in prereaching infants. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2019; 116:17747-17752. [PMID: 31431537 DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1904410116] [Citation(s) in RCA: 26] [Impact Index Per Article: 5.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/18/2022] Open
Abstract
We investigated the origins and interrelations of causal knowledge and knowledge of agency in 3-month-old infants, who cannot yet effect changes in the world by reaching for, grasping, and picking up objects. Across 5 experiments, n = 152 prereaching infants viewed object-directed reaches that varied in efficiency (following the shortest physically possible path vs. a longer path), goal (lifting an object vs. causing a change in its state), and causal structure (action on contact vs. action at a distance and after a delay). Prereaching infants showed no strong looking preference between a person's efficient and inefficient reaches when the person grasped and displaced an object. When the person reached for and caused a change in the state of the object on contact, however, infants looked longer when this action was inefficient than when it was efficient. Three-month-old infants also showed a key signature of adults' and older infants' causal inferences: This looking preference was abolished if a short spatial and temporal gap separated the action from its effect. The basic intuition that people are causal agents, who navigate around physical constraints to change the state of the world, may be one important foundation for infants' ability to plan their own actions and learn from the acts of others.
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35
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Bahrick LE, McNew ME, Pruden SM, Castellanos I. Intersensory redundancy promotes infant detection of prosody in infant-directed speech. J Exp Child Psychol 2019; 183:295-309. [PMID: 30954804 PMCID: PMC6980335 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2019.02.008] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/25/2018] [Revised: 02/13/2019] [Accepted: 02/14/2019] [Indexed: 10/27/2022]
Abstract
Prosody, or the intonation contours of speech, conveys emotion and intention to the listener and provides infants with an early basis for detecting meaning in speech. Infant-directed speech (IDS) is characterized by exaggerated prosody, slower tempo, and elongated pauses, all amodal properties detectable across the face and voice. Although speech is an audiovisual event, it has been studied primarily as a unimodal auditory stream without the synchronized dynamic face of the speaker. According to the intersensory redundancy hypothesis, redundancy across the senses facilitates perceptual learning of amodal information, including prosody. We predicted that young infants who are still learning to discriminate and categorize prosodic information would detect prosodic changes better in the presence of intersensory redundancy (i.e., synchronous audiovisual speech) than in its absence (i.e., unimodal auditory or asynchronous audiovisual speech). To test this hypothesis, 72 4-month-old infants were habituated to recordings of women reciting passages in IDS with prosody conveying either approval or prohibition and then were tested with recordings of a novel passage with either a change or no change in prosody. Infants who received bimodal synchronous stimulation exhibited significant visual recovery to the novel passage with a change in prosody, but not to a novel passage with no change in prosody. Infants in the unimodal auditory and bimodal asynchronous conditions did not exhibit visual recovery in either condition. Results support the hypothesis that intersensory redundancy facilitates detection and abstraction of invariant prosody across changes in linguistic content and likely serves as an early foundation for the detection of meaning in fluent speech.
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Affiliation(s)
- Lorraine E Bahrick
- Department of Psychology, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199, USA.
| | - Myriah E McNew
- Department of Psychology, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199, USA.
