Beliefs about God, the afterlife and morality support the role of supernatural policing in human cooperation

Construction and Validation of the Belief in Divine Retribution Scale for Pakistani Muslims

The purpose of the study was to construct and validate a Belief in Divine Retribution Scale for the Pakistani Muslim population. The process of construction and validation was completed by following standardized guidelines for scale construction (Boateng et al., 2018). The present study was carried out in four phases. In phase I, the task of item generation was completed through literature review and interviews (inductive and deductive approaches). Phase II aimed at exploration of factor structure. Exploratory factor analysis was carried out on a sample of seven hundred Muslim participants. Data for EFA were collected through a purposive sampling technique, which comprised both men (n = 339) and women (n = 361) with an age range of 18 to 69 years. Results of EFA revealed a two-factor structure with a cumulative variance of 42.59 and with a Cronbach alpha reliability of .83. To confirm the obtained factor structure, Phase III was carried out on a sample of three hundred Muslim participants. The results of CFA confirmed the two-dimensional factor structure with a good model fit to the data. Phase IV provided evidence of convergent and discriminant validity of the scale. Moreover, data for validation were collected from an independent sample (N = 204). Finally, the results of validation revealed that there exists a significant positive correlation of Belief in Divine Retribution Scale with Belief in Just World Scale, which provided evidence of convergent validity. However, there exists a non-significant correlation of Belief in Divine Retribution Scale with Religious Practice Subscale of Short Muslim Practice and Belief Scale, and it provided evidence of discriminant validity. Implications along with limitations and suggestions for future research have also been mentioned.

Sanctity of Life or God's Command? Investigating Religious Determinants of Attitudes Toward Three Cases of Unnatural Death: Capital Punishment, Abortion, and Euthanasia

Whether individuals may decide to end other people's or their own lives has always been a matter of ethical and social debate. The current research explores attitudes toward three cases of unnatural death: capital punishment, abortion, and euthanasia. One considerable factor that shapes individuals' attitudes toward human intervention in death is religion. This paper argues that religion causes significant changes in individuals' mindsets toward human intervention in the death process. Therefore, the present research examines how religion affects attitudes toward the death penalty, abortion, and euthanasia. This study proposes differentiating religion into four dimensions: religiosity, spirituality, afterlife beliefs, and religious affiliation. Using data from the 2018 wave of the General Social Survey (GSS), the present research found that religion's various dimensions have distinct effects on attitudes toward the death penalty, abortion, and euthanasia.

Gods are watching and so what? Moralistic supernatural punishment across 15 cultures

Psychological and cultural evolutionary accounts of human sociality propose that beliefs in punitive and monitoring gods that care about moral norms facilitate cooperation. While there is some evidence to suggest that belief in supernatural punishment and monitoring generally induce cooperative behaviour, the effect of a deity's explicitly postulated moral concerns on cooperation remains unclear. Here, we report a pre-registered set of analyses to assess whether perceiving a locally relevant deity as moralistic predicts cooperative play in two permutations of two economic games using data from up to 15 diverse field sites. Across games, results suggest that gods' moral concerns do not play a direct, cross-culturally reliable role in motivating cooperative behaviour. The study contributes substantially to the current literature by testing a central hypothesis in the evolutionary and cognitive science of religion with a large and culturally diverse dataset using behavioural and ethnographically rich methods.

The Potential of Religion for Promoting Sustainability: The Role of Stewardship

The present paper discusses how religious, theistic stewardship-the belief that humans have a responsibility to take care of the world that God created and has entrusted to humankind-promotes pro-environmental support among religious individuals. Reviewing the existing literature, we describe how religious stewardship belief may shape cognitions and emotions regarding various environmentally relevant objects (i.e., natural environment, environmental problems, and pro-environmental behaviors) and how these cognitions and emotions lead to motivation to engage in pro-environmental action. We also discuss religious beliefs that may suppress the positive effects of stewardship belief as well as key factors that may moderate the effects of stewardship belief. Last, we discuss potential ways of leveraging religious stewardship in messaging and communications for behavioral change toward sustainability. Although the existing evidence on whether religion helps or hinders environmental protection is mixed, our review suggests that stewardship belief clearly provides great potential for environmental support among religious communities.

C-H-E-A-T: Wordle Cheating Is Related to Religiosity and Cultural Tightness

Wordle is a daily, online brainteaser. The widespread popularity of the game in the early months of 2022 has also led to widespread cheating. Here, we use data from Google Trends and Twitter to explore correlates of cheating on Wordle. We find that cheating behavior is negatively related to religiosity and cultural tightness. Although this is a benign example of cheating behavior, we discuss how popular trends can be used as case studies of group-level behavior.

