Social grasping: From mirroring to mentalizing

Three-stage Dynamic Brain-cognitive Model of Understanding Action Intention Displayed by Human Body Movements

The ability to comprehend the intention conveyed through human body movements is crucial for effective interpersonal interactions. If people can't understand the intention behind other individuals' isolated or interactive actions, their actions will become meaningless. Psychologists have investigated the cognitive processes and neural representations involved in understanding action intention, yet a cohesive theoretical explanation remains elusive. Hence, we mainly review existing literature related to neural correlates of action intention, and primarily propose a putative Three-stage Dynamic Brain-cognitive Model of understanding action intention, which involves body perception, action identification and intention understanding. Specifically, at the first stage, body parts/shapes are processed by those brain regions such as extrastriate and fusiform body areas; During the second stage, differentiating observed actions relies on configuring relationships between body parts, facilitated by the activation of the Mirror Neuron System; The last stage involves identifying various intention categories, utilizing the Mentalizing System for recruitment, and different activation patterns concerning the nature of the intentions participants dealing with. Finally, we delves into the clinical practice, like intervention training based on a theoretical model for individuals with autism spectrum disorders who encounter difficulties in interpersonal communication.

Spatio-temporal dynamics of oscillatory brain activity during the observation of actions and interactions between point-light agents

Predicting actions from non-verbal cues and using them to optimise one's response behaviour (i.e. interpersonal predictive coding) is essential in everyday social interactions. We aimed to investigate the neural correlates of different cognitive processes evolving over time during interpersonal predictive coding. Thirty-nine participants watched two agents depicted by moving point-light stimuli while an electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded. One well-recognizable agent performed either a 'communicative' or an 'individual' action. The second agent either was blended into a cluster of noise dots (i.e. present) or was entirely replaced by noise dots (i.e. absent), which participants had to differentiate. EEG amplitude and coherence analyses for theta, alpha and beta frequency bands revealed a dynamic pattern unfolding over time: Watching communicative actions was associated with enhanced coupling within medial anterior regions involved in social and mentalising processes and with dorsolateral prefrontal activation indicating a higher deployment of cognitive resources. Trying to detect the agent in the cluster of noise dots without having seen communicative cues was related to enhanced coupling in posterior regions for social perception and visual processing. Observing an expected outcome was modulated by motor system activation. Finally, when the agent was detected correctly, activation in posterior areas for visual processing of socially relevant features was increased. Taken together, our results demonstrate that it is crucial to consider the temporal dynamics of social interactions and of their neural correlates to better understand interpersonal predictive coding. This could lead to optimised treatment approaches for individuals with problems in social interactions.

Action Observation Network Activity Related to Object-Directed and Socially-Directed Actions in Adolescents

The human action observation network (AON) encompasses brain areas consistently engaged when we observe other's actions. Although the core nodes of the AON are present from childhood, it is not known to what extent they are sensitive to different action features during development. Because social cognitive abilities continue to mature during adolescence, the AON response to socially-oriented actions, but not to object-related actions, may differ in adolescents and adults. To test this hypothesis, we scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) male and female typically-developing teenagers (n = 28; 13 females) and adults (n = 25; 14 females) while they passively watched videos of manual actions varying along two dimensions: sociality (i.e., directed toward another person or not) and transitivity (i.e., involving an object or not). We found that action observation recruited the same fronto-parietal and occipito-temporal regions in adults and adolescents. The modulation of voxel-wise activity according to the social or transitive nature of the action was similar in both groups of participants. Multivariate pattern analysis, however, revealed that decoding accuracies in intraparietal sulcus (IPS)/superior parietal lobe (SPL) for both sociality and transitivity were lower for adolescents compared with adults. In addition, in the lateral occipital temporal cortex (LOTC), generalization of decoding across the orthogonal dimension was lower for sociality only in adolescents. These findings indicate that the representation of the content of others' actions, and in particular their social dimension, in the adolescent AON is still not as robust as in adults.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The activity of the action observation network (AON) in the human brain is modulated according to the purpose of the observed action, in particular the extent to which it involves interaction with an object or with another person. How this conceptual representation of actions is implemented during development is largely unknown. Here, using multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data, we discovered that, while the action observation network is in place in adolescence, the fine-grain organization of its posterior regions is less robust than in adults to decode the abstract social dimensions of an action. This finding highlights the late maturation of social processing in the human brain.

