What is the intention to move and when does it occur?

Neuronal responses in the human primary motor cortex coincide with the subjective onset of movement intention in brain-machine interface-mediated actions

Self-initiated behavior is accompanied by the experience of intending our actions. Here, we leverage the unique opportunity to examine the full intentional chain-from intention to action to environmental effects-in a tetraplegic person outfitted with a primary motor cortex (M1) brain-machine interface (BMI) generating real hand movements via neuromuscular electrical stimulation (NMES). This combined BMI-NMES approach allowed us to selectively manipulate each element of the intentional chain (intention, action, effect) while probing subjective experience and performing extra-cellular recordings in human M1. Behaviorally, we reveal a novel form of intentional binding: motor intentions are reflected in a perceived temporal attraction between the onset of intentions and that of actions. Neurally, we demonstrate that evoked spiking activity in M1 largely coincides in time with the onset of the experience of intention and that M1 spike counts and the onset of subjective intention may co-vary on a trial-by-trial basis. Further, population-level dynamics, as indexed by a decoder instantiating movement, reflect intention-action temporal binding. The results fill a significant knowledge gap by relating human spiking activity in M1 with the onset of subjective intention and complement prior human intracranial work examining pre-motor and parietal areas.

Using a Veto paradigm to investigate the decision models in explaining Libet-style experiments

The question of whether free will exists or not has intrigued philosophers for centuries. About 40 years ago, cognitive neuroscientists such as Benjamin Libet have joined the discussion by demonstrating that an ERP component, the readiness potential (RP), precedes the reported time of decision to act by a few hundred milliseconds. Libet et al. (1983) argued that our brains unconsciously prepare the movement before we experience any conscious intention, which led some free will skeptics (e.g., Ebert & Wegner, 2011) to argue that free will does not exist. While Libet's interpretation of his findings initiated an intense philosophical debate, alternative interpretations have been put forward more recently (Bode et al., 2014; Brass et al., 2019; Schurger et al., 2012; 2021). Integration to bound models (ITB) of Libet-style experiments suggest that we accumulate information until an intention threshold is reached, which triggers our experience of intention and execution of voluntary behaviors. The RP, from this perspective reflects the decision process itself rather than the consequence of an unconscious decision. To determine if the ITB model better predicts behavioral patterns in Libet-style experiments, we added a whether-component to the classical Libet task (the Veto Libet task) and compared the behavioral measures in the Veto Libet task with the Classical Libet task. We hypothesized that the signal accumulation in the Veto Libet task would be less steep than in the Classical Libet task, resulting in longer wait times and earlier self-reported intentions to act (i.e., the W). The result in general supported our hypotheses. In addition, these behavioral differences between the Classical Libet task and the Veto Libet task established valuable behavioral correlates for future investigations into the vetoing phenomenon. Finally, this study was also the first application of the Libet task in an online setting, and the behavioral parameters were highly comparable to the previous offline studies, further supporting the possibility of using the online platform to study arbitrary decision-making.

The value of believing in free will: A prediction on seeking and experiencing meaning in life

Despite abundant philosophical pondering and experiential evidence demonstrating the need for freedom in leading a meaningful life, the literature lacks an investigation of whether and how free will beliefs contribute to one's meaningful life as an antecedent variable. Based on the coupling of the life-affirming hypothesis and Chinese culture, we used a manipulation experiment (Study 1, n = 242) and a two-wave longitudinal study (Study 2, n = 378) to test the potential causality between laypeople's daily beliefs in free will and meaning in life (presence of and search for meaning) with two samples of Chinese undergraduates. The results show that belief in free will positively predicts the presence of meaning and search for meaning, immediately (Study 1) and 2 months later (Study 2). The present work corroborated that the belief in free will is an antecedent variable that imbues life with meaning and sparks actions seeking meaning, supporting the life-affirming hypothesis instead of the deficit-correcting hypothesis.

