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Fitouchi L, André JB, Baumard N. The puritanical moral contract: Purity, cooperation, and the architecture of the moral mind. Behav Brain Sci 2023; 46:e322. [PMID: 37789526 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x23001188] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 10/05/2023]
Abstract
Commentators raise fundamental questions about the notion of purity (sect. R1), the architecture of moral cognition (sect. R2), the functional relationship between morality and cooperation (sect. R3), the role of folk-theories of self-control in moral judgment (sect. R4), and the cultural variation of morality (sect. R5). In our response, we address all these issues by clarifying our theory of puritanism, responding to counter-arguments, and incorporating welcome corrections and extensions.
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Affiliation(s)
- Léo Fitouchi
- Département d'études cognitives, Institut Jean Nicod, École normale supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, Paris, France ; https://sites.google.com/view/leofitouchi/home ; http://jb.homepage.free.fr/ ; https://nicolasbaumards.org/
| | - Jean-Baptiste André
- Département d'études cognitives, Institut Jean Nicod, École normale supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, Paris, France ; https://sites.google.com/view/leofitouchi/home ; http://jb.homepage.free.fr/ ; https://nicolasbaumards.org/
| | - Nicolas Baumard
- Département d'études cognitives, Institut Jean Nicod, École normale supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, Paris, France ; https://sites.google.com/view/leofitouchi/home ; http://jb.homepage.free.fr/ ; https://nicolasbaumards.org/
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2
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Claessens S, Kyritsis T. Partner choice does not predict prosociality across countries. EVOLUTIONARY HUMAN SCIENCES 2022; 4:e54. [PMID: 37588938 PMCID: PMC10426035 DOI: 10.1017/ehs.2022.51] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/26/2022] [Revised: 11/06/2022] [Accepted: 11/08/2022] [Indexed: 11/22/2022] Open
Abstract
Why does human prosociality vary around the world? Evolutionary models and laboratory experiments suggest that possibilities for partner choice (i.e. the ability to leave unprofitable relationships and strike up new ones) should promote cooperation across human societies. Leveraging the Global Preferences Survey (n = 27,125; 27 countries) and the World Values Survey (n = 54,728; 32 countries), we test this theory by estimating the associations between relational mobility, a socioecological measure of partner choice, and a wide variety of prosocial attitudes and behaviours, including impersonal altruism, reciprocity, trust, collective action and moral judgements of antisocial behaviour. Contrary to our pre-registered predictions, we found little evidence that partner choice is related to prosociality across countries. After controlling for shared causes of relational mobility and prosociality - environmental harshness, subsistence style and geographic and linguistic proximity - we found that only altruism and trust in people from another religion are positively related to relational mobility. We did not find positive relationships between relational mobility and reciprocity, generalised trust, collective action or moral judgements. These findings challenge evolutionary theories of human cooperation which emphasise partner choice as a key explanatory mechanism, and highlight the need to generalise models and experiments to global samples.
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Affiliation(s)
- Scott Claessens
- School of Psychology, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
| | - Thanos Kyritsis
- School of Psychology, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
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3
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Arai S, Tooby J, Cosmides L. Why punish cheaters? Those who withdraw cooperation enjoy better reputations than punishers, but both are viewed as difficult to exploit. EVOL HUM BEHAV 2022. [DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2022.10.002] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
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4
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Levy DA. Optimizing the social utility of judicial punishment: An evolutionary biology and neuroscience perspective. Front Hum Neurosci 2022; 16:967090. [PMID: 36171873 PMCID: PMC9511021 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2022.967090] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 06/12/2022] [Accepted: 08/24/2022] [Indexed: 11/13/2022] Open
Abstract
Punishment as a response to impairment of individual or group welfare may be found not only among humans but also among a wide range of social animals. In some cases, acts of punishment serve to increase social cooperation among conspecifics. Such phenomena motivate the search for the biological foundations of punishment among humans. Of special interest are cases of pro-social punishment of individuals harming others. Behavioral studies have shown that in economic games people punish exploiters even at a cost to their own welfare. Additionally, neuroimaging studies have reported activity during the planning of such punishment in brain areas involved in the anticipation of reward. Such findings hint that there is an evolutionarily honed basic drive to punish social offenders. I argue that the transfer of punishment authority from the individual to the group requires that social offenders be punished as a public good, even if such punishment is not effective as retribution or deterrent. Furthermore, the social need for punishment of offenders has implications for alternatives to incarceration, publicity of punishment, and judicial structure.