Socially evaluative contexts facilitate mentalizing

Our ability to understand others' minds stands at the foundation of human learning, communication, cooperation, and social life more broadly. Although humans' ability to mentalize has been well-studied throughout the cognitive sciences, little attention has been paid to whether and how mentalizing differs across contexts. Classic developmental studies have examined mentalizing within minimally social contexts, in which a single agent seeks a neutral inanimate object. Such object-directed acts may be common, but they are typically consequential only to the object-seeking agent themselves. Here, we review a host of indirect evidence suggesting that contexts providing the opportunity to evaluate prospective social partners may facilitate mentalizing across development. Our article calls on cognitive scientists to study mentalizing in contexts where it counts.

Neurophysiological Perspective on Allostasis and Homeostasis: Dynamic Adaptation in Viable Systems

Allostasis is a physiological principle based on a dynamic regulatory system, contrary to homeostasis, in which the goal is to reach a steady state and recover from deviation from a set point in the internal environment. The concept of allostasis has continued to develop with advances in the field of neuroscience. In this short review, the author presents several new findings in neuroscience and extend the concept of allostasis as mutual regulation between cognitive, somatic, and autonomic systems. In this manner, biological systems adapt to external and internal environments by changing themselves.

High-definition transcranial direct current stimulation modulates eye gaze on emotional faces in college students with alexithymia: An eye-tracking study

BACKGROUND

Atypical eye gaze on emotional faces is a core feature of alexithymia. The inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) is considered to be the neurophysiological basis of alexithymia-related emotional face fixation. Our aim was to examine whether anodal high-definition transcranial direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS) administered to the right (r)IFG would facilitate eye gaze of emotional faces in alexithymia individuals.

METHOD

Forty individuals with alexithymia were equally assigned to anodal or sham HD-tDCS of the rIFG according to the principle of randomization. The individuals then completed a free-viewing eye tracking task (including happy, sad, and neutral faces) before and after 5 consecutive days of stimulation (twice a day).

RESULTS

The results showed that twice a day anodal HD-tDCS of the rIFG significantly increased the fixation time and fixation count of the eye area on happy and neutral faces, but there was no significant effect on sad faces. According to the temporal-course analysis, after the intervention, the fixation time on neutral faces increased significantly at almost all time points of the eye tracking task. For happy faces, the improvement was demonstrated between 500 and 1000 ms and between 2500 and 3500 ms. For sad faces, the fixation time improved but not significantly.

CONCLUSIONS

Applying high-dose anodal HD-tDCS to the rIFG selectively facilitated eye gaze in the eye area of neutral and happy faces in individuals with alexithymia, which may improve their face processing patterns.

Investigation of the neural correlates of mentalizing through the Dynamic Inference Task, a new naturalistic task of social cognition

Understanding others' intentions requires both the identification of social cues (e.g., emotional facial expressions, gaze direction) and the attribution of a mental state to another. The neural substrates of these processes have often been studied separately, and results are heterogeneous, in part attributable to the variety of paradigms used. The aim of the present study was to explore the neural regions underlying these sociocognitive processes, using a novel naturalistic task in which participants engage with human protagonists featured in videos. A total of 51 right-handed volunteers underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging while performing the Dynamic Inference Task (DIT), manipulating the degree of inference (high vs. low), the presence of emotion (emotional vs. nonemotional), and gaze direction (direct vs. averted). High nonemotional inference elicited neural activation in temporal regions encompassing the right posterior superior temporal sulcus. The presence (vs. absence) of emotion in the high-inference condition elicited a bilateral pattern of activation in internal temporal areas around the amygdala and orbitofrontal structures, as well as activation in the right dorsomedial part of the superior frontal gyrus and the left precuneus. On account of its dynamic, naturalistic approach, the DIT seems a suitable task for exploring social interactions and the way we interact with others, both in nonclinical and clinical populations.

