The effects of observed decision time on expectations of extremity and cooperation

The Maximizing Penalty: Maximizers are Perceived as Less Warm and Receive Less Social Support

Economically, maximizing, the tendency to seek the best, is good because it entails possibilities to optimize decision outcomes. However, research has shown that maximizing is costly in that maximizers are more regretful and less satisfied with their decisions. Beyond these intrapersonal downsides, this research investigates another important but largely ignored downside—the interpersonal costs of being a maximizer—and documents a maximizing penalty in social cognition wherein maximizers (vs. satisficers) are viewed as less warm and consequently receive less social support. Four studies provide evidence for the maximizing penalty. This research contributes to the literature on maximizing by revealing the social cost of being a maximizer and the literature on choice perception by showing that decision makers are perceived by their aspiration.

Trustors' disregard for trustees deciding quickly or slowly in three experiments with time constraints

Many decisions in the economic and social domain are made under time constraints, be it under time pressure or forced delay. Requiring individuals to decide quickly or slowly often elicit different responses. Time pressure has been associated with inefficiency in market settings and market regulation often requires individuals to delay their decisions via cooling-off periods. Yet, recent research suggests that people who make reflective decisions are met with distrust. If this extends to external time constraints, then forcing individuals to delay their decisions may be counterproductive in scenarios where trust considerations are important, such as in market and organizational design. In three Trust Game experiments (total number of participants = 1872), including within- and between-subjects designs, we test whether individuals trust (more) someone who is forced to respond quickly (intuitively) or slowly (reflectively). We find that trustors do not adjust their behavior (or their beliefs) to the trustee’s time conditions. This seems to be an appropriate response because time constraints do not affect trustees’ behavior, at least when the game decisions are binary (trust vs. don’t trust; reciprocate vs. don’t reciprocate) and therefore mistakes cannot explain choices. Thus, delayed decisions per se do not seem to elicit distrust.

Does similarity trigger cooperation? Dyadic effect of similarity in social value orientation and cognitive resources on cooperation

Although a considerable amount of research has demonstrated a robust relationship between social value orientation and cooperation, these studies may be limited by focusing solely on the individual. Building on the growing literature documenting the effect of group formation on cooperation and personality similarity on negotiation, the present study explored whether similarity in social value orientation (both being pro-social or pro-self) leads to more cooperation in social dilemmas among dyad members. Drawing from expectancy theory and the concept of cognitive resources, we further predicted that the relationship between similarity in social value orientation and cooperation uniquely depends on whether the individual is cognitively busy. To test our hypothesis, we grouped our participants according to their social value orientation into three different dyads (similar-pro-self, similar-pro-social, and pro-self-pro-social) to complete a repeated prisoner's dilemma task, and controlled their cognitive resources using a simultaneous digit memory task. The results suggested that (1) heterogeneous dyads' (pro-self-pro-social) cooperation possibility experience a steeper decay as the number of rounds increases compared with the two homogeneous dyads (similar-pro-self, similar-pro-social). In addition, (2) similarity in social value orientation, interacting with participants' cognitive resources, significantly influenced individual-level cooperation. Specifically, both pro-selfs and pro-socials, paired with unlike-minded counterparts, were more cooperative when they had abundant cognitive resources. However, cognitive resources had no significant influence on dyads with similar social value orientation. Overall, these findings demonstrate the importance of considering personality configuration when attempting to understand cooperation in social dilemmas among dyads.

Supplementary Information

The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-022-03276-8.

Distinctive roles of mPFC subregions in forming impressions and guiding social interaction based on others' social behaviour

People can quickly form impressions of others from their social behaviour, which can guide their future social interactions. This study investigated how the type and timing of others' social decisions affect the impression formation and social interactions. In each trial, participants watched a responder's decision in an ultimatum game, decided whether to choose the responder as their next partner for proposer or responder and reported the perceived warmth, competence and likability of the responder. Participants preferred responders who accepted (i.e. accepters) unfair offers for the responder and those who rejected (i.e. rejecters) unfair offers for the proposer in their next ultimatum game, and the rostral medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) activity encoded such a strategic context-dependent valuation when choosing partners. Slow rejecters were perceived as warmer than fast rejecters, which was mirrored by the anterior mid-cingulate cortex activity when watching others' decisions, possibly detecting and resolving conflicting impressions. Finally, those who perceived accepters vs rejecters as warmer showed higher ventral mPFC responses to accepters vs rejecters when choosing a partner, regardless of the context. The present study suggests that distinctive subregions of the mPFC may be differentially involved in forming impressions and guiding social interactions with others based on their social behaviours.

Cognitive and affective processes of prosociality

One piece of the puzzle to prosocial behavior is understanding its underlying cognitive and affective processes. We discuss how modeling behavior in social dilemmas can be expanded by integrating cognitive theories and attention-based models of decision processes, and models of affective influences on prosocial decision-making. We review theories speaking to the interconnections of cognition and affect, identifying the need for further theory development regarding modeling moment-by-moment decision-making processes. We discuss how these theoretical perspectives are mirrored in empirical evidence, drawn from classical outcome-oriented as well as contemporary process-tracing research. Finally, we develop perspectives for future research trajectories aiming to further elucidate the processes by which prosocial decisions are formed, by linking process measures to usually unobservable cognitive and affective reactions.

Choice perception: Making sense (and nonsense) of others' decisions

People constantly and effortlessly acquire information about one another's decisions and use this information to form impressions (and judgments) of others. We review research on this process of choice perception - how people come to make sense of others' choices. We suggest that choice perception consists of observers' inferences about (a) what was chosen, (b) why it was chosen, (c) how (or through what process) it was chosen, and (d) broader impressions about who chose it. These inferences can affect observers in multiple ways, such as prompting erroneous beliefs about the actor due to interpersonal errors (i.e., mistakes in how observers perceive actors) and cue-perception errors (i.e., mistakes in how observers perceive chosen options), as well as changes in one's own behavior.

