New reflections on agency and body ownership: The moving rubber hand illusion in the mirror

The bodily self from psychosis to psychedelics

The sense of self is a foundational element of neurotypical human consciousness. We normally experience the world as embodied agents, with the unified sensation of our selfhood being nested in our body. Critically, the sense of self can be altered in psychiatric conditions such as psychosis and altered states of consciousness induced by psychedelic compounds. The similarity of phenomenological effects across psychosis and psychedelic experiences has given rise to the "psychotomimetic" theory suggesting that psychedelics simulate psychosis-like states. Moreover, psychedelic-induced changes in the sense of self have been related to reported improvements in mental health. Here we investigated the bodily self in psychedelic, psychiatric, and control populations. Using the Moving Rubber Hand Illusion, we tested (N = 75) patients with psychosis, participants with a history of substantial psychedelic experiences, and control participants to see how psychedelic and psychiatric experience impacts the bodily self. Results revealed that psychosis patients had reduced Body Ownership and Sense of Agency during volitional action. The psychedelic group reported subjective long-lasting changes to the sense of self, but no differences between control and psychedelic participants were found. Our results suggest that while psychedelics induce both acute and enduring subjective changes in the sense of self, these are not manifested at the level of the bodily self. Furthermore, our data show that bodily self-processing, related to volitional action, is disrupted in psychosis patients. We discuss these findings in relation to anomalous self-processing across psychedelic and psychotic experiences.

Infants' representations of the infant body in the first year of life: a preferential looking time study

Representing others' bodies is of fundamental importance for interacting with our environment, yet little is known about how body representations develop. Previous research suggests that infants have expectations about the typical structure of human bodies from relatively early in life, but that these expectations are dependent on how closely the stimuli resemble the bodies infants are exposed to in daily life. Yet, all previous studies used images of adult human bodies, and therefore it is unknown whether infants' representations of infant bodies follow a similar developmental trajectory. In this study we investigated whether infants have expectations about the relative size of infant body parts in a preferential looking study using typical and disproportional infant bodies. We recorded the looking behaviour of three groups of infants between 5 and 14 months of age while they watched images of upright and inverted infant bodies, typical and proportionally distorted, and also collected data on participants' locomotor abilities. Our results showed that infants of all ages looked equally at the typical and proportionally distorted infant body stimuli in both the upright and inverted conditions, and that their looking behaviour was unrelated to their locomotor skills. These findings suggest that infants may need additional visual experience with infant bodies to develop expectations about their typical proportions.

Instant disembodiment of virtual body parts

Evidence from multisensory body illusions suggests that body representations may be malleable, for instance, by embodying external objects. However, adjusting body representations to current task demands also implies that external objects become disembodied from the body representation if they are no longer required. In the current web-based study, we induced the embodiment of a two-dimensional (2D) virtual hand that could be controlled by active movements of a computer mouse or on a touchpad. Following initial embodiment, we probed for disembodiment by comparing two conditions: Participants either continued moving the virtual hand or they stopped moving and kept the hand still. Based on theoretical accounts that conceptualize body representations as a set of multisensory bindings, we expected gradual disembodiment of the virtual hand if the body representations are no longer updated through correlated visuomotor signals. In contrast to our prediction, the virtual hand was instantly disembodied as soon as participants stopped moving it. This result was replicated in two follow-up experiments. The observed instantaneous disembodiment might suggest that humans are sensitive to the rapid changes that characterize action and body in virtual environments, and hence adjust corresponding body representations particularly swiftly.

Is self-image, in reference to the gravitational vertical, altered in adolescent idiopathic scoliosis? A multicenter, single-blind, case-control study

PURPOSE

Adolescent idiopathic scoliosis (AIS) is associated with perturbation of orthostatic postural control. In humans, orthostatic postural control is organized around the gravitational vertical (GV). Perception of the GV involves a bottom-up process (central integration of multisensorial information) and a top-down process that uses cognitive mechanisms relying on body image. This study hypothesized that AIS would be associated with an erroneous central representation of verticality. The objective was to demonstrate an altered top-down process of sense of verticality in AIS.

METHODS

This multicenter, single-blind, case-control study evaluated 63 adolescent girls with AIS divided into two groups (major AIS (n = 31) and minor AIS (n = 32)) and 30 matched non-scoliotic adolescents. Participants scored their perception of trunk appearance in an upright position using a pictographic scale. The outcome measure was the difference between perception score and real trunk deformity.

