Exploring the experience of episodic past, future, and counterfactual thinking in younger and older adults: A study of a Colombian sample

Integrity of autobiographical memory and episodic future thinking in older adults varies with cognitive functioning

Research has documented changes in autobiographical memory and episodic future thinking in mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and Alzheimer's disease (AD). However, cognitive decline occurs gradually and recent findings suggest that subtle alterations in autobiographical cognition may be evident earlier in the trajectory towards dementia, before AD-related symptoms emerge or a clinical diagnosis has been given. The current study used the Autobiographical Interview to examine the episodic and semantic content of autobiographical past and future events generated by older adults (N = 38) of varying cognitive functioning who were grouped into High (N = 20) and Low Cognition (N = 18) groups based on their Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) scores. Participants described 12 past and 12 future autobiographical events, and transcripts were scored to quantify the numbers of internal (episodic) or external (non-episodic, including semantic) details. Although the Low Cognition group exhibited a differential reduction for internal details comprising both past and future events, they did not show the expected overproduction of external details relative to the High Cognition group. Multilevel modelling demonstrated that on trials lower in episodic content, semantic content was significantly increased in both groups. Although suggestive of a compensatory mechanism, the magnitude of this inverse relationship did not differ across groups or interact with MoCA scores. This finding indicates that external detail production may be underpinned by mechanisms not affected by cognitive decline, such as narrative style and the ability to contextualize one's past and future events in relation to broader autobiographical knowledge.

Counterfactual thinking induces different neural patterns of memory modification in anxious individuals

Episodic counterfactual thinking (eCFT) is the process of mentally simulating alternate versions of experiences, which confers new phenomenological properties to the original memory and may be a useful therapeutic target for trait anxiety. However, it remains unclear how the neural representations of a memory change during eCFT. We hypothesized that eCFT-induced memory modification is associated with changes to the neural pattern of a memory primarily within the default mode network, moderated by dispositional anxiety levels. We tested this proposal by examining the representational dynamics of eCFT for 39 participants varying in trait anxiety. During eCFT, lateral parietal regions showed progressively more distinct activity patterns, whereas medial frontal neural activity patterns became more similar to those of the original memory. Neural pattern similarity in many default mode network regions was moderated by trait anxiety, where highly anxious individuals exhibited more generalized representations for upward eCFT (better counterfactual outcomes), but more distinct representations for downward eCFT (worse counterfactual outcomes). Our findings illustrate the efficacy of examining eCFT-based memory modification via neural pattern similarity, as well as the intricate interplay between trait anxiety and eCFT generation.

Age-consistent phenomenological experience in remembering the past and imagining the past and the future

We investigated age differences in mental time travel by comparing young, middle-aged and older adults, with equal number of participants in each age decade, from age 22 to 79. Participants generated and phenomenologically rated one experienced and one imagined past event, and two imagined future events. The results showed event type effects with richer phenomenology for experienced than imagined events, but no age group differences. Specifically, experienced events were more vivid, detailed, and were re-lived in the mind more than the other event types. All events were highly central to life, revealing no event type effects on centrality. For both past events, older age groups generated more distant events. There were no age group differences for temporal distance for the two future events. Both future events were from a near future. The results suggest that for events that are central to life, phenomenological experience may be similar across the adulthood.

Taking stock of the past: A psychometric evaluation of the Autobiographical Interview

Autobiographical memory (AM) involves a rich phenomenological re-experiencing of a spatio-temporal event from the past, which is challenging to objectively quantify. The Autobiographical Interview (AI; Levine et al. Psychology and Aging, 17(4), 677-689, 2002) is a manualized performance-based assessment designed to quantify episodic (internal) and semantic (external) features of recalled and verbally conveyed prior experiences. The AI has been widely adopted, yet has not undergone a comprehensive psychometric validation. We investigated the reliability, validity, association to individual differences measures, and factor structure in healthy younger and older adults (N = 352). Evidence for the AI's reliability was strong: the subjective scoring protocol showed high inter-rater reliability and previously identified age effects were replicated. Internal consistency across timepoints was robust, suggesting stability in recollection. Central to our validation, internal AI scores were positively correlated with standard, performance-based measures of episodic memory, demonstrating convergent validity. The two-factor structure for the AI was not well supported by confirmatory factor analysis. Adjusting internal and external detail scores for the number of words spoken (detail density) improved trait estimation of AM performance. Overall, the AI demonstrated sound psychometric properties for inquiry into the qualities of autobiographical remembering.