No good deed goes unpunished: the social costs of prosocial behaviour

Performing costly helpful behaviours can allow individuals to improve their reputation. Those who gain a good reputation are often preferred as interaction partners and are consequently better able to access support through cooperative relationships with others. However, investing in prosocial displays can sometimes yield social costs: excessively generous individuals risk losing their good reputation, and even being vilified, ostracised or antisocially punished. As a consequence, people frequently try to downplay their prosocial actions or hide them from others. In this review, we explore when and why investments in prosocial behaviour are likely to yield social costs. We propose two key features of interactions that make it more likely that generous individuals will incur social costs when: (a) observers infer that helpful behaviour is motivated by strategic or selfish motives; and (b) observers infer that helpful behaviour is detrimental to them. We describe how the cognition required to consider ulterior motives emerges over development and how these tendencies vary across cultures - and discuss how the potential for helpful actions to result in social costs might place boundaries on prosocial behaviour as well as limiting the contexts in which it might occur. We end by outlining the key avenues and priorities for future research.

(Mis)perceiving cooperativeness

Cooperation is crucial for the success of social interactions. Given its importance, humans should readily be able to use available cues to predict how likely others are to cooperate. Here, we review the empirical literature on how accurate such predictions are. To this end, we distinguish between three classes of cues: behavioral (including past decisions), personal (including gender, attractiveness, and group membership) and situational (including the benefits to cooperation and the ability to communicate with each other). We discuss (i) how each cue correlates with future cooperative decisions and (ii) whether people correctly anticipate each cue's predictive value. We find that people are fairly accurate in interpreting behavioral and situational cues. However, they often misperceive the value of personal cues.

Beliefs about others' intentions determine whether cooperation is the faster choice

Is collaboration the fast choice for humans? Past studies proposed that cooperation is a behavioural default, based on Response Times (RT) findings. Here we contend that the individual's reckoning of the immediate social environment shapes her predisposition to cooperate and, hence, response latencies. In a social dilemma game, we manipulate the beliefs about the partner's intentions to cooperate and show that they act as a switch that determines cooperation and defection RTs; when the partner's intention to cooperate is perceived as high, cooperation choices are speeded up, while defection is slowed down. Importantly, this social context effect holds across varying expected payoffs, indicating that it modulates behaviour regardless of choices' similarity in monetary terms. Moreover, this pattern is moderated by individual variability in social preferences: Among conditional cooperators, high cooperation beliefs speed up cooperation responses and slow down defection. Among free-riders, defection is always faster and more likely than cooperation, while high cooperation beliefs slow down all decisions. These results shed new light on the conflict of choices account of response latencies, as well as on the intuitive cooperation hypothesis, and can help to correctly interpret and reconcile previous, apparently contradictory results, by considering the role of context in social dilemmas.

The determinants of response time in a repeated constant-sum game: A robust Bayesian hierarchical dual-process model

The investigation of response time and behavior has a long tradition in cognitive psychology, particularly for non-strategic decision-making. Recently, experimental economists have also studied response time in strategic interactions, but with an emphasis on either one-shot games or repeated social-dilemmas. I investigate the determinants of response time in a repeated (pure-conflict) game, admitting a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, with fixed partner matching. Response times depend upon the interaction of two decision models embedded in a dual-process framework (Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer, 2014; Alós-Ferrer, 2016). The first decision model is the commonly used win-stay/lose-shift heuristic and the second the pattern-detecting reinforcement learning model in Spiliopoulos (2013b). The former is less complex and can be executed more quickly than the latter. As predicted, conflict between these two models (i.e., each one recommending a different course of action) led to longer response times than cases without conflict. The dual-process framework makes other qualitative response time predictions arising from the interaction between the existence (or not) of conflict and which one of the two decision models the chosen action is consistent with-these were broadly verified by the data. Other determinants of RT were hypothesized on the basis of existing theory and tested empirically. Response times were strongly dependent on the actions chosen by both players in the previous rounds and the resulting outcomes. Specifically, response time was shortest after a win in the previous round where the maximum possible payoff was obtained; response time after losses was significantly longer. Strongly auto-correlated behavior (regardless of its sign) was also associated with longer response times. I conclude that, similar to other tasks, there is a strong coupling in repeated games between behavior and RT, which can be exploited to further our understanding of decision making.

Cooperation, decision time, and culture: Online experiments with American and Indian participants

Two separate bodies of work have examined whether culture affects cooperation in economic games and whether cooperative or non-cooperative decisions occur more quickly. Here, we connect this work by exploring the relationship between decision time and cooperation in American versus Indian subjects. We use a series of dynamic social network experiments in which subjects play a repeated public goods game: 80 sessions for a total of 1,462 subjects (1,059 from the United States, 337 from India, and 66 from other countries) making 13,560 decisions. In the first round, where subjects do not know if connecting neighbors are cooperative, American subjects are highly cooperative and decide faster when cooperating than when defecting, whereas a majority of Indian subjects defect and Indians decide faster when defecting than when cooperating. Almost the same is true in later rounds where neighbors were previously cooperative (a cooperative environment) except decision time among Indian subjects. However, when connecting neighbors were previously not cooperative (a non-cooperative environment), a large majority of both American and Indian subjects defect, and defection is faster than cooperation among both sets of subjects. Our results imply the cultural background of subjects in their real life affects the speed of cooperation decision-making differentially in online social environments.