A model of the hierarchy of behaviour, cognition, and consciousness

How can we apply decision-making theories to wild animal behavior? Predictions arising from dual process theory and Bayesian decision theory

Our understanding of decision-making processes and cognitive biases is ever increasing, thanks to an accumulation of testable models and a large body of research over the last several decades. The vast majority of this work has been done in humans and laboratory animals because these study subjects and situations allow for tightly controlled experiments. However, it raises questions about how this knowledge can be applied to wild animals in their complex environments. Here, we review two prominent decision-making theories, dual process theory and Bayesian decision theory, to assess the similarities in these approaches and consider how they may apply to wild animals living in heterogenous environments within complicated social groupings. In particular, we wanted to assess when wild animals are likely to respond to a situation with a quick heuristic decision and when they are likely to spend more time and energy on the decision-making process. Based on the literature and evidence from our multi-destination routing experiments on primates, we find that individuals are likely to make quick, heuristic decisions when they encounter routine situations, or signals/cues that accurately predict a certain outcome, or easy problems that experience or evolutionary history has prepared them for. Conversely, effortful decision-making is likely in novel or surprising situations, when signals and cues have unpredictable or uncertain relationships to an outcome, and when problems are computationally complex. Though if problems are overly complex, satisficing via heuristics is likely, to avoid costly mental effort. We present hypotheses for how animals with different socio-ecologies may have to distribute their cognitive effort. Finally, we examine the conservation implications and potential cognitive overload for animals experiencing increasingly novel situations caused by current human-induced rapid environmental change.

Toward assessing the role of dietary fatty acids in lamb's neurological and cognitive development

Understanding and measuring sheep cognition and behavior can provide us with measures to safeguard the welfare of these animals in production systems. Optimal neurological and cognitive development of lambs is important to equip individuals with the ability to better cope with environmental stressors. However, this development can be affected by nutrition with a special role from long-chain fatty acid supply from the dam to the fetus or in lamb's early life. Neurological development in lambs takes place primarily during the first two trimesters of gestation. Through late fetal and early postnatal life, the lamb brain has a high level of cholesterol synthesis. This rate declines rapidly at weaning and remains low throughout adulthood. The main polyunsaturated fatty acids (PUFA) in the brain are ω-6 arachidonic acid and ω-3 docosahexaenoic acid (DHA), which are elements of plasma membranes' phospholipids in neuronal cells. DHA is essential for keeping membrane integrity and is vital for normal development of the central nervous system (CNS), and its insufficiency can damage cerebral functions and the development of cognitive capacities. In sheep, there is evidence that supplying PUFA during gestation or after birth may be beneficial to lamb productive performance and expression of species-specific behaviors. The objective of this perspective is to discuss concepts of ruminant behavior and nutrition and reflect on future research directions that could help to improve our knowledge on how dietary fatty acids (FA) relate to optimal neurological and cognitive development in sheep.

Automatic and Controlled Processes in Behavioural Control: Implications for Personality Psychology

This paper highlights a number of unresolved theoretical issues that, it is argued, continue to impede the construction of a viable model of behavioural control in personality psychology. It is contended that, in order to integrate motivation, emotion, cognition and conscious experience within a coherent framework, two major issues need to be recognised: (a) the relationship between automatic (reflexive) and controlled (reflective) processing and (b) the lateness of controlled processing (including the generation of conscious awareness)—phenomenally, such processing seems to ‘control’ behaviour, but experimentally it can be shown to postdate the behaviour it represents. The implications of these two major issues are outlined, centred on the need to integrate theoretical perspectives within personality psychology, as well as the greater unification of personality psychology with general psychology. A model of behavioural control is sketched, formulated around the concept of the behavioural inhibition system (BIS), which accounts for: (a) why certain stimuli are extracted for controlled processing (i.e. those that are not ‘going to plan’, as detected by an error mechanism) and (b) the function of controlled processing (including conscious awareness) in terms of adjusting the cybernetic weights of automatic processes (which are always in control of immediate behaviour) which, then, influence future automatically controlled behaviour. The relevance of this model is illustrated in relation to a number of topics in personality psychology, as well related issues of free–will and difficult–to–control behaviours. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Computational animal welfare: towards cognitive architecture models of animal sentience, emotion and wellbeing

