Re-examining the role of family relationships in structuring perceived helping obligations, and their impact on moral evaluation

Moral Future-Thinking: Does the Moral Circle Stand the Test of Time?

Humanity's long-term welfare may lie in the hands of those who are presently living, raising the question of whether people today hold the generations of tomorrow in their moral circles. Five studies (NTotal = 1652; Prolific) reveal present-oriented bias in the moral standing of future generations, with greater perceived moral obligation, moral concern, and prosocial intentions for proximal relative to distal future targets. Yet, present-oriented bias appears stronger for socially close compared with socially distant targets and for human targets relative to non-human animals and entities in nature. Individual differences, including longtermism beliefs and subjective imaginative vividness, predict greater concern for and obligation to the future. Likewise, concern and obligation predict greater future-oriented generosity. Our studies are among the first to explore moral considerations for targets across deep temporal expanses, reconcile conflicting evidence in the extant literature on moral judgment and future-thinking, and offer practical implications for bettering the shared societal future.

Family favouring effects across intent and outcome-based moral judgements and decisions

Doing harm is a moral violation, but helping a family member is morally obligatory. In this study, participants encountered this ethical dilemma through stories featuring their sibling (i.e., brother) as either the perpetrator or victim in various moral scenarios. Subsequently, they provided their moral judgements (i.e., moral acceptability and perceived transgression) and made decisions (i.e., willingness and difficulty to disclose what the agent did to the police) regarding the perpetrator. The manipulation of family membership was integrated into the moral scenarios, which were crafted based on whether the perpetrator had malicious intent and whether those intentions resulted in a harmful outcome (i.e., intentional harm, failed attempts to harm, accidental harm, and a harmless/baseline). While we initially expected that individuals would exhibit favouritism towards their brother when harmful intent or outcomes were absent, our findings revealed that both agent/victim identities (brother/stranger) and intent-outcome-based moral scenarios had an additive effect on both measures of moral judgement. This suggests that the family favouring effect was observed across all intent-outcome scenarios, with a slightly more pronounced effect when the brother accidentally harmed a stranger compared to a stranger accidentally harming the brother. Regarding moral decisions, participants demonstrated a willingness to disclose what they witnessed regardless of their familial relationship with the agent or victim, but it was universally perceived as a difficult decision to make. Together, our results underscore the context-specific nature of moral judgements and decisions, emphasising the significant impact of family members when they are involved as moral characters.

Standing-up against moral violations: The predicting role of attribution, kinship, and severity

Witnesses of moral violations stand up for their moral principles, despite facing substantial costs for intervening. Notwithstanding its importance, little is known whether responsibility attributions and the relation between the victim and a witness (i.e., kinship) have different effects on the intention to intervene in situations of different severity (e.g., moral courage situations). We predict an interaction between the situation's severity and the victims' responsibility for their plight. In less-severe situations, witnesses would be less willing to help when they perceive the victim to be responsible for their plight. However, those who are not seen as responsible would receive more help. For more-severe situations, responsibility is predicted to have no effect. Opposite effects are predicted for the relationship between the helper and the victim. We further predict that perceived costs for helping mediates witnesses' willingness to intervene. Two studies showed that people are more willing to help individuals who are perceived as being innocent, but only in less-severe situations. In more-severe situations, people's willingness to intervene increases, regardless of responsibility attributions. We did not observe effects for kinship. Moreover, we provide partial evidence that witnesses of more-severe situations indeed accept higher costs for intervention.

Children think differently from adults when reasoning about resources acquired from parents

Although sharing is often considered a virtuous behavior, individuals rarely share all their extra resources with those less fortunate. The current research investigated conditions under which children believe that someone who has more resources deserves to keep them rather than address an inequality. Specifically, we contrasted resources acquired via merit, windfall, and parental allocations. Across two studies, we showed 5- and 6-year-old children (n = 59), 8- and 9-year-old children (n = 120), and adults (n = 163) three scenarios in which one person acquired more resources than the other due to luck, due to merit, or because that person's parents gave him or her more, and we asked whether that person should share these resources or keep all of them. Results suggested that adults differentiated both the family resource and the merit conditions from the windfall allocation, believing that an agent deserves to keep the extra resources more when they are acquired through one's family or due to merit. However, children did not differentiate family resources from windfall, although they were more likely to believe that individuals deserve to keep their extra resources when they were acquired through merit. The type of the resource (i.e., money vs. balls) did not affect participants' sharing decisions. Overall, these findings suggest that over development the resources acquired from one's family come to be seen as more deserved than windfall resources.

How unexpected events are processed in theory of mind regions: A conceptual replication

Recent research in social neuroscience has postulated that Theory of Mind (ToM) regions play a role in processing social prediction error (PE: the difference between what was expected and what was observed). Here, we tested whether PE signal depends on the type of prior information people use to make predictions - an agent's prior mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, preferences) or an agent's prior behavior - as well as the type of information that confirms or violates such predictions. That is, does prior information about mental states (versus behavior) afford stronger predictions about an agent's subsequent mental states or behaviors? Additionally, when information about an agent's prior mental states or behavior is available, is PE signal strongest when information about an agent's subsequent mental state (vs behavior) is revealed? In line with prior research, results suggest that DMPFC, LTPJ, and RTPJ are recruited more for unexpected than expected outcomes. However, PE signal does not seem to discriminate on the basis of prior or outcome information type. These findings suggest that ToM regions may flexibly incorporate any available information to make predictions about, monitor, and perhaps explain, inconsistencies in social agents.

How social relationships shape moral wrongness judgments

Judgments of whether an action is morally wrong depend on who is involved and the nature of their relationship. But how, when, and why social relationships shape moral judgments is not well understood. We provide evidence to address these questions, measuring cooperative expectations and moral wrongness judgments in the context of common social relationships such as romantic partners, housemates, and siblings. In a pre-registered study of 423 U.S. participants nationally representative for age, race, and gender, we show that people normatively expect different relationships to serve cooperative functions of care, hierarchy, reciprocity, and mating to varying degrees. In a second pre-registered study of 1,320 U.S. participants, these relationship-specific cooperative expectations (i.e., relational norms) enable highly precise out-of-sample predictions about the perceived moral wrongness of actions in the context of particular relationships. In this work, we show that this 'relational norms' model better predicts patterns of moral wrongness judgments across relationships than alternative models based on genetic relatedness, social closeness, or interdependence, demonstrating how the perceived morality of actions depends not only on the actions themselves, but also on the relational context in which those actions occur.