Spontaneous, modality-general abstraction of a ratio scale

The calculating brain

The human brain possesses neural networks and mechanisms enabling the representation of numbers, basic arithmetic operations, and mathematical reasoning. Without the ability to represent numerical quantity and perform calculations, our scientifically and technically advanced culture would not exist. However, the origins of numerical abilities are grounded in an intuitive understanding of quantity deeply rooted in biology. Nevertheless, more advanced symbolic arithmetic skills require a cultural background with formal mathematical education. In the past two decades, cognitive neuroscience has seen significant progress in understanding the workings of the calculating brain through various methods and model systems. This review begins by exploring the mental and neuronal representations of nonsymbolic numerical quantity and then progresses to symbolic representations acquired in childhood. During arithmetic operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division), these representations are processed and transformed according to arithmetic rules and principles, leveraging different mental strategies and types of arithmetic knowledge that can be dissociated in the brain. Although it was once believed that number processing and calculation originated from the language faculty, it is now evident that mathematical and linguistic abilities are primarily processed independently in the brain. Understanding how the healthy brain processes numerical information is crucial for gaining insights into debilitating numerical disorders, including acquired conditions like acalculia and learning-related calculation disorders such as developmental dyscalculia.

Rational number representation by the approximate number system

The approximate number system (ANS) enables organisms to represent the approximate number of items in an observed collection, quickly and independently of natural language. Recently, it has been proposed that the ANS goes beyond representing natural numbers by extracting and representing rational numbers (Clarke & Beck, 2021a). Prior work demonstrates that adults and children discriminate ratios in an approximate and ratio-dependent manner, consistent with the hallmarks of the ANS. Here, we use a well-known "connectedness illusion" to provide evidence that these ratio-dependent ratio discriminations are (a) based on the perceived number of items in seen displays (and not just non-numerical confounds), (b) are not dependent on verbal working memory, or explicit counting routines, and (c) involve representations with a part-whole (or subset-superset) format, like a fraction, rather than a part-part format, like a ratio. These results vindicate key predictions of the hypothesis that the ANS represents rational numbers.

Heuristic strategy of intuitive statistical inferences in 7- to 10-year-old children

Intuitive statistical inferences refer to making inferences about uncertain events based on limited probabilistic information, which is crucial for both human and non-human species' survival and reproduction. Previous research found that 7- and 8-year-old children failed in intuitive statistical inference tasks after heuristic strategies had been controlled. However, few studies systematically explored children's heuristic strategies of intuitive statistical inferences and their potential numerical underpinnings. In the current research, Experiment 1 (N = 81) examined 7- to 10-year-olds' use of different types of heuristic strategies; results revealed that children relied more on focusing on the absolute number strategy. Experiment 2 (N = 99) and Experiment 3 (N = 94) added continuous-format stimuli to examine whether 7- and 8-year-olds could make genuine intuitive statistical inferences instead of heuristics. Results revealed that both 7- and 8-year-olds and 9- and 10-year-olds performed better in intuitive statistical inference tasks with continuous-format stimuli, even after focusing on the absolute number strategy had been controlled. The results across the three experiments preliminarily hinted that the ratio processing system might rely on the approximate number system. Future research could clarify what specific numerical processing mechanism may be used and how it might support children's statistical intuitions.

How is visual separation assessed? By counting distance units

How does the human visual system assess the separation between pairs of stimuli in a frontal plane? According to the direct (or subtractive) view the system finds the difference between the positions of the stimuli in a localization system. According to the indirect (or additive) view the system finds the number of instances of a distance unit lying between representations of the stimuli. Critically, position is explicitly represented under the direct view, with separation being derived from position. Position is not explicitly represented under the indirect view; separation is consequently inferred by counting an internal unit of distance. Recent results favor the indirect over the direct view of separation assessment. Dissociations between assessments of separation and position, various context effects in the assessment of separation, and suggestions that position information is not cleanly accessed argue against the direct view. At the same time, various context effects in separation assessment argue for the indirect view. Recent findings regarding the brain bases of vision are consistent with the indirect view. In short, recent results suggest that assessing the separation between two frontal stimuli involves integrating distance units between representations of the stimuli.