To understand animal wellbeing, we need to consider subjective phenomena and sentience. This is challenging, since these properties are private and cannot be observed directly. Certain motivations, emotions and related internal states can be inferred in animals through experiments that involve choice, learning, generalization and decision-making. Yet, even though there is significant progress in elucidating the neurobiology of human consciousness, animal consciousness is still a mystery. We propose that computational animal welfare science emerges at the intersection of animal behaviour, welfare and computational cognition. By using ideas from cognitive science, we develop a functional and generic definition of subjective phenomena as any process or state of the organism that exists from the first-person perspective and cannot be isolated from the animal subject. We then outline a general cognitive architecture to model simple forms of subjective processes and sentience. This includes evolutionary adaptation which contains top-down attention modulation, predictive processing and subjective simulation by re-entrant (recursive) computations. Thereafter, we show how this approach uses major characteristics of the subjective experience: elementary self-awareness, global workspace and qualia with unity and continuity. This provides a formal framework for process-based modelling of animal needs, subjective states, sentience and wellbeing.

Neural signs and mechanisms of consciousness: Is there a potential convergence of theories of consciousness in sight?

Various theories for the neural basis of consciousness have been proposed, suggesting a diversity of neural signs and mechanisms. We ask to what extent this diversity is real, or whether many theories share the same basic ideas with a potential for convergence towards a more unified theory of the neural basis of consciousness. For that purpose, we review and compare the various neural signs, measures, and mechanisms proposed in the different theories. We demonstrate that different theories focus on neural signs and measures of distinct aspects of neural activity including stimulus-related, prestimulus, and resting state activity as well as on distinct features of consciousness. Therefore, the various mechanisms proposed in the different theories may, in part, complement each other. Together, we provide insight into the shared basis and convergences (and, in part, discrepancies) of the different theories of consciousness. We conclude that the different theories concern distinct aspects of both neural activity and consciousness which, as we suppose, may be integrated and nested within the brain's overall temporo-spatial dynamics.

Six clarifications for behaviour systems

The precursors of contemporary behaviour systems theory were hotly debated, and yet a similar critical fervour has not followed the second generation of behaviour systems research. I raise six items of potential or extant misunderstanding concerning behaviour systems perspectives, and attempt to set straight some of the assumptions and what motivated them, with attention to historical and theoretical context. The six challenges in focus are: 1) variety of conceptualisation of consummation; 2) potential misapprehensions about the role of general search; 3) ambiguity of predictions concerning response form; 4) ambiguity concerning what aspects are modelled as hierarchical; 5) assumptions of directedness; and 6) the relevance of spontaneous activity. For each of these six issues, some clarification is offered.

Impulsive reactivity to emotion and vulnerability to psychopathology

Impulsiveness has been studied as an aspect of personality and psychopathology for generations. There are longstanding disagreements about how to define it and whether it should be viewed as one construct or several. This article begins by briefly reviewing some earlier and some more recent work on impulsiveness. Several approaches have recently converged to focus on a distinction between impulsive reactions to emotion and impulsive properties that are not initiated by emotion. From this review, we turn to psychopathology. It is well known that impulsiveness is related to externalizing psychopathology, but some have concluded that a similar relation does not exist for internalizing psychopathology. A recent literature is described that challenges the latter conclusion, linking impulsive reactivity to emotion to both externalizing and internalizing aspects of psychopathology. Discussion then turns to emotion-related impulsiveness and other constructs to which it is conceptually and empirically related, reexamining whether other conceptual targets should be added to the discussion. The article closes with a consideration of how important it is to continue to remain open to new conceptual perspectives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

A common heritage of behaviour systems

Behaviour systems theory had its beginnings with Nikolaas Tinbergen’s “hierarchical systems”, an aspect of his thinking and writing that he conspicuously left out of his very memorable 1963 manifesto. This starting point has since been developed within psychology, where it has provided numerous advances. Tinbergen’s aspiration for behaviour systems had been principled integration of ethology with physiology, but the bridge among sciences it ultimately provided led to psychology. To an ethology audience, this paper attempts to reintroduce behaviour systems as a part of Tinbergen’s legacy to make accessible the theoretical developments of behaviour systems theory that have occurred outside of ethology over the last several decades. To a psychology audience, the paper serves as a reminder of the ethological origins of behaviour systems. Both sciences and their integration stand to benefit from recognising this point of common heritage.

