How would the carbon tax on energy commodities affect consumer welfare? Evidence from China's household energy consumption system

Rethinking personal carbon trading (PCT) mechanism: A comprehensive review

The implementation of Personal Carbon Trading (PCT) holds promise in facilitating a noteworthy contribution towards the attainment of emissions reduction predicated on consumption patterns and consequently motivating lifestyle modifications. As individual consumption behaviors usually lead to continuous changes in carbon emissions, it is crucial to rethink PCT from a systematic perspective. This review employed a bibliometric analysis of 1423 papers related to PCT, highlighting the key themes of carbon emissions from energy consumption, climate change, and public opinion on policies in the context of PCT. Most of the existing PCT researches focus on theoretical assumptions and public attitudes, while the quantification of carbon emissions and simulation of PCT require further investigation. Furthermore, the concept of Tan Pu Hui is seldom addressed in PCT studies and case analyses. Moreover, there are limited PCT schemes worldwide that can be directly implemented in practice, leading to a scarcity of large-scale, high-participation case studies. To address these gaps, this review proposes a framework to clarify how PCT can stimulate individual emission reductions on the consumption side, comprising two phases, from motivation to behavior and behavior to target. Future endeavors should prioritize the enhancement of the systematic study of the theoretical foundation of PCT, encompassing carbon emissions accounting and policy design, the incorporation of cutting-edge technology, and the reinforcement of integrated policy practice. This review serves as a valuable reference for future research endeavors and policymaking efforts.

Strategies of property developers in the context of carbon tax

China needs to guide property developers in actively reducing emissions to reach carbon emission reduction targets and respond to global climate change. A carbon tax is an important policy tool. Still, to establish successful rules to steer property developers' reasonable carbon emission reduction behavior, we must first explore property developers' decision-making mechanisms. This study develops an emission reduction and price game model for property developers under the constraint of a carbon tax. It then applies reverse order induction and optimization methods to identify the game equilibrium solution for property developers. Using the game equilibria, we explore the carbon tax mechanism on emission reduction and property developer pricing strategies. We can derive the following conclusions if the carbon tax policy is not implemented: 1.House prices are related to the substitutability of the two types of competitive property developers. 2.The greater the substitutability, the greater the cost of emission reduction paid by consumers. 3.The game equilibrium carbon emission intensity is the average carbon emission intensity of the housing business. In the situation of enacting a carbon tax, we arrive at the following conclusions: 1.The profits of real estate developers who do not have the advantage of emission reduction continue to decline with the increase of carbon tax. 2. For real estate developers who have the advantage of decreasing emissions, profits declined initially and then increased as the carbon tax rate increased, and only when the carbon tax rate reaches Tm1* can they fully leverage the cost advantage and obtain ever-increasing profits. 3.Low tax rates should be adopted by the government at the start of the implementation of the carbon tax policy to provide a buffer time for real estate developers who do not have the advantage of emission reduction costs.

Factors Influencing Intergovernmental Cooperation on Emission Reduction in Chengdu-Chongqing Urban Agglomeration: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

In this study, we introduced the realistic problem of a dynamic carbon tax, built several evolutionary game models for cooperative emission reduction by local governments, and determined the factors that influence governments' willingness to cooperate in emission reduction. The findings revealed that, first, the probability of governments opting for cooperative emission reduction strategies increases at different rates depending on the benefits and costs of cooperation. Second, externalities influence governments' willingness to cooperate in emission reduction during cooperative carbon emission reduction. Furthermore, the emergence of a free-riding situation reduces the effectiveness of intergovernmental cooperation in reducing carbon emissions. Third, carbon tax policy can influence the likelihood that local governments will choose cooperative emission reduction, and different carbon tax sizes have different effects on their willingness to choose cooperative emission reduction.