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Affiliation(s)
- Daniel A. Levy
- Baruch Ivcher School of Psychology, Reichman University – IDC, Herzliya, Israel
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5
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Sensorimotor communication fosters trust and generosity: The role of effort and signal utility. Cognition 2022; 224:105066. [DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105066] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/26/2021] [Revised: 02/04/2022] [Accepted: 02/13/2022] [Indexed: 11/22/2022]
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6
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How to make big decisions: A cross-sectional study on the decision making process in life choices. CURRENT PSYCHOLOGY 2022. [DOI: 10.1007/s12144-022-02792-x] [Citation(s) in RCA: 0] [Impact Index Per Article: 0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/27/2022]
Abstract
AbstractPeople often make life choices that will affect their future (e.g. getting married). However, research on decision making focuses more on abstract dilemmas than on decision making. The aim of this study is threefold: to analyze (1) whether people rely mainly on intuitive or rational processing (System 1 or 2) when making life choices; (2) whether some characteristics of recalled life choices (e.g., difficulty in making the decision) differ between life areas (sentimental and work contexts); (3) whether personality traits and System 1 or 2 utilization may predict final satisfaction in life choices. By conducting a cross-sectional study on 188 participants’ recall of selected life decisions (in the sentimental and work life areas) we found that System 1 is more involved than System 2 in sentimental choices while the opposite happens for work ones. Lastly, satisfaction in life choices is partially predicted by the involvement of cognitive systems and individual differences, with different predictors emerging across life areas. Discussion suggests directions for future research on naturalistic decision making.
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7
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Batistoni T, Barclay P, Raihani NJ. Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game. Proc Biol Sci 2022; 289:20211773. [PMID: 35016543 PMCID: PMC8753170 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2021.1773] [Citation(s) in RCA: 1] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/07/2021] [Accepted: 12/07/2021] [Indexed: 01/20/2023] Open
Abstract
Third-party punishment is thought to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent and such signals might escalate when competing to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate whether partner choice competition prompts escalating investment in third-party punishment. We also consider the case of signalling via helpful acts to provide a direct test of the relative strength of the two types of signals. Individuals invested more in third-party helping than third-party punishment and invested more in both signals when observed compared to when investments would be unseen. We found no clear effect of partner choice (over and above mere observation) on investments in either punishment or helping. Third-parties who invested more than a partner were preferentially chosen for a subsequent Trust Game although the preference to interact with the higher investor was more pronounced in the help than in the punishment condition. Third-parties who invested more were entrusted with more money and investments in third-party punishment or helping reliably signalled trustworthiness. Individuals who did not invest in third-party helping were more likely to be untrustworthy than those who did not invest in third-party punishment. This supports the conception of punishment as a more ambiguous signal of cooperative intent compared to help.