Cultural differences in neurocognitive mechanisms underlying believing

Believing as a fundamental mental process influences other cognitive/affective processes and behavior. However, it is unclear whether believing engages distinct neurocognitive mechanisms in people with different cultural experiences. We addressed this issue by scanning Chinese and Danish adults using functional MRI during believing judgments on personality traits of oneself and a celebrity. Drift diffusion model analyses of behavioral performances revealed that speed/quality of information acquisition varied between believing judgments on positive and negative personality traits in Chinese but not in Danes. Chinese adopted a more conservative strategy of decision-making during celebrity- than self-believing judgments whereas an opposite pattern was observed in Danes. Non-decisional processes were longer for celebrity- than for self-believing in Danes but not in Chinese. Believing judgments activated the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in both cultural groups but elicited stronger left anterior insular and ventral frontal activations in Chinese. Greater mPFC activity in Chinese was associated with longer duration of non-decision processes during believing-judgments, which predicted slower retrieval of self-related information in a memory test. Greater mPFC activity in Danes, however, was associated with a less degree of adopting a conservative strategy during believing judgments, which predicted faster retrieval of self-related information. Our findings highlight different neurocognitive processes engaged in believing between individuals from East Asian and Western cultures.

Can I Pay at Purgatory? The Negative Impact of the Purgatory Ethic in Islamic Societies: Theoretical and Empirical Evidence

The psychological and social effects of the doctrine of purgatory (temporary afterlife punishment) have not received sufficient attention from sociologists. Temporary afterlife punishment (TAP) is any kind of ‘temporary’ torment a person believes they will receive after death as a result of one’s sins, before admission into heaven/paradise. Investigating the effects of TAP beliefs can help to understand their social impact on contemporary Islamic societies. Drawing on related research on the Protestant ethic hypothesis, and self-control theory, the present study theorized the negative psychological and social impact of TAP. We argue that the effect of the Predestination doctrine on pro-sociality is best attributed to the Protestant denial of belief in TAP, and that the positive impact of afterlife punishment beliefs on self-control and prosocial behavior decreases with belief in TAP. To test these hypotheses, we first developed the Temporary Afterlife Punishment Expectations (TAPE) scale and examined the relationship between TAPE and self-control, rule-breaking ability, and integrity (as an indicator of prosocial behavior). Data were collected from Muslim youth in two countries (Jordan N = 605 and Malaysia N = 303). Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of the Jordanian data support the construct validity of the TAPE scale. In line with our hypotheses, path analysis results supported the negative effects of TAPE on self-control, rule-breaking ability, and integrity. Replicating the study with the Malaysian sample led to similar results. Future research directions are recommended.

Supernatural punishment beliefs as cognitively compelling tools of social control

Why do humans develop beliefs in supernatural entities that punish uncooperative behaviors? Leading hypotheses maintain that these beliefs are widespread because they facilitate cooperation, allowing their groups to outcompete others in intergroup competition. Focusing on within-group interactions, we present a model in which people strategically endorse supernatural punishment beliefs as intuitive tools of social control to manipulate others into cooperating. Others accept these beliefs, meanwhile, because they are made compelling by various cognitive biases: they appear to provide information about why misfortune occurs; they appeal to intuitions about immanent justice; they contain threatening information; and they allow believers to signal their trustworthiness. Explaining supernatural beliefs requires considering both motivations to invest in their endorsement and the reasons others adopt them.

Cultural similarity among coreligionists within and between countries

Cultural evolutionary theories suggest that world religions have consolidated beliefs, values, and practices within a superethnic cultural identity. It follows that affiliation with religious traditions would be reliably associated with global variation in cultural traits. To test this hypothesis, we measured cultural distance between religious groups within and between countries, using the Cultural Fixation Index ([Formula: see text]) applied to the World Values Survey (88 countries, n = 243,118). Individuals who shared a religious tradition and level of commitment to religion were more culturally similar, both within and across countries, than those with different affiliations and levels of religiosity, even after excluding overtly religious values. Moreover, distances between denominations within a world religion echoed shared historical descent. Nonreligious individuals across countries also shared cultural values, offering evidence for the cultural evolution of secularization. While nation-states were a stronger predictor of cultural traits than religious traditions, the cultural similarity of coreligionists remained robust, controlling for demographic characteristics, geographic and linguistic distances between groups, and government restriction on religion. Together, results reveal the pervasive cultural signature of religion and support the role of world religions in sustaining superordinate identities that transcend geographical boundaries.