RESULTS

Participants with major AIS presented with misperception of their trunk appearance in an upright position when compared with those with minor AIS or controls.

CONCLUSION

Adolescents with major AIS underestimate their trunk deformity in an upright position. This suggests an altered representation of body image, affecting top-down control of sense of verticality.

Virtual Mirror and Beyond: The Psychological Basis for Avatar Embodiment via a Mirror

In virtual reality (VR), a virtual mirror is often used to display the VR avatar to the user for enhancing the embodiment. The reflected image of the synchronization of the virtual body with the user’s movement is expected to be recognized as the user’s own reflection. In addition to the visuo-motor synchrony, there are some mirror reflection factors that are probably involved in avatar embodiment. This paper reviews literature on the psychological studies that involve mirror-specific self-identification and embodied perception to clarify how the reflected image of the virtual body is embodied. Furthermore, subjective misconceptions about mirror reflections reported in naïve optics have also been reviewed to discuss the potential of virtual mirror displays to modulate avatar embodiment.

Effects of Symmetry and Apparent Distance in a Parasagittal-Mirror Variant of the Rubber Hand Illusion Paradigm

When I see my face in a mirror, its apparent position (behind the glass) is not one that my own face could be in. I accept the face I see as my own because I have an implicit understanding of how mirrors work. The situation is different if I look at the reflection of my right hand in a parasagittal mirror (parallel to body midline) when my left hand is hidden behind the mirror. It is as if I were looking through a window at my own left hand. The experience of body ownership has been investigated using rubber hand illusion (RHI) paradigms, and several studies have demonstrated ownership of a rubber hand viewed in a frontal mirror. Our “proof of concept” study was the first to combine use of a parasagittal mirror and synchronous stroking of both a prosthetic hand (viewed in the mirror) and the participant’s hand, with a manipulation of distance between the hands. The strength of the RHI elicited by our parasagittal-mirror paradigm depended not on physical distance between the hands (30, 45, or 60 cm) but on apparent distance between the prosthetic hand (viewed in the mirror) and the participant’s hand. This apparent distance was reduced to zero when the prosthetic hand and participant’s hand were arranged symmetrically (e.g., 30 cm in front of and behind the mirror). Thus, the parasagittal-mirror paradigm may provide a distinctive way to assess whether competition for ownership depends on spatial separation between the prosthetic hand and the participant’s hand.

Contribution of interaction force to the sense of hand ownership and the sense of hand agency

When performing willed actions, we have the unified and coherent experience of owning and controlling our body. Body ownership is believed to emerge from the integration of coherent multisensory signals, while agency is believed to emerge from the coherence between predicted and perceived outcomes of actions. As a consequence, body ownership and agency can both be modulated by multisensory conflicts. The contribution of active movement generation to ownership and agency has not been parametrically explored. Here, we investigated the contribution of interaction force between the agent and the environment to the sense of hand ownership (SO) and the sense of hand agency (SA). By combining robotics and virtual reality, we manipulated the sensorimotor and visual information during immersive scenarios to induce and quantify altered states of SO and SA. First, we demonstrated that SO and SA could be successfully manipulated by our experimental paradigms. Second, we showed that interaction force strongly contributes to SA, but to a lesser extent to SO. Finally, we showed that SO and SA interact beyond their common multisensory basis. Our results, based on two independent studies, provide a direct link between sensorimotor interactions and subjective body experience and demonstrate a new dissociation between SO and SA.

Back in control of intentional action: Improvement of ideomotor apraxia by mirror box treatment

OBJECTIVES

A novel method of rehabilitation for ideomotor apraxia (IMA), using a modified version of the mirror box (MB), is proposed. The rationale is based on the theory that disrupted body representation occurs in IMA and that MB training may improve body representation. In the present MB training, patients observed and reproduced movements made by the experimenter in a mirror. The visual perspective gave the illusory sensation of seeing one's own affected hand in the mirror.

METHODS

Thirteen patients were included in the study; apraxia was measured four times: i) at baseline; ii) after a week of unspecific poststroke rehabilitation (rest); iii) after a week of imitation training for apraxia, used as a control; and iv) after a week of MB training. Imitation and mirror box training were presented in counterbalanced order between participants. The effect of the mirror box on a measure of body representation was also assessed.

RESULTS

The results show that MB training improved apraxia when compared to the outcomes in both the imitation and rest conditions. The improvement correlates with the impact of the mirror box on the body representation (i.e., the degree of embodiment).