Social cerebellum in goal-directed navigation

The posterior cerebellum is responsible for the understanding and learning of sequences of actions by others, which are a prerequisite for social understanding. This study investigates this cerebellar function while navigating toward a goal in a social context. Participants undertook a novel social navigation task requiring them to memorize and subsequently reproduce a protagonist's trajectory through a grid toward a desirable goal. As a nonsocial control condition, a ball underwent the same trajectory by passively rolling through the grid toward the same endpoint. To establish that memorizing and reproducing a trajectory is a critical cerebellar function, two non-sequencing control conditions were created, which involved the observation only of the trajectory by the protagonist or ball. Our results showed that the posterior cerebellar Crus II was involved in memorizing both social and nonsocial trajectories, along with the parahippocampal gyrus and other cortical areas involved in social cognition. As hypothesized, cerebellar Crus I was more active when memorizing social as opposed to nonsocial trajectories. Moreover, cerebellar Crus I and II, and lobule VI, were activated when reproducing both social and nonsocial trajectories. These findings highlight the involvement of the posterior cerebellar Crus in supporting human goal-directed social navigation.

The Kinematics of Social Action: Visual Signals Provide Cues for What Interlocutors Do in Conversation

During natural conversation, people must quickly understand the meaning of what the other speaker is saying. This concerns not just the semantic content of an utterance, but also the social action (i.e., what the utterance is doing-requesting information, offering, evaluating, checking mutual understanding, etc.) that the utterance is performing. The multimodal nature of human language raises the question of whether visual signals may contribute to the rapid processing of such social actions. However, while previous research has shown that how we move reveals the intentions underlying instrumental actions, we do not know whether the intentions underlying fine-grained social actions in conversation are also revealed in our bodily movements. Using a corpus of dyadic conversations combined with manual annotation and motion tracking, we analyzed the kinematics of the torso, head, and hands during the asking of questions. Manual annotation categorized these questions into six more fine-grained social action types (i.e., request for information, other-initiated repair, understanding check, stance or sentiment, self-directed, active participation). We demonstrate, for the first time, that the kinematics of the torso, head and hands differ between some of these different social action categories based on a 900 ms time window that captures movements starting slightly prior to or within 600 ms after utterance onset. These results provide novel insights into the extent to which our intentions shape the way that we move, and provide new avenues for understanding how this phenomenon may facilitate the fast communication of meaning in conversational interaction, social action, and conversation.

Action Observation Responses Are Influenced by Movement Kinematics and Target Identity

In order to inform the debate whether cortical areas related to action observation provide a pragmatic or a semantic representation of goal-directed actions, we performed 2 functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments in humans. The first experiment, involving observation of aimless arm movements, resulted in activation of most of the components known to support action execution and action observation. Given the absence of a target/goal in this experiment and the activation of parieto-premotor cortical areas, which were associated in the past with direction, amplitude, and velocity of movement of biological effectors, our findings suggest that during action observation we could be monitoring movement kinematics. With the second, double dissociation fMRI experiment, we revealed the components of the observation-related cortical network affected by 1) actions that have the same target/goal but different reaching and grasping kinematics and 2) actions that have very similar kinematics but different targets/goals. We found that certain areas related to action observation, including the mirror neuron ones, are informed about movement kinematics and/or target identity, hence providing a pragmatic rather than a semantic representation of goal-directed actions. Overall, our findings support a process-driven simulation-like mechanism of action understanding, in agreement with the theory of motor cognition, and question motor theories of action concept processing.

Simulation and social behavior: an fMRI study of neural processing during simulation in individuals with and without risk for psychosis

Social dysfunction is a risk indicator for schizophrenia spectrum disorders, with at-risk individuals demonstrating a range of social behavior impairments. Variability in social ability may be explained by individual differences in the psychological processes of social behavior. In particular, mental simulation, the process by which an individual generates an internal representation of the thoughts or feelings of another, may explain variation in social behavior. This study investigates the neural process of simulation in healthy individuals and individuals at risk for psychosis. Using a novel fMRI pain paradigm, individuals watch videos of another person’s hand or foot experiencing pain. After each video, individuals are asked to simulate the observed painful situation on their own hand or foot. Neural activity during simulation in the somatosensory cortex was associated with real-world self-reported social behavior, such that a stronger neural response in the somatosensory cortex was associated with greater rates of positive social experiences and affective empathy across all participants. These findings suggest that the neural mechanisms that underlie simulation are important for social behavior, and may explain individual variability in social functioning in healthy and at-risk populations.