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Affiliation(s)
- Tommaso Batistoni
- Centre for Experimental Social Sciences, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 1NF, UK
| | - Pat Barclay
- Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Guelph, Canada N1G 2W1
| | - Nichola J. Raihani
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London WC1H 0AP, UK
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8
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Molho C, Wu J. Direct punishment and indirect reputation-based tactics to intervene against offences. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2021; 376:20200289. [PMID: 34601906 PMCID: PMC8487740 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0289] [Citation(s) in RCA: 9] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Accepted: 07/19/2021] [Indexed: 12/22/2022] Open
Abstract
Punishment and reputation-based mechanisms play a major role in supporting the evolution of human cooperation. Theoretical accounts and field observations suggest that humans use multiple tactics to intervene against offences-including confrontation, gossip and ostracism-which have unique benefits and costs. Here, we draw a distinction between direct punishment tactics (i.e. physical and verbal confrontation) and indirect reputation-based tactics (i.e. gossip and ostracism). Based on this distinction, we sketch the common and unique social functions that different tactics are tailored to serve and describe information-processing mechanisms that potentially underlie decisions concerning how to intervene against offences. We propose that decision rules guiding direct and indirect tactics should weigh information about the benefits of changing others' behaviour versus the costs of potential retaliation. Based on a synthesis of existing evidence, we highlight the role of situational, relational and emotional factors in motivating distinct punishment tactics. We suggest that delineating between direct and indirect tactics can inform debates about the prevalence and functions of punishment and the reputational consequences of third-party intervention against offences. We emphasize the need to study how people use reputation-based tactics for partner recalibration and partner choice, within interdependent relationships and social networks, and in daily life situations. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.
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Affiliation(s)
- Catherine Molho
- Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, Université Toulouse 1 Capitole, Toulouse, France
- Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED), University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1001 NJ Amsterdam, The Netherlands
| | - Junhui Wu
- CAS Key Laboratory of Behavioral Science, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China
- Department of Psychology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China
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9
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Raihani NJ, Power EA. No good deed goes unpunished: the social costs of prosocial behaviour. EVOLUTIONARY HUMAN SCIENCES 2021; 3:e40. [PMID: 37588551 PMCID: PMC10427331 DOI: 10.1017/ehs.2021.35] [Citation(s) in RCA: 7] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 12/21/2022] Open
Abstract
Performing costly helpful behaviours can allow individuals to improve their reputation. Those who gain a good reputation are often preferred as interaction partners and are consequently better able to access support through cooperative relationships with others. However, investing in prosocial displays can sometimes yield social costs: excessively generous individuals risk losing their good reputation, and even being vilified, ostracised or antisocially punished. As a consequence, people frequently try to downplay their prosocial actions or hide them from others. In this review, we explore when and why investments in prosocial behaviour are likely to yield social costs. We propose two key features of interactions that make it more likely that generous individuals will incur social costs when: (a) observers infer that helpful behaviour is motivated by strategic or selfish motives; and (b) observers infer that helpful behaviour is detrimental to them. We describe how the cognition required to consider ulterior motives emerges over development and how these tendencies vary across cultures - and discuss how the potential for helpful actions to result in social costs might place boundaries on prosocial behaviour as well as limiting the contexts in which it might occur. We end by outlining the key avenues and priorities for future research.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nichola J. Raihani
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, LondonWC1H 0AP, UK
| | - Eleanor A. Power
- Department of Methodology, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, LondonWC2A 2AE, UK
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10
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Shen C, Jusup M, Shi L, Wang Z, Perc M, Holme P. Exit rights open complex pathways to cooperation. J R Soc Interface 2021; 18:20200777. [PMID: 33435841 DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2020.0777] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
We study the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma game in which cooperators and defectors interact with another actor type called exiters. Rather than being exploited by defectors, exiters exit the game in favour of a small pay-off. We find that this simple extension of the game allows cooperation to flourish in well-mixed populations when iterations or reputation are added. In networked populations, however, the exit option is less conducive to cooperation. Instead, it enables the coexistence of cooperators, defectors, and exiters through cyclic dominance. Other outcomes are also possible as the exit pay-off increases or the network structure changes, including network-wide oscillations in actor abundances that may cause the extinction of exiters and the domination of defectors, although game parameters should favour exiting. The complex dynamics that emerges in the wake of a simple option to exit the game implies that nuances matter even if our analyses are restricted to incentives for rational behaviour.