Intuitive Dualism and Afterlife Beliefs: A Cross-Cultural Study

It is widely held that intuitive dualism-an implicit default mode of thought that takes minds to be separable from bodies and capable of independent existence-is a human universal. Among the findings taken to support universal intuitive dualism is a pattern of evidence in which "psychological" traits (knowledge, desires) are judged more likely to continue after death than bodily or "biological" traits (perceptual, physiological, and bodily states). Here, we present cross-cultural evidence from six study populations, including non-Western societies with diverse belief systems, that shows that while this pattern exists, the overall pattern of responses nonetheless does not support intuitive dualism in afterlife beliefs. Most responses of most participants across all cultures tested were not dualist. While our sample is in no way intended to capture the full range of human societies and afterlife beliefs, it captures a far broader range of cultures than in any prior study, and thus puts the case for afterlife beliefs as evidence for universal intuitive dualism to a strong test. Based on these findings, we suggest that while dualist thinking is a possible mode of thought enabled by evolved human psychology, such thinking does not constitute a default mode of thought. Rather, our data support what we will call intuitive materialism-the view that the underlying intuitive systems for reasoning about minds and death produce as a default judgment that mental states cease to exist with bodily death.

Belief in an Afterlife Influences Altruistic Helping Intentions in Alignment With Adaptive Tendencies

Evolutionary definitions of altruism are only concerned with reproductive consequences and not motives or other psychological mechanisms, making them ideal for generalization to all forms of organisms. Hamilton's inclusive fitness theory explains altruistic behavior toward genetic relatives and has generated extensive empirical support. Trivers' theory of reciprocal altruism helps explain patterns of helping among non-kin, and other research has demonstrated that human helping intentions follow fitness consequences from age-based reproductive value on altruism. The current study examines a novel psychological factor, belief in the afterlife, which may influence altruistic helping intentions. Belief in the afterlife was incorporated into a previous study design assessing the effects of a target's genetic relatedness and age-based reproductive value. The influences of inclusive fitness and target age were reproduced in a non-Western sample of participants (N = 300) in Iran. Belief in the afterlife predicted the overall confidence of risking one's life to save another across all targets, and also moderated the effects of genetic relatedness and target age. Rather than promoting altruism equitably or advantaging those favored by adaptive tendencies, higher belief in an afterlife aligned with these tendencies in promoting further favoritism toward close kin and younger targets with higher reproductive value.

Prosociality and religion

Although self-reports suggest that religious individuals consider themselves universally prosocial, behavioral measures suggest a more limited prosociality and priming studies suggest a small causal relationship. Recent research has uncovered new moderators, with religiousness being more strongly related to prosociality under self-image threat, and when faced with a needier recipient. One major moderator remains the identity of the recipient: religious prosociality often favors religious ingroups over outgroups. Mechanisms of religious prosociality include supernatural monitoring and moral identity, with secular analogues such as priming civic institutions also having comparable effects. Further research is needed on determinants of parochial versus universal religious helping, and the circumstances under which each type of helping might be most adaptive.

The Origins and Psychology of Human Cooperation

Humans are an ultrasocial species. This sociality, however, cannot be fully explained by the canonical approaches found in evolutionary biology, psychology, or economics. Understanding our unique social psychology requires accounting not only for the breadth and intensity of human cooperation but also for the variation found across societies, over history, and among behavioral domains. Here, we introduce an expanded evolutionary approach that considers how genetic and cultural evolution, and their interaction, may have shaped both the reliably developing features of our minds and the well-documented differences in cultural psychologies around the globe. We review the major evolutionary mechanisms that have been proposed to explain human cooperation, including kinship, reciprocity, reputation, signaling, and punishment; we discuss key culture-gene coevolutionary hypotheses, such as those surrounding self-domestication and norm psychology; and we consider the role of religions and marriage systems. Empirically, we synthesize experimental and observational evidence from studies of children and adults from diverse societies with research among nonhuman primates.

Resource Stress Predicts Changes in Religious Belief and Increases in Sharing Behavior

We examine and test alternative models for explaining the relationships between resource stress, beliefs that gods and spirits influence weather (to help or harm food supply or punish for norm violations), and customary beyond-household sharing behavior. Our model, the resource stress model, suggests that resource stress affects both sharing as well as conceptions of gods' involvement with weather, but these supernatural beliefs play no role in explaining sharing. An alternative model, the moralizing high god model, suggests that the relationship between resource stress and sharing is at least partially mediated by religious beliefs in moralizing high gods. We compared the models using a worldwide sample of 96 cultures from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS), newly coded data on supernatural involvement with weather, and previously coded data on food and labor sharing. We conducted three types of analysis: multilevel and society-level regressions, and mediational path modeling using Monte Carlo simulations. Resource stress shows a robust effect on beliefs that high gods are associated with weather (and the more specific beliefs that high gods help or hurt the food supply with weather), that superior gods help the food supply through weather, and that minor spirits hurt the food supply through weather. Resource stress also predicts greater belief in moralizing high gods. However, no form of high god belief that we test significantly predicts more sharing. Mediational models suggest the religious beliefs do not significantly explain why resource stress is associated with food and labor sharing. Our findings generally accord with the view that resource stress changes religious belief and has a direct effect on sharing behavior, unmediated by high god beliefs.