Toward a Functional View of the P Factor in Psychopathology

Evidence indicates the existence of a superordinate factor of general psychopathology, which has been termed p. Among the issues raised by this discovery is whether this factor has substantive meaning or not. This article suggests a functional interpretation of the p factor, based in part on a family of dual process models, in which an associative system and a deliberative system compete for influence over action. The associative system is frequently said to be impulsively responsive to emotions. We hypothesize that this impulsive responsivity to emotion underlies the p factor. One benefit of this view is to use the same underlying process variable to account for both internalizing and externalizing vulnerabilities, as well as aspects of thought disorder. Evidence is reviewed linking impulsive reactivity to emotion to the p factor, and (separately) to internalizing, externalizing, and thought-disorder symptoms. Alternative interpretations are considered.

The role of habit in different phases of exercise

OBJECTIVES

The primary purpose of this study was to investigate how habit strength in a preparatory and performance phase predicts exercise while accounting for intention. The secondary purpose was to determine the strength of potential habit antecedents (affective judgement, perceived behavioural control, consistency, and cues) in both exercise phases.

DESIGN

This was a prospective study with measures collected at baseline and week 6.

METHODS

Participants (n = 181) were a sample of adults (18-65) recruited across nine gyms and recreation centres who completed baseline and follow-up questionnaires after 6 weeks.

RESULTS

Intention (β = .28, p = .00) and habit preparation (β = .20, p = .03), predicted exercise, and change of exercise with coefficients of β = .25, (p = .00) and β = .18, (p = .04), respectively, across 6 weeks but not habit performance (p>.05).

CONCLUSIONS

This study highlighted the distinction between the two phases of exercise and the importance of preparatory habit in predicting behaviour. Focusing on a consistent preparatory routine could be helpful in establishing an exercise habit. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? A recent meta-analysis found habit to correlate r = .43 with behaviour (Gardner, de Bruijn, & Lally, ). Verplanken and Melkevik () propose that habit in exercise should be measured in separate components. Phillips and Gardner () interpreted this as habitual instigation (thought) to exercise and execution. What does this study add? Extended pervious work and identified two distinct behavioural phases (preparation and performance) for exercise. Habit model revealed that temporal consistency was the strongest predictor in both phases of exercise. Intention and habit of preparatory behaviour predicted exercise fluctuations in gym members.

Testosterone Reduces Conscious Detection of Signals Serving Social Correction

Elevated levels of testosterone have repeatedly been associated with antisocial behavior, but the psychobiological mechanisms underlying this effect are unknown. However, testosterone is evidently capable of altering the processing of facial threat, and facial signals of fear and anger serve sociality through their higher-level empathy-provoking and socially corrective properties. We investigated the hypothesis that testosterone predisposes people to antisocial behavior by reducing conscious recognition of facial threat. In a within-subjects design, testosterone (0.5 mg) or placebo was administered to 16 female volunteers. Afterward, a task with morphed stimuli indexed their sensitivity for consciously recognizing the facial expressions of threat (disgust, fear, and anger) and nonthreat (surprise, sadness, and happiness). Testosterone induced a significant reduction in the conscious recognition of facial threat overall. Separate analyses for the three categories of threat faces indicated that this effect was reliable for angry facial expressions exclusively. This testosterone-induced impairment in the conscious detection of the socially corrective facial signal of anger may predispose individuals to antisocial behavior.

Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate

Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory.

Large-scale brain systems and subcortical relationships: the vertically organized brain

This article reviews the vertical organization of the brain. The cortico-basal ganglia and the cerebro-cerebellar circuitry systems are described as fundamental to cognitive and behavioral control. The basal ganglia anticipate and guide implicitly learned behaviors on the basis of experienced reward outcomes. The cerebellar-cortical network anticipates sensorimotor outcomes, allowing behaviors to be adapted across changing settings and across contexts. These vertically organized systems, operating together, represent the underpinning of cognitive control. The medial temporal lobe system, and its development, is also reviewed in order to better understand how brain systems interact for both implicit and explicit cognitive control.

The embodied embedded character of system 1 processing

In the last thirty years, a relatively large group of cognitive scientists have begun characterising the mind in terms of two distinct, relatively autonomous systems. To account for paradoxes in empirical results of studies mainly on reasoning, Dual Process Theories were developed. Such Dual Process Theories generally agree that System 1 is rapid, automatic, parallel, and heuristic-based and System 2 is slow, capacity-demanding, sequential, and related to consciousness. While System 2 can still be decently understood from a traditional cognitivist approach, I will argue that it is essential for System 1 processing to be comprehended in an Embodied Embedded approach to Cognition.

