Pay-for-performance step-by-step: Introduction to the MIMIQ model

Lessons learned from a pay-for-performance scheme for appropriate prescribing using electronic health records from general practices in the Netherlands

INTRODUCTION

A nationwide pay-for-performance (P4P) scheme was introduced in the Netherlands between 2018 and 2023 to incentivize appropriate prescribing in general practice. Appropriate prescribing was operationalised as adherence to prescription formularies and measured based on electronic health records (EHR) data. We evaluated this P4P scheme from a learning health systems perspective.

METHODS

We conducted semi-structured interviews with 15 participants representing stakeholders of the scheme: general practitioners (GPs), health insurers, pharmacists, EHR suppliers and formulary committees. We used a thematic approach for data analysis.

RESULTS

Using EHR data showed several benefits, but lack of uniformity of EHR systems hindered consistent measurements. Specific indicators were favoured over general indicators as they allow GPs to have more control over their performance. Most participants emphasized the need for GPs to jointly reflect on their performance. Communication to GPs appeared to be challenging. Partly because of these challenges, impact of the scheme on prescribing behaviour was perceived as limited. However, several unexpected positive effects of the scheme were mentioned, such as better EHR recording habits.

CONCLUSIONS

This study identified benefits and challenges useful for future P4P schemes in promoting appropriate care with EHR data. Enhancing uniformity in EHR systems is crucial for more consistent quality measurements. Future P4P schemes should focus on high-quality feedback, peer-to-peer learning and establish a single point of communication for healthcare providers.

Characterization and effectiveness of pay-for-performance in ophthalmology: a systematic review

Background

To identify, characterize and compare existing pay-for-performance approaches and their impact on the quality of care and efficiency in ophthalmology.

Methods

A systematic evidence-based review was conducted. English, French and German written literature published between 2000 and 2015 were searched in the following databases: Medline (via PubMed), NCBI web site, Scopus, Web of Knowledge, Econlit and the Cochrane Library. Empirical as well as descriptive articles were included. Controlled clinical trials, meta-analyses, randomized controlled studies as well as observational studies were included as empirical articles. Systematic characterization of identified pay-for-performance approaches (P4P approaches) was conducted according to the “Model for Implementing and Monitoring Incentives for Quality” (MIMIQ). Methodological quality of empirical articles was assessed according to the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) checklists.

Results

Overall, 13 relevant articles were included. Eleven articles were descriptive and two articles included empirical analyses. Based on these articles, four different pay-for-performance approaches implemented in the United States were identified. With regard to quality and incentive elements, systematic comparison showed numerous differences between P4P approaches. Empirical studies showed isolated cost or quality effects, while a simultaneous examination of these effects was missing.

Conclusion

Research results show that experiences with pay-for-performance approaches in ophthalmology are limited. Identified approaches differ with regard to quality and incentive elements restricting comparability. Two empirical studies are insufficient to draw strong conclusions about the effectiveness and efficiency of these approaches.

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12913-017-2333-x) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Performing Economic Evaluation of Integrated Care: Highway to Hell or Stairway to Heaven?

Health economists are increasingly interested in integrated care in order to support decision-makers to find cost-effective solutions able to tackle the threat that chronic diseases pose on population health and health and social care budgets. However, economic evaluation in integrated care is still in its early years, facing several difficulties. The aim of this paper is to describe the unique nature of integrated care as a topic for economic evaluation, explore the obstacles to perform economic evaluation, discuss methods and techniques that can be used to address them, and set the basis to develop a research agenda for health economics in integrated care. The paper joins the voices that call health economists to pay more attention to integrated care and argues that there should be no more time wasted for doing it.

Relationship of embodied nursing knowledge and client outcomes in home health

Embodied nursing knowledge and its effects on patient outcomes are understudied in home health. The researchers performed a descriptive correlational study, in nine home health agencies in Ohio, to consider the effects of embodied nursing knowledge in expert practice in 107 registered nurses working in Medicare certified home health agencies. While statistical significance was not noted, findings of this study add to the understanding or research and the outcome improvement scores in home health. Findings also pose the question that the concepts used in acute care to improve mortality rates and patient outcome improvements may be different in home health.

Who to pay for performance? The choice of organisational level for hospital performance incentives

Financial incentives for quality improvement in hospital care [known as pay for performance (P4P)] can be directed to either the hospital level or redistributed to the department level. Theoretically, performance payments distributed to lower organisational levels are more effective in increasing performance than payments directed to the hospital level, but the empirical evidence for this expectation is scarce. This paper compares the performance of hospital departments at hospitals that do and do not redistribute performance payments to the department level. We study a Danish P4P scheme to provide patients with case managers. Applying difference in differences analysis, we estimate a 5 percentage points higher performance at hospital departments that are subject to a direct financial incentive. Our results suggest that payers can improve the effectiveness of P4P payments by distributing payments to the department level rather than the hospital level.

Participating physician preferences regarding a pay-for-performance incentive design: a discrete choice experiment

OBJECTIVE

To determine whether the magnitude of incentives or other design attributes should be prioritized and the most important attributes, according to physicians, of the diabetes P4P (pay-for-performance) program design.

DESIGN

We implemented a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to elicit the P4P incentive design-related preferences of physicians.

PARTICIPANTS

All of the physicians (n = 248) who participated in the diabetes P4P program located in the supervisory area of the northern regional branch of the Bureau of National Health Insurance in 2009 were included. The response rate was ∼ 60%.