Environmental adversity is associated with lower investment in collective actions

Environmental adversity is associated with a wide range of biological outcomes and behaviors that seem to fulfill a need to favor immediate over long-term benefits. Adversity is also associated with decreased investment in cooperation, which is defined as a long-term strategy. Beyond establishing the correlation between adversity and cooperation, the channel through which this relationship arises remains unclear. We propose that this relationship is mediated by a present bias at the psychological level, which is embodied in the reproduction-maintenance trade-off at the biological level. We report two pre-registered studies applying structural equation models to test this relationship on large-scale datasets (the European Values Study and the World Values Survey). The present study replicates existing research linking adverse environments (both in childhood and in adulthood) with decreased investment in adult cooperation and finds that this association is indeed mediated by variations in individuals’ reproduction-maintenance trade-off.

Generosity among the Ik of Uganda

According to Turnbull's 1972 ethnography The Mountain People, the Ik of Uganda had a culture of selfishness that made them uncooperative. His claims contrast with two widely accepted principles in evolutionary biology, that humans cooperate on larger scales than other species and that culture is an important facilitator of such cooperation. We use recently collected data to examine Ik culture and its influence on Ik behaviour. Turnbull's observations of selfishness were not necessarily inaccurate but they occurred during a severe famine. Cooperation re-emerged when people once again had enough resources to share. Accordingly, Ik donations in unframed Dictator Games are on par with average donations in Dictator Games played by people around the world. Furthermore, Ik culture includes traits that encourage sharing with those in need and a belief in supernatural punishment of selfishness. When these traits are used to frame Dictator Games, the average amounts given by Ik players increase. Turnbull's claim that the Ik have a culture of selfishness can be rejected. Cooperative norms are resilient, and the consensus among scholars that humans are remarkably cooperative and that human cooperation is supported by culture can remain intact.

Moralizing gods, impartiality and religious parochialism across 15 societies

The emergence of large-scale cooperation during the Holocene remains a central problem in the evolutionary literature. One hypothesis points to culturally evolved beliefs in punishing, interventionist gods that facilitate the extension of cooperative behaviour toward geographically distant co-religionists. Furthermore, another hypothesis points to such mechanisms being constrained to the religious ingroup, possibly at the expense of religious outgroups. To test these hypotheses, we administered two behavioural experiments and a set of interviews to a sample of 2228 participants from 15 diverse populations. These populations included foragers, pastoralists, horticulturalists, and wage labourers, practicing Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism, but also forms of animism and ancestor worship. Using the Random Allocation Game (RAG) and the Dictator Game (DG) in which individuals allocated money between themselves, local and geographically distant co-religionists, and religious outgroups, we found that higher ratings of gods as monitoring and punishing predicted decreased local favouritism (RAGs) and increased resource-sharing with distant co-religionists (DGs). The effects of punishing and monitoring gods on outgroup allocations revealed between-site variability, suggesting that in the absence of intergroup hostility, moralizing gods may be implicated in cooperative behaviour toward outgroups. These results provide support for the hypothesis that beliefs in monitoring and punitive gods help expand the circle of sustainable social interaction, and open questions about the treatment of religious outgroups.

Large-scale cooperation driven by reputation, not fear of divine punishment

Reputational considerations favour cooperation and thus we expect less cooperation in larger communities where people are less well known to each other. Some argue that institutions are, therefore, necessary to coordinate large-scale cooperation, including moralizing religions that promote cooperation through the fear of divine punishment. Here, we use community size as a proxy for reputational concerns, and test whether people in small, stable communities are more cooperative than people in large, less stable communities in both religious and non-religious contexts. We conducted a donation game on a large naturalistic sample of 501 people in 17 communities, with varying religions or none, ranging from small villages to large cities in northwestern China. We found that more money was donated by those in small, stable communities, where reputation should be more salient. Religious practice was also associated with higher donations, but fear of divine punishment was not. In a second game on the same sample, decisions were private, giving donors the opportunity to cheat. We found that donors to religious institutions were not less likely to cheat, and community size was not important in this game. Results from the donation game suggest donations to both religious and non-religious institutions are being motivated by reputational considerations, and results from both games suggest fear of divine punishment is not important. This chimes with other studies suggesting social benefits rather than fear of punishment may be the more salient motive for cooperative behaviour in real-world settings.

