Best response dynamics improve sustainability and equity outcomes in common-pool resources problems, compared to imitation dynamics

Modelling coupled human-environment complexity for the future of the biosphere: strengths, gaps and promising directions

Humans and the environment form a single complex system where humans not only influence ecosystems but also react to them. Despite this, there are far fewer coupled human-environment system (CHES) mathematical models than models of uncoupled ecosystems. We argue that these coupled models are essential to understand the impacts of social interventions and their potential to avoid catastrophic environmental events and support sustainable trajectories on multi-decadal timescales. A brief history of CHES modelling is presented, followed by a review spanning recent CHES models of systems including forests and land use, coral reefs and fishing and climate change mitigation. The ability of CHES modelling to capture dynamic two-way feedback confers advantages, such as the ability to represent ecosystem dynamics more realistically at longer timescales, and allowing insights that cannot be generated using ecological models. We discuss examples of such key insights from recent research. However, this strength brings with it challenges of model complexity and tractability, and the need for appropriate data to parameterize and validate CHES models. Finally, we suggest opportunities for CHES models to improve human-environment sustainability in future research spanning topics such as natural disturbances, social structure, social media data, model discovery and early warning signals. This article is part of the theme issue 'Ecological complexity and the biosphere: the next 30 years'.

Adaptation strategies and collective dynamics of extraction in networked commons of bistable resources

When populations share common-pool resources (CPRs), individuals decide how much effort to invest towards resource extraction and how to allocate this effort among available resources. We investigate these dual aspects of individual choice in networked games where resources undergo regime shifts between discrete quality states (viable or depleted) depending on collective extraction levels. We study the patterns of extraction that emerge on various network types when agents are free to vary extraction from each CPR separately to maximize their short-term payoffs. Using these results as a basis for comparison, we then investigate how results are altered if agents fix one aspect of adaptation (magnitude or allocation) while letting the other vary. We consider two constrained adaptation strategies: uniform adaptation, whereby agents adjust their extraction levels from all CPRs by the same amount, and reallocation, whereby agents selectively shift effort from lower- to higher-quality resources. A preference for uniform adaptation increases collective wealth on degree-heterogeneous agent-resource networks. Further, low-degree agents retain preferences for these constrained strategies under reinforcement learning. Empirical studies have indicated that some CPR appropriators ignore—while others emphasize—allocation aspects of adaptation; our results demonstrate that structural patterns of resource access can determine which behavior is more advantageous.

Imitation and aspiration dynamics bring different evolutionary outcomes in feedback-evolving games

Feedback-evolving games characterize the interplay between the evolution of strategies and environments. Rich dynamics have been derived for such games under the premise of the replicator equation, which unveils persistent oscillations between cooperation and defection. Besides replicator dynamics, here we have employed aspiration dynamics, in which individuals, instead of comparing payoffs with opposite strategies, assess their payoffs by self-evaluation to update strategies. We start with a brief review of feedback-evolving games with replicator dynamics and then comprehensively discuss such games with aspiration dynamics. Interestingly, the tenacious cycles, as perceived in replicator dynamics, cannot be observed in aspiration dynamics. Our analysis reveals that a parameter θ —which depicts the strength of cooperation in enhancing the environment—plays a pivotal role in comprehending the dynamics. In particular, with the symmetric aspiration level, if replete and depleted states, respectively, experience Prisoner's Dilemma and Trivial games, the rich environment is achievable only when θ  > 1. The case θ  < 1 never allows us to reach the replete state, even with a higher cooperation level. Furthermore, if cooperators aspire less than defectors, then the enhanced state can be achieved with a relatively lower θ value compared with the opposite scenario because too much expectation from cooperation can be less beneficial.