Children dynamically update and extend the interface between number words and perceptual magnitudes

As adults, we represent and think about number, space, and time in at least two ways: our intuitive-but imprecise-perceptual representations, and the slowly learned-but precise-number words. With development, these representational formats interface, allowing us to use precise number words to estimate imprecise perceptual experiences. We test two accounts of this developmental milestone. Either slowly learned associations are required for the interface to form, predicting that deviations from typical experiences (e.g., presentation of a novel unit or unpracticed dimension) will disrupt children's ability to map number words to their perceptual experiences or children's understanding of the logical similarity between number words and perceptual representations allows them to flexibly extend this interface to novel experiences (e.g., units and dimensions they have not yet learned how to formally measure). 5-11-year-olds completed verbal estimation and perceptual sensitivity tasks across three dimensions: Number, Length, and Area. For verbal estimation, they were given novel units (i.e., a three-dot unit called one "toma" for Number, a 44 px long line called one "blicket" for Length, a 111 px2 blob called one "modi" for Area) and asked to estimate how many tomas/blickets/modies they saw when shown a larger set of dots, lines, and blobs. Children could flexibly link number words to novel units across dimensions, demonstrating positive estimation slopes, even for Length and Area, which younger children had limited experience with. This suggests that the logic of structure mapping can be dynamically utilized across perceptual dimensions, even without extensive experience.

Questions About Quantifiers: Symbolic and Nonsymbolic Quantity Processing by the Brain

One approach to understanding how the human cognitive system stores and operates with quantifiers such as "some," "many," and "all" is to investigate their interaction with the cognitive mechanisms for estimating and comparing quantities from perceptual input (i.e., nonsymbolic quantities). While a potential link between quantifier processing and nonsymbolic quantity processing has been considered in the past, it has never been discussed extensively. Simultaneously, there is a long line of research within the field of numerical cognition on the relationship between processing exact number symbols (such as "3" or "three") and nonsymbolic quantity. This accumulated knowledge can potentially be harvested for research on quantifiers since quantifiers and number symbols are two different ways of referring to quantity information symbolically. The goal of the present review is to survey the research on the relationship between quantifiers and nonsymbolic quantity processing mechanisms and provide a set of research directions and specific questions for the investigation of quantifier processing.

Decoding of spatial proportions using somatosensory feedback in sighted and visually impaired children

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

Humans can naturally operate with ratios of continuous magnitudes (proportions). We asked if sighted children (S) and visually impaired children (VI) can discriminate proportions via somatosensory feedback.

PROCEDURES

Children formed a proportion by tracing a pair of straight lines with their finger, and compared this proportion with a second proportion resulting from the tracing of another pair of lines.

MAIN FINDINGS

Performance was 68% in S, thus significantly lower (p < 0.001) compared to VI (75%). Tracing velocity (p < 0.01) and trial-to-trial variability of tracing velocity (p < 0.05) was higher in S compared to VI.

CONCLUSIONS

Operating with proportions solely from somatosensory feedback is possible, thus tracing lines might support learning in mathematics education. Kinematic variables point to the reason for the difference between S and VI, in that higher trial-to-trial variability in velocity in S leads to biased estimation of absolute line lengths.

Preferential Attraction Effects With Visual Stimuli: The Role of Quantitative Versus Qualitative Visual Attributes

Offering an inferior and rarely chosen third (decoy) option to decision makers choosing between two options has a paradoxical effect: It increases the choice share of the option most similar to the decoy. This attraction effect is robust when options are numeric but rarely occurs in humans when options are visual, even though it occurs in animals. Building on psychophysics, we examined two types of visual attributes: quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative visual attributes (e.g., different bottle volumes) can be perceived as magnitudes. Qualitative visual attributes (e.g., different colors), however, do not fall onto a magnitude scale. One can perceive that a bottle's volume is twice that of another bottle but not that a green bottle's color is twice that of a red bottle. We observed robust attraction effects for quantitative visual attributes (4,602 adults, 237 college-age participants), which reversed to repulsion effects when the visual attributes were qualitative (6,005 adults).

Circling around number: People can accurately extract numeric values from circle area ratios

It has long been known that people have the ability to estimate numerical quantities without counting. A standard account is that people develop a sense of the size of symbolic numbers by learning to map symbolic numbers (e.g., 6) to their corresponding numerosities (e.g. :::) and concomitant approximate magnitude system (ANS) representations. However, we here demonstrate that adults are capable of extracting fractional numerical quantities from non-symbolic visual ratios (i.e., labeling a ratio of two circle areas with the appropriate symbolic fraction). Not only were adult participants able to perform this task, but they were remarkably accurate: linear regressions on median estimates yielded slopes near 1, and accounted for 97% of the variability. Participants also performed at least as well on line-estimation and ratio-estimation tasks using non-numeric circular stimuli as they did in earlier experiments using non-symbolic numerosities, which are frequently considered to be numeric stimuli. We discuss results as consistent with accounts suggesting that non-symbolic ratios have the potential to act as a reliable and stable ground for symbolic number, even when composed of non-numeric stimuli.

Real models: The limits of behavioural evidence for understanding the ANS

Clarke and Beck use behavioural evidence to argue that (1) approximate ratio computations are sufficient for claiming that the approximate number system (ANS) represents the rationals, and (2) the ANS does not represent the reals. We argue that pure behaviour is a poor litmus test for this problem, and that we should trust the psychophysical models that place ANS representations within the reals.

Ratio-based perceptual foundations for rational numbers, and perhaps whole numbers, too?

Clarke and Beck suggest that the ratio processing system (RPS) may be a component of the approximate number system (ANS), which they suggest represents rational numbers. We argue that available evidence is inconsistent with their account and advocate for a two-systems view. This implies that there may be many access points for numerical cognition - and that privileging the ANS may be a mistake.

More than the sum of its parts: Exploring the development of ratio magnitude versus simple magnitude perception

Humans perceptually extract quantity information from our environments, be it from simple stimuli in isolation, or from relational magnitudes formed by taking ratios of pairs of simple stimuli. Some have proposed that these two types of magnitude are processed by a common system, whereas others have proposed separate systems. To test these competing possibilities, the present study examined the developmental trajectories of simple and relational magnitude discrimination and relations among these abilities for preschoolers (n = 42), 2nd-graders (n = 31), 5th-graders (n = 29), and adults (n = 32). Participants completed simple magnitude and ratio discrimination tasks in four different nonsymbolic formats, using dots, lines, circles, and irregular blobs. All age cohorts accurately discriminated both simple and ratio magnitudes. Discriminability differed by format such that performance was highest with line and lowest with dot stimuli. Moreover, developmental trajectories calculated for each format were similar across simple and ratio discriminations. Although some characteristics were similar for both types of discrimination, ratio acuity in a given format was more closely related with ratio acuities in alternate formats than to within-format simple magnitude acuity. Results demonstrate that ratio magnitude processing shares several similarities to simple magnitude processing, but is also substantially different.

Auditory and visual short-term memory: influence of material type, contour, and musical expertise

Short-term memory has mostly been investigated with verbal or visuospatial stimuli and less so with other categories of stimuli. Moreover, the influence of sensory modality has been explored almost solely in the verbal domain. The present study compared visual and auditory short-term memory for different types of materials, aiming to understand whether sensory modality and material type can influence short-term memory performance. Furthermore, we aimed to assess if music expertise can modulate memory performance, as previous research has reported better auditory memory (and to some extent, visual memory), and better auditory contour recognition for musicians than non-musicians. To do so, we adapted the same recognition paradigm (delayed-matching to sample) across different types of stimuli. In each trial, participants (musicians and non-musicians) were presented with two sequences of events, separated by a silent delay, and had to indicate whether the two sequences were identical or different. The performance was compared for auditory and visual materials belonging to three different categories: (1) verbal (i.e., syllables); (2) nonverbal (i.e., that could not be easily denominated) with contour (based on loudness or luminance variations); and (3) nonverbal without contour (pink noise sequences or kanji letters sequences). Contour and no-contour conditions referred to whether the sequence can entail (or not) a contour (i.e., a pattern of up and down changes) based on non-pitch features. Results revealed a selective advantage of musicians for auditory no-contour stimuli and for contour stimuli (both visual and auditory), suggesting that musical expertise is associated with specific short-term memory advantages in domains close to the trained domain, also extending cross-modally when stimuli have contour information. Moreover, our results suggest a role of encoding strategies (i.e., how the material is represented mentally during the task) for short-term-memory performance.

Cross-dimensional magnitude interaction is modulated by representational noise: evidence from space-time interaction

Magnitudes along different dimensions (e.g., space and time) tend to interact with each other in perception, with some magnitude dimensions more susceptible to cross-dimensional interference than others. What causes such asymmetries in cross-dimensional magnitude interaction is being debated. The current study investigated whether the representational noise of magnitudes modulates the (a)symmetry in space-time interaction. In three experiments using different formats of length, we showed that dynamic unfilled lengths resulted in a higher representational noise than either static unfilled length or static filled length. Correspondingly, we observed that the time-on-space effect was larger for dynamic unfilled lengths than for static unfilled length or static filled length (and it did not differ between the latter two). Further correlational analyses showed that the susceptibility of a target dimension to the influence of a concurrent dimension increased as a function of participants' representational noise in the target dimension (e.g., the noisier length representations, the larger the time-on-space effect). In all, our study showed that the representational noise of space and time modulates the way the two dimensions interact. These findings suggest that cross-dimensional magnitude interactions arise as a result of memory interference, with noisier magnitudes being more prone to being nudged by concurrent magnitudes in other dimensions. Such memory interference can be seen as a result of Bayesian inference with correlated priors between magnitude dimensions.

Symbolic fractions elicit an analog magnitude representation in school-age children

A fundamental question about fractions is whether they are grounded in an abstract nonsymbolic magnitude code similar to that postulated for whole numbers. Mounting evidence suggests that symbolic fractions could be grounded in mechanisms for perceiving nonsymbolic ratio magnitudes. However, systematic examination of such mechanisms in children has been lacking. We asked second- and fifth-grade children (prior to and after formal instructions with fractions, respectively) to compare pairs of symbolic fractions, nonsymbolic ratios, and mixed symbolic-nonsymbolic pairs. This paradigm allowed us to test three key questions: (a) whether children show an analog magnitude code for rational numbers, (b) whether that code is compatible with mental representations of symbolic fractions, and (c) how formal education with fractions affects the symbolic-nonsymbolic relation. We examined distance effects as a marker of analog ratio magnitude processing and notation effects as a marker of converting across numerical codes. Second and fifth graders' reaction times and error rates showed classic distance and notation effects. Nonsymbolic ratios were processed most efficiently, with mixed and symbolic notations being relatively slower. Children with more formal instruction in symbolic fractions had a significant advantage in comparing symbolic fractions but had a smaller advantage for nonsymbolic ratio stimuli. Supplemental analyses showed that second graders relied on numerator distance more than holistic distance and that fifth graders relied on holistic fraction magnitude distance more than numerator distance. These results suggest that children have a nonsymbolic ratio magnitude code and that symbolic fractions can be translated into that magnitude code.

No calculation necessary: Accessing magnitude through decimals and fractions

Research on how humans understand the relative magnitude of symbolic fractions presents a unique case of the symbol-grounding problem with numbers. Specifically, how do people access a holistic sense of rational number magnitude from decimal fractions (e.g. 0.125) and common fractions (e.g. 1/8)? Researchers have previously suggested that people cannot directly access magnitude information from common fraction notation, but instead must use a form of calculation to access this meaning. Questions remain regarding the nature of calculation and whether a division-like conversion to decimals is a necessary process that permits access to fraction magnitudes. To test whether calculation is necessary to access fractions magnitudes, we carried out a series of six parallel experiments in which we examined how adults access the magnitude of rational numbers (decimals and common fractions) under varying task demands. We asked adult participants to indicate which of two fractions was larger in three different conditions: decimal-decimal, fraction-fraction, and mixed decimal-fraction pairs. Across experiments, we manipulated two aspects of the task demands. 1) Response windows were limited to 1, 2 or 5 s, and 2) participants either did or did not have to identify when the two stimuli were the same magnitude (catch trials). Participants were able to successfully complete the task even at a response window of 1 s and showed evidence of holistic magnitude processing. These results indicate that calculation strategies with fractions are not necessary for accessing a sense of a fractions meaning but are strategic routes to magnitude that participants may use when granted sufficient time. We suggest that rapid magnitude processing with fractions and decimals may occur by mapping symbolic components onto common amodal mental representations of rational numbers.