Influence of Indigenous Spiritual Beliefs on Natural Resource Management and Ecological Conservation in Thailand

Understanding how indigenous people manage their natural resources can provide a basis for formulating appropriate policies for natural resources management that benefits them while preserving their cultural beliefs. The objective of this study is to investigate the factors that influence the management of natural resources and the conservation of river ecology by the indigenous people in the Nongchaiwan wetland. We conducted in-depth interviews with 5 key informants and quantitative surveys with 158 households in two phases over a period of 3 years. Ancestral spiritual beliefs that are still salient in the Lower Songkhram River Basin influence natural resources management because they traditionally link people and natural resources. Such spiritual beliefs in the Lower Songkhram River Basin supported the indigenous people to continue conserving the natural resources in their territory. In addition, property rights granted to indigenous people also contribute to the conservation of natural resources. Our findings suggest that policy makers should engage with local beliefs in order to achieve sustainable resource management and, therefore, such practices should be recognized and included in the government’s policies on natural resources management in locations, where indigenous people live for generations.

Religious change preceded economic change in the 20th century

The decline in the everyday importance of religion with economic development is a well-known correlation, but which phenomenon comes first? Using unsupervised factor analysis and a birth cohort approach to create a retrospective time series, we present 100-year time series of secularization in different nations, derived from recent global values surveys, which we compare by decade to historical gross domestic product figures in those nations. We find evidence that a rise in secularization generally has preceded economic growth over the past century. Our multilevel, time-lagged regressions also indicate that tolerance for individual rights predicted 20th century economic growth even better than secularization. These findings hold when we control for education and shared cultural heritage.

Coevolution of landesque capital intensive agriculture and sociopolitical hierarchy

One of the defining trends of the Holocene has been the emergence of complex societies. Two essential features of complex societies are intensive resource use and sociopolitical hierarchy. Although it is widely agreed that these two phenomena are associated cross-culturally and have both contributed to the rise of complex societies, the causality underlying their relationship has been the subject of longstanding debate. Materialist theories of cultural evolution tend to view resource intensification as driving the development of hierarchy, but the reverse order of causation has also been advocated, along with a range of intermediate views. Phylogenetic methods have the potential to test between these different causal models. Here we report the results of a phylogenetic study that modeled the coevolution of one type of resource intensification-the development of landesque capital intensive agriculture-with political complexity and social stratification in a sample of 155 Austronesian-speaking societies. We found support for the coevolution of landesque capital with both political complexity and social stratification, but the contingent and nondeterministic nature of both of these relationships was clear. There was no indication that intensification was the "prime mover" in either relationship. Instead, the relationship between intensification and social stratification was broadly reciprocal, whereas political complexity was more of a driver than a result of intensification. These results challenge the materialist view and emphasize the importance of both material and social factors in the evolution of complex societies, as well as the complex and multifactorial nature of cultural evolution.

The Influence of Divine Rewards and Punishments on Religious Prosociality

A common finding across many cultures has been that religious people behave more prosocially than less (or non-) religious people. Numerous priming studies have demonstrated that the activation of religious concepts via implicit and explicit cues (e.g., 'God,' 'salvation,' among many others) increases prosociality in religious people. However, the factors underlying such findings are less clear. In this review we discuss hypotheses (e.g., the supernatural punishment hypothesis) that explain the religion-prosociality link, and also how recent findings in the empirical literature converge to suggest that the divine rewards (e.g., heaven) and punishments (e.g., hell) promised by various religious traditions may play a significant role. In addition, we further discuss inconsistencies in the religion-prosociality literature, as well as existing and future psychological studies which could improve our understanding of whether, and how, concepts of divine rewards and punishments may influence prosociality.

Uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness

Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an answer: people cooperate in an uncalculating way to signal their trustworthiness to observers. We present two economic game experiments in which uncalculating versus calculating decision-making is operationalized by either a subject's choice of whether to reveal the precise costs of cooperating (Exp. 1) or the time a subject spends considering these costs (Exp. 2). In both experiments, we find that participants are more likely to engage in uncalculating cooperation when their decision-making process is observable to others. Furthermore, we confirm that people who engage in uncalculating cooperation are perceived as, and actually are, more trustworthy than people who cooperate in a calculating way. Taken together, these data provide the first empirical evidence, to our knowledge, that uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness, and is not merely an efficient decision-making strategy that reduces cognitive costs. Our results thus help to explain a range of puzzling behaviors, such as extreme altruism, the use of ethical principles, and romantic love.