Theory and Metatheory in the Study of Dual Processing

In this article, we respond to the four comments on our target article. Some of the commentators suggest that we have formulated our proposals in a way that renders our account of dual-process theory untestable and less interesting than the broad theory that has been critiqued in recent literature. Our response is that there is a confusion of levels. Falsifiable predictions occur not at the level of paradigm or metatheory—where this debate is taking place—but rather in the instantiation of such a broad framework in task level models. Our proposal that many dual-processing characteristics are only correlated features does not weaken the testability of task-level dual-processing accounts. We also respond to arguments that types of processing are not qualitatively distinct and discuss specific evidence disputed by the commentators. Finally, we welcome the constructive comments of one commentator who provides strong arguments for the reality of the dual-process distinction.

Sensory integration, sensory processing, and sensory modulation disorders: putative functional neuroanatomic underpinnings

This paper examines conditions that have variously been called sensory integration disorder, sensory processing disorder, and sensory modulation disorder (SID/SPD/SMD). As these conditions lack readily and consistently agreed-upon operational definitions, there has been confusion as to how these disorders are conceptualized. Rather than addressing various diagnostic controversies, we will instead focus upon explaining the symptoms that are believed to characterize these disorders. First, to clarify the overall context within which to view symptoms, we summarize a paradigm of adaptation characterized by continuous sensorimotor interaction with the environment. Next, we review a dual-tiered, integrated model of brain function in order to establish neuroanatomic underpinnings with which to conceptualize the symptom presentations. Generally accepted functions of the neocortex, basal ganglia, and cerebellum are described to illustrate how interactions between these brain regions generate both adaptive and pathological symptoms and behaviors. We then examine the symptoms of SID/SPD/SMD within this interactive model and in relation to their impact upon the development of inhibitory control, working memory, academic skill development, and behavioral automation. We present likely etiologies for these symptoms, not only as they drive neurodevelopmental pathologies but also as they can be understood as variations in the development of neural networks.

The interference of introversion-extraversion and depressive symptomatology with reasoning performance: a behavioural study

The objective of this study was to investigate the link between the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) scores and depressive symptomatology with reasoning performance induced by a task including valid and invalid Aristotelian syllogisms. The EPQ and the Zung Depressive Scale (ZDS) were completed by 48 healthy subjects (27 male, 21 female) aged 33.5 ± 9.0 years. Additionally, the subjects engaged into two reasoning tasks (valid vs. invalid syllogisms). Analysis showed that the judgment of invalid syllogisms is a more difficult task than of valid judgments (65.1% vs. 74.6% of correct judgments respectively, p < 0.01). In both conditions, the subjects' degree of confidence is significantly higher when they make a correct judgment than when they make an incorrect judgment (83.8 ± 11.2 vs. 75.3 ± 17.3, p < 0.01). Subjects with extraversion as measured by EPQ and high sexual desire as rated by the relative ZDS subscale are more prone to make incorrect judgments in the valid syllogisms, while, at the same time, they are more confident in their responses. The effects of extraversion/introversion and sexual desire on the outcome measures of the valid condition are not commutative but additive. These findings indicate that extraversion/introversion and sexual desire variations may have a detrimental effect in the reasoning performance.

Characterizing the behavior of children emerging with delirium from general anesthesia

BACKGROUND

Emergence delirium (ED) frequently occurs in young children awakening from general anesthesia (GA). To date, research is limited by scales that are unable to discriminate the condition from other forms of agitation.

AIM

The primary aim of this study was to determine the core behaviors of ED that discriminate the condition from pain and tantrum in young children and to cluster these behaviors according to the DSM-IV/V core diagnostic criteria and associated behaviors of delirium.

METHOD

Children aged 18 months to 6 years (n=198) were observed upon awakening from GA following surgical or nonsurgical procedures to determine which behaviors categorize ED. Behaviors were recorded via a structured behavioral observation. Clinical opinion was sought to determine whether the child presented ED, pain, or tantrum.

RESULTS

A chi-square analysis revealed children with ED were significantly more likely to display activity, nonpurposefulness, eyes averted, stared or closed, no language, and nonresponsivity. These behaviors were not significantly associated with pain or tantrum. A logistic regression showed eyes averted or stared and nonpurposefulness were significant predictors of ED, while no language and activity were not significant predictors of ED.

CONCLUSIONS

Children with ED are significantly more likely to display nonpurposefulness, eyes averted, stared or closed, and nonresponsivity. These behaviors were not significantly associated with pain or tantrum and are believed to reflect the DSM-IV/V diagnostic criteria for delirium. Associated behaviors of ED identified by this research are irrelevant language, activity, and vocalization.