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Affiliation(s)
- Chen Shen
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, People's Republic of China.,Tokyo Tech World Hub Research Initiative, Institute of Innovative Research, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo 152-8550, Japan
| | - Marko Jusup
- Tokyo Tech World Hub Research Initiative, Institute of Innovative Research, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo 152-8550, Japan
| | - Lei Shi
- School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming 650221, People's Republic of China
| | - Zhen Wang
- Center for OPTical IMagery Analysis and Learning (OPTIMAL) and School of Mechanical Engineering, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, People's Republic of China
| | - Matjaž Perc
- Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia.,Department of Medical Research, China Medical University Hospital, China Medical University, Taichung 404332, Taiwan, Republic of China.,Complexity Science Hub Vienna, 1080 Vienna, Austria
| | - Petter Holme
- Tokyo Tech World Hub Research Initiative, Institute of Innovative Research, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo 152-8550, Japan
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11
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Darden SK, James R, Cave JM, Brask JB, Croft DP. Trinidadian guppies use a social heuristic that can support cooperation among non-kin. Proc Biol Sci 2020; 287:20200487. [PMID: 32900316 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2020.0487] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 01/02/2023] Open
Abstract
Cooperation among non-kin is well documented in humans and widespread in non-human animals, but explaining the occurrence of cooperation in the absence of inclusive fitness benefits has proven a significant challenge. Current theoretical explanations converge on a single point: cooperators can prevail when they cluster in social space. However, we know very little about the real-world mechanisms that drive such clustering, particularly in systems where cognitive limitations make it unlikely that mechanisms such as score keeping and reputation are at play. Here, we show that Trinidadian guppies (Poecilia reticulata) use a 'walk away' strategy, a simple social heuristic by which assortment by cooperativeness can come about among mobile agents. Guppies cooperate during predator inspection and we found that when experiencing defection in this context, individuals prefer to move to a new social environment, despite having no prior information about this new social group. Our results provide evidence in non-human animals that individuals use a simple social partner updating strategy in response to defection, supporting theoretical work applying heuristics to understanding the proximate mechanisms underpinning the evolution of cooperation among non-kin.
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Affiliation(s)
- Safi K Darden
- Centre for Research in Animal Behaviour, Department of Psychology, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, UK
| | - Richard James
- Department of Physics and Centre for Networks and Collective Behaviour, University of Bath, Bath, UK
| | - James M Cave
- Department of Physics and Centre for Networks and Collective Behaviour, University of Bath, Bath, UK
| | - Josefine Bohr Brask
- Centre for Research in Animal Behaviour, Department of Psychology, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, UK
| | - Darren P Croft
- Centre for Research in Animal Behaviour, Department of Psychology, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, UK
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12
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The evolution of leadership: Leadership and followership as a solution to the problem of creating and executing successful coordination and cooperation enterprises. LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY 2020. [DOI: 10.1016/j.leaqua.2019.05.006] [Citation(s) in RCA: 17] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/23/2022]
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13
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Abstract
Humans are outstanding in their ability to cooperate with unrelated individuals, and punishment - paying a cost to harm others - is thought to be a key supporting mechanism. According to this view, cooperators punish defectors, who respond by behaving more cooperatively in future interactions. However, a synthesis of the evidence from laboratory and real-world settings casts serious doubts on the assumption that the sole function of punishment is to convert cheating individuals into cooperators. Instead, punishment often prompts retaliation and punishment decisions frequently stem from competitive, rather than deterrent motives. Punishment decisions often reflect the desire to equalise or elevate payoffs relative to targets, rather than the desire to enact revenge for harm received or to deter cheats from reoffending in future. We therefore suggest that punishment also serves a competitive function, where what looks like spiteful behaviour actually allows punishers to equalise or elevate their own payoffs and/or status relative to targets independently of any change in the target's behaviour. Institutions that reduce or remove the possibility that punishers are motivated by relative payoff or status concerns might offer a way to harness these competitive motives and render punishment more effective at restoring cooperation.
