Finding the “odd one out”: Memory color effects and the logic of appearance

Prediction of Attention Groups and Big Five Personality Traits from Gaze Features Collected from an Outlier Search Game

This study explores the intersection of personality, attention and task performance in traditional 2D and immersive virtual reality (VR) environments. A visual search task was developed that required participants to find anomalous images embedded in normal background images in 3D space. Experiments were conducted with 30 subjects who performed the task in 2D and VR environments while their eye movements were tracked. Following an exploratory correlation analysis, we applied machine learning techniques to investigate the predictive power of gaze features on human data derived from different data collection methods. Our proposed methodology consists of a pipeline of steps for extracting fixation and saccade features from raw gaze data and training machine learning models to classify the Big Five personality traits and attention-related processing speed/accuracy levels computed from the Group Bourdon test. The models achieved above-chance predictive performance in both 2D and VR settings despite visually complex 3D stimuli. We also explored further relationships between task performance, personality traits and attention characteristics.

Using Illusions to Track the Emergence of Visual Perception

Everybody loves illusions. At times, the content on the internet seems to be mostly about illusions-shoes, dresses, straight lines looking bent. This attraction has a long history. Almost 2,000 years ago, Ptolemy marveled at how the sail of a distant boat could appear convex or concave. This sense of marvel continues to drive our fascination with illusions; indeed, few other corners of science can boast of such a large reach. However, illusions not only draw in the crowds; they also offer insights into visual processes. This review starts with a simple definition of illusions as conflicts between perception and cognition, where what we see does not agree with what we believe we should see. This mismatch can be either because cognition has misunderstood how perception works or because perception has misjudged the visual input. It is the perceptual errors that offer the chance to track the development of perception across visual regions. Unfortunately, the effects of illusions in different brain regions cannot be isolated in any simple way: Top-down projections from attention broadcast the expected perceptual properties everywhere, obscuring the critical evidence of where the illusion and perception emerge. The second part of this review then highlights the roadblocks to research raised by attention and describes current solutions for accessing what illusions can offer.

The human brain deals with violating general color or depth knowledge in different time courses

Utilizing the high temporal resolution of event-related potentials (ERPs), we compared the time course of processing incongruent color versus 3D-depth information. Participants were asked to judge whether the food color (color condition) or 3D structure (3D-depth condition) was congruent or incongruent with their previous knowledge and experience. The behavioral results showed that the reaction times in the congruent 3D-depth condition were slower than those in the congruent color condition. The reaction times in the incongruent 3D-depth condition were slower than those in the incongruent color condition. The ERP results showed that incongruent color stimuli induced a larger N270, larger P300, and smaller N400 components in the fronto-central region than the congruent color stimuli. Incongruent 3D-depth stimuli induced a smaller N1 in the occipital region, larger P300 and smaller N400 in the parietal-occipital region than congruent 3D-depth stimuli. The time-frequency analysis found that incongruent color stimuli induced a larger theta band (360-580 ms) activation in the fronto-central region than congruent color stimuli. Incongruent 3D-depth stimuli induced larger alpha and beta bands (240-350 ms) activation in the parietal region than congruent 3D-depth stimuli. Our results suggest that the human brain deals with violating general color or depth knowledge in different time courses. We speculate that the depth perception conflict was dominated by solving the problem with visual processing, whereas the color perception conflict was dominated by solving the problem with semantic violation.

Caricaturing Shapes in Visual Memory

When representing high-level stimuli, such as faces and animals, we tend to emphasize salient features-such as a face's prominent cheekbones or a bird's pointed beak. Such mental caricaturing leaves traces in memory, which exaggerates these distinctive qualities. How broadly does this phenomenon extend? Here, in six experiments (N = 700 adults), we explored how memory automatically caricatures basic units of visual processing-simple geometric shapes-even without task-related demands to do so. Participants saw a novel shape and then immediately adjusted a copy of that shape to match what they had seen. Surprisingly, participants reconstructed shapes in exaggerated form, amplifying curvature, enlarging salient parts, and so on. Follow-up experiments generalized this bias to new parameters, ruled out strategic responding, and amplified the effects in serial transmission. Thus, even the most basic stimuli we encounter are remembered as caricatures of themselves.

Aphantasia and involuntary imagery

Aphantasia is a condition that is often characterized as the impaired ability to create voluntary mental images. Aphantasia is assumed to selectively affect voluntary imagery mainly because even though aphantasics report being unable to visualize something at will, many report having visual dreams. We argue that this common characterization of aphantasia is incorrect. Studies on aphantasia are often not clear about whether they are assessing voluntary or involuntary imagery, but some studies show that several forms of involuntary imagery are also affected in aphantasia (including imagery in dreams). We also raise problems for two attempts to show that involuntary images are preserved in aphantasia. In addition, we report the results of a study about afterimages in aphantasia, which suggest that these tend to be less intense in aphantasics than in controls. Involuntary imagery is often treated as a unitary kind that is either present or absent in aphantasia. We suggest that this approach is mistaken and that we should look at different types of involuntary imagery case by case. Doing so reveals no evidence of preserved involuntary imagery in aphantasia. We suggest that a broader characterization of aphantasia, as a deficit in forming mental imagery, whether voluntary or not, is more appropriate. Characterizing aphantasia as a volitional deficit is likely to lead researchers to give incorrect explanations for aphantasia, and to look for the wrong mechanisms underlying it.