CONCLUSIONS

MB training shows promising effects in promoting recovery from apraxia. The hypothesis is that the mirror box triggers a quickly generated sense of embodiment of the reflected moving arm into the observer's body representation. This embodiment of the visuomotor features of the observed movements would positively affect motor programming, promoting motor improvement. Crucially, this effect seems to extend to actions performed outside the mirror box setup, enhancing patients' performance on an apraxia test.

Multisensory integration of visual cues from first- to third-person perspective avatars in the perception of self-motion

In the perception of self-motion, visual cues originating from an embodied humanoid avatar seen from a first-person perspective (1^st-PP) are processed in the same way as those originating from a person's own body. Here, we sought to determine whether the user's and avatar's bodies in virtual reality have to be colocalized for this visual integration. In Experiment 1, participants saw a whole-body avatar in a virtual mirror facing them. The mirror perspective could be supplemented with a fully visible 1^st-PP avatar or a suggested one (with the arms hidden by a virtual board). In Experiment 2, the avatar was viewed from the mirror perspective or a third-person perspective (3^rd-PP) rotated 90° left or right. During an initial embodiment phase in both experiments, the avatar's forearms faithfully reproduced the participant's real movements. Next, kinaesthetic illusions were induced on the static right arm from the vision of passive displacements of the avatar's arms enhanced by passive displacement of the participant's left arm. Results showed that this manipulation elicited kinaesthetic illusions regardless of the avatar's perspective in Experiments 1 and 2. However, illusions were more likely to occur when the mirror perspective was supplemented with the view of the 1st-PP avatar's body than with the mirror perspective only (Experiment 1), just as they are more likely to occur in the latter condition than with the 3^rd-PP (Experiment 2). Our results show that colocalization of the user's and avatar's bodies is an important, but not essential, factor in visual integration for self-motion perception.

Self-Body Recognition through a Mirror: Easing Spatial-Consistency Requirements for Rubber Hand Illusion

Considering that humans recognize mirror images as copies of the real world despite misinterpreting optical reflections, spatial disagreement may be accepted in rubber hand illusion (RHI) settings when a mirror is used to show a fake hand. The present study performed two experiments to reveal how self-body recognition of a fake hand via a mirror affects RHI. First, we tested whether illusory ownership of a fake hand seen in a mirror could be induced in our experimental environment (screening experiment). Subjective evaluations using an RHI questionnaire demonstrated that embodiment of the rubber hand was evoked in the presence or absence of a mirror. We then examined whether using a mirror image for RHI allows disagreement in orientation (45 ∘ ) between the rubber and actual hands (main experiment). The participants experienced RHI even when the actual and rubber hands were incongruent in terms of orientation. These findings suggest that using a mirror masks subtle spatial incongruency or degrades the contribution of visual cues for spatial recognition and facilitates multisensory integration for bodily illusions.

Effects of Human Synchronous Hand Movements in Eliciting a Sense of Agency and Ownership

The self is built as an entity independent from the external world using the human ability to experience the senses of agency and ownership. Humans usually experience these senses during movement. Nevertheless, researchers recently reported that another person’s synchronous mirror-symmetrical movements elicited both agency and ownership in research participants. However, it is unclear whether this elicitation was caused by the synchronicity or the mirror symmetry of the movements. To address this question, we investigated the effect of interpersonal synchronization on the self-reported sense of agency and ownership in two conditions, using movements with and without mirror symmetry. Participants performed rhythmic hand movements while viewing the experimenter’s synchronous or random hand movements, and then reported their perceptions of agency and ownership in a questionnaire. We observed that agency and ownership were significantly elicited by the experimenter’s synchronous hand movements in both conditions. The results suggested that the synchronous movements of another person—rather than mirror- or non-mirror-symmetrical movements—appear to elicit the experience of a sense of agency and ownership. The results also suggested that people could experience these senses not only from their own movements but also from another person’s synchronous movements.

The Embodiment of Objects: Review, Analysis, and Future Directions

Here we offer a thorough review of the empirical literature on the conditions under which an object, such as a tool or a prosthetic (whether real or virtual), can be experienced as being in some sense a part or extension of one's body. We discuss this literature both from the standpoint of the apparent malleability of our body representations, and also from within the framework of radical embodied cognition, which understands the phenomenon to result not from an alteration to a representation, but rather from the achievement of a certain kind of sensory/motor coupling. We highlight both the tensions between these frameworks, and also areas where they can productively complement one another for future research.