| | - Shannon M Pruden
- Department of Psychology, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199, USA
| | - Irina Castellanos
- Department of Otolaryngology-Head & Neck Surgery, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43212, USA
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McDonough KL, Hudson M, Bach P. Cues to intention bias action perception toward the most efficient trajectory. Sci Rep 2019; 9:6472. [PMID: 30996227 PMCID: PMC6470138 DOI: 10.1038/s41598-019-42204-y] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/02/2018] [Accepted: 03/21/2019] [Indexed: 11/15/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans interpret others' behaviour as intentional and expect them to take the most energy-efficient path to achieve their goals. Recent studies show that these expectations of efficient action take the form of a prediction of an ideal "reference" trajectory, against which observed actions are evaluated, distorting their perceptual representation towards this expected path. Here we tested whether these predictions depend upon the implied intentionality of the stimulus. Participants saw videos of an actor reaching either efficiently (straight towards an object or arched over an obstacle) or inefficiently (straight towards obstacle or arched over empty space). The hand disappeared mid-trajectory and participants reported the last seen position on a touch-screen. As in prior research, judgments of inefficient actions were biased toward efficiency expectations (straight trajectories upwards to avoid obstacles, arched trajectories downward towards goals). In two further experimental groups, intentionality cues were removed by replacing the hand with a non-agentive ball (group 2), and by removing the action's biological motion profile (group 3). Removing these cues substantially reduced perceptual biases. Our results therefore confirm that the perception of others' actions is guided by expectations of efficient actions, which are triggered by the perception of semantic and motion cues to intentionality.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Matthew Hudson
- University of Plymouth, School of Psychology, Plymouth, PL48AA, UK
- School of Business, National College of Ireland, Mayor Street, Dublin 1, Ireland
| | - Patric Bach
- University of Plymouth, School of Psychology, Plymouth, PL48AA, UK
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Formanowicz M, Goldenberg A, Saguy T, Pietraszkiewicz A, Walker M, Gross JJ. Understanding dehumanization: The role of agency and communion. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2018. [DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2018.04.003] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/17/2022]
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Infants' prosocial behavior is governed by cost-benefit analyses. Cognition 2018; 177:12-20. [PMID: 29626793 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2018.03.021] [Citation(s) in RCA: 22] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.7] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/28/2015] [Revised: 03/23/2018] [Accepted: 03/26/2018] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
Abstract
Cost-benefit analyses are central to mature decision-making and behavior across a range of contexts. Given debates regarding the nature of infants' prosociality, we investigated whether 18-month-old infants' (N = 160) prosocial behavior is impacted by anticipated costs and benefits. Infants participated in a helping task in which they could carry either a heavy or light block across a room to help an experimenter. Infants' helping behavior was attenuated when the anticipated physical costs were high versus low (Experiment 1), and high-cost helping was enhanced under conditions of increased intrinsic motivational benefits (Experiments 2 and 3). High-cost helping was further predicted by infants' months of walking experience, presumably because carrying a heavy block across a room is more effortful for less experienced walkers than for more experienced walkers demonstrating that infants subjectively calibrate costs. Thus, infants' prosocial responding may be guided by a rational decision-making process that weighs and integrates costs and benefits.
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Jara-Ettinger J, Sun F, Schulz L, Tenenbaum JB. Sensitivity to the Sampling Process Emerges From the Principle of Efficiency. Cogn Sci 2018; 42 Suppl 1:270-286. [PMID: 29451315 DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12596] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/28/2016] [Revised: 01/16/2018] [Accepted: 01/18/2018] [Indexed: 11/26/2022]
Abstract
Humans can seamlessly infer other people's preferences, based on what they do. Broadly, two types of accounts have been proposed to explain different aspects of this ability. The first account focuses on spatial information: Agents' efficient navigation in space reveals what they like. The second account focuses on statistical information: Uncommon choices reveal stronger preferences. Together, these two lines of research suggest that we have two distinct capacities for inferring preferences. Here we propose that this is not the case, and that spatial-based and statistical-based preference inferences can be explained by the assumption that agents are efficient alone. We show that people's sensitivity to spatial and statistical information when they infer preferences is best predicted by a computational model of the principle of efficiency, and that this model outperforms dual-system models, even when the latter are fit to participant judgments. Our results suggest that, as adults, a unified understanding of agency under the principle of efficiency underlies our ability to infer preferences.
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Affiliation(s)
| | - Felix Sun
- Department of Brain & Cognitive Sciences, MIT
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Liu S, Ullman TD, Tenenbaum JB, Spelke ES. Ten-month-old infants infer the value of goals from the costs of actions. Science 2017; 358:1038-1041. [DOI: 10.1126/science.aag2132] [Citation(s) in RCA: 65] [Impact Index Per Article: 9.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/22/2017] [Accepted: 10/12/2017] [Indexed: 11/02/2022]
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Leonard JA, Lee Y, Schulz LE. Infants make more attempts to achieve a goal when they see adults persist. Science 2017; 357:1290-1294. [DOI: 10.1126/science.aan2317] [Citation(s) in RCA: 30] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 03/15/2017] [Accepted: 08/23/2017] [Indexed: 11/02/2022]
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