The role of memory color in visual attention

The expected color of an object influences how it is perceived. For example, a banana in a greyscale photo may appear slightly yellow because bananas are expected to be yellow. This phenomenon is known as the memory color effect (MCE), and the objects with a memory color are called "color-diagnostic." The MCE is theorized to be a top-down influence of color knowledge on visual perception. However, its validity has been questioned because most evidence for the MCE is based on subjective reports. Here a change detection task is used as an objective measure of the effect and the results show that change detection differs for color-diagnostic objects. Specifically, it was predicted and found that unnaturally colored color-diagnostic objects (e.g., a blue banana) would attract attention and thus be discovered more quickly and accurately. In the experiment, two arrays alternated with the target present in one array and absent in the other while all other objects remained unchanged. Participants had to find the target as quickly and accurately as possible. In the experimental condition, the targets were color-diagnostic objects (e.g., a banana) presented in either their natural (yellow) or an unnatural (blue) color. In the control condition, non-color-diagnostic objects (e.g., a mug) were presented with the same colors as the color-diagnostic objects. Unnaturally colored color-diagnostic objects were found more quickly, which suggests that the MCE is a top-down, preattentive process that can influence a nonsubjective visual perceptual task such as change detection.

Fading boundaries between the physical and the social world: Insights and novel techniques from the intersection of these two fields

This review focuses on the subtle interactions between sensory input and social cognition in visual perception. We suggest that body indices, such as gait and posture, can mediate such interactions. Recent trends in cognitive research are trying to overcome approaches that define perception as stimulus-centered and are pointing toward a more embodied agent-dependent perspective. According to this view, perception is a constructive process in which sensory inputs and motivational systems contribute to building an image of the external world. A key notion emerging from new theories on perception is that the body plays a critical role in shaping our perception. Depending on our arm's length, height and capacity of movement, we create our own image of the world based on a continuous compromise between sensory inputs and expected behavior. We use our bodies as natural "rulers" to measure both the physical and the social world around us. We point out the necessity of an integrative approach in cognitive research that takes into account the interplay between social and perceptual dimensions. To this end, we review long-established and novel techniques aimed at measuring bodily states and movements, and their perception, with the assumption that only by combining the study of visual perception and social cognition can we deepen our understanding of both fields.

Negative affect impedes perceptual filling-in in the uniformity illusion

The notion of cognitive penetrability, i.e., whether perceptual contents can in principle be influenced by non-perceptual factors, has sparked a significant debate over methodological concerns and the correct interpretation of existing findings. In this study, we combined predictive processing models of visual perception and affective states to investigate influences of affective valence on perceptual filling-in in extrafoveal vision. We tested how experimentally induced affect would influence the probability of perceptual filling-in occurring in the uniformity illusion (N = 50). Negative affect led to reduced occurrence rates and increased onset times of visual uniformity. This effect was selectively observed in illusionary trials, requiring perceptual filling-in, and not in control trials, where uniformity was the veridical percept, ruling out biased motor responses or deliberate judgments as confounding variables. This suggests an influential role of affective status on subsequent perceptual processing, specifically on how much weight is ascribed to priors as opposed to sensory evidence.

Highly similar and competing visual scenes lead to diminished object but not spatial detail in memory drawings

Drawings of scenes made from memory can be highly detailed and spatially accurate, with little information not found in the observed stimuli. While prior work has focused on studying memory for distinct scenes, less is known about the specific detail recalled when episodes are highly similar and competing. Here, participants (N = 30) were asked to study and recall eight complex scene images using a drawing task. Importantly, four of these images were exemplars of different scene categories, while the other four images were from the same scene category. The resulting 213 drawings were judged by 1764 online scorers for a comprehensive set of measures, including scene and object diagnosticity, spatial information, and fixation and pen movement behaviour. We observed that competition in memory resulted in diminished object detail, with drawings and objects that were less diagnostic of their original image. However, repeated exemplars of a category did not result in differences in spatial memory accuracy, and there were no differences in fixations during study or pen movements during recall. These results reveal that while drawings for distinct categories of scenes can be highly detailed and accurate, drawings for scenes from repeated categories, creating competition in memory, show reduced object detail.

Visual Self-Misperception in Eating Disorders

Many who suffer from eating disorders claim that they see themselves as "fat". Despite decades of research into the phenomenon, behavioural evidence has failed to confirm that eating disorders involve visual misperception of own-body size. I illustrate the importance of this phenomenon for our understanding of perceptual processing, outline the challenges involved in experimentally confirming it, and provide solutions to those challenges.

