Hybrid governance and performances of environmental accounting

Can institutional pressures serve as an efficacious catalyst for mitigating corporate carbon emissions?

Driving enterprises to implement carbon emission reduction actions and reduce carbon emissions is a crucial research topic in achieving the carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals. As a significant external environment factor influencing corporate behavior, can institutional pressures effectively promote enterprises to reduce carbon emissions? This study aims to probe into the impact and mechanism of three institutional pressures, namely coercive, mimetic, and normative, on corporate carbon emissions, taking Chinese-listed companies as the research object. The results indicate that coercive pressure is positively associated with corporate carbon reduction, while normative pressure has no significant impact. Furthermore, mimetic pressure impedes corporate carbon emissions. The mechanism test shows that carbon reduction is a mediator in the influence exerted by three institutional pressures on corporate carbon emissions. In response to coercive pressure and mimetic pressure, enterprises tend to reduce their carbon emissions by cultivating concepts related to carbon emission reduction. Concepts related to carbon reduction play a more dominant role than carbon reduction actions when both are mediators, with the former even replacing the latter. This research provides a new perspective for improving corporate environmental performance and corporate sustainability.

Research on the effect of environmental regulation to the green water resource efficiency in China-based on the perspectives of high pressure and low suction

Environmental regulation with spatial spillover effect is an important way to accelerate the transformation and upgrading of modern water resources structure, and then achieve sustainable development of China's water resources. How does environmental regulation affect the GWRE to alleviate or solve China's water shortage? In this paper, the GWRE is measured based on panel data from 31 provinces in China from 2000-2020, and the impact of high pressure (low suction) and heterogeneity on GWRE by environmental regulations is explored. The results revealed that the high pressure of environmental regulation significantly promoted the improvement of GWRE, but the improvement effect of low suction power was not significant. Similar conclusions are drawn under the tests of population size-economic distance and population size-technology distance. The high pressure of market-type and autonomous-type environmental regulation has a significant effect on GWRE, while the improvement effect of command-type environmental regulation is weak. The high pressure of environmental regulation in the eastern, central, western, and northeastern regions has a decreasing effect on GWRE. It is recommended to break the principle of GDP performance appraisal, establish and improve the "green performance" evaluation system, adopt regional differentiated environmental regulation policies, and establish a modern green water resources industrial structure system.

Corporate governance and carbon emissions performance: International evidence on curvilinear relationships

This study investigates the impact of corporate governance mechanisms (namely board meeting, board independence, board gender diversity, CEO duality, ESG-based compensation and ESG committee) on carbon emissions performance of multinational entities (MNEs). The study analysed international sample of 336 top MNEs operating in 42 non-financial industries from 32 countries over a 15-year period. Result shows that board gender diversity, CEO duality, and ESG committee are negatively associated with carbon emissions rate, whilst board independence and ESG-based compensation have significant positive impact. Whereas board gender diversity and CEO duality have significant negative impact on carbon emissions rate in carbon-intensive industries, the impact of board meeting, board independence and ESG-based compensation is significant and positive. In the non-carbon-intensive industries, board meeting, board gender diversity and CEO duality have significant negative impact on carbon emissions rate, whilst the impact of ESG-based compensation is positive. Further, there is a negative association between the millennium development goals (MDGs)/sustainable development goals (SDGs) era dichotomy and carbon emissions rate, implying that the United Nations agenda for sustainable development significantly affected carbon emissions performance of MNEs, with the SDGs era generally witnessing better carbon emissions management in comparison to the MDGs era in spite of the higher emissions level in the SDGs era. The study contributes to knowledge in several ways. First, it adds to the limited literature on the determinants of carbon emissions reduction within an international context. Second, the study addresses mixed result reported in prior studies. Third, the study adds to knowledge on the governance factors affecting carbon emissions performance in the MDGs and SDGs periods, thus providing evidence on progress MNEs are making towards addressing climate change challenges through carbon emissions management.

Regulation, the hybrid market, and species conservation: The case of conservation banking in California

Conservation Banking in California is a long-established offset program. Banks are hybrid instruments that hover between market autonomy and regulatory oversight. Challenges that may affect outcomes of the program include aligning regulation with the scales and objectives of the hybrid market and conservation and interaction with other compensation instruments. I use an analytical framework combining social-ecological fit (does the regulation fit the spatial, functional, and temporal scales of the market or conservation?) and instrument interaction (are compensation instruments redundant, synergetic, etc.?) to analyze the institutional framework of the conservation banking program. Results show that the program fails to reflect the hybrid market or species conservation objectives, creating a social-ecological mismatch. The institutional framework disincentivizes banking, while its contribution in conserving species cannot be measured. Competing and redundant instruments can lead to weaker compensation. The program needs equal standards that reflect conservation objectives for all compensation instruments. Findings on fit can be useful for other banking programs, and considerations on instrument interaction could improve offsets anywhere.