Culture moderates the relationship between self-control ability and free will beliefs in childhood

Choosing Among Undesirable Options: Children Consider Desirability of Available Choices in Evaluation of Socially Mindful Actions

Previous studies show that adults and children evaluate the act of leaving a choice for others as prosocial, and have termed such actions as socially mindful actions. The current study investigates how the desirability of the available options (i.e., whether the available options are desirable or not) may influence adults' and children's evaluation of socially mindful actions. Children (N = 120, 4- to 6-year-olds) and adults (N = 124) were asked to evaluate characters selecting items for themselves from a set of three items-two identical items and one unique item-in a way that either leaves a choice (two diverse items) or leaves no choice (two identical items) for the next person (i.e., the beneficiary). We manipulated whether the available options were either desirable or undesirable (i.e., damaged). We found that adults' and 6-year-olds' evaluation of socially mindful actions is moderated by the desirability of the options. Although they evaluate the act of leaving a choice for others as nicer than the act of leaving no choice both when the choosing options are desirable and when they are undesirable, the discrepancy in the evaluation becomes significantly smaller when the choosing options are undesirable. We also found that inference of the beneficiary's feeling underlies social evaluation of the actor leaving a choice (or not). These findings suggest that children consider both the diversity of options left and the desirability of the available options in understanding and evaluating socially mindful acts.

The development and predictors of a preference for strivers over naturals in the United States and China

Across three pre-registered studies (n = 221 4-9-year olds, 51% female; 218 parents, 80% female; working- and middle-class backgrounds; data collected during 2019-2021) conducted in the United States (Studies 1-2; 74% White) and China (Study 3; 100% Asian), we document the emergence of a preference for "strivers." Beginning at age 7, strivers (who work really hard) were favored over naturals (who are really smart) in both cultures (R2 ranging .03-.11). We explored several lay beliefs surrounding this preference. Beliefs about outcomes and the controllability of effort predicted the striver preference: Children who expected strivers to be more successful than naturals and believed effort was more controllable than talent preferred strivers more. Implications of the striver preference in education and beyond are discussed.

Cultural Differences in Inhibitory Control: An ALE Meta-Analysis

Culture greatly influences our attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, affecting how we communicate and make decisions. There is an ongoing debate regarding the belief that people from Eastern cultures possess greater self-control abilities when compared to people from Western cultures. In this study, we conducted a meta-analysis using the Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE) algorithm to compare 30 studies (719 subjects, 373 foci) that used fMRI to investigate the performance in Go-Nogo and Stop Signal Tasks of participants from Western and/or Eastern countries. Our meta-analysis found differences between the networks activated in Eastern and Western culture participants. The right prefrontal cortex showed distinct patterns, with the Inferior Frontal gyrus more active in the Eastern group and the middle and superior frontal gyri more active in the Western group. Our findings suggest that Eastern culture subjects have a higher tendency to activate brain regions involved in proactive inhibitory control, while Western culture subjects rely more on reactive inhibitory brain regions during cognitive control tasks. This implies that proactive inhibition may play a crucial role in promoting the collective and interdependent behavior typical of Eastern cultures, while reactive inhibition may be more important for efficient cognitive control in subjects of Western cultures that prioritize individualism and independence.

Preference matters: Knowledge of beneficiary's preference influences children's evaluations of the act of leaving a choice for others

People value indirect prosocial actions that benefit others as byproducts of self-oriented actions. One example of such an action is the act of leaving a choice for others when selecting an item for oneself. In this study, we investigated how knowledge of the beneficiary's preference may influence children's evaluations of such actions. Children (n = 91, 4- to 10-year-olds) and adults (n = 43) were asked to evaluate characters taking a snack for themselves from a set of three items-two identical items and one unique item-in a way that either leaves a choice (two different items) or leaves no choice (two identical items) for the next person (the beneficiary). The beneficiary's preference was systematically manipulated as unknown, preferring the unique item, or preferring the item of which there are two. We found notable developmental changes: Children as young as 4 years of age understand that it is nicer not to take away the only thing others prefer; with age, children increasingly appreciate the value of leaving a diverse choice when the beneficiary's preference is unknown; however, when the beneficiary clearly prefers the item of which there are two, children increasingly think that it is nicer to leave two identical but preferred items than to leave a diverse choice. These findings reveal increasing flexibility and subtlety in children's social evaluation of indirect prosocial actions; their evaluation develops from a mere understanding of the value of preference to a flexible appreciation of both preference and choice.