The Perception of Relations

The world contains not only objects and features (red apples, glass bowls, wooden tables), but also relations holding between them (apples contained in bowls, bowls supported by tables). Representations of these relations are often developmentally precocious and linguistically privileged; but how does the mind extract them in the first place? Although relations themselves cast no light onto our eyes, a growing body of work suggests that even very sophisticated relations display key signatures of automatic visual processing. Across physical, eventive, and social domains, relations such as support, fit, cause, chase, and even socially interact are extracted rapidly, are impossible to ignore, and influence other perceptual processes. Sophisticated and structured relations are not only judged and understood, but also seen - revealing surprisingly rich content in visual perception itself.

Hi-def memories of lo-def scenes

The study of visual memory is typically concerned with an image's content: How well, and with what precision, we can recall which objects, people, or features we have seen in the past. But images also vary in their quality: The same object or scene may appear in an image that is sharp and highly resolved, or it may appear in an image that is blurry and faded. How do we remember those properties? Here six experiments demonstrate a new phenomenon of "vividness extension": a tendency to (mis)remember images as though they are "enhanced" versions of themselves - that is, sharper and higher quality than they actually appeared at the time of encoding. Subjects briefly saw images of scenes that varied in how blurry they were, and then adjusted a new image to be as blurry as the original. Unlike an old photograph that fades and blurs, subjects misremembered scenes as more vivid (i.e., less blurry) than those scenes had actually appeared moments earlier. Follow-up experiments extended this phenomenon to saturation and pixelation - with subjects recalling scenes as more colorful and resolved - and ruled out various forms of response bias. We suggest that memory misrepresents the quality of what we have seen, such that the world is remembered as more vivid than it is.

Seeing synchrony: A replication of the effects of task-irrelevant social information on perceptions of interpersonal coordination

The display of synchronous behaviour can be both an engaging spectacle and a source of important social information. When understood as a dynamical system, interpersonal synchrony has specific kinematic qualities that have been shown to shape social perceptions. Little research, however, has examined the converse relationship - are perceptions of the kinematics of interpersonal synchrony influenced by socially relevant, but task-irrelevant, information? To provide further insight to this question we conducted a pre-registered replication of Lumsden, Miles, and Macrae (2012). Participants (n = 191) rated the level of coordination present in dyads made up of individuals with either similar or dissimilar skin tones. Faithful to the original study, the results indicated that perceivers were sensitive to differing levels of interpersonal coordination, and judged dissimilar dyads to be less coordinated than dyads with a similar skin tone despite actual coordination levels being objectively equivalent. Extending Lumsden et al., the results also revealed a negative relationship between subclinical variation in social anxiety and the degree of perceived coordination. This work is discussed with respect to the perceptual and social factors that underlie judgements of interpersonal coordination.

A neurodynamic model of the interaction between color perception and color memory

The memory color effect and Spanish castle illusion have been taken as evidence of the cognitive penetrability of vision. In the same manner, the successful decoding of color-related brain signals in functional neuroimaging studies suggests the retrieval of memory colors associated with a perceived gray object. Here, we offer an alternative account of these findings based on the design principles of adaptive resonance theory (ART). In ART, conscious perception is a consequence of a resonant state. Resonance emerges in a recurrent cortical circuit when a bottom-up spatial pattern agrees with the top-down expectation. When they do not agree, a special control mechanism is activated that resets the network and clears off erroneous expectation, thus allowing the bottom-up activity to always dominate in perception. We developed a color ART circuit and evaluated its behavior in computer simulations. The model helps to explain how traces of erroneous expectations about incoming color are eventually removed from the color perception, although their transient effect may be visible in behavioral responses or in brain imaging. Our results suggest that the color ART circuit, as a predictive computational system, is almost never penetrable, because it is equipped with computational mechanisms designed to constrain the impact of the top-down predictions on ongoing perceptual processing.

Examining the Role of Familiarity in the Perception of Depth

Bishop Berkeley suggested that the distance of an object can be estimated if the object's size is familiar to the observer. It has been suggested that humans can perceive the distance of the object by using such "familiarity" information, but most or many of the prior experiments that found an effect of familiarity were not designed to minimize or eliminate potential influences of: higher cognitive factors on the observers' responses, or the influences of low-level image features in the visual stimuli used. We looked for the familiarity effect in two experiments conducted both in Russia and Japan. The visual stimuli used were images of three coins used in Russia and Japan. The participants' depth perception was measured with a multiple-choice task testing the perceived depth-order of the coins. Our expectation was that any effect of "familiarity" on depth perception would only be observed with the coins of the participant's country. We expected a substantial familiarity effect based on our meta-analysis of the "familiarity" effects observed in prior experiments. But, our results in both experiments showed that the familiarity effect was virtually zero. These findings suggest that the importance of a familiarity effect in depth perception should be reconsidered.