How Good Is the Samaritan, and Why?

What is the extent and nature of religious prosociality? If religious prosociality exists, is it parochial and extended selectively to coreligionists or is it generalized regardless of the recipient? Further, is it driven by preferences to help others or by expectations of reciprocity? We examined how much of a US$0.30 bonus Mechanical Turk workers would share with the other player whose religion was prominently displayed during two online resource allocation games. In one game (but not the other), the recipient could choose to reciprocate. Results from both games showed that the more central religion was in participants’ lives, the more of the bonus they shared, regardless of whether they were giving to atheists or Christians. Furthermore, this effect was most clearly related to self-reported frequency of “thinking about religious ideas” rather than belief in God or religious practice/experience. Our findings provide evidence of generalized religious prosociality and illuminate its basis.

Moralistic gods, supernatural punishment and the expansion of human sociality

Since the origins of agriculture, the scale of human cooperation and societal complexity has dramatically expanded. This fact challenges standard evolutionary explanations of prosociality because well-studied mechanisms of cooperation based on genetic relatedness, reciprocity and partner choice falter as people increasingly engage in fleeting transactions with genetically unrelated strangers in large anonymous groups. To explain this rapid expansion of prosociality, researchers have proposed several mechanisms. Here we focus on one key hypothesis: cognitive representations of gods as increasingly knowledgeable and punitive, and who sanction violators of interpersonal social norms, foster and sustain the expansion of cooperation, trust and fairness towards co-religionist strangers. We tested this hypothesis using extensive ethnographic interviews and two behavioural games designed to measure impartial rule-following among people (n = 591, observations = 35,400) from eight diverse communities from around the world: (1) inland Tanna, Vanuatu; (2) coastal Tanna, Vanuatu; (3) Yasawa, Fiji; (4) Lovu, Fiji; (5) Pesqueiro, Brazil; (6) Pointe aux Piments, Mauritius; (7) the Tyva Republic (Siberia), Russia; and (8) Hadzaland, Tanzania. Participants reported adherence to a wide array of world religious traditions including Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism, as well as notably diverse local traditions, including animism and ancestor worship. Holding a range of relevant variables constant, the higher participants rated their moralistic gods as punitive and knowledgeable about human thoughts and actions, the more coins they allocated to geographically distant co-religionist strangers relative to both themselves and local co-religionists. Our results support the hypothesis that beliefs in moralistic, punitive and knowing gods increase impartial behaviour towards distant co-religionists, and therefore can contribute to the expansion of prosociality.

Corruption and the Other(s): Scope of Superordinate Identity Matters for Corruption Permissibility

The decision to engage in corruption-public and private corruption, nepotism, and embezzlement-is often attributed to rational actors maximizing benefits to themselves. However, the importance of reciprocal relationships in humans suggests that an actor may weigh the costs of harms of her corrupt behavior to individuals who may generate future benefits for her. We hypothesize that actors who have a larger circle of actual and potential social partners will have more individuals to consider when generating harms and will thus be less likely to find corrupt acts permissible than actors with smaller circles of valued others. Using data from the World Values Survey and European Values Study (WVS), we explore whether participants with a larger geographic identity or a greater number of group memberships (i.e. a larger scope of actual and potential social partners) are less likely to find accepting bribes permissible. We find mixed support for our hypotheses, but consistently find that WVS participants with local, country, continent, or world geographic identities are less likely to find accepting a bribe permissible than those with regional identities-that is, actors whose primary identities that encompass more than their region find corruption less permissible. We discuss the importance of considering an actor's valuation of others when modeling corruption persistence, noting that establishing scopes of positive valuation is a precursor to predicting where actors will target benefits and shunt costs.

The nature and dynamics of world religions: a life-history approach

In contrast with tribal and archaic religions, world religions are characterized by a unique emphasis on extended prosociality, restricted sociosexuality, delayed gratification and the belief that these specific behaviours are sanctioned by some kind of supernatural justice. Here, we draw on recent advances in life history theory to explain this pattern of seemingly unrelated features. Life history theory examines how organisms adaptively allocate resources in the face of trade-offs between different life-goals (e.g. growth versus reproduction, exploitation versus exploration). In particular, recent studies have shown that individuals, including humans, adjust their life strategy to the environment through phenotypic plasticity: in a harsh environment, organisms tend to adopt a 'fast' strategy, pursuing smaller but more certain benefits, while in more affluent environments, organisms tend to develop a 'slow' strategy, aiming for larger but less certain benefits. Reviewing a range of recent research, we show that world religions are associated with a form of 'slow' strategy. This framework explains both the promotion of 'slow' behaviours such as altruism, self-regulation and monogamy in modern world religions, and the condemnation of 'fast' behaviours such as selfishness, conspicuous sexuality and materialism. This ecological approach also explains the diffusion pattern of world religions: why they emerged late in human history (500-300 BCE), why they are currently in decline in the most affluent societies and why they persist in some places despite this overall decline.

