Dichotomous thinking about social groups: Learning about one group can activate opposite beliefs about another group

Suppression and Memory for Childhood Traumatic Events: Trauma Symptoms and Non-Disclosure

Self-reported lost memory of child sexual abuse (CSA) can be mistaken for "repressed memory." Based on our longitudinal studies of memory and disclosure in child maltreatment victims who are now adults, we discuss findings relevant to "repressed memory cases." We examined relations between self-report of temporarily lost memory of CSA (subjective forgetting) and memory accuracy for maltreatment-related experiences (objective memory). Across two studies involving separate samples, we find evidence for memory suppression rather than repression: (1) Most adults who claimed temporary lost memory of CSA reported memory suppression and clarified that they could have remembered the event if asked; (2) subjective forgetting was positively associated with accurate objective memory for maltreatment-related experiences. Subjective forgetting was also related to increased adult trauma symptoms and related to childhood non-disclosure of CSA. Moreover, trauma-related psychopathology mediated the relation between non-disclosure and subjective forgetting. Implications for psychological theory and repressed memory cases are discussed.

Exaggerating differences back and forth: Two levels of intergroup accentuation

Social perceivers tend to exaggerate existing differences between groups, a phenomenon known as intergroup accentuation. In two preregistered experiments, we tested the hypothesis that accentuation originates in the initial learning of information about a novel group. In both experiments, perceivers exaggerated differences between two fictitious social groups that differed probabilistically in two dimensional traits. As hypothesized, accentuation was stronger for the group encountered second, confirming that accentuation originates partly in processes operating during the acquisition of group information. However, accentuation was also robust for the group encountered first, suggesting that it also occurs 'backward' even when group learning was unbiased. We discuss implications for stereotype formation generally and the perception of social minorities and out-groups specifically. As these groups are often encountered second in social reality, stereotypes of them might be particularly polarized.

Condemned or valued: Young children evaluate nonconformity based on nonconformists' group orientations

Nonconformity--the act of deviating from established norms and expectations of one's group--is often evaluated negatively, despite its potential benefits for society. Three preregistered studies (N = 153) examined how nonconformists' group orientations (attitudes and intentions toward ingroup and outgroups) might affect 4-6-year-olds' evaluations of nonconformity in intergroup situations. Study 1 examined children's default beliefs of nonconformists' group attitudes toward ingroup and outgroup. We found that children expected nonconformists to hold more positive attitudes toward their outgroup than toward their ingroup, and this expectation predicted their disapproval of nonconformity. In Study 2, however, when nonconformity was explicitly motivated by positive intentions toward the ingroup rather than toward the outgroup, children were more accepting of nonconformity. Study 3 found that among nonconformists with different types of group orientations (positive toward the outgroup, ingroup or both group), young children evaluated the most positively nonconformists who bring the ingroup and the outgroup together. Collectively, these findings suggest that children evaluate nonconformity based on nonconformists' group orientations, illuminating one mechanism for how nonconformity could be more socially accepted and valued.

Generically partisan: Polarization in political communication

American political parties continue to grow more polarized, but the extent of ideological polarization among the public is much less than the extent of perceived polarization (what the ideological gap is believed to be). Perceived polarization is concerning because of its link to interparty hostility, but it remains unclear what drives this phenomenon. We propose that a tendency for individuals to form broad generalizations about groups on the basis of inconsistent evidence may be partly responsible. We study this tendency by measuring the interpretation, endorsement, and recall of category-referring statements, also known as generics (e.g., "Democrats favor affirmative action"). In study 1 (n = 417), perceived polarization was substantially greater than actual polarization. Further, participants endorsed generics as long as they were true more often of the target party (e.g., Democrats favor affirmative action) than of the opposing party (e.g., Republicans favor affirmative action), even when they believed such statements to be true for well below 50% of the relevant party. Study 2 (n = 928) found that upon receiving information from political elites, people tended to recall these statements as generic, regardless of whether the original statement was generic or not. Study 3 (n = 422) found that generic statements regarding new political information led to polarized judgments and did so more than nongeneric statements. Altogether, the data indicate a tendency toward holding mental representations of political claims that exaggerate party differences. These findings suggest that the use of generic language, common in everyday speech, enables inferential errors that exacerbate perceived polarization.

How cues to social categorization impact children's inferences about social categories

Social categorization involves two crucial processes: First, children seek properties on which they can categorize individuals, i.e., they learn to form social categories; then children make inferences based on social category membership and might develop affective responses toward social categories. Over the last decade, a growing number of research in developmental psychology started to use novel social categories to investigate how children learn and reason about social categories. To date, three types of cues have been put forward as means to form social categories, namely linguistic, visual, and behavioral cues. Based on social category membership, children draw inferences about the shared properties of social category members and about how social category members ought to behave and interact with each other. With additional input, children might apply essentialist beliefs to social categories and develop affective responses toward social categories. This article aims to provide key insights on the development of stereotypes and intergroup biases by reviewing recent works that investigated how children learn to form novel social categories and the kind of inferences they make about these novel social categories.