The association of brightness with number/duration in human newborns

Human neonates spontaneously associate changes in magnitude across the dimensions of number, length, and duration. Do these particular associations generalize to other pairs of magnitudes in the same way at birth, or do they reflect an early predisposition to expect specific relations between spatial, temporal, and numerical representations? To begin to answer this question, we investigated how strongly newborns associated auditory sequences changing in number/duration with visual objects changing in levels of brightness. We tested forty-eight newborn infants in one of three, bimodal stimulus conditions in which auditory numbers/durations increased or decreased from a familiarization trial to the two test trials. Auditory numbers/durations were paired with visual objects in familiarization that remained the same on one test trial but changed in luminance/contrast or shape on the other. On average, results indicated that newborns looked longer when changes in brightness accompanied the number/duration change as compared to no change, a preference that was most consistent when the brightness change was congruent with the number/duration change. For incongruent changes, this preference depended on trial order. Critically, infants showed no preference for a shape change over no shape change, indicating that infants likely treated brightness differently than a generic feature. Though this performance pattern is somewhat similar to previously documented associations, these findings suggest that cross-magnitude associations among number, length, and duration may be more specialized at birth, rather than emerge gradually from postnatal experience or maturation.

The Relational SNARC: Spatial Representation of Nonsymbolic Ratios

Recent research in numerical cognition has begun to systematically detail the ability of humans and nonhuman animals to perceive the magnitudes of nonsymbolic ratios. These relationally defined analogs to rational numbers offer new potential insights into the nature of human numerical processing. However, research into their similarities with and connections to symbolic numbers remains in its infancy. The current research aims to further explore these similarities by investigating whether the magnitudes of nonsymbolic ratios are associated with space just as symbolic numbers are. In two experiments, we found that responses were faster on the left for smaller nonsymbolic ratio magnitudes and faster on the right for larger nonsymbolic ratio magnitudes. These results further elucidate the nature of nonsymbolic ratio processing, extending the literature of spatial-numerical associations to nonsymbolic relative magnitudes. We discuss potential implications of these findings for theories of human magnitude processing in general and how this general processing relates to numerical processing.

Is Emotional Magnitude Spatialized? A Further Investigation

Accumulating evidence suggests that different magnitudes (e.g., number, size, and duration) are spatialized in the mind according to a common left-right metric, consistent with a generalized system for representing magnitude. A previous study conducted by two of us (Holmes & Lourenco, ) provided evidence that this metric extends to the processing of emotional magnitude, or the intensity of emotion expressed in faces. Recently, however, Pitt and Casasanto () showed that the earlier effects may have been driven by a left-right mapping of mouth size rather than emotional magnitude, and they found no evidence for an emotional magnitude mapping when using words as stimuli. Here, we report two new experiments that further examine these conclusions. In Experiment 1, using face stimuli with mouths occluded, we replicate the original finding: Less emotional faces were associated with the left and more emotional faces with the right. However, we also find that people can reliably infer the sizes of the occluded mouths, and that these inferred mouth sizes can explain the observed left-right mapping. In Experiment 2, we show that comparative judgments of emotional words yield a left-right mapping of emotional magnitude not attributable to stimulus confounds. Based on these findings, we concur with Pitt and Casasanto that faces pose challenges for isolating the forces driving spatialization, but we suggest that emotional magnitude, when assessed using unconfounded stimuli in a sufficiently sensitive task, may indeed be spatialized as originally proposed. Suggestions for further research on the spatialization of emotional magnitude are discussed.

Number, time, and space are not singularly represented: Evidence against a common magnitude system beyond early childhood

Our ability to represent temporal, spatial, and numerical information is critical for understanding the world around us. Given the prominence of quantitative representations in the natural world, numerous cognitive, neurobiological, and developmental models have been proposed as a means of describing how we track quantity. One prominent theory posits that time, space, and number are represented by a common magnitude system, or a common neural locus (i.e., Bonn & Cantlon in Cognitive Neuropsychology, 29(1/2), 149-173, 2012; Cantlon, Platt, & Brannon in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(2), 83-91, 2009; Meck & Church in Animal Behavior Processes, 9(3), 320, 1983; Walsh in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(11), 483-488, 2003). Despite numerous similarities in representations of time, space, and number, an increasing body of literature reveals striking dissociations in how each quantity is processed, particularly later in development. These findings have led many researchers to consider the possibility that separate systems may be responsible for processing each quantity. This review will analyze evidence in favor of a common magnitude system, particularly in infancy, which will be tempered by counter evidence, the majority of which comes from experiments with children and adult participants. After reviewing the current data, we argue that although the common magnitude system may account for quantity representations in infancy, the data do not provide support for this system throughout the life span. We also identify future directions for the field and discuss the likelihood of the developmental divergence model of quantity representation, like that of Newcombe (Ecological Psychology, 2, 147-157, 2014), as a more plausible account of quantity development.

Cross-magnitude interactions across development: Longitudinal evidence for a general magnitude system

There is general agreement that humans represent numerical, spatial, and temporal magnitudes from early in development. However, there is disagreement about whether different magnitudes converge within a general magnitude system and whether this system supports behavioral demonstrations of cross-magnitude interactions at different developmental time points. Using a longitudinal design, we found a relation between children's cross-magnitude interactions assessed at two developmental time points with different behavioral measures. More specifically, stronger cross-magnitude interactions in infancy (M = 9.3 months) predicted a stronger cross-magnitude congruity effect at preschool age (M = 44.2 months), even when controlling for performance on measures of inhibitory control, analogical reasoning, and verbal competence at preschool age. The results suggest a common mechanism for cross-magnitude interactions at different points in development as well as stability of the underlying individual differences. We argue that this mechanism reflects a nonverbal general magnitude system that is operational early in life and that displays continuity from infancy to preschool age.

Task Constraints Affect Mapping From Approximate Number System Estimates to Symbolic Numbers

The Approximate Number System (ANS) allows individuals to assess nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (e.g., the number of apples on a tree) without counting. Several prominent theories posit that human understanding of symbolic numbers is based – at least in part – on mapping number symbols (e.g., 14) to their ANS-processed nonsymbolic analogs. Number-line estimation – where participants place numerical values on a bounded number-line – has become a key task used in research on this mapping. However, some research suggests that such number-line estimation tasks are actually proportion judgment tasks, as number-line estimation requires people to estimate the magnitude of the to-be-placed value, relative to set upper and lower endpoints, and thus do not so directly reflect magnitude representations. Here, we extend this work, assessing performance on nonsymbolic tasks that should more directly interface with the ANS. We compared adults’ (n = 31) performance when placing nonsymbolic numerosities (dot arrays) on number-lines to their performance with the same stimuli on two other tasks: Free estimation tasks where participants simply estimate the cardinality of dot arrays, and ratio estimation tasks where participants estimate the ratio instantiated by a pair of arrays. We found that performance on these tasks was quite different, with number-line and ratio estimation tasks failing to the show classic psychophysical error patterns of scalar variability seen in the free estimation task. We conclude the constraints of tasks using stimuli that access the ANS lead to considerably different mapping performance and that these differences must be accounted for when evaluating theories of numerical cognition. Additionally, participants showed typical underestimation patterns in the free estimation task, but were quite accurate on the ratio task. We discuss potential implications of these findings for theories regarding the mapping between ANS magnitudes and symbolic numbers.

Non-cortical magnitude coding of space and time by pigeons

Considerable research in cognitive science, neuroscience, and developmental science has revealed that the temporal, spatial, and numerical features of a stimulus can interact with one another [1,2], as when larger stimuli are perceived as lasting longer than smaller stimuli. These findings have inspired the prominent hypothesis that time, space, and number are processed by a 'common magnitude system', which represents these dimensions via the same unit of magnitude [3,4]. According to current theorizing, the parietal cortex mediates this system [4]. To test the species generality and neuroanatomical foundations of this hypothesis, we asked whether space-time interactions can be observed in birds. Unlike mammals, birds lack a cortex [5,6]; rather, they possess a neuron-dense pallium that is organized in clusters, in contrast to the laminar structure of the mammalian cortex [7]. Despite these striking neuroanatomical disparities, we observed reliable space-time interactions in pigeons. Our findings suggest that common magnitude systems are more widespread among animals than previously believed and need not be cortically dependent in all species.