Cortical Regions Encoding Hardness Perception Modulated by Visual Information Identified by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging With Multivoxel Pattern Analysis

Recent studies have revealed that hardness perception is determined by visual information along with the haptic input. This study investigated the cortical regions involved in hardness perception modulated by visual information using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA). Twenty-two healthy participants were enrolled. They were required to place their left and right hands at the front and back, respectively, of a mirror attached to a platform placed above them while lying in a magnetic resonance scanner. In conditions SFT, MED, and HRD, one of three polyurethane foam pads of varying hardness (soft, medium, and hard, respectively) was presented to the left hand in a given trial, while only the medium pad was presented to the right hand in all trials. MED was defined as the control condition, because the visual and haptic information was congruent. During the scan, the participants were required to push the pad with the both hands while observing the reflection of the left hand and estimate the hardness of the pad perceived by the right (hidden) hand based on magnitude estimation. Behavioral results showed that the perceived hardness was significantly biased toward softer or harder in >73% of the trials in conditions SFT and HRD; we designated these trials as visually modulated (SFTvm and HRDvm, respectively). The accuracy map was calculated individually for each of the pair-wise comparisons of (SFTvm vs. MED), (HRDvm vs. MED), and (SFTvm vs. HRDvm) by a searchlight MVPA, and the cortical regions encoding the perceived hardness with visual modulation were identified by conjunction of the three accuracy maps in group analysis. The cluster was observed in the right sensory motor cortex, left anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS), bilateral parietal operculum (PO), and occipito-temporal cortex (OTC). Together with previous findings on such cortical regions, we conclude that the visual information of finger movements processed in the OTC may be integrated with haptic input in the left aIPS, and the subjective hardness perceived by the right hand with visual modulation may be processed in the cortical network between the left PO and aIPS.

Investigating the Components of Body Image Disturbance Within Eating Disorders

Body image disturbance has been highlighted as a common characteristic within the development and maintenance of clinical eating disorders (EDs), represented by alterations in an individual's bodily experience. However, whilst the perceptual stability of the sense of body ownership has been investigated in ED patients, the stability of the sense of body agency in those with ED is yet to be examined. Therefore, body ownership and body agency were investigated using the moving rubber hand illusion, alongside measures of explicit and implicit body satisfaction. Furthermore, with evidence demonstrating a direct link between perceptual and cognitive-affective components of body image in the healthy population, the relationship between measures of body perception and body satisfaction was investigated. Results showed that both ED and healthy individuals displayed a similar subjective experience of illusory ownership and agency towards the fake hand, following voluntary movement. However, whilst both groups initially overestimated their own hand width prior to the illusion, the ED group displayed a significant reduction in hand size estimation following the illusion, which was not matched to the same degree in healthy individuals. In addition, ED individuals displayed a significantly lower body satisfaction compared with healthy females, on both an explicit and implicit level. Such implicit outcomes were shown to be driven specifically by a weaker association between the self and attractiveness. Finally, a significant relationship was observed between specific perceptual measures and implicit body satisfaction, which highlights the important link between perceptual and cognitive-affective components of one's body image. Together, such findings provide a useful foundation for further research to study the conditions in which these two components relate with regard to body image and its disturbance, particularly in relation to the prognosis and treatment of EDs.

Effect of Visual Information on Active Touch During Mirror Visual Feedback

Several studies have demonstrated that observation of a dummy or mirror-reflected hand being stroked or moving at the same time as the hidden hand evokes a feeling that the dummy hand is one’s own, such as the rubber hand illusion (RHI) and mirror visual feedback (MVF). Under these conditions, participants also report sensing the tactile stimulation applied to the fake hands, suggesting that tactile perception is modulated by visual information during the RHI and MVF. Previous studies have utilized passive stimulation conditions; however, active touch is more common in real-world settings. Therefore, we investigated whether active touch is also modulated by visual information during an MVF scenario. Twenty-three participants (13 men and 10 women; mean age ± SD: 21.6 ± 2.0 years) were required to touch a polyurethane pad with both hands synchronously, and estimate the hardness of the pad while observing the mirror reflection. When participants observed the mirror reflection of the other hand pushing a softer or harder pad, perceived hardness estimates were significantly biased toward softer or harder, respectively, even though the physical hardness of the pad remained constant. Furthermore, perceived hardness exhibited a strong correlation with finger displacement of the mirrored, but not hidden, hand. The modulatory effects on perceived hardness diminished when participants touched the pad with both hands asynchronously or with their eyes closed. Moreover, participants experienced ownership of the mirrored hand when they touched the pad with both hands synchronously but not asynchronously. These results indicate that hardness estimates were modulated by observation of the mirrored hand during synchronous touch conditions. The present study demonstrates that, similar to passive touch, active touch is also modulated by visual input.