Mental causation: an evolutionary perspective

The relationship between consciousness and individual agency is examined from a bottom-up evolutionary perspective, an approach somewhat different from other ways of dealing with the issue, but one relevant to the question of animal consciousness. Two ways are identified that would decouple the two, allowing consciousness of a limited kind to exist without agency: (1) reflex pathways that incorporate conscious sensations as an intrinsic component (InCs), and (2) reflexes that are consciously conditioned and dependent on synaptic plasticity but not memory (CCRs). Whether InCs and CCRs exist as more than hypothetical constructs is not clear, and InCs are in any case limited to theories where consciousness depends directly on EM field-based effects. Consciousness with agency, as we experience it, then belongs in a third category that allows for deliberate choice of alternative actions (DCs), where the key difference between this and CCR-level pathways is that DCs require access to explicit memory systems whereas CCRs do not. CCRs are nevertheless useful from a heuristic standpoint as a conceptual model for how conscious inputs could act to refine routine behaviors while allowing evolution to optimize phenomenal experience (i.e., qualia) in the absence of individual agency, a somewhat counterintuitive result. However, so long as CCRs are not a required precondition for the evolution of memory-dependent DC-level processes, the later could have evolved first. If so, the adaptive benefit of consciousness when it first evolved may be linked as much to the role it plays in encoding memories as to any other function. The possibility that CCRs are more than a theoretical construct, and have played a role in the evolution of consciousness, argues against theories of consciousness focussed exclusively on higher-order functions as the appropriate way to deal with consciousness as it first evolved, as it develops in the early postnatal period of life, or with the conscious experiences of animals other than ourselves. An evolutionary perspective also resolves the problem of free will, that it is best treated as a property of a species rather than the individuals belonging to that species whereas, in contrast, agency is an attribute of individuals.

The place of Free Will: the freedom of the prisoner

Debates about the concept of Free Will date back to ancient times. About 40 years ago, Benjamin Libet designed an experiment showing that the conscious intention to move is preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation. His finding suggested that unconscious processes determine our decisions. Libet-style experiments have continued to dominate the debate about Free Will, pushing some authors to argue that the existence of Free Will is a mere illusion. We believe that this dispute is because we often measure Free Will using arbitrary human decisions rather than deliberate actions. After reviewing the definition of Free Will and the related literature, we conclude that the scientific evidence does not disprove the existence of Free Will. However, our will encounters several constraints and limitations that should be considered when evaluating our deeds' personal responsibility.

Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition

The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.

Is food preference innate instinct driven or human's free will?

The question whether food preference decisions are controlled by innate instincts, or a conscious decision-making process is still open. The answer to this question is important not only for neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers but also for food scientists and developers. Looking from different perspectives involved in food preference decisions could not only settle a long ongoing debate but also pave the way to understand why people prefer to eat what they eat.

Moving in response to an unseen visual stimulus

OBJECTIVE

Whether consciousness has a causal role in voluntary movements is not clear. Backward masking blocks a stimulus from becoming conscious, but it can trigger movement in a reaction time paradigm. We hypothesize that if backward masking is used in a choice reaction time paradigm, when the visible stimulus (S2) differs from the masked stimulus (S1), the movement will often differ from conscious intent. We did such a study employing electroencephalography (EEG) to explore the brain activity associated with this effect.

METHODS

Twenty healthy adults participated in a choice reaction time task with a backwardly masked stimulus and EEG. They moved right or left hand in response to the direction of an arrow. S2 was congruent or incongruent with S1. When incongruent, responses were frequently concordant with S1, with faster reaction time than when responding to S2 and thought to be a mistake.

RESULTS

We show that it is possible to trigger movements from the unperceived stimuli indicating consciousness is not causal since the movement was not in accord with intent. EEG showed information flow from occipital cortex to motor cortex.

CONCLUSIONS

Occipital activity was the same despite response, but the parietal and frontal EEG differed. When responding to S1, the motor cortex responded as soon as information arrived, and when responding to S2, the motor cortex responded with a delay allowing for other brain processing prior to movement initiation. While the exact time of conscious recognition of S2 is not clear, when there is a response to S1, the frontal cortex signals an "error", but this is apparently too late to veto the movement.

SIGNIFICANCE

While consciousness does not initiate the movement, it monitors the concordance of intent and result.