Trust, Punishment, and Cooperation Across 18 Societies: A Meta-Analysis

Punishment promotes contributions to public goods, but recent evidence suggests that its effectiveness varies across societies. Prior theorizing suggests that cross-societal differences in trust play a key role in determining the effectiveness of punishment, as a form of social norm enforcement, to promote cooperation. One line of reasoning is that punishment promotes cooperation in low-trust societies, primarily because people in such societies expect their fellow members to contribute only if there are strong incentives to do so. Yet another line of reasoning is that high trust makes punishment work, presumably because in high-trust societies people may count on each other to make contributions to public goods and also enforce norm violations by punishing free riders. This poses a puzzle of punishment: Is punishment more effective in promoting cooperation in high- or low-trust societies? In the present article, we examine this puzzle of punishment in a quantitative review of 83 studies involving 7,361 participants across 18 societies that examine the impact of punishment on cooperation in a public goods dilemma. The findings provide a clear answer: Punishment more strongly promotes cooperation in societies with high trust rather than low trust.

The cultural evolution of prosocial religions

We develop a cultural evolutionary theory of the origins of prosocial religions and apply it to resolve two puzzles in human psychology and cultural history: (1) the rise of large-scale cooperation among strangers and, simultaneously, (2) the spread of prosocial religions in the last 10–12 millennia. We argue that these two developments were importantly linked and mutually energizing. We explain how a package of culturally evolved religious beliefs and practices characterized by increasingly potent, moralizing, supernatural agents, credible displays of faith, and other psychologically active elements conducive to social solidarity promoted high fertility rates and large-scale cooperation with co-religionists, often contributing to success in intergroup competition and conflict. In turn, prosocial religious beliefs and practices spread and aggregated as these successful groups expanded, or were copied by less successful groups. This synthesis is grounded in the idea that although religious beliefs and practices originally arose as nonadaptive by-products of innate cognitive functions, particular cultural variants were then selected for their prosocial effects in a long-term, cultural evolutionary process. This framework (1) reconciles key aspects of the adaptationist and by-product approaches to the origins of religion, (2) explains a variety of empirical observations that have not received adequate attention, and (3) generates novel predictions. Converging lines of evidence drawn from diverse disciplines provide empirical support while at the same time encouraging new research directions and opening up new questions for exploration and debate.

Chance, purpose, and progress in evolution and christianity

Evolutionary biology has a complex relationship with ideas of chance, purpose, and progress. Probability plays a subtle role; strikingly, founding figures in statistics were motivated by evolutionary questions. The findings of evolutionary biology have been used both in support of narratives of progress, and in their deconstruction. Likewise, professional biologists bring to their scientific work a set of preconceptions about chance and progress, grounded in their philosophical, religious, and/or political views. From the religious side, questions of purpose are ever-present. We explore this interplay in five broad categories: chance, progress, intelligence, eugenics, and the evolution of religious practices, each the subject of a semester long symposium. The intellectual influence of evolutionary biology has had a broad societal impact in these areas. Based on our experience, we draw attention to a number of relevant facts that, while accepted by experts in their respective fields, may be unfamiliar outside them. We list common areas of miscommunication, including specific examples and discussing causes: sometimes semantics and sometimes more substantive knowledge barriers. We also make recommendations for those attempting similar dialogue.

Negatively-biased credulity and the cultural evolution of beliefs

The functions of cultural beliefs are often opaque to those who hold them. Accordingly, to benefit from cultural evolution’s ability to solve complex adaptive problems, learners must be credulous. However, credulity entails costs, including susceptibility to exploitation, and effort wasted due to false beliefs. One determinant of the optimal level of credulity is the ratio between the costs of two types of errors: erroneous incredulity (failing to believe information that is true) and erroneous credulity (believing information that is false). This ratio can be expected to be asymmetric when information concerns hazards, as the costs of erroneous incredulity will, on average, exceed the costs of erroneous credulity; no equivalent asymmetry characterizes information concerning benefits. Natural selection can therefore be expected to have crafted learners’ minds so as to be more credulous toward information concerning hazards. This negatively-biased credulity extends general negativity bias, the adaptive tendency for negative events to be more salient than positive events. Together, these biases constitute attractors that should shape cultural evolution via the aggregated effects of learners’ differential retention and transmission of information. In two studies in the U.S., we demonstrate the existence of negatively-biased credulity, and show that it is most pronounced in those who believe the world to be dangerous, individuals who may constitute important nodes in cultural transmission networks. We then document the predicted imbalance in cultural content using a sample of urban legends collected from the Internet and a sample of supernatural beliefs obtained from ethnographies of a representative collection of the world’s cultures, showing that beliefs about hazards predominate in both.

When punishment pays

Explaining cooperation in groups remains a key problem because reciprocity breaks down between more than two. Punishing individuals who contribute little provides a potential answer but changes the dilemma to why pay the costs of punishing which, like cooperation itself, provides a public good. Nevertheless, people are observed to punish others in behavioural economic games, posing a problem for existing theory which highlights the difficulty in explaining the spread and persistence of punishment. Here, I consider the apparent mismatch between theory and evidence and show by means of instructive analysis and simulation how much of the experimental evidence for punishment comes from scenarios in which punishers may expect to obtain a net benefit from punishing free-riders. In repeated games within groups, punishment works by imposing costs on defectors so that it pays them to switch to cooperating. Both punishers and non-punishers then benefit from the resulting increase in cooperation, hence investing in punishment can constitute a social dilemma. However, I show the conditions in which the benefits of increased cooperation are so great that they more than offset the costs of punishing, thereby removing the temptation to free-ride on others' investments and making punishment explicable in terms of direct self-interest. Crucially, this is because of the leveraging effect imposed in typical studies whereby people can pay a small cost to inflict a heavy loss on a punished individual. In contrast to previous models suggesting punishment is disadvantaged when rare, I show it can invade until it comes into a producer-scrounger equilibrium with non-punishers. I conclude that adding punishment to an iterated public goods game can solve the problem of achieving cooperation by removing the social dilemma.

Faith after an earthquake: a longitudinal study of religion and perceived health before and after the 2011 Christchurch New Zealand Earthquake

On 22 February 2011, Christchurch New Zealand (population 367,700) experienced a devastating earthquake, causing extensive damage and killing one hundred and eighty-five people. The earthquake and aftershocks occurred between the 2009 and 2011 waves of a longitudinal probability sample conducted in New Zealand, enabling us to examine how a natural disaster of this magnitude affected deeply held commitments and global ratings of personal health, depending on earthquake exposure. We first investigated whether the earthquake-affected were more likely to believe in God. Consistent with the Religious Comfort Hypothesis, religious faith increased among the earthquake-affected, despite an overall decline in religious faith elsewhere. This result offers the first population-level demonstration that secular people turn to religion at times of natural crisis. We then examined whether religious affiliation was associated with differences in subjective ratings of personal health. We found no evidence for superior buffering from having religious faith. Among those affected by the earthquake, however, a loss of faith was associated with significant subjective health declines. Those who lost faith elsewhere in the country did not experience similar health declines. Our findings suggest that religious conversion after a natural disaster is unlikely to improve subjective well-being, yet upholding faith might be an important step on the road to recovery.

Outsourcing punishment to God: beliefs in divine control reduce earthly punishment

The sanctioning of norm-transgressors is a necessary--though often costly--task for maintaining a well-functioning society. Prior to effective and reliable secular institutions for punishment, large-scale societies depended on individuals engaging in 'altruistic punishment'--bearing the costs of punishment individually, for the benefit of society. Evolutionary approaches to religion suggest that beliefs in powerful, moralizing Gods, who can distribute rewards and punishments, emerged as a way to augment earthly punishment in large societies that could not effectively monitor norm violations. In five studies, we investigate whether such beliefs in God can replace people's motivation to engage in altruistic punishment, and their support for state-sponsored punishment. Results show that, although religiosity generally predicts higher levels of punishment, the specific belief in powerful, intervening Gods reduces altruistic punishment and support for state-sponsored punishment. Moreover, these effects are specifically owing to differences in people's perceptions that humans are responsible for punishing wrongdoers.

Spreading order: religion, cooperative niche construction, and risky coordination problems

Adaptationists explain the evolution of religion from the cooperative effects of religious commitments, but which cooperation problem does religion evolve to solve? I focus on a class of symmetrical coordination problems for which there are two pure Nash equilibriums: (1) ALL COOPERATE, which is efficient but relies on full cooperation; (2) ALL DEFECT, which is inefficient but pays regardless of what others choose. Formal and experimental studies reveal that for such risky coordination problems, only the defection equilibrium is evolutionarily stable. The following makes sense of otherwise puzzling properties of religious cognition and cultures as features of cooperative designs that evolve to stabilise such risky exchange. The model is interesting because it explains lingering puzzles in the data on religion, and better integrates evolutionary theories of religion with recent, well-motivated models of cooperative niche construction.