RESULTS

Our research found that the bonus type of incentive was the most important attribute, followed by the incentive structure and the investment magnitude.

CONCLUSIONS

Physicians may feel that good P4P designs are more important than the magnitude of the investment by the insurer. The two most important P4P designs include providing the bonus type of incentive and using pay-for-excellence plus pay-for-improvement.

Effects of performance measure implementation on clinical manager and provider motivation

BACKGROUND

Clinical performance measurement has been a key element of efforts to transform the Veterans Health Administration (VHA). However, there are a number of signs that current performance measurement systems used within and outside the VHA may be reaching the point of maximum benefit to care and in some settings, may be resulting in negative consequences to care, including overtreatment and diminished attention to patient needs and preferences. Our research group has been involved in a long-standing partnership with the office responsible for clinical performance measurement in the VHA to understand and develop potential strategies to mitigate the unintended consequences of measurement.

OBJECTIVE

Our aim was to understand how the implementation of diabetes performance measures (PMs) influences management actions and day-to-day clinical practice.

DESIGN

This is a mixed methods study design based on quantitative administrative data to select study facilities and quantitative data from semi-structured interviews.

PARTICIPANTS

Sixty-two network-level and facility-level executives, managers, front-line providers and staff participated in the study.

APPROACH

Qualitative content analyses were guided by a team-based consensus approach using verbatim interview transcripts. A published interpretive motivation theory framework is used to describe potential contributions of local implementation strategies to unintended consequences of PMs.

KEY RESULTS

Implementation strategies used by management affect providers' response to PMs, which in turn potentially undermines provision of high-quality patient-centered care. These include: 1) feedback reports to providers that are dissociated from a realistic capability to address performance gaps; 2) evaluative criteria set by managers that are at odds with patient-centered care; and 3) pressure created by managers' narrow focus on gaps in PMs that is viewed as more punitive than motivating.

CONCLUSIONS

Next steps include working with VHA leaders to develop and test implementation approaches to help ensure that the next generation of PMs motivate truly patient-centered care and are clinically meaningful.

Application of the analytic hierarchy process in the performance measurement of colorectal cancer care for the design of a pay-for-performance program in Taiwan

OBJECTIVE

To prioritize performance measures for colorectal cancer care to facilitate the implementation of a pay-for-performance (PFP) system.

DESIGN

Questionnaires survey.

SETTING

Medical hospitals in Taiwan.

PARTICIPANTS

Sixty-six medical doctors from 5 November 2009 to 10 December 2009.

INTERVENTION

Analytic hierarchy process (AHP) technique. Main outcome measure(s) Performance measures (two pre-treatment, six treatment related and three monitoring related) were used.

RESULTS

Forty-eight doctors responded and returned questionnaires (response rate 72.7%) with surgeons and physicians contributing equally. The most important measure was the proportion of colorectal patients who had pre-operative examinations that included chest X-ray and abdominal ultrasound, computed tomography or MRI (global priority: 0.144), followed by the proportion of stages I-III colorectal cancer patients who had undergone a wide surgical resection documented as 'negative margin' (global priority: 0.133) and the proportion of colorectal cancer patients who had undergone surgery with a pathology report that included information on tumor size and node differentiation (global priority: 0.116). Most participants considered that the best interval for the renewal indicators was 3-5 years (43.75%) followed by 5-10 years (27.08%).

CONCLUSIONS

To design a PFP program, the AHP method is a useful technique to prioritize performance measures, especially in a highly specialized domain such as colorectal cancer care.

Design choices made by target users for a pay-for-performance program in primary care: an action research approach

Background

International interest in pay-for-performance (P4P) initiatives to improve quality of health care is growing. Current programs vary in the methods of performance measurement, appraisal and reimbursement. One may assume that involvement of health care professionals in the goal setting and methods of quality measurement and subsequent payment schemes may enhance their commitment to and motivation for P4P programs and therefore the impact of these programs. We developed a P4P program in which the target users were involved in decisions about the P4P methods.

Methods

For the development of the P4P program a framework was used which distinguished three main components: performance measurement, appraisal and reimbursement. Based on this framework design choices were discussed in two panels of target users using an adapted Delphi procedure. The target users were 65 general practices and two health insurance companies in the South of the Netherlands.

Results

Performance measurement was linked to the Dutch accreditation program based on three domains (clinical care, practice management and patient experience). The general practice was chosen as unit of assessment. Relative standards were set at the 25^th percentile of group performance. The incentive for clinical care was set twice as high as the one for practice management and patient experience. Quality scores were to be calculated separately for all three domains, and for both the quality level and the improvement of performance. The incentive for quality level was set thrice as high as the one for the improvement of performance. For reimbursement, quality scores were divided into seven levels. A practice with a quality score in the lowest group was not supposed to receive a bonus. The additional payment grew proportionally for each extra group. The bonus aimed at was on average 5% to 10% of the practice income.

Conclusions

Designing a P4P program for primary care with involvement of the target users gave us an insight into their motives, which can help others who need to discuss similar programs. The resulting program is in line with target users' views and assessments of relevance and applicability. This may enhance their commitment to the program as was indicated by the growing number of voluntary participants after a successfully performed field test during the procedure. The elements of our framework can be very helpful for others who are developing or evaluating a P4P program.