Motor Control and Sensory Feedback Enhance Prosthesis Embodiment and Reduce Phantom Pain After Long-Term Hand Amputation

We quantified prosthesis embodiment and phantom pain reduction associated with motor control and sensory feedback from a prosthetic hand in one human with a long-term transradial amputation. Microelectrode arrays were implanted in the residual median and ulnar arm nerves and intramuscular electromyography recording leads were implanted in residual limb muscles to enable sensory feedback and motor control. Objective measures (proprioceptive drift) and subjective measures (survey answers) were used to assess prosthesis embodiment. For both measures, there was a significant level of embodiment of the physical prosthetic limb after open-loop motor control of the prosthesis (i.e., without sensory feedback), open-loop sensation from the prosthesis (i.e., without motor control), and closed-loop control of the prosthesis (i.e., motor control with sensory feedback). There was also a statistically significant reduction in reported phantom pain after experimental sessions that included open-loop nerve microstimulation, open-loop prosthesis motor control, or closed-loop prosthesis motor control. The closed-loop condition provided no additional significant improvements in phantom pain reduction or prosthesis embodiment relative to the open-loop sensory condition or the open-loop motor condition. This study represents the first long-term (14-month), systematic report of phantom pain reduction and prosthesis embodiment in a human amputee across a variety of prosthesis use cases.

Implicit and explicit changes in body satisfaction evoked by body size illusions: Implications for eating disorder vulnerability in women

Dissatisfaction with one's body is a widespread issue in modern society and has been linked to vulnerability for developing eating disorders. Recent studies have demonstrated a direct relationship between body perception and body satisfaction by manipulating perceived body size using multisensory body illusions. However, how these body size illusions influence implicit affective experience has not previously been examined. The current experiment used an established full-body ownership illusion paradigm to induce feelings of illusory obesity in male and female participants. The effects of illusory obesity on explicit and implicit body satisfaction were measured in naïve participants across two separate experiments. In terms of explicit measures, owning an obese body decreased body satisfaction, and owning a slimmer body increased body satisfaction in females but not in males. However, implicit feelings regarding the body were only influenced by the synchrony of the touch and not the size of the body in the illusion. These results suggest that implicit and explicit affective experiences of the body may be mediated by different factors. In addition, these findings may have clinical implications because both implicit and explicit changes in affective experience of the body were related to behaviours and thoughts associated with disordered eating in a non-clinical sample.

Body ownership and agency altered by an electromyographically controlled robotic arm

Understanding how we consciously experience our bodies is a fundamental issue in cognitive neuroscience. Two fundamental components of this are the sense of body ownership (the experience of the body as one's own) and the sense of agency (the feeling of control over one's bodily actions). These constructs have been used to investigate the incorporation of prostheses. To date, however, no evidence has been provided showing whether representations of ownership and agency in amputees are altered when operating a robotic prosthesis. Here we investigated a robotic arm using myoelectric control, for which the user varied the joint position continuously, in a rubber hand illusion task. Fifteen able-bodied participants and three trans-radial amputees were instructed to contract their wrist flexors/extensors alternately, and to watch the robotic arm move. The sense of ownership in both groups was extended to the robotic arm when the wrists of the real and robotic arm were flexed/extended synchronously, with the effect being smaller when they moved in opposite directions. Both groups also experienced a sense of agency over the robotic arm. These results suggest that these experimental settings induced successful incorporation of the prosthesis, at least for the amputees who took part in the present study.