Individual differences in the frequency of voluntary & involuntary episodic memories, future thoughts, and counterfactual thoughts

Voluntary and involuntary mental time travel can take the form of episodic memory, episodic future thinking, and episodic counterfactual thinking. This study uses an individual-differences approach to understand why people engage in these forms of mental time travel. The individual-differences variables include trait-level personality, boredom proneness, depression, anxiety, stress, emotion regulation, mindfulness, mind-wandering, positive and negative affect, rumination, optimism, thinking styles, and time perspective. Across two studies, our results indicate that individual differences underlie these forms of mental time travel. The most unique, episodic counterfactual thinking, was alone positively correlated with negative emotionality and negatively correlated with optimism. We also observe differences as a function of voluntariness and discuss these findings in relation to the cognitively demanding nature of constructing future and counterfactual thoughts. We discuss the importance of distinguishing voluntary from involuntary thinking and assessing episodic counterfactual thinking in relation to episodic memory and episodic future thinking.

Using a counterfactual-based intervention to change eating intentions: Results from Hispanic and non-Hispanic undergraduate and community samples

Finding ways to improve eating behavior has become a major focus of interventions designed to improve health outcomes. Counterfactual thinking (i.e., mental simulations of how a past outcome could have been different) is a cognitive strategy that has been shown to improve behavior regulation and could be a promising intervention to improve eating behavior. The purpose of the current research was to examine the effect of a counterfactual-based intervention to shift contemplation to change eating behavior, motivation towards eating healthier, and intentions to engage in healthier eating behaviors. Participants in both studies were randomly assigned to either a counterfactual-based intervention or a control condition. In Study 1, those in the counterfactual-based intervention condition reported an increase in readiness to change their eating behavior, higher extrinsic motivation towards eating healthy, and higher intentions to eat healthy compared to those in the control condition. Within the counterfactual condition, individuals who self-identified as Hispanic had higher intentions to use their counterfactual strategies than those who identified as non-Hispanic. Study 2 found similar results using a more diverse community sample. Those in the counterfactual-based intervention condition reported an increase in readiness to change, intentions to eat healthy, and intentions to use their counterfactual strategies, with this effect being stronger for self-identified Hispanic participants. These studies provide initial evidence for the use of a counterfactual-based intervention to improve eating behavior in diverse populations.

Episodic Past, Future, and counterfactual thinking in Relapsing-Remitting Multiple sclerosis

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Performance in episodic past, future or counterfactual thinking in relapsing-remitting MS and controls was explored.

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Behavioral and diffusion weighted imaging were used to evaluate associations between white matter integrity and group differences in performance.

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Relative to controls, MS patients showed reductions in episodic details across all three simulations.

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Reduced white matter integrity in three association tracts predicted this reduction in episodic details during counterfactual simulations.