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Affiliation(s)
- Nichola J. Raihani
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UK
| | - Redouan Bshary
- Institut de Biologie, Université de Neuchâtel, Rue Emilie-Argand 11, Neuchâtel, CH-2000, Switzerland
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14
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Abstract
Our target article modeled conflict within and between groups as an asymmetric game of strategy and developed a framework to explain the evolved neurobiological, psychological, and sociocultural mechanisms underlying attack and defense. Twenty-seven commentaries add insights from diverse disciplines, such as animal biology, evolutionary game theory, human neuroscience, psychology, anthropology, and political science, that collectively extend and supplement this model in three ways. Here we draw attention to the superordinate structure of attack and defense, and its subordinate means to meet the end of status quo maintenance versus change, and we discuss (1) how variations in conflict structure and power disparities between antagonists can impact strategy selection and behavior during attack and defense; (2) how the positions of attack and defense emerge endogenously and are subject to rhetoric and propaganda; and (3) how psychological and economic interventions can transform attacker-defender conflicts into coordination games that allow mutual gains and dispute resolution.
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15
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Geoffroy F, Baumard N, André JB. Why cooperation is not running away. J Evol Biol 2019; 32:1069-1081. [PMID: 31298759 DOI: 10.1111/jeb.13508] [Citation(s) in RCA: 2] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.4] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/08/2019] [Accepted: 06/14/2019] [Indexed: 11/28/2022]
Abstract
A growing number of experimental and theoretical studies show the importance of partner choice as a mechanism to promote the evolution of cooperation, especially in humans. In this paper, we focus on the question of the precise quantitative level of cooperation that should evolve under this mechanism. When individuals compete to be chosen by others, their level of investment in cooperation evolves towards higher values, a process called competitive altruism, or runaway cooperation. Using a classic adaptive dynamics model, we first show that when the cost of changing partner is low, this runaway process can lead to a profitless escalation of cooperation. In the extreme, when partner choice is entirely frictionless, cooperation even increases up to a level where its cost entirely cancels out its benefit. That is, at evolutionary equilibrium, individuals gain the same payoff than if they had not cooperated at all. Second, importing models from matching theory in economics we, however, show that when individuals can plastically modulate their choosiness in function of their own cooperation level, partner choice stops being a runaway competition to outbid others and becomes a competition to form the most optimal partnerships. In this case, when the cost of changing partner tends towards zero, partner choice leads to the evolution of the socially optimum level of cooperation. This last result could explain the observation that human cooperation seems to be often constrained by considerations of social efficiency.
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Affiliation(s)
- Félix Geoffroy
- Institut des Sciences de l'Évolution, UMR 5554 - CNRS - Université Montpellier, Montpellier, France
| | - Nicolas Baumard
- Institut Jean-Nicod (CNRS - EHESS - ENS), Département d'Etudes Cognitives, Ecole Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University, Paris, France
| | - Jean-Baptiste André
- Institut Jean-Nicod (CNRS - EHESS - ENS), Département d'Etudes Cognitives, Ecole Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University, Paris, France
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16
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Enforcement is central to the evolution of cooperation. Nat Ecol Evol 2019; 3:1018-1029. [PMID: 31239554 DOI: 10.1038/s41559-019-0907-1] [Citation(s) in RCA: 40] [Impact Index Per Article: 8.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 10/24/2018] [Accepted: 04/26/2019] [Indexed: 01/21/2023]
Abstract
Cooperation occurs at all levels of life, from genomes, complex cells and multicellular organisms to societies and mutualisms between species. A major question for evolutionary biology is what these diverse systems have in common. Here, we review the full breadth of cooperative systems and find that they frequently rely on enforcement mechanisms that suppress selfish behaviour. We discuss many examples, including the suppression of transposable elements, uniparental inheritance of mitochondria and plastids, anti-cancer mechanisms, reciprocation and punishment in humans and other vertebrates, policing in eusocial insects and partner choice in mutualisms between species. To address a lack of accompanying theory, we develop a series of evolutionary models that show that the enforcement of cooperation is widely predicted. We argue that enforcement is an underappreciated, and often critical, ingredient for cooperation across all scales of biological organization.