Body ownership and the four-hand illusion

Recent studies of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) have shown that the sense of body ownership is constrained by several factors and yet is still very flexible. However, exactly how flexible is our sense of body ownership? In this study, we address this issue by investigating the following question: is it possible that one may have the illusory experience of owning four hands? Under visual manipulation, the participant adopted the experimenter’s first-person perspective (1PP) as if it was his/her own. Sitting face to face, the participant saw four hands—the experimenter’s two hands from the adopted 1PP together with the subject’s own two hands from the adopted third-person perspective (3PP). We found that: (1) the four-hand illusion did not occur in the passive four-hand condition. (2) In the active four-hand condition, the participants tapped their index fingers, imitated by the experimenter. When tactile stimulations were not provided, the key illusion was not induced, either. (3) Strikingly, once all four hands began to act with the same pattern and received synchronous tactile stimulations at the same time, many participants felt as if they had two more hands. These results show that the sense of body ownership is much more flexible than most researchers have suggested.

The neuroscience of body memory: From the self through the space to the others

Our experience of the body is not direct; rather, it is mediated by perceptual information, influenced by internal information, and recalibrated through stored implicit and explicit body representation (body memory). This paper presents an overview of the current investigations related to body memory by bringing together recent studies from neuropsychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary and cognitive psychology. To do so, in the paper, I explore the origin of representations of human body to elucidate their developmental process and, in particular, their relationship with more explicit concepts of self. First, it is suggested that our bodily experience is constructed from early development through the continuous integration of sensory and cultural data from six different representations of the body, i.e., the Sentient Body (Minimal Selfhood), the Spatial Body (Self Location), the Active Body (Agency), the Personal Body (Whole Body Ownership - Me); the Objectified Body (Objectified Self - Mine), and the Social Body (Body Satisfaction - Ideal Me). Then, it is suggested that these six representations can be combined in a coherent supramodal representation, i.e. the "body matrix", through a predictive, multisensory processing activated by central, top-down, attentional processes. From an evolutionary perspective, the main goal of the body matrix is to allow the self to protect and extend its boundaries at both the homeostatic and psychological levels. From one perspective, the self extends its boundaries (peripersonal space) through the enactment and recognition of motor schemas. From another perspective, the body matrix, by defining the boundaries of the body, also defines where the self is present, i.e., in the body that is processed by the body matrix as the most likely to be its one, and in the space surrounding it. In the paper I also introduce and discuss the concept of "embodied medicine": the use of advanced technology for altering the body matrix with the goal of improving our health and well-being.

The Moving Rubber Hand Illusion Reveals that Explicit Sense of Agency for Tapping Movements Is Preserved in Functional Movement Disorders

Functional movement disorders (FMD) are characterized by motor symptoms (e.g., tremor, gait disorder, and dystonia) that are not compatible with movement abnormalities related to a known organic cause. One key clinical feature of FMD is that motor symptoms are similar to voluntary movements but are subjectively experienced as involuntary by patients. This gap might be related to abnormal self-recognition of bodily action, which involves two main components: sense of agency and sense of body ownership. The aim of this study was to systematically investigate whether this function is altered in FMD, specifically focusing on the subjective feeling of agency, body ownership, and their interaction during normal voluntary movements. Patients with FMD (n = 21) and healthy controls (n = 21) underwent the moving Rubber Hand Illusion (mRHI), in which passive and active movements can differentially elicit agency, ownership or both. Explicit measures of agency and ownership were obtained via a questionnaire. Patients and controls showed a similar pattern of response: when the rubber hand was in a plausible posture, active movements elicited strong agency and ownership; implausible posture of the rubber hand abolished ownership but not agency; passive movements suppressed agency but not ownership. These findings suggest that explicit sense of agency and body ownership are preserved in FMD. The latter finding is shared by a previous study in FMD using a static version of the RHI, whereas the former appears to contrast with studies demonstrating altered implicit measures of agency (e.g., sensory attenuation). Our study extends previous findings by suggesting that in FMD: (i) the sense of body ownership is retained also when interacting with the motor system; (ii) the subjective experience of agency for voluntary tapping movements, as measured by means of mRHI, is preserved.

Virtual Reality for Research in Social Neuroscience

The emergence of social neuroscience has significantly advanced our understanding of the relationship that exists between social processes and their neurobiological underpinnings. Social neuroscience research often involves the use of simple and static stimuli lacking many of the potentially important aspects of real world activities and social interactions. Whilst this research has merit, there is a growing interest in the presentation of dynamic stimuli in a manner that allows researchers to assess the integrative processes carried out by perceivers over time. Herein, we discuss the potential of virtual reality for enhancing ecological validity while maintaining experimental control in social neuroscience research. Virtual reality is a technology that allows for the creation of fully interactive, three-dimensional computerized models of social situations that can be fully controlled by the experimenter. Furthermore, the introduction of interactive virtual characters—either driven by a human or by a computer—allows the researcher to test, in a systematic and independent manner, the effects of various social cues. We first introduce key technical features and concepts related to virtual reality. Next, we discuss the potential of this technology for enhancing social neuroscience protocols, drawing on illustrative experiments from the literature.