Adaptation, expertise, and giftedness: towards an understanding of cortical, subcortical, and cerebellar network contributions

Current cortico-centric models of cognition lack a cohesive neuroanatomic framework that sufficiently considers overlapping levels of function, from "pathological" through "normal" to "gifted" or exceptional ability. While most cognitive theories presume an evolutionary context, few actively consider the process of adaptation, including concepts of neurodevelopment. Further, the frequent co-occurrence of "gifted" and "pathological" function is difficult to explain from a cortico-centric point of view. This comprehensive review paper proposes a framework that includes the brain's vertical organization and considers "giftedness" from an evolutionary and neurodevelopmental vantage point. We begin by discussing the current cortico-centric model of cognition and its relationship to intelligence. We then review an integrated, dual-tiered model of cognition that better explains the process of adaptation by simultaneously allowing for both stimulus-based processing and higher-order cognitive control. We consider the role of the basal ganglia within this model, particularly in relation to reward circuitry and instrumental learning. We review the important role of white matter tracts in relation to speed of adaptation and development of behavioral mastery. We examine the cerebellum's critical role in behavioral refinement and in cognitive and behavioral automation, particularly in relation to expertise and giftedness. We conclude this integrated model of brain function by considering the savant syndrome, which we believe is best understood within the context of a dual-tiered model of cognition that allows for automaticity in adaptation as well as higher-order executive control.

Socially explosive minds: the triple imbalance hypothesis of reactive aggression

The psychobiological basis of reactive aggression, a condition characterized by uncontrolled outbursts of socially violent behavior, is unclear. Nonetheless, several theoretical models have been proposed that may have complementary views about the psychobiological mechanisms involved. In this review, we attempt to unite these models and theorize further on the basis of recent data from psychological and neuroscientific research to propose a comprehensive neuro-evolutionary framework: The Triple Imbalance Hypothesis (TIH) of reactive aggression. According to this model, reactive aggression is essentially subcortically motivated by an imbalance in the levels of the steroid hormones cortisol and testosterone (Subcortical Imbalance Hypothesis). This imbalance not only sets a primal predisposition for social aggression, but also down-regulates cortical-subcortical communication (Cortical-Subcortical Imbalance Hypothesis), hence diminishing control by cortical regions that regulate socially aggressive inclinations. However, these bottom-up hormonally mediated imbalances can drive both instrumental and reactive social aggression. The TIH suggests that reactive aggression is differentiated from proactive aggression by low brain serotonergic function and that reactive aggression is associated with left-sided frontal brain asymmetry (Cortical Imbalance Hypothesis), especially observed when the individual is socially threatened or provoked. This triple biobehavioral imbalance mirrors an evolutionary relapse into violently aggressive motivational drives that are adaptive among many reptilian and mammalian species, but may have become socially maladaptive in modern humans.

The testosterone-cortisol ratio: A hormonal marker for proneness to social aggression

Social aggression is an escalating hazard for individuals and society. It is most frequently observed as impulsive-reactive aggression in antisocial personality disorder (APD), but in psychopathic aggressive personalities instrumental social aggression is more prominent. However, the psychobiological mechanisms underlying human social aggression are still poorly understood. Here we propose a psychobiological mechanism that may explain human social aggression wherein the steroid hormones cortisol and testosterone play a critical role. High levels of testosterone and low levels of cortisol have been associated with social aggression in several species but it seems that in those individuals wherein these hormonal markers combine social aggression is most violent. In this review we discuss fundamental and clinical research which underscores the potential of the testosterone-cortisol ratio as a possible marker for criminal aggressive tendencies.

An integrative theoretical framework for understanding sexual motivation, arousal, and behavior

An integrative theoretical framework and model for understanding sexual motivation, arousal, and behavior is presented, combining the principles of incentive motivation theory and the hierarchical control of behavior. It is intended to stimulate discussion. The framework can serve as a "route map" in understanding the links between different component processes and their interactions, as well as the relations between different academic perspectives on understanding sexuality. It is suggested that both excitation and inhibition of sexual motivation, arousal, and behavior act at various levels in a hierarchical structure, and much confusion can be avoided by distinguishing these levels. The model integrates information from different branches of psychology: biological, evolutionary, clinical, cognitive, developmental, and social. It describes interactions between sexual behavior and anxiety, attachment, aggression, and drug taking; and it is applied to gender differences, evolutionary psychology, sexual deviancy, sexual addiction, and the biological bases of sexuality.