Minimally counterintuitive stimuli trigger greater curiosity than merely improbable stimuli

Curiosity plays a key role in directing learning throughout the lifespan. Prior work finds that violations of expectations can be powerful triggers of curiosity in both children and adults, but it is unclear which expectation-violating events induce the greatest curiosity and how this might vary over development. Some theories have suggested a U-shaped function such that stimuli of moderate extremity pique the greatest curiosity. However, expectation-violations vary not only in degree, but in kind: for example, some things violate an intuitive theory (e.g., an alligator that can talk) and others are merely unlikely (e.g., an alligator hiding under your bed). Combining research on curiosity with distinctions posited in the cognitive science of religion, we test whether minimally counterintuitive (MCI) stimuli, which involve one violation of an intuitive theory, are especially effective at triggering curiosity. We presented adults (N = 77) and 4- and 5-year-olds (N = 36) in the United States with stimuli that were ordinary, unlikely, MCI, and very counterintuitive (VCI) and asked which one they would like to learn more about. Adults and 5-year-olds chose Unlikely over Ordinary and MCI over Unlikely, but not VCI over MCI, more often than chance. Our results suggest that (i) minimally counterintuitive stimuli trigger greater curiosity than merely unlikely stimuli, (ii) surprisingness has diminishing returns, and (iii) sensitivity to surprisingness increases with age, appearing in our task by age 5.

When it's not easy to do the right thing: Developmental changes in understanding cost drive evaluations of moral praiseworthiness

Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires. Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in contrast with other work showing that children incorporate notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning. Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016) vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving inner conflict. In two studies (N = 192 children, range = 4.00-9.95 years; and N = 193 adults), we contrasted a character who paid a personal cost (psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a moral action with another who acted morally without paying a cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and 9-year-old children and adults recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct motivational force on actions. They further suggest that costly choice-a hallmark of moral agency-is implicated in judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.

Causal learning, counterfactual reasoning and pretend play: a cross-cultural comparison of Peruvian, mixed- and low-socioeconomic status U.S. children

Pretend play universally emerges during early childhood and may support the development of causal inference and counterfactual reasoning. However, the amount of time spent pretending, the value that adults place on pretence and the scaffolding adults provide vary by both culture and socioeconomic status (SES). In middle class U.S. preschoolers, accuracy on a pretence-based causal reasoning task predicted performance on a similar causal counterfactual task. We explore the relationship between cultural environment, pretence and counterfactual reasoning in low-income Peruvian (N = 62) and low-income U.S. (N = 57) 3- to 4-year olds, and contrast findings against previous findings in an age-matched, mixed-SES U.S. sample (N = 60). Children learned a novel causal relationship, then answered comparable counterfactual and pretence-based questions about the relationship. Children's responses for counterfactual and pretence measures differed across populations, with Peruvian and lower-income U.S. children providing fewer causally consistent responses when compared with middle class U.S. children. Nevertheless, correlations between the two measures emerged in all populations. Across cohorts, children also provided more causally consistent answers during pretence than counterfactually. Our findings strengthen the hypothesis that causal pretend play is related to causal counterfactual reasoning across cultural contexts, while also suggesting a role for systematic environmental differences. This article is part of the theme issue 'Thinking about possibilities: mechanisms, ontogeny, functions and phylogeny'.

Automatic or controlled: How does disbelief in free will influence cognitive functioning?

Most people believe in free will. Past research has indicated that reducing this belief has numerous downstream consequences including everyday outcomes as well as neural and cognitive correlates associated with a reduction of self-control. However, the exact mechanisms through which a reduction in free will belief affects self-control are still a matter of investigation. In the present registered report, we used a task switching paradigm to examine whether reducing belief in free will makes people less controlled or whether it enhances their reliance on automatic impulses. Using Bayesian sequential analysis, we failed to conceptually replicate the previous link between free will belief and cognitive control. Our registered report plan mostly accumulated substantial evidence supporting the null hypothesis. That is, diminished belief in free will does neither impact control nor automaticity. Theoretical implications of this finding are discussed.

Imagination and social cognition in childhood

Imagination is a cognitive process used to generate new ideas from old, not just in the service of creativity and fantasy, but also in our ordinary thoughts about alternatives to current reality. In this article, I argue for the central function of imagination in the development of social cognition in infancy and childhood. In Section 1, I review a work showing that even in the first year of life, social cognition can be viewed through a nascent ability to imagine the physical possibilities and physical limits on action. In Section 2, I discuss how imagination of what should happen is appropriately constrained by what can happen, and how this influences children's moral evaluations. In the final section, I suggest developmental changes in imagination—especially the ability to imagine improbable events—may have implications for social inference, leading children to learn that inner motives can conflict. These examples point to a flexible and domain‐general process that operates on knowledge to make social meaning.

This article is categorized under:

Psychology > Development and Aging

Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development

Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief