The neural substrate of the ideomotor principle: An event-related fMRI analysis

Cognitive simulation along with neural adaptation explain effects of suggestions: a novel theoretical framework

Hypnosis is an effective intervention with proven efficacy that is employed in clinical settings and for investigating various cognitive processes. Despite their practical success, no consensus exists regarding the mechanisms underlying well-established hypnotic phenomena. Here, we suggest a new framework called the Simulation-Adaptation Theory of Hypnosis (SATH). SATH expands the predictive coding framework by focusing on (a) redundancy elimination in generative models using intrinsically generated prediction errors, (b) adaptation due to amplified or prolonged neural activity, and (c) using internally generated predictions as a venue for learning new associations. The core of our treatise is that simulating proprioceptive, interoceptive, and exteroceptive signals, along with the top-down attenuation of the precision of sensory prediction errors due to neural adaptation, can explain objective and subjective hypnotic phenomena. Based on these postulations, we offer mechanistic explanations for critical categories of direct verbal suggestions, including (1) direct-ideomotor, (2) challenge-ideomotor, (3) perceptual, and (4) cognitive suggestions. Notably, we argue that besides explaining objective responses, SATH accounts for the subjective effects of suggestions, i.e., the change in the sense of agency and reality. Finally, we discuss individual differences in hypnotizability and how SATH accommodates them. We believe that SATH is exhaustive and parsimonious in its scope, can explain a wide range of hypnotic phenomena without contradiction, and provides a host of testable predictions for future research.

The Role of the Angular Gyrus in Goal-directed Behavior-Two Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Studies Examining Response Outcome Learning and Outcome Anticipation

Learning the contingencies between a situational context (S), one's own responses (R), and their outcomes (O) and selecting responses according to their anticipated outcomes is the basis of a goal-directed behavior. Previous imaging studies found the angular gyrus (AG) to be correlated to both the representation of R-O associations and outcome-based response selection. Based on this correlational relationship, we investigated the causal link between AG function and goal-directed behavior in offline and online TMS experiments. To this end, we employed an experimental R-O compatibility paradigm testing outcome anticipation during response selection and S-R-O knowledge to probe S-R-O learning. In Experiment 1, we applied 1-Hz rTMS offline to the AG or the vertex before participants performed the experimental tasks. In Experiment 2, we applied online 10-Hz pulse trains to the AG or used sham stimulation during an early action selection stage in half of the trials. In both experiments, the R-O compatibility effect was unaltered when response selection was outcome-based, suggesting no causal role of the AG in outcome anticipation during response selection. However, in both experiments, groups with AG stimulation showed significantly modulated knowledge of S-R-O associations in a posttest. Additionally, in an explorative analysis, we found an induced R-O compatibility effect later in the experiment when response selection was guided by stimulus-response rules, suggesting reduced selectivity of outcome anticipation. We discuss possible compensatory behavioral and brain mechanism as well as specific TMS-related methodical considerations demonstrating important implications for further studies investigating cognitive function by means of TMS.

Ideomotor learning: Time to generalize a longstanding principle

The ideomotor principle holds that anticipating the sensory consequences of a movement triggers an associated motor response. Even though this framework dates back to the 19th century, it continues to lie at the heart of many contemporary approaches to human action control. Here we specifically focus on the ideomotor learning mechanism that has to precede action initiation via effect anticipation. Traditional approaches to this learning mechanism focused on establishing novel action-effect (or response-effect) associations. Here we apply the theoretical concept of common coding for action and perception to argue that the same learning principle should result in response-response and stimulus-stimulus associations just as well. Generalizing ideomotor learning in such a way results in a powerful and general framework of ideomotor action control, and it allows for integrating the two seemingly separate fields of ideomotor approaches and hierarchical learning.

Instruction-based learning: A review

Humans are able to learn to implement novel rules from instructions rapidly, which is termed "instruction-based learning" (IBL). This remarkable ability is very important in our daily life in both learning individually or working as a team, and almost every psychology experiment starts with instructing participants. Many recent progresses have been made in IBL research both psychologically and neuroscientifically. In this review, we discuss the role of language in IBL, the importance of the first trial performance in IBL, why IBL should be considered as a goal-directed behavior, intelligence and IBL, cognitive flexibility and IBL, how behaviorally relevant information is processed in the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), how the lateral frontal cortex (LFC) networks work as a functional hierarchy during IBL, and the cortical and subcortical contributions to IBL. Finally, we develop a neural working model for IBL and provide some sensible directions for future research.

The anterior midcingulate cortex might be a neuronal substrate for the ideomotor mechanism

The way the brain controls voluntary movements for normal and pathological subject remains puzzling. In this selective review, we provide unreported harmonies between the anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC) activities and the ideomotor mechanism postulating that voluntary movements are controlled by the anticipation of the expected perceptual consequences of an action, critically involving bidirectional interplay of a given motor activity and corresponding sensory feedback. Among other evidence, we found that the required asymmetry in the bidirectional interplay between a given motor command and its expected sensory effect could rely on the specific activity of aMCC neurons when observing errors and successes. We confirm this hypothesis by presenting a pathological perspective, studying obsessive-compulsive and other related disorders in which hyperactivated and uniform aMCC activities should lead to a circular-reflex process that results in persistent ideas and repeated actions. By evaluating normal and pathological data, we propose considering the aMCC at a central position within the cerebral network involved in the ideomotor mechanism.

The role of dopamine in action control: Insights from medication effects in Parkinson's disease

Parkinson's disease (PD) is a neurological disorder associated primarily with overt motor symptoms. Several studies show that PD is additionally accompanied by impairments in covert cognitive processes underlying goal-directed motor functioning (e.g., action planning, conflict adaptation, inhibition), and that dopaminergic medication may modulate these action control components. In this review we aim to leverage findings from studies in this domain to elucidate the role of dopamine (DA) in action control. A qualitative review of studies that investigated the effects of medication status (on vs. off) on action control in PD suggests a component-specific role for DA in action control, although the expression of medication effects depends on characteristics of both the patients and experimental tasks used to measure action control. We discuss these results in the light of findings from other research lines examining the role of DA in action control (e.g., animal research, pharmacology), and recommend that future studies use multi-method, within-subject approaches to model DA effects on action control across different components as well as underlying striatal pathways (ventral vs. dorsal).

Reward does not modulate corticospinal excitability in anticipation of a Stroop trial

Action preparation is associated with a transient decrease of corticospinal excitability just before target onset. We have previously shown that the prospect of reward modulates preparatory corticospinal excitability in a Simon task. While the conflict in the Simon task strongly implicates the motor system, it is unknown whether reward prospect modulates preparatory corticospinal excitability in tasks that implicate the motor system less directly. To that effect, we examined reward-modulated preparatory corticospinal excitability in the Stroop task. We administered a rewarded cue-target delay paradigm using Stroop stimuli that afforded a left or right index finger response. Single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation was administered over the left primary motor cortex and electromyography was obtained from the right first dorsal interosseous muscle. In line with previous findings, there was a preparatory decrease in corticospinal excitability during the delay period. In contrast to our previous study using the Simon task, preparatory corticospinal excitability was not modulated by reward. Our results indicate that reward-modulated changes in the motor system depend on specific task-demands, possibly related to varying degrees of motor conflict.

Are self-caused distractors easier to ignore? Experiments with the flanker task

Four experiments are reported that investigate the relationship between action-outcome learning and the ability to ignore distractors. Each participant performed 600 acquisition trials, followed by 200 test trials. In the acquisition phase, participants were presented with a fixed action-outcome contingency (e.g., Key #1 ➔ green distractors), while that contingency was reversed in the test phase. In Experiments 1-3, a distractor feature depended on the participants' action. In Experiment 1, actions determined the color of the distractors; in Experiment 2, they determined the target-distractor distance; in Experiment 3, they determined target-distractor compatibility. Results suggest that with the relatively simple features (color and distance), exposure to action-outcome contingencies changed distractor cost, whereas with the complex or relational feature (target-distractor compatibility), exposure to the contingencies did not affect distractor cost. In Experiment 4, the same pattern of results was found (effect of contingency learning on distractor cost) with perceptual sequence learning, using visual cues ("X" vs. "O") instead of actions. Thus, although the mechanism of associative learning may not be unique to actions, such learning plays a role in the allocation of attention to task-irrelevant events.

Social learning of action-effect associations: Modulation of action control following observation of virtual action's effects

A core assumption of ideomotor theory is that learned bidirectional associations between actions and their effects enable agents to select and initiate actions by anticipating their sensory consequences. Although the acquisition of bidirectional action-effect (A-E) associations built on the experience of one's own movements has received considerable empirical support, the available evidence for A-E learning through the observation of others' actions and their effects remains limited. In two experiments, we tested whether A-E associations could be acquired through social learning in an experimental setup involving observation of virtual actions. In an acquisition phase, participants repeatedly observed finger movements on a screen, and each movement was consistently followed by a specific effect tone. In the subsequent test phase, tones were presented as imperative stimuli in a reaction-time task. In both experiments, reaction times were shorter when tones required the same response with which they had been linked in the preceding observation phase, compared with when they required a different response, revealing the impact of A-E associations acquired through observation. Similar results were obtained whether the movements observed during the acquisition phase were spatially aligned (Experiment 1) or not (Experiment 2) with participants' responses in the test phase, ruling out the possibility that the results merely reflect spatial compatibility effects. Our findings add new evidence for an acquisition of A-E associations through observation. Importantly, we generalize this acquisition process to the observation of virtual actions. These findings further confirm effect-based action control, as proposed by ideomotor theory.

Conjunctive representations that integrate stimuli, responses, and rules are critical for action selection

A tennis player planning the next stroke has to consider various pieces of information: the type of stroke, the trajectory of the incoming ball, and where to hit the ball. Here, by decoding electroencephalography signals while participants executed simple, rule-based actions, we found that such different, actionrelevant aspects are integrated within a unified, conjunctive representation rather than being processed in a piecemeal manner. Furthermore, the strength of conjunctive representations is a highly robust predictor of how quickly actions are executed. Human-level theories and recent single-cell evidence from animal models suggest that conjunctive representations are a necessary condition for successful action selection. Our results provide direct evidence in humans that is consistent with this hypothesis.

People can use abstract rules to flexibly configure and select actions for specific situations, yet how exactly rules shape actions toward specific sensory and/or motor requirements remains unclear. Both research from animal models and human-level theories of action control point to the role of highly integrated, conjunctive representations, sometimes referred to as event files. These representations are thought to combine rules with other, goal-relevant sensory and motor features in a nonlinear manner and represent a necessary condition for action selection. However, so far, no methods exist to track such representations in humans during action selection with adequate temporal resolution. Here, we applied time-resolved representational similarity analysis to the spectral-temporal profiles of electroencephalography signals while participants performed a cued, rule-based action selection task. In two experiments, we found that conjunctive representations were active throughout the entire selection period and were functionally dissociable from the representation of constituent features. Specifically, the strength of conjunctions was a highly robust predictor of trial-by-trial variability in response times and was selectively related to an important behavioral indicator of conjunctive representations, the so-called partial-overlap priming pattern. These results provide direct evidence for conjunctive representations as critical precursors of action selection in humans.

The response relevance of visual stimuli modulates the P3 component and the underlying sensorimotor network

The functional meaning and neural basis of the P3b component of ERPs are still under debate. One of the main issues is whether P3b reflects only stimulus-related processes (stimulus evaluation hypothesis) or response-related processes as well (stimulus-response or S-R link activation hypothesis). Here, we conducted an EEG experiment examining whether P3b may indeed reflect an S-R link activation, followed by an fMRI experiment in which we explored the brain areas and functional connectivity possibly constituting the neural basis of these sensorimotor links. In both experiments, two successive visual stimuli, S1 and S2, were presented with a 1 sec interval, and responses were defined either by S1 or S2, while participants responded only after S2 onset. The obtained EEG results suggest that P3b may be interpreted in terms of the S-R link activation account, although further studies are needed to disentangle P3-related activity from overlapping anticipatory activity. The obtained fMRI results showed that processing of the relevant S1 involved activation of a distributed postero-anterior sensorimotor network, and increased strength of functional connectivity within this network. This network may underlie activation of the S-R links, thus possibly also the P3b component, forming a bridging step between sensory encoding and response execution.

How different effectors and action effects modulate the formation of separate motor memories

Humans can operate a variety of modern tools, which are often associated with different visuomotor transformations. Studies investigating this ability have shown that separate motor memories can be acquired implicitly when different sensorimotor transformations are associated with distinct (intended) postures or explicitly when abstract contextual cues are leveraged by aiming strategies. It still remains unclear how different transformations are remembered implicitly when postures are similar. We investigated whether features of planning to manipulate a visual tool, such as its visual identity or the environmental effect intended by its use (i.e. action effect) would enable implicit learning of opposing visuomotor rotations. Results show that neither contextual cue led to distinct implicit motor memories, but that cues only affected implicit adaptation indirectly through generalization around explicit strategies. In contrast, a control experiment where participants practiced opposing transformations with different hands did result in contextualized aftereffects differing between hands across generalization targets. It appears that different (intended) body states are necessary for separate aftereffects to emerge, suggesting that the role of sensory prediction error-based adaptation may be limited to the recalibration of a body model, whereas establishing separate tool models may proceed along a different route.

Grasping a Chestnut Burr

This work aimed to assess the role of manual laterality in action coding strategies and, subsequently, in environmental features relevant for each hand's action. Relying on Eder and Hommel's (2013) proposal, we distinguished stimulus-related and end state-related consequences in a Simon paradigm where right-handed participants were divided into two groups, one responding with gloves and one without. Two objects were presented pictorially: one for which sensory consequences of grasping were negatively valenced (a chestnut burr), and one for which they were positively valenced (an apricot). By these means, stimulus and end-state effects could be assessed separately, along with the relevance of each feature of the experimental settings. Results showed that the use of one's dominant or non dominant hand gives rise to different repercussions of stimulus-related and end state-related effects on response: Responses made with the right (dominant) hand were based on an elaborated coding (representing features of stimulus-related and end state-related consequences of action). In contrast, responses made with the left (non dominant) hand seemed to be based on a less elaborated coding (not taking into account end-state consequences of an action).

Mirror and (absence of) counter-mirror responses to action sounds measured with TMS

To what extent is the mirror neuron mechanism malleable to experience? The answer to this question can help characterising its ontogeny and its role in social cognition. Some suggest that it develops through sensorimotor associations congruent with our own actions. Others argue for its extreme volatility that will encode any sensorimotor association in the environment. Here, we added to this debate by exploring the effects of short goal-directed 'mirror' and 'counter-mirror' trainings (a 'mirror' training is defined as the first type of training encountered by the participants) on human auditory mirror motor-evoked potentials (MEPs). We recorded MEPs in response to two tones void of previous motor meaning, before and after mirror and counter-mirror trainings in which participants generated two tones of different pitch by performing free-choice button presses. The results showed that mirror MEPs, once established, were protected against an equivalent counter-mirror experience: they became manifest very rapidly and the same number of training trials that lead to the initial association did not suffice to reverse the MEP pattern. This steadiness of the association argues that, by serving direct-matching purposes, the mirror mechanism is a good solution for social cognition.

From goals to muscles: motor familiarity shapes the representation of action-related sounds in the human motor system

Numerous studies corroborated the idea that the sound of familiar motor acts triggers a muscle-specific replica of the perceived actions in the listener's brain. We recently contradicted this conclusion by demonstrating that the representation of newly-learned action-related sounds is not somatotopically organised but rather it corresponds to the goal a particular action aims to achieve. In the present study, we aimed at reconciling these results. We measured MEPs to TMS as an index of the functional correspondence between the sensory stimulation and the activity in the listener's motor cortex. Participants heard two tones of different pitch, void of previous motor meaning, before and after an acquisition phase in which they generated them by performing 400 free-choice button presses. We then disentangled the representation of the action goal (button-tone association) from the somatotopic (muscle-tone) association by reversing the muscle-button contingencies. Our result supports the hypothesis that the neuronal representations of action-related sounds depends on motor familiarity: perceptuomotor representations of newly-learned actions are muscle-independent and correspond to the button-tone contingencies, whilst longer-term practice results in representations that rely on lower-level intrinsic parameters associated with the kinematics of specific movements.

The Age Effects on the Cognitive Processes of Intention-Based and Stimulus-Based Actions: An ERP Study

The functional decline in action among older adults is caused not only by physical weakness but also by cognitive decline. In this study, we aimed to compare the cognitive effects of age between intention-based and stimulus-based action modes electrophysiologically. Because age-related declines in cognitive function might proceed distinctly according to specific action modes and processes, four specific cognitive processes, action-effect binding, stimulus-response linkage, action-effect feedback control, and effect-action retrieval, were investigated. We recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) during a modified acquisition-test paradigm in young (mean age = 21, SD = 2) and old (mean age = 69, SD = 5) groups. A temporal bisection task and a movement pre-cuing task were used during the acquisition and test phases, respectively. Using ERP indices including readiness potential (RP), P3, N2 and contingent negative variation (CNV) to identify these four specific processes for the two action modes, we revealed the effects of age on each ERP index. The results showed similar patterns of waveforms but consistently decreasing amplitudes of all four ERP indices in the old age group compared with the young age group, which indicates not only generally declining functions of action preparation in older adults but also age effects specific to the action modes and processes that might otherwise be mixed together under confounding experimental conditions. Particularly, an interference effect indexed by the differences in the amplitudes of CNV between congruent and incongruent tasks was observed in the young age group, which is consistent with previous behavioral reports. However, this effect was absent in the old age group, indicating a specific age-related deficit in the effect-action retrieval process of intention-based action, which might be caused by an age-related deficit in associative memory. In sum, this study investigated the cognitive processes of two action modes from a developmental perspective and suggests the importance of adding associative memory training to interventions for older adults with the aim of improving intention-based action.

The ERP Effects of Combined Cognitive Training on Intention-Based and Stimulus-Based Actions in Older Chinese Adults

Age-related decreases in action are caused by neuromuscular weakness and cognitive decline. Although physical interventions have been reported to have beneficial effects on cognitive function in older adults, whether cognitive training improves action-related function remains unclear. In this study, we investigated the effects of combined cognitive training on intention-based and stimulus-based actions in older adults using event-related potentials (ERPs). A total of 26 healthy older adults (16 in the training group and 10 in the control group) participated in the study. The training group received 16 sessions of cognitive training, including eight sessions of executive function training and eight sessions of memory strategy training. Before and after training, both groups of participants underwent cognitive assessments and ERP recordings during both the acquisition and test phases with a motor cognitive paradigm. During the acquisition phase, subjects were asked to press one of two keys, either using a self-selected (intention-based) method or based on the preceding stimulus (stimulus-based). During the test phase, subjects were asked to respond to the pre-cues with either congruent or incongruent tasks. Using ERP indices—including readiness potential, P3 and contingent negative variation to identify motor preparation, stimulus processing and interference effect, respectively—we revealed the effects of training on both intention-based and stimulus-based actions. The correlations were also computed between the improved cognitive performance and the ERP amplitudes. It was shown that the improved executive function might extend substantial benefits to both actions, whereas associative memory may be specifically related to the bidirectional action-effect association of intention-based action, although the training effect of memory was absent during the insufficient training hours. In sum, the present study provided empirical evidence demonstrating that action could benefit from cognitive training. Clinical Trial Registration: www.chictr.org.cn, identifier: ChiCTR-OON-16007793.

HiTEC: a connectionist model of the interaction between perception and action planning

Increasing evidence suggests that perception and action planning do not represent separable stages of a unidirectional processing sequence, but rather emerging properties of highly interactive processes. To capture these characteristics of the human cognitive system, we have developed a connectionist model of the interaction between perception and action planning: HiTEC, based on the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al. in Behav Brain Sci 24:849–937, 2001). The model is characterized by representations at multiple levels and by shared representations and processes. It complements available models of stimulus–response translation by providing a rationale for (1) how situation-specific meanings of motor actions emerge, (2) how and why some aspects of stimulus–response translation occur automatically and (3) how task demands modulate sensorimotor processing. The model is demonstrated to provide a unitary account and simulation of a number of key findings with multiple experimental paradigms on the interaction between perception and action such as the Simon effect, its inversion (Hommel in Psychol Res 55:270–279, 1993), and action–effect learning.

The Prospective Nature of Voluntary Action: Insights from the Reflexive Imagery Task

Voluntary action is peculiar in several ways. For example, it is highly prospective in nature, requiring the activation of the representations of anticipated action-effects (e.g., a button pressed). These prospective action-effects can represent outcomes in the short-term (e.g., fingers snapping or uttering “cheers”) or in the long-term (e.g., building a house). In this review about the prospective nature of voluntary action, we first discuss in brief ideomotor theory, a theoretical approach that illuminates both the nature of the prospective representations in voluntary action and how these representations are acquired and subsequently used in the control of behavior. In this framework, prospective action-effects could be construed as ‘action options’ that, residing in consciousness, may or may not influence upcoming behavior, depending on the nature of the other prospective action-effects that happen to be coactivated at that time. In ideomotor theory, there is no homunculus that selects one prospective action-effect over another. Many of these prospective action-effects enter consciousness automatically. Second, we introduce the principle of atemporality and discuss the prospective nature of determining tendencies and mental simulation, all in the context of new findings from the Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT). The RIT reveals that, as a function of external control, prospective action-effects can enter consciousness in a reflex-like, automatic, and insuppressible manner. The RIT and its associated theoretical framework shed light on why the activation of such representations, though often undesired, is nonetheless adaptive and why not all of these prospective representations lead to overt action.

The neural basis of integrating pre- and post-response information for goal-directed actions

A fundamental prerequisite for goal-directed action is to encode the contingencies between responses (R) producing specific outcomes (O) in specific stimulus conditions (S). The present study aimed to characterize the functional neuroanatomy of different associational sub-components of such S-R-O contingencies during the first few trials of exposure. We devised a novel paradigm that was suited to distinguish BOLD activation patterns related to S-R, R-O, and the full S-R-O contingency. Different from previous studies our experimental design ensured that stimulus-related processes and outcome-related processes were maximally comparable, as both were learned incidentally and lacked intrinsic incentive value, and different from trial-and-error learning situations, outcomes did not serve a special role as performance feedback. We observed contingency-related dissociations between SMA, lateral OFC, and large parts of the reward system including central OFC, anterior striatum and midbrain areas. While the lateral OFC was involved in processing differential outcomes irrespective of a predictive stimulus context, the SMA was specifically engaged when differential outcomes could be predicted by the stimulus. By contrast, the activation pattern of reward system areas suggested that these regions serve a role in integrating non-incentive differential outcome information and incentive common outcome information. Together, these results support the notion that striatal and orbitofrontal regions are involved in outcome-related processes beyond trial-and-error S-R learning, that is, when outcomes are non-incentive and do not serve as reinforcing feedback that drives learning. Furthermore, our results clarify the role of the SMA in outcome-related processes thereby supporting current versions of ideomotor theory.

Contributions to a neurophysiology of meaning: the interpretation of written messages could be an automatic stimulus-reaction mechanism before becoming conscious processing of information

Background. Even though the interpretation of natural language messages is generally conceived as the result of a conscious processing of the message content, the influence of unconscious factors is also well known. What is still insufficiently known is the way such factors work. We have tackled interpretation assuming it is a process, whose basic features are the same for the whole humankind, and employing a naturalistic approach (careful observation of phenomena in conditions the closest to "natural" ones, and precise description before and independently of data statistical analysis). Methodology. Our field research involved a random sample of 102 adults. We presented them with a complete real world-like case of written communication using unabridged message texts. We collected data (participants' written reports on their interpretations) in controlled conditions through a specially designed questionnaire (closed and opened answers); then, we treated it through qualitative and quantitative methods. Principal Findings. We gathered some evidence that, in written message interpretation, between reading and the attribution of conscious meaning, an intermediate step could exist (we named it "disassembling") which looks like an automatic reaction to the text words/expressions. Thus, the process of interpretation would be a discontinuous sequence of three steps having different natures: the initial "decoding" step (i.e., reading, which requires technical abilities), disassembling (the automatic reaction, an unconscious passage) and the final conscious attribution of meaning. If this is true, words and expressions would firstly function like physical stimuli, before being taken into account as symbols. Such hypothesis, once confirmed, could help explaining some links between the cultural (human communication) and the biological (stimulus-reaction mechanisms as the basis for meanings) dimension of humankind.

Visuospatial cueing by self-caused features: Orienting of attention and action-outcome associative learning

The effect of a salient visual feature in orienting spatial attention was examined as a function of the learned association between the visual feature and the observer's action. During an initial acquisition phase, participants learned that two keypress actions consistently produced red and green visual cues. Next, in a test phase, participants' actions continued to result in singletons, but their color could be either congruent or incongruent with the learned action-color associations. Furthermore, the color singletons now functioned as valid or invalid spatial cues in a visual search, in which participants looked for a tilted line ("/" or "\") among distractors ("X"s). The results showed that an action-congruent color was more effective as a valid cue in the search task (increased benefit), but less effective as an invalid cue (reduced cost). We discuss our findings in terms of both an inhibition account and a preactivation account of action-driven sensory bias, and argue in favor of the preactivation account.

Homing in on consciousness in the nervous system: An action-based synthesis

What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, serving the somatic nervous system. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and "low level" than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is descriptive (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than normative (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness.

Mental representations of magnitude and order: a dissociation by sensorimotor learning

Numbers and spatially directed actions share cognitive representations. This assertion is derived from studies that have demonstrated that the processing of small- and large-magnitude numbers facilitates motor behaviors that are directed to the left and right, respectively. However, little is known about the role of sensorimotor learning for such number-action associations. In this study, we show that sensorimotor learning in a serial reaction-time task can modify the associations between number magnitudes and spatially directed movements. Experiments 1 and 3 revealed that this effect is present only for the learned sequence and does not transfer to a novel unpracticed sequence. Experiments 2 and 4 showed that the modification of stimulus-action associations by sensorimotor learning does not occur for other sets of ordered stimuli such as letters of the alphabet. These results strongly suggest that numbers and actions share a common magnitude representation that differs from the common order representation shared by letters and spatially directed actions. Only the magnitude representation, but not the order representation, can be modified episodically by sensorimotor learning.

Neural mechanisms of goal-directed behavior: outcome-based response selection is associated with increased functional coupling of the angular gyrus

Goal-directed behavior is based on representations of contingencies between a certain situation (S), a certain (re)action (R) and a certain outcome (O). These S-R-O representations enable flexible response selection in different situations according to the currently pursued goal. Importantly however, the successful formation of such representations is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for goal-directed behavior which additionally requires the actual usage of the contingency information for action control. The present fMRI study aimed at identifying the neural basis of each of these two aspects: representing vs. explicitly using experienced S-R-O contingencies. To this end, we created three experimental conditions: S-R-O contingency present and used for outcome-based response selection, S-R-O contingency present but not used, and S-R-O contingency absent. The comparison between conditions with and without S-R-O contingency revealed that the angular gyrus is relevant for representing S-R-O contingencies. The explicit usage of learnt S-R-O representations in turn was associated with increased functional coupling between angular gyrus and several subcortical (hippocampus, caudate head), prefrontal (lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (RLPFC)) and cerebellar areas, which we suggest represent different explicit and implicit processes of goal-directed action control. Hence, we ascribe a central role to the angular gyrus in associating actions to their sensory outcomes which is used to guide behavior through coupling of the angular gyrus with multiple areas related to different aspects of action control.

Attention and prediction in human audition: a lesson from cognitive psychophysiology

Attention is a hypothetical mechanism in the service of perception that facilitates the processing of relevant information and inhibits the processing of irrelevant information. Prediction is a hypothetical mechanism in the service of perception that considers prior information when interpreting the sensorial input. Although both (attention and prediction) aid perception, they are rarely considered together. Auditory attention typically yields enhanced brain activity, whereas auditory prediction often results in attenuated brain responses. However, when strongly predicted sounds are omitted, brain responses to silence resemble those elicited by sounds. Studies jointly investigating attention and prediction revealed that these different mechanisms may interact, e.g. attention may magnify the processing differences between predicted and unpredicted sounds. Following the predictive coding theory, we suggest that prediction relates to predictions sent down from predictive models housed in higher levels of the processing hierarchy to lower levels and attention refers to gain modulation of the prediction error signal sent up to the higher level. As predictions encode contents and confidence in the sensory data, and as gain can be modulated by the intention of the listener and by the predictability of the input, various possibilities for interactions between attention and prediction can be unfolded. From this perspective, the traditional distinction between bottom-up/exogenous and top-down/endogenous driven attention can be revisited and the classic concepts of attentional gain and attentional trace can be integrated.

Limits of ideomotor action-outcome acquisition

Ideomotor theory proposes that goal-directed action emerges from the implicit, incidental acquisition of bi-directional associations between actions and their outcomes. In line with this idea, a simple two-stage priming paradigm has provided evidence that presentation of outcomes primes previously associated actions. In the current study we compare the standard priming paradigm with two actions and two unique outcomes (Experiment 1) with two more complex, but otherwise identical versions (Experiment 2: two vs. four actions with four outcomes). Our results show stronger evidence of action-outcome learning in the simple compared to the more complex versions. We suggest that, when using the classic two-stage paradigm, action-outcome acquisition is limited to just a few action-outcome associations that can be concurrently learned-at least if learning is not supported by discriminative stimuli and outcomes are not salient or motivationally relevant. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled SI: Prediction and Attention.

A review of ideomotor approaches to perception, cognition, action, and language: advancing a cultural recycling hypothesis

The term "cultural recycling" derives from the neuronal recycling hypothesis, which suggests that representations of cultural inventions like written words, Arabic numbers, or tools can occupy brain areas dedicated to other functions. In the present selective review article, we propose a recycling hypothesis for the ideomotor mechanism. The ideomotor approach assumes that motor actions are controlled by the anticipation of the expected perceptual consequences that they aim to generate in the environment. Arguably, such action-perception mechanisms contribute to motor behaviour for human and non-human animals since millions of years. However, recent empirical studies suggest that the ideomotor mechanism can also contribute to word processing, number representation, and arithmetic. For instance, it has been shown that the anticipatory simulation of abstract semantics, like the numerical quantitative value of three items can prime processing of the associated Arabic number "3". Arabic numbers, words, or tools represent cultural inventions, so that, from a theoretical perspective, we suggest an ideomotor recycling hypothesis for the interaction with such artefacts. In this view, the ideomotor mechanism spreads its influence to other functions beyond motor control, and is recycled to flexibly adapt different human behaviours towards dealing with more abstract concepts.

Knowledge of response location alone is not sufficient to generate social inhibition of return

Previous research has revealed that the inhibition of return (IOR) effect emerges when individuals respond to a target at the same location as their own previous response or the previous response of a co-actor. The latter social IOR effect is thought to occur because the observation of co-actor's response evokes a representation of that action in the observer and that the observation-evoked response code subsequently activates the inhibitory mechanisms underlying IOR. The present study was conducted to determine if knowledge of the co-actor's response alone is sufficient to evoke social IOR. Pairs of participants completed responses to targets that appeared at different button locations. Button contact generated location-contingent auditory stimuli (high and low tones in Experiment 1 and colour words in Experiment 2). In the Full condition, the observer saw the response and heard the auditory stimuli. In the Auditory Only condition, the observer did not see the co-actor's response, but heard the auditory stimuli generated via button contact to indicate response endpoint. It was found that, although significant individual and social IOR effects emerged in the Full conditions, there were no social IOR effects in the Auditory Only conditions. These findings suggest that knowledge of the co-actor's response alone via auditory information is not sufficient to activate the inhibitory processes leading to IOR. The activation of the mechanisms that lead to social IOR seems to be dependent on processing channels that code the spatial characteristics of action.

Role of an ideomotor mechanism in number processing

The ideomotor principle predicts that the anticipation of expected sensory consequences precedes and controls voluntary goal-directed movements. Recent studies have revealed that an ideomotor mechanism could also support the link between finger movements and number processing. However, it is unknown whether such a mechanism is devoted to number processing per se, that is, without associated movement. In three experiments, we tested whether the ideomotor mechanism was also involved in a verbal number production task without associated goal-directed and motor dimensions. We tested this hypothesis in a response-effect (R-E) paradigm generally used to assess the ideomotor mechanisms. The results of Experiment 1 revealed a compatibility effect both in a stimulus-response task and an R-E task, suggesting the involvement of an ideomotor mechanism during number processing. More importantly, Experiment 2 revealed that performance in a motor imagery task correlated with the R-E compatibility effect, whereas performance in a visual imagery task did not, suggesting a distinct motor imagery contribution to R-E compatibility. Finally, Experiment 3 showed a strong R-E compatibility effect in a verbal word production task, but the correlations with motor or visual imagery tasks were not observed. Altogether, these findings suggest that ideomotor mechanisms play a specific and functional role in number processing.

Directive and incentive functions of affective action consequences: an ideomotor approach

Five experiments examined whether affective consequences become associated with the responses producing them and whether anticipations of positive and negative action outcomes influence action control differently. In a learning phase, one response produced pleasant and another response unpleasant visual effects. In a subsequent test phase, the same actions were carried out in response to a neutral feature of affective stimuli. Results showed that responses were faster when the irrelevant valence of the response cue matched the valence of the response outcome, but only when the responses still produced outcomes. These results suggest that affective action consequences have a directive function in that they facilitate the selection of the associated response over other responses, even when the response outcome is unpleasant (Experiment 4A). Results of another experiment showed that affective action consequences can also have an incentive function in that responses with pleasant outcomes are generally facilitated relative to responses with unpleasant outcomes. However, this motivational effect was seen only in a free-choice test (Experiment 5). The results suggest that behavioral impulses induced by ideomotor processes are constrained by the motivational evaluation of the anticipated action outcome. A model that integrates motivational factors into ideomotor theory is presented.

A goal-based mechanism for delayed motor intention: considerations from motor skills, tool use and action memory

Thinking about our behaviors for a future recall like playing a piano sonata during the next weekend (i.e., delayed motor intention) should engage at some level sensorimotor-based representations. Theoretically, such representations can be stored through both an action- and a goal-based mechanism. An action-based mechanism is related to the specific motor sequence of fingers like the key presses on the piano, and a goal-based mechanism is related to the musical tones generated by the key presses. From these considerations, the present article tries to explore whether the cognitive nature of delayed motor intention is more based on an action or goal mechanism. We reviewed empirical evidence and theoretical accounts of different domains such as motor skills, tool use, and action memory supporting the idea that such delayed motor intentions are rather represented through a goal-based mechanism. The specific role of this goal-based mechanism is to envision the future in an implementation-neutral mode to flexibly and efficiently retrieve an adapted action to environmental constraints. This goal-based account offers an interesting alternative to reshape the classical models about the representations of delayed motor intention. We also discuss how this account can be applied to practical activities in daily life situations.

Neural correlates of ideomotor effect anticipations

How does our mind produce physical, goal-directed action of our body? For about 200years, philosophers and psychologists hypothesized the transformation from mind to body to rely on the anticipation of an action's sensory consequences. Whereas this hypothesis received tremendous support from behavioral experiments, the neural underpinnings of action control via such ideomotor effect anticipations are virtually unknown. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, the present study identified the inferior parietal cortex and the parahippocampal gyrus as key regions for this type of action control - setting the stage for a neuroscientific framework for explaining action control by ideomotor effect anticipations and thus enabling a synthesis of psychological and neuroscientific approaches to human action.

Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying social learning in infancy: infants' neural processing of the effects of others' actions

Social transmission of knowledge is one of the reasons for human evolutionary success, and it has been suggested that already human infants possess eminent social learning abilities. However, nothing is known about the neurocognitive mechanisms that subserve infants' acquisition of novel action knowledge through the observation of other people's actions and their consequences in the physical world. In an electroencephalogram study on social learning in infancy, we demonstrate that 9-month-old infants represent the environmental effects of others' actions in their own motor system, although they never achieved these effects themselves before. The results provide first insights into the neurocognitive basis of human infants' unique ability for social learning of novel action knowledge.

The case of Watson vs. James: effect-priming studies do not support ideomotor theory

In this paper we show that response facilitation in choice reaction tasks achieved by priming the (previously perceived) effect is based on stimulus-response associations rather than on response-effect associations. The reduced key-press response time is not accounted for by earlier established couplings between the key-press movement and its subsequent effect, but instead results from couplings between this effect and the contingent key-release movement. This key-release movement is an intrinsic part of the entire performed response action in each trial of a reaction-time task, and always spontaneously follows the key-press movement. Eliminating the key-release movement from the task leads to the disappearance of the response facilitation, which raises the question whether response-effect associations actually play a role in studies that use the effect-priming paradigm. Together the three experiments presented in the paper cast serious doubts on the claim that action-effect couplings are acquired and utilized by the cognitive system in the service of action selection, and that the priming paradigm by itself can provide convincing evidence for this claim. As a corollary, we question whether the related two-step model for the ideomotor principle holds a satisfying explanation for how anticipation of future states guides action planning. The results presented here may have profound implications for priming studies in other disciplines of psychology as well.

The neural substrate of the ideomotor principle revisited: evidence for asymmetries in action-effect learning

Ideomotor theory holds that the perception or anticipatory imagination of action effects activates motor tendencies toward the action that is known to produce these effects, herein referred to as ideomotor response activation (IRA). IRA presupposes that the agent has previously learned which action produces which effects, and that this learning process has created bidirectional associations between the sensory effect codes and the motor codes producing the sensory effects. Here, we refer to this process as ideomotor learning. In the presented fMRI study, we adopted a standard two-phase ideomotor learning paradigm; a mixed between/within-subjects design allowed us to assess the neural substrate of both, IRA and ideomotor learning. We replicated earlier findings of a hand asymmetry in ideomotor processing with significantly stronger IRA by left-hand than right-hand action effects. Crucially, we traced this effect back to more pronounced associative learning for action-contingent effects of the left hand compared with effects of the right hand. In this context, our findings point to the caudate nucleus and the angular gyrus as central structures of the neural network underlying ideomotor learning.

Too Good to be True? Ideomotor Theory from a Computational Perspective

In recent years, Ideomotor Theory has regained widespread attention and sparked the development of a number of theories on goal-directed behavior and learning. However, there are two issues with previous studies' use of Ideomotor Theory. Although Ideomotor Theory is seen as very general, it is often studied in settings that are considerably more simplistic than most natural situations. Moreover, Ideomotor Theory's claim that effect anticipations directly trigger actions and that action-effect learning is based on the formation of direct action-effect associations is hard to address empirically. We address these points from a computational perspective. A simple computational model of Ideomotor Theory was tested in tasks with different degrees of complexity. The model evaluation showed that Ideomotor Theory is a computationally feasible approach for understanding efficient action-effect learning for goal-directed behavior if the following preconditions are met: (1) The range of potential actions and effects has to be restricted. (2) Effects have to follow actions within a short time window. (3) Actions have to be simple and may not require sequencing. The first two preconditions also limit human performance and thus support Ideomotor Theory. The last precondition can be circumvented by extending the model with more complex, indirect action generation processes. In conclusion, we suggest that Ideomotor Theory offers a comprehensive framework to understand action-effect learning. However, we also suggest that additional processes may mediate the conversion of effect anticipations into actions in many situations.

Sensory-based mechanism for delayed motor intention

Prospective motor learning (PML) can be defined as learning an action to be performed in the future. The privileged retrieval mechanism behind this delayed motor performance remains unknown. From a motor control and learning perspective, we may conceive of two forms of retrieval: a stimulus- and an intention-based control. Retrieval from intention-based control is based on the anticipation of intended sensory effects related to an action in order to select and control the appropriate motor procedure (i.e., the ideomotor mechanism). In contrast, in a stimulus-based control a connection between stimuli-features and their related action-features is stored in the memory and serves as the retrieval mechanism. In this view, action retrieval from external stimuli is based on the detection of events in the environment to perform the intended behaviour (i.e., the sensorimotor mechanism). In this study, we report an advantage in the action retrieval for participants who use an intention-based mode of control in comparison to a stimulus-based control. Furthermore, a control task reveals that the intention-based advantage is specific to PML. Our findings show that PML is benefited by mental anticipation of a sensory effect that is efficiently processed through an ideomotor mechanism to fulfil delayed motor intentions.

Adaptive skeletal muscle action requires anticipation and "conscious broadcasting"

Historically, the conscious and anticipatory processes involved in voluntary action have been associated with the loftiest heights of nervous function. Concepts like mental time travel, "theory of mind," and the formation of "the self" have been at the center of many attempts to determine the purpose of consciousness. Eventually, more reductionistic accounts of consciousness emerged, proposing rather that conscious states play a much more basic role in nervous function. Though the widely held integration consensus proposes that conscious states integrate information-processing structures and events that would otherwise be independent, Supramodular Interaction Theory (SIT) argues that conscious states are necessary for the integration of only certain kinds of information. As revealed in this selective review, this integration is related to what is casually referred to as "voluntary" action, which is intimately related to the skeletal muscle output system. Through a peculiar form of broadcasting, conscious integration often controls and guides action via "ideomotor" mechanisms, where anticipatory processes play a central role. Our selective review covers evidence (including findings from anesthesia research) for the integration consensus, SIT, and ideomotor theory.

Frontostriatal mechanisms in instruction-based learning as a hallmark of flexible goal-directed behavior

The present review intends to provide a neuroscientific perspective on the flexible (here: almost instantaneous) adoption of novel goal-directed behaviors. The overarching goal is to sketch the emerging framework for examining instruction-based learning and how this can be related to more established research approaches to instrumental learning and goal-directed action. We particularly focus on the contribution of frontal and striatal brain regions drawing on studies in both, animals and humans, but with an emphasize put on human neuroimaging studies. In section one, we review and integrate a selection of previous studies that are suited to generally delineate the neural underpinnings of goal-directed action as opposed to more stimulus-based (i.e., habitual) action. Building on that the second section focuses more directly on the flexibility to rapidly implement novel behavioral rules as a hallmark of goal-directed action with a special emphasis on instructed rules. In essence, the current neuroscientific evidence suggests that the prefrontal cortex and associative striatum are able to selectively and transiently code the currently relevant relationship between stimuli, actions, and the effects of these actions in both, instruction-based learning as well as in trial-and-error learning. The premotor cortex in turn seems to form more durable associations between stimuli and actions or stimuli, actions and effects (but not incentive values) thus representing the available action possibilities. Together, the central message of the present review is that instruction-based learning should be understood as a prime example of goal-directed action, necessitating a closer interlacing with basic mechanisms of goal-directed action on a more general level.

Action effect anticipation: neurophysiological basis and functional consequences

Voluntary actions are thought to be selected with respect to their intended goal. Converging data suggests that medial frontal cortex plays a crucial role in linking actions to their predicted effects. Recent neuroimaging data also suggests that during action selection, the brain pre-activities the representation of the predicted action effect. We review evidence of action effect prediction, both in terms of its neurophysiological basis as well as its functional consequences. By assuming that action preparation includes activation of the predicted sensory consequences of the action, we provide a mechanism to understand sensory attenuation and intentional binding. In this account, sensory attenuation results from more difficult discrimination between the observed action effect and the pre-activation of the predicted effect, as compared to when no (or incorrect) prediction is present. Similarly, a predicted action effect should also reach the threshold of awareness faster (intentional binding), if its perceptual representation is pre-activated. By comparing this potential mechanism to mental imagery and repetition suppression we propose a possible neural basis for the processing of predicted action effects.

Harleß' Apparatus of Will: 150 years later

As the empirical study of action control via ideomotor effect anticipations continues to uncover more and more aspects of this fundamental process, it is time to look back to the 19th century roots of the theory to assess which classical ideas are supported by contemporary research. In turn, classic ideas might stimulate studies on aspects of the ideomotor mechanism that have not yet been addressed empirically. The present article is a tribute to this classical work—more precisely to the article “Der Apparat des Willens” [The Apparatus of Will], published by Emil Harleß 150 years ago. At a closer look, Harleß does not only present a concise description of the ideomotor mechanism; he also presents a wealth of intriguing ideas that deserve empirical investigation.