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17
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Bigenwald A, Chambon V. Criminal Responsibility and Neuroscience: No Revolution Yet. Front Psychol 2019; 10:1406. [PMID: 31316418 PMCID: PMC6610327 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01406] [Citation(s) in RCA: 15] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 02/15/2019] [Accepted: 05/31/2019] [Indexed: 11/25/2022] Open
Abstract
Since the 1990's, neurolaw is on the rise. At the heart of heated debates lies the recurrent theme of a neuro-revolution of criminal responsibility. However, caution should be observed: the alleged foundations of criminal responsibility (amongst which free will) are often inaccurate and the relative imperviousness of its real foundations to scientific facts often underestimated. Neuroscientific findings may impact on social institutions, but only insofar as they also engage in a political justification of the changes being called for, convince populations, and take into consideration the ensuing consequences. Moreover, the many limits of neuroscientific tools call for increased vigilance when, if ever, using neuroscientific evidence in a courtroom. In this article, we aim at setting the basis for future sound debates on the contribution of neuroscience to criminal law, and in particular to the assessment of criminal responsibility. As such, we provide analytical tools to grasp the political and normative nature of criminal responsibility and review the current or projected use of neuroscience in the law, all the while bearing in mind the highly publicized question: can neuroscience revolutionize criminal responsibility? Answering this question implicitly requires answering a second question: should neuroscience revolutionize the institution of criminal responsibility? Answering both, in turn, requires drawing the line between science and normativity, revolution and dialogue, fantasies and legitimate hopes.
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Affiliation(s)
- Ariane Bigenwald
- Département de Philosophie, Université Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne, Paris, France
- Institut Jean Nicod (ENS – EHESS – CNRS), Département d’Etudes Cognitives, Ecole Normale Supérieure, PSL University, Paris, France
| | - Valerian Chambon
- Institut Jean Nicod (ENS – EHESS – CNRS), Département d’Etudes Cognitives, Ecole Normale Supérieure, PSL University, Paris, France
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18
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Pathways to cognitive design. Behav Processes 2019; 161:73-86. [DOI: 10.1016/j.beproc.2018.05.013] [Citation(s) in RCA: 8] [Impact Index Per Article: 1.6] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 08/31/2017] [Revised: 05/01/2018] [Accepted: 05/22/2018] [Indexed: 11/19/2022]
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19
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Gross J, De Dreu CK. Individual solutions to shared problems create a modern tragedy of the commons. SCIENCE ADVANCES 2019; 5:eaau7296. [PMID: 31001579 PMCID: PMC6469947 DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.aau7296] [Citation(s) in RCA: 21] [Impact Index Per Article: 4.2] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [MESH Headings] [Grants] [Track Full Text] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 07/10/2018] [Accepted: 02/28/2019] [Indexed: 05/31/2023]
Abstract
Alone and together, climatic changes, population growth, and economic scarcity create shared problems that can be tackled effectively through cooperation and coordination. Perhaps because cooperation is fragile and easily breaks down, societies also provide individual solutions to shared problems, such as privatized healthcare or retirement planning. But how does the availability of individual solutions affect free-riding and the efficient creation of public goods? We confronted groups of individuals with a shared problem that could be solved either individually or collectively. Across different cost-benefit ratios of individually versus collectively solving the shared problem, individuals display a remarkable tendency toward group-independent, individual solutions. This "individualism" leads to inefficient resource allocations and coordination failure. Introducing peer punishment further results in wasteful punishment feuds between "individualists" and "collectivists." In the presence of individual solutions to shared problems, groups struggle to balance self-reliance and collective efficiency, leading to a "modern tragedy of the commons."