Serotonergic function, two-mode models of self-regulation, and vulnerability to depression: what depression has in common with impulsive aggression

Evidence from diverse literatures supports the viewpoint that two modes of self-regulation exist, a lower-order system that responds quickly to associative cues of the moment and a higher-order system that responds more reflectively and planfully; that low serotonergic function is linked to relative dominance of the lower-order system; that how dominance of the lower-order system is manifested depends on additional variables; and that low serotonergic function therefore can promote behavioral patterns as divergent as impulsive aggression and lethargic depression. Literatures reviewed include work on two-mode models; studies of brain function supporting the biological plausibility of the two-mode view and the involvement of serotonergic pathways in functions pertaining to it; and studies relating low serotonergic function to impulsiveness, aggression (including extreme violence), aspects of personality, and depression vulnerability. Substantial differences between depression and other phenomena reviewed are interpreted by proposing that depression reflects both low serotonergic function and low reward sensitivity. The article closes with brief consideration of the idea that low serotonergic function relates to even more diverse phenomena, whose natures depend in part on sensitivities of other systems.

What do all personality disorders have in common? Ineffectiveness and uncooperativeness

We still lack operative and theoretically founded definitions of what a personality disorder (PD) is, as well as empirically validated and feasible instruments to measure the disorder construct. The Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI) is the only personality instrument that explicitly distinguishes personality style and disordered functioning. Here, we seek to (1) confirm in a clinical sample that the character dimensions of the TCI capture a general construct of PD across all specific PD subtypes, (2) determine whether such core features can be used to detect the presence of PD, and (3) analyze whether such detection is affected by the presence and severity of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) Axis I symptoms. Two hundred five anxious/depressed outpatients were evaluated with the Structural Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I and II Disorders. Assessment also included the TCI, the Hamilton rating scales for depression and anxiety, and the Panic and Agoraphobia Scale. Sixty-one patients (29.8%) were diagnosed as having a DSM-IV PD. Self-directedness and Cooperativeness, but no other TCI dimensions, predicted the presence of PD (Nagelkerke R(2) = 0.35-0.45) and had a moderate diagnostic utility (kappa = 0.47-0.58) when Axis I symptoms were absent or mild. However, accuracy decreased in anxious or depressed patients. Our study supports the hypothesis of a disorder construct that is not related to the intensity of any specific PD subtype but which is common to all PDs. This construct relies largely on internal representations of the self revealing ineffectiveness and uncooperativeness.

Sign- and goal-tracking in Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua)

When animals associate a stimulus with food, they may either direct their response towards the stimulus (sign-tracking) or towards the food (goal-tracking). The direction of the conditioned response of cod was investigated to elucidate how cod read cue signals. Groups of cod were conditioned to associate a blinking light (conditioned stimulus, CS) with a food reward (unconditioned stimulus, US), with the CS and the US located at opposite sides of the tank. Two groups were trained in a delay conditioning procedure (CS = 60 s, interstimulus interval = 30 s) and two groups were trained in a trace conditioning procedure (CS = 12 s, trace interval = 20 s). The response pattern was similar for the delay- and trace-conditioned groups. The initial main response at the onset of the CS was approaching the blinking lights, i.e. sign-tracking. In the early trials, the fish did not gather in the feeding area before the arrival of food. In the later trials, the fish first approached the blinking lights, but then moved across the tank and gathered below the feeder before the food arrived, i.e. sign-tracking followed by goal-tracking within each trial. These two responses are interpreted as reflecting two learning systems, i.e. one rapid, reflexive response directed at the signal (sign-tracking) and one slower, more flexible response based on expectations about time and place for arrival of the food (goal-tracking). The ecological significance of these two learning systems in cod is discussed.

Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition

This article reviews a diverse set of proposals for dual processing in higher cognition within largely disconnected literatures in cognitive and social psychology. All these theories have in common the distinction between cognitive processes that are fast, automatic, and unconscious and those that are slow, deliberative, and conscious. A number of authors have recently suggested that there may be two architecturally (and evolutionarily) distinct cognitive systems underlying these dual-process accounts. However, it emerges that (a) there are multiple kinds of implicit processes described by different theorists and (b) not all of the proposed attributes of the two kinds of processing can be sensibly mapped on to two systems as currently conceived. It is suggested that while some dual-process theories are concerned with parallel competing processes involving explicit and implicit knowledge systems, others are concerned with the influence of preconscious processes that contextualize and shape deliberative reasoning and decision-making.