Multiple sclerosis (MS) is a progressive disease characterized by widespread white matter lesions in the brain and spinal cord. In addition to well-characterized motor deficits, MS results in cognitive impairments in several domains, notably in episodic autobiographical memory. Recent studies have also revealed that patients with MS exhibit deficits in episodic future thinking, i.e., our capacity to imagine possible events that may occur in our personal future. Both episodic memory and episodic future thinking have been shown to share cognitive and neural mechanisms with a related kind of hypothetical simulation known as episodic counterfactual thinking: our capacity to imagine alternative ways in which past personal events could have occurred but did not. However, the extent to which episodic counterfactual thinking is affected in MS is still unknown. The current study sought to explore this issue by comparing performance in mental simulation tasks involving either past, future or counterfactual thoughts in relapsing-remitting MS. Diffusion weighted imaging (DWI) measures were also extracted to determine whether changes in structural pathways connecting the brain’s default mode network (DMN) would be associated with group differences in task performance. Relative to controls, patients showed marked reductions in the number of internal details across all mental simulations, but no differences in the number of external and semantic-based details. It was also found that, relative to controls, patients with relapsing-remitting MS reported reduced composition ratings for episodic simulations depicting counterfactual events, but not so for actual past or possible future episodes. Additionally, three DWI measures of white matter integrity—fractional anisotropy, radial diffusivity and streamline counts—showed reliable differences between patients with relapsing-remitting MS and matched healthy controls. Importantly, DWI measures associated with reduced white matter integrity in three association tracts on the DMN—the right superior longitudinal fasciculus, the left hippocampal portion of the cingulum and the left inferior longitudinal fasciculus—predicted reductions in the number of internal details during episodic counterfactual simulations. Taken together, these results help to illuminate impairments in episodic simulation in relapsing-remitting MS and show, for the first time, a differential association between white matter integrity and deficits in episodic counterfactual thinking in individuals with relapsing-remitting MS.

I remember it like it was yesterday: Age-related differences in the subjective experience of remembering

It has been frequently described that older adults subjectively report the vividness of their memories as being as high, or even higher, than young adults, despite poorer objective memory performance. Here, we review studies that examined age-related differences in the subjective experience of memory vividness. By examining vividness calibration and resolution, studies using different types of approaches converge to suggest that older adults overestimate the intensity of their vividness ratings relative to young adults, and that they rely on retrieved memory details to a lesser extent to judge vividness. We discuss potential mechanisms underlying these observations. Inflation of memory vividness with regard to the richness of memory content may stem from age-differences in vividness criterion or scale interpretation and psycho-social factors. The reduced reliance on episodic memory details in older adults may stem from age-related differences in how they monitor these details to make their vividness ratings. Considered together, these findings emphasize the importance of examining age-differences in memory vividness using different analytical methods and they provide valuable evidence that the subjective experience of remembering is more than the reactivation of memory content. In this vein, we recommend that future studies explore the links between memory vividness and other subjective memory scales (e.g., ratings of details or memory confidence) in healthy aging and/or other populations, as it could be used as a window to better characterize the cognitive processes that underpin the subjective assessment of the quality of recollected events.

Projecting the self in aging: an exploratory study of self-defining future projections

The concept of "Self-Defining Future Projections" (SDFPs) has been recently introduced to better explore the link between future thinking and identity. To date, SDFPs have only been examined in young adults and it remains unknown how self-defining future thoughts evolve in aging. In this cross-sectional study, 43 young adults (age range = 19-28; mean age = 23.06) and 43 older adults (age range 60-80; mean age = 69.46) were asked to generate three SDFPs. Our results indicated that SDFPs were less specific in older adults compared to young adults, but there was no difference between the two groups concerning autobiographical reasoning. However, regarding subjective experience, older adults rated imagined future events as containing more sensory details and contextual information and reported a higher feeling of pre-experiencing the personal future. Additionally, older participants described future events that were more positive and less distant in the future, with fewer narratives about future achievements but more narratives describing leisure time, with a similar probability between the two groups that the event will occur in the future. Our study extends previous aging research and adds to the literature by better understanding how future event representations are formed in older adults.

How imagining personal future scenarios influences affect: Systematic review and meta-analysis

Imagining the future is a fundamental human capacity that occupies a large part of people's waking time and impacts their affective well-being. In this meta-analysis, we examined the effect of (1) positive future imagination and (2) negative future imagination on affect, and (3) compared the affective responses between imagining the future and remembering the past; lastly, we (4) examined potential moderating variables in this regard. We identified 63 experimental studies (N = 6813) from different research areas and combined studies that applied the best possible self imagination task, future worry induction, and episodic future simulation, respectively. Findings yielded that imagining the future has a moderate to strong impact on affect, and it has a stronger influence on affect compared to remembering the past. Relevant moderator variables in each research area were also identified. We discuss the findings for the field of psychology in general and clinical psychology in particular. More elaborate research on personal future imagination seems crucial for the further advancement of clinical applications for mental health complaints. We conclude with recommendations for future research on the impact of future imagination on affective well-being.