Moral character evaluation: Testing another's moral-cognitive machinery

On the Highway to Hell: Slippery Slope Perceptions in Judgments of Moral Character

Across four studies, we test the hypothesis that people exhibit "slippery slope" thinking in their judgments of moral character-that is, do observers judge that a person who behaves immorally will become increasingly immoral over time? In Study 1, we find that a person who commits an immoral act is judged as more likely to behave immorally and as having a worse character in the future than in the past. In Study 2, we find that it is the commission of an immoral act specifically-rather than merely attempting an immoral act-that drives this slippery slope effect. In Study 3, we demonstrate that observers judge the moral agent as more likely to commit acts of greater severity further in time after the initial immoral act. In Study 4, we find that this effect is driven by an anticipated corrupting of moral character, related to perceptions of the agent's guilt.

Forming Evaluations of Moral Character: How Are Multiple Pieces of Information Prioritized and Integrated?

Evaluating other people's moral character is a crucial social cognitive task. However, the cognitive processes by which people seek out, prioritize, and integrate multiple pieces of character-relevant information have not been studied empirically. The first aim of this research was to examine which character traits are considered most important when forming an impression of a person's overall moral character. The second aim was to understand how differing levels of trait expression affect overall character judgments. Four preregistered studies and one supplemental study (total N = 720), using five different measures of importance and sampling undergraduates, online workers, and community members, found that our participants placed the most importance on the traits honest, helpful, compassionate, loyal, and responsible. Also, when integrating the information that they have learned, our participants seemed to engage in a simple averaging process in which all available, relevant information is combined in a linear fashion to form an overall evaluation of moral character. This research provides new insights into the cognitive processes by which evaluations of moral character are formed.

Development of beliefs about censorship

Across four studies (total N = 431), we examined 5- to 10-year-old children's choices to censor depictions of harm. In all studies, children learned about (fictional) movies that depicted harmful behaviors and decided whether specific audiences should be allowed to watch those movies. In Study 1, children often censored depictions of harms and did so similarly when considering both themselves and another hypothetical child as the viewer. At the same time, children did not censor indiscriminately: Children censored depictions of intentional harms more than accidental harms and, in Study 2, children (and adults; N = 101) censored harms (especially intentional ones) more from younger versus older audiences. In Studies 3 and 4, we more directly tested children's motivations for censoring harms, examining dual potential motivations of 1) preventing viewers from feeling sad; and 2) preventing viewers from being inspired to engage in harmful behaviors. We found that children who were motivated to avoid inspiring harmful behaviors were especially likely to censor depictions of harmful intentions. Together, our results indicate that children make sophisticated decisions regarding censorship and underscore an early emerging motivation to disrupt cascades of harmful behavior. These findings hold implications for children's thinking about the psychological and behavioral consequences of harm and for children's thinking about the potential effects of media on themselves and others.

Virtue Discounting: Observability Reduces Moral Actors' Perceived Virtue

Performing prosociality in public presents a paradox: only by doing so can people demonstrate their virtue and also influence others through their example, yet observers may derogate actors' behavior as mere "virtue signaling." Here we investigate the role of observability of actors' behavior as one reason that people engage in such "virtue discounting." Further, we investigate observers' motivational inferences as a mechanism of this effect, using the comparison of generosity and fairness as a case study among virtues. Across 14 studies (7 preregistered, total N = 9,360), we show that public actors are perceived as less virtuous than private actors, and that this effect is stronger for generosity compared to fairness (i.e., differential virtue discounting). Exploratory factor analysis suggests that three types of motives-principled, reputation-signaling, and norm-signaling-affect virtue discounting. Using structural equation modeling, we show that observability's effect on actors' trait virtue ratings is largely explained by inferences that actors have less principled motivations. Further, we leverage experimental evidence to provide stronger causal evidence of these effects. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of our findings, as well as future directions for research on the social perception of virtue.

Is it good to feel bad about littering? Conflict between moral beliefs and behaviors for everyday transgressions

People sometimes do things that they think are morally wrong. We investigate how actors' perceptions of the morality of their own behaviors affects observer evaluations. In Study 1 (n = 302), we presented participants with six different descriptions of actors who routinely engaged in a morally questionable behavior and varied whether the actors thought the behavior was morally wrong. Actors who believed their behavior was wrong were seen as having better moral character, but their behavior was rated as more wrong. In Study 2 (n = 391) we investigated whether perceptions of actor metadesires were responsible for the effects of actor beliefs on character judgments. We used the same stimuli and measures as in Study 1 but added a measure of the actor's perceived desires to engage in the behaviors. As predicted, the effect of actors' moral beliefs on judgments of their moral character was mediated by perceived metadesires. In Study 3 (n = 1092) we replicated these findings in a between-participants design and further found that the effect of actor beliefs on act and character judgments was moderated by participant beliefs about the general acceptability of the behavior.

Workplace Mistreatment and Employee Deviance: An Investigation of the Reciprocal Relationship Between Hostile Work Environments and Harmful Work Behaviors

This study examined responses from more than one thousand employed adults across the United States to shed light on the causal directions and temporal dynamics between, on the one hand, the hostile social situations employees face at work (i.e., workplace mistreatment) and, on the other hand, the harmful behaviors that employees enact at work. Using autoregressive cross-lagged panel analyses on a 12-wave longitudinal dataset, we show that employees’ bad behaviors at work (e.g., sabotage, theft, abuse of coworkers) are both a cause and a consequence of experiencing mistreatment from colleagues and supervisors (e.g., ostracism, everyday discrimination, abusive supervision). We investigate the temporal aspects of this reciprocal relationship and find that deviance-to-mistreatment and mistreatment-to-deviance effects both occur over a 1-week time horizon. Moreover, this reciprocal relationship continued across the 12 weeks of the study, and its magnitude neither intensified nor diminished over this time period. Finally, we investigated the role of moral character evaluations in the reciprocal mistreatment-deviance relationship. Our results revealed that individuals whose moral character is more positively regarded by coworkers (i.e., those evaluated as higher in honesty-humility) are less penalized by others in response to their deviance. We discuss theoretical and managerial implications of these results for mitigating deviance and mistreatment in organizations.

Deconstructing moral character judgments

People often make judgments of others' moral character - an inferred moral essence that presumably predicts moral behavior. We first define moral character and explore why people make character judgments before outlining three key elements that drive character judgments: behavior (good vs. bad, norm violations, and deliberation), mind (intentions, explanations, capacities), and identity (appearance, social groups, and warmth). We also provide taxonomy of moral character that goes beyond simply good vs. evil. Drawing from the theory of dyadic morality, we outline a two-dimensional triangular space of character judgments (valence and strength/agency), with three key corners - heroes, villains, and victims. Varieties of perceived moral character include saints and demons, strivers/sinners and opportunists, the nonmoral, virtuous, and culpable victims, and pure victims.