Thinking more or thinking differently? Using drift-diffusion modeling to illuminate why accuracy prompts decrease misinformation sharing

Adult age differences in the integration of values for self and other

Previous research suggests that older adults may display more prosocial behavior than younger adults. However, recent meta-analyses indicate that effects are heterogeneous, may be small, and are influenced by how prosociality is measured. Further, the precise cognitive and computational factors contributing to age-related differences in prosocial behavior remain largely unknown. In this study, we utilized a modified dictator game to combine a value-based decision framework with Bayesian hierarchical drift-diffusion modeling to investigate prosocial decision-making in a sample of younger (n = 63) and older adults (n = 48). We observed differences in how older and younger individuals incorporate information corresponding to potential gains for themselves (self) and another person (other) to reach a (potentially prosocial) decision. Younger adults integrated values for benefits for themselves and others in the decision-making process and demonstrated increased decision-making efficiency by effectively integrating both sources of information. In contrast, older adults showed improved decision-making efficiency when solely considering values for self and others separately. Interestingly, individual differences in the capacity of inhibitory control in older adults moderated the observed age effects: older adults with stronger inhibitory control abilities made decisions based on the integrated information of benefits for themselves and others. Together, these findings offer new insights into the behavioral and computational mechanisms influencing age effects in prosocial decision-making.

Easy-fix attentional focus manipulation boosts the intuitive and deliberate use of base-rate information

In addressing human reasoning biases, "easy-fix" attentional focus interventions have shown that we can prompt reasoners to align responses with logico-mathematical principles. The current study aimed to test the impact of such interventions on both intuitive and deliberate responses on base-rate items. Using a two-response paradigm, participants provided initial intuitive responses under time constraints and cognitive load, followed by deliberate responses. During the intervention, we used attentional focus manipulations with base-rate items that aimed to redirect participants' attention toward the "logical" base-rate cue (i.e., the logical intervention) or toward the "heuristic" descriptive cue (i.e., the heuristic intervention). The results indicate that the logical intervention led to improved alignment with logico-mathematical principles in both intuitive and deliberate responses, albeit with a modest effect size. Conversely, the heuristic intervention had no discernible impact on accuracy. This indicates that our attentional focus manipulation is more effective at getting reasoners to respect rather than to override base-rates.

Pause before action: Waiting short time as a simple and resource-rational boost

Many workers today engage in straightforward judgment tasks, increasing the need for interventions to improve accuracy. We propose a resource-rational and psychohygienic intervention, "wait short time", which introduces a brief pause before displaying alternatives. This pause works as a harmonious triad: it clears the mind of prior judgment bias, restores present attention, and prepares the mind for future judgments; and all this without additional instructions. Based on a resource rationality framework, cognitive costs (e.g., irritation, cognitive conflict) are associated with prolonged thinking because of humans limited cognitive resources. Therefore, there should be an appropriately short thinking time to achieve higher accuracy with minimal workload. We investigated the effectiveness of the proposed intervention both theoretically and empirically. The computer simulations demonstrated that, under assumptions of limited cognitive resources, there was an optimal time at the early stages for maximizing total benefits. The results of behavioral experiment was consistent with the theoretical findings: Providing a waiting time (1 s or 2.5 s) improved judgment accuracy, but cognitive conflicts increased over time and an unnecessarily long time (2.5 s) induced more subjective irritation. Consequently, an appropriate time (1 s) could enhance judgment accuracy with less workload. We discuss the implications and limitations of the proposed intervention.

Inoculation and accuracy prompting increase accuracy discernment in combination but not alone

Misinformation is a major focus of intervention efforts. Psychological inoculation-an intervention intended to help people identify manipulation techniques-is being adopted at scale around the globe. Yet the efficacy of this approach for increasing belief accuracy remains unclear, as prior work uses synthetic materials that do not contain claims of truth. To address this issue, we conducted five studies with 7,286 online participants using a set of news headlines based on real-world true/false content in which we systematically varied the presence or absence of emotional manipulation. Although an emotional manipulation inoculation did help participants identify emotional manipulation, there was no improvement in participants' ability to tell truth from falsehood. However, when the inoculation was paired with an intervention that draws people's attention to accuracy, the combined intervention did successfully improve truth discernment (by increasing belief in true content). These results provide evidence for synergy between popular misinformation interventions.