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Affiliation(s)
- Jörg Gross
- Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, 2300 RB Leiden, Netherlands
| | - Carsten K.W. De Dreu
- Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, 2300 RB Leiden, Netherlands
- Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision Making (CREED), University of Amsterdam, 1001 NB Amsterdam, Netherlands
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20
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Hunter-Gatherers Maintain Assortativity in Cooperation despite High Levels of Residential Change and Mixing. Curr Biol 2018; 28:3152-3157.e4. [PMID: 30245106 DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2018.07.064] [Citation(s) in RCA: 99] [Impact Index Per Article: 16.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/19/2018] [Revised: 06/11/2018] [Accepted: 07/24/2018] [Indexed: 11/20/2022]
Abstract
Widespread cooperation is a defining feature of human societies from hunter-gatherer bands to nation states [1, 2], but explaining its evolution remains a challenge. Although positive assortment of cooperators is recognized as a basic requirement for the evolution of cooperation, the mechanisms governing assortment are debated. Moreover, the social structure of modern hunter-gatherers, characterized by high mobility, residential mixing, and low genetic relatedness [3], undermines assortment and adds to the puzzle of how cooperation evolved. Here, we analyze four years of data (2010, 2013, 2014, 2016) tracking residence and levels of cooperation elicited from a public goods game in Hadza hunter-gatherers of Tanzania. Data were collected from 56 camps, comprising 383 unique individuals, 137 of whom we have data for two or more years. Despite significant residential mixing, we observe a robust pattern of assortment that is necessary for cooperation to evolve; in every year, Hadza camps exhibit high between-camp and low within-camp variation in cooperation. We find little evidence that cooperative behavior within individuals is stable over time or that similarity in cooperation between dyads predicts their future cohabitation. Both sets of findings are inconsistent with models that assume stable cooperative and selfish types, including partner choice models. Consistent with social norms, culture, and reciprocity theories, the strongest predictor of an individual's level of cooperation is the mean cooperation of their current campmates. These findings underscore the adaptive nature of human cooperation-particularly its responsiveness to social contexts-as a feature that is important in generating the assortment necessary for cooperation to evolve.
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The Dark Triad and framing effects predict selfish behavior in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma. PLoS One 2018; 13:e0203891. [PMID: 30231036 PMCID: PMC6145542 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0203891] [Citation(s) in RCA: 18] [Impact Index Per Article: 3.0] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 05/21/2018] [Accepted: 08/29/2018] [Indexed: 11/19/2022] Open
Abstract
What causes us to display selfish behaviors? We explored the extent to which Dark Triad traits (sub-clinical psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism) support a selfish behavioral strategy. We related performance on a hypothetical Prisoner's Dilemma (an economic game that simulates a two-person social dilemma) to participants' (N = 1400) Dark Triad scores. Because contextual factors also impact selfish behaviors, we tested how framing (gain vs. loss; and social vs. nonsocial) shaped performance in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Participants with high Dark Triad scores were more likely to behave selfishly in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Participants were also most likely to betray their partner in loss-framed and non-socially framed contexts. These effects did not interact with Dark Triad scores. Our data are consistent with the view that seemingly negative personality traits (like those associated with the Dark Triad traits) that persist in the population may serve as evolutionarily adaptive behavioral strategies.
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Haesevoets T, Bostyn DH, Reinders Folmer C, Roets A, Van Hiel A. Decision making in the prisoner's dilemma game: The effect of exit on cooperation and social welfare. JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 2018. [DOI: 10.1002/bdm.2096] [Citation(s) in RCA: 5] [Impact Index Per Article: 0.8] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Track Full Text] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Indexed: 11/08/2022]
Affiliation(s)
- Tessa Haesevoets
- Department of Developmental, Personality and Social PsychologyGhent University Ghent Belgium
| | - Dries H. Bostyn
- Department of Developmental, Personality and Social PsychologyGhent University Ghent Belgium
| | | | - Arne Roets
- Department of Developmental, Personality and Social PsychologyGhent University Ghent Belgium
| | - Alain Van Hiel
- Department of Developmental, Personality and Social PsychologyGhent University Ghent Belgium
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Bshary R, Raihani NJ. Helping in humans and other animals: a fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue. Proc Biol Sci 2018; 284:rspb.2017.0929. [PMID: 28954904 PMCID: PMC5627196 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2017.0929] [Citation(s) in RCA: 14] [Impact Index Per Article: 2.3] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Key Words] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 04/29/2017] [Accepted: 08/29/2017] [Indexed: 11/12/2022] Open
Abstract
Humans are arguably unique in the extent and scale of cooperation with unrelated individuals. While pairwise interactions among non-relatives occur in some non-human species, there is scant evidence of the large-scale, often unconditional prosociality that characterizes human social behaviour. Consequently, one may ask whether research on cooperation in humans can offer general insights to researchers working on similar questions in non-human species, and whether research on humans should be published in biology journals. We contend that the answer to both of these questions is yes. Most importantly, social behaviour in humans and other species operates under the same evolutionary framework. Moreover, we highlight how an open dialogue between different fields can inspire studies on humans and non-human species, leading to novel approaches and insights. Biology journals should encourage these discussions rather than drawing artificial boundaries between disciplines. Shared current and future challenges are to study helping in ecologically relevant contexts in order to correctly interpret how payoff matrices translate into inclusive fitness, and to integrate mechanisms into the hitherto largely functional theory. We can and should study human cooperation within a comparative framework in order to gain a full understanding of the evolution of helping.
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Affiliation(s)
- Redouan Bshary
- Institute of Biology, University of Neuchâtel, Emile-Argand 11, 2000 Neuchâtel, Switzerland
| | - Nichola J Raihani
- Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UK
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Abstract
Our species is routinely depicted as unique in its ability to achieve cooperation, whereas our closest relative, the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), is often characterized as overly competitive. Human cooperation is assisted by the cost attached to competitive tendencies through enforcement mechanisms, such as punishment and partner choice. To examine if chimpanzees possess the same ability to mitigate competition, we set up a cooperative task in the presence of the entire group of 11 adults, which required two or three individuals to pull jointly to receive rewards. This open-group set-up provided ample opportunity for competition (e.g., freeloading, displacements) and aggression. Despite this unique set-up and initial competitiveness, cooperation prevailed in the end, being at least five times as common as competition. The chimpanzees performed 3,565 cooperative acts while using a variety of enforcement mechanisms to overcome competition and freeloading, as measured by (attempted) thefts of rewards. These mechanisms included direct protest by the target, third-party punishment in which dominant individuals intervened against freeloaders, and partner choice. There was a marked difference between freeloading and displacement; freeloading tended to elicit withdrawal and third-party interventions, whereas displacements were met with a higher rate of direct retaliation. Humans have shown similar responses in controlled experiments, suggesting shared mechanisms across the primates to mitigate competition for the sake of cooperation.
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Gossip Versus Punishment: The Efficiency of Reputation to Promote and Maintain Cooperation. Sci Rep 2016; 6:23919. [PMID: 27039896 PMCID: PMC4819221 DOI: 10.1038/srep23919] [Citation(s) in RCA: 52] [Impact Index Per Article: 6.5] [Reference Citation Analysis] [Abstract] [Track Full Text] [Download PDF] [Figures] [Journal Information] [Subscribe] [Scholar Register] [Received: 12/04/2015] [Accepted: 03/16/2016] [Indexed: 11/11/2022] Open
Abstract
Prior theory suggests that reputation spreading (e.g., gossip) and punishment are two key mechanisms to promote cooperation in groups, but no behavioral research has yet examined their relative effectiveness and efficiency in promoting and maintaining cooperation. To examine these issues, we observed participants interacting in a four-round public goods game (PGG) with or without gossip and punishment options, and a subsequent two-round trust game (TG). We manipulated gossip as the option to send notes about other group members to these members’ future partners, and punishment as the option to assign deduction points to reduce other group members’ outcomes with a fee-to-fine ratio of 1:3. Findings revealed that in the four-round PGG, the option to gossip increased both cooperation and individual earnings, whereas the option to punish had no overall effect on cooperation (but a positive effect on cooperation in the last two rounds of the PGG) and significantly decreased individual earnings. Importantly, the initial option to gossip made people more trusting and trustworthy in the subsequent TG when gossip was no longer possible, compared to the no-gossip condition. Thus, we provide some initial evidence that gossip may be more effective and efficient than punishment to promote and maintain cooperation.
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