My action lasts longer: Potential link between subjective time and agency during voluntary action

Time perception distorts across different phases of bodily movement. During motor execution, sensory feedback matching an internal sensorimotor prediction is perceived to last longer. The sensorimotor prediction also underlies sense of agency. We investigated association between subjective time and agency during voluntary action. Participants performed hand action while watching a video feedback of their hand with various delays to manipulate agency. The perceived duration and agency over the video feedback were judged. Minimal delay of the video feedback resulted in longer perceived duration than the actual duration and stronger agency, while substantial feedback delay resulted in shorter perceived duration and weaker agency. These fluctuations of perceived duration and agency were nullified by the feedback of other's hand instead of their own, but not by inverted feedback from a third-person perspective. Subjective time during action might be associated with agency stemming from sensorimotor prediction, and self-other distinction based on bodily appearance.

The Onset Time of the Ownership Sensation in the Moving Rubber Hand Illusion

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a perceptual illusion whereby a model hand is perceived as part of one's own body. This illusion has been extensively studied, but little is known about the temporal evolution of this perceptual phenomenon, i.e., how long it takes until participants start to experience ownership over the model hand. In the present study, we investigated a version of the rubber hand experiment based on finger movements and measured the average onset time in active and passive movement conditions. This comparison enabled us to further explore the possible role of intentions and motor control processes that are only present in the active movement condition. The results from a large group of healthy participants (n = 117) showed that the illusion of ownership took approximately 23 s to emerge (active: 22.8; passive: 23.2). The 90th percentile occurs in both conditions within approximately 50 s (active: 50; passive: 50.6); therefore, most participants experience the illusion within the first minute. We found indirect evidence of a facilitatory effect of active movements compared to passive movements, and we discuss these results in the context of our current understanding of the processes underlying the moving RHI.

Mood migration: How enfacing a smile makes you happier

People tend to perceive the face of another person more as their own if own and other face are stroked in synchrony-the enfacement illusion. We conceptually replicated the enfacement illusion in a virtual reality environment, in which participants could control the movements of a virtual face by moving and touching their own face. We then used this virtual enfacement illusion to study whether enfacing a virtual face would also involve adopting the emotion that this face is expressing. As predicted, participants adopted the expressed emotion, as indicated by higher valence scores and better performance in a mood-sensitive divergent-thinking task when facing a happy virtual face, if the virtual face moved in synchrony with their own head movements. This suggests that impact on or control over another person's facial movements invite "mood migration" from the person one identifies with to oneself.

Owning the body in the mirror: The effect of visual perspective and mirror view on the full-body illusion

Mirrors allow us to view our own body from a third-person (observer) perspective. However, how viewing ourselves through a mirror affects central body representations compared with true third-person perspective is not fully understood. Across a series of experiments, multisensory full-body illusions were used to modulate feelings of ownership over a mannequin body that was viewed from a third-person perspective through a mirror, from a third-person perspective without a mirror, and from a first-person perspective. In contrast to non-mirror third-person perspective, synchronously touching the participant’s actual body and the mannequin body viewed in the mirror elicited strong feelings of ownership over the mannequin and increased physiological responses to the mannequin being threatened compared to the equivalent asynchronous (non-ownership) control condition. Subjective reports of ownership viewing the mannequin through a mirror were also statistically equivalent to those following the first-person perspective illusion. These findings suggest that mirrors have a special role for viewing the self. The results also support the importance of egocentric reference frames for body ownership and suggest that mirror reflections of one’s own body are related to peripersonal space, which enables updating of central body representations.

The Mirrored Hand Illusion: I Control, So I Possess?

Certain situations may not only cause people to misjudge external information but also distort people's perception of themselves. The present study is the first to report the mirrored hand illusion which could be generated when the experimenter imitated the fist-clenching movements of the subject synchronously. The subjects formed the illusion that the experimenter's hand was "something I can control" when being imitated synchronously. In addition, a sense of ownership over the alien hand was established by integrating multisensory signals and comparing these signals with preexisting body presentations. This method might represent a new avenue for research on the formation of self-consciousness.