Political reinforcement learners

Politics can seem home to the most calculating and yet least rational elements of humanity. How might we systematically characterize this spectrum of political cognition? Here, we propose reinforcement learning (RL) as a unified framework to dissect the political mind. RL describes how agents algorithmically navigate complex and uncertain domains like politics. Through this computational lens, we outline three routes to political differences, stemming from variability in agents' conceptions of a problem, the cognitive operations applied to solve the problem, or the backdrop of information available from the environment. A computational vantage on maladies of the political mind offers enhanced precision in assessing their causes, consequences, and cures.

Lay standards for reasoning predict people's acceptance of suspect claims

People vary between each other and across contexts with respect to how important it is to them to think in logical, impartial, and evidence-based ways. Recent studies demonstrate that this variation in people's personal standards for thinking predicts the nature and quality of their beliefs. Strong commitments to epistemic virtues motivate careful thinking and protect people from suspicious claims. At the same time, people are more likely to knowingly hold biased or evidentially unsupported beliefs when they think that they are justified to think in biased or evidentially poor ways. People's personal standards for reasoning likely play an important role in shaping how suspect or unreasonable information is received.

Understanding belief in political statements using a model-driven experimental approach: a registered report

Misinformation harms society by affecting citizens' beliefs and behaviour. Recent research has shown that partisanship and cognitive reflection (i.e. engaging in analytical thinking) play key roles in the acceptance of misinformation. However, the relative importance of these factors remains a topic of ongoing debate. In this registered study, we tested four hypotheses on the relationship between each factor and the belief in statements made by Argentine politicians. Participants (N = 1353) classified fact-checked political statements as true or false, completed a cognitive reflection test, and reported their voting preferences. Using Signal Detection Theory and Bayesian modeling, we found a reliable positive association between political concordance and overall belief in a statement (median = 0.663, CI95 = [0.640, 0.685]), a reliable positive association between cognitive reflection and scepticism (median = 0.039, CI95 = [0.006, 0.072]), a positive but unreliable association between cognitive reflection and truth discernment (median = 0.016, CI95 = [- 0.015, 0.046]) and a negative but unreliable association between cognitive reflection and partisan bias (median = - 0.016, CI95 = [- 0.037, 0.006]). Our results highlight the need to further investigate the relationship between cognitive reflection and partisanship in different contexts and formats. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION: The stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 22 August 2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/EBRGC .

Changing the incentive structure of social media platforms to halt the spread of misinformation

The powerful allure of social media platforms has been attributed to the human need for social rewards. Here, we demonstrate that the spread of misinformation on such platforms is facilitated by existing social 'carrots' (e.g., 'likes') and 'sticks' (e.g., 'dislikes') that are dissociated from the veracity of the information shared. Testing 951 participants over six experiments, we show that a slight change to the incentive structure of social media platforms, such that social rewards and punishments are contingent on information veracity, produces a considerable increase in the discernment of shared information. Namely, an increase in the proportion of true information shared relative to the proportion of false information shared. Computational modeling (i.e., drift-diffusion models) revealed the underlying mechanism of this effect is associated with an increase in the weight participants assign to evidence consistent with discerning behavior. The results offer evidence for an intervention that could be adopted to reduce misinformation spread, which in turn could reduce violence, vaccine hesitancy and political polarization, without reducing engagement.

Insight Problem Solving Ability Predicts Reduced Susceptibility to Fake News, Bullshit, and Overclaiming

The information humans are exposed to has grown exponentially. This has placed increased demands upon our information selection strategies resulting in reduced fact-checking and critical-thinking time. Prior research shows that problem solving (traditionally measured using the Cognitive Reflection Test-CRT) negatively correlates with believing in false information. We argue that this result is specifically related to insight problem solving. Solutions via insight are the result of parallel processing, characterized by filtering external noise, and, unlike cognitively controlled thinking, it does not suffer from the cognitive overload associated with processing multiple sources of information. We administered the Compound Remote Associate Test (problems used to investigate insight problem solving) as well as the CRT, 20 fake and real news headlines, the bullshit, and overclaiming scales to a sample of 61 participants. Results show that insight problem solving predicts better identification of fake news and bullshit (over and above traditional measures i.e., the CRT), and is associated with reduced overclaiming. These results have implications for understanding individual differences in susceptibility to believing false information.