Recognizing humanity: dehumanization predicts neural mirroring and empathic accuracy in face-to-face interactions

Dehumanization is the failure to recognize the cognitive and emotional complexities of the people around us. While its presence has been well documented in horrific acts of violence, it is also theorized to play a role in everyday life. We measured its presence and effects in face-to-face dyadic interactions between strangers and found that not only was there variance in the extent to which they perceived one another as human, but this variance predicted neural processing and behavior. Specifically, participants showed stronger neural mirroring, indexed by electroencephalography (EEG) mu-suppression, in response to partners they evaluated as more human, suggesting their brains neurally simulated those targets' actions more. Participants were also marginally more empathically accurate about the emotions of partners deemed more human and performed better with them on a cooperative task. These results suggest that there are indeed differences in our recognition of the humanity of people we meet-demonstrated for the first time in a real, face-to-face interaction-and that this mundane variation affects our ability to neurally simulate, cooperate and empathize.

Increased pSTS activity and decreased pSTS-mPFC connectivity when processing negative social interactions

We have previously shown that activity and connectivity within and between the action observation and mentalizing brain systems reflect the degree of positive dimensions expressed by social interactions such as cooperativity and affectivity, respectively. Here we aim to extend this evidence by investigating the neural bases of processing negative dimensions of observed interactions, such as competition and affective conflict, possibly representing a benchmark for different pathological conditions. In this fMRI study 34 healthy participants were shown pictures depicting interactions characterized by two crossed dimensions, i.e. positively- vs. negatively- connotated social intentions mainly expressed in terms of motor acts vs. mental states, i.e. cooperative, competitive, affective and conflicting interactions. We confirmed the involvement of the action observation and mentalizing networks in processing intentions mainly expressed through motor acts (cooperative/competitive) vs. mental states (affective/conflicting), respectively. Results highlighted the selective role of the left pSTS/TPJ in decoding social interactions, even when compared with parallel actions by non-interacting individuals. Its right-hemispheric homologue displayed stronger responses to negative than positive social intentions, regardless of their motor/mental status, and decreased connectivity with the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) when processing negative interactions. The resulting mPFC downregulation by negative social scenes might reflect an adaptive response to socio-affective threats, via decreased mentalizing when facing negative social stimuli. This evidence on the brain mechanisms underlying the decoding of real complex interactions represents a baseline for assessing both the neural correlates of impaired social cognition, and the effects of rehabilitative treatments, in neuro-psychiatric diseases or borderline conditions such as loneliness.

Enhanced mirroring upon mutual gaze: multimodal evidence from TMS-assessed corticospinal excitability and the EEG mu rhythm

Previous research has demonstrated that eye contact between actor and observer specifically enhances the 'mirroring' of others' actions, as measured by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)-induced motor evoked potentials (MEPs). However, it remains unknown whether other markers of mirror system activation, such as suppression of the EEG mu rhythm (8-13 Hz) over the sensorimotor strip, are also susceptible to perceived eye contact. Here, both TMS-induced MEPs and EEG mu suppression indices were assessed (in separate sessions) while 32 participants (mean age: 24y; 8m) observed a simple hand movement combined with direct or averted gaze from the actor. Both measures were significantly modulated by perceived eye gaze during action observation; showing an increase in MEP amplitude and an attenuation of the mu rhythm during direct vs. averted gaze. Importantly, while absolute MEP and mu suppression scores were not related, a significant association was identified between gaze-related changes in MEPs and mu suppression, indicating that both measures are similarly affected by the modulatory impact of gaze cues. Our results suggest that although the neural substrates underlying TMS-induced MEPs and the EEG mu rhythm may differ, both are sensitive to the social relevance of the observed actions, which might reflect a similar neural gating mechanism.

The neural and cognitive time course of intention reasoning: Electrophysiological evidence from ERPs

Intention is a typical mental state in the theory of mind. However, to date, there have been theoretical debates on the conceptual structure of intention. The neural and cognitive time course of intention reasoning remains unclear. The present event-related potential (ERP) study had two purposes: first, to investigate the neural correlates of intention reasoning based on a differentiated conceptual structure distinguishing desire and intention; second, to investigate the neural basis of intention reasoning for different agents. Thus, we compared the neural activity elicited by intention reasoning for self and for others when the intention matched or mismatched the desire of the agent. The results revealed that three ERP components distinguished among different types of intention reasoning. A negative-going ERP deflection with right frontal distribution between 400 and 500 ms might reflect the cognitive conflict involved in intention reasoning, a right frontal late positive component might be associated with the categorisation of agents, and a centro-parietal late slow wave might indicate the conceptual mental operations associated with decoupling mechanisms in intention processing. These findings implied the neural and cognitive time course of intention reasoning and provided neural evidence for the differentiated conception of intention.

A causal role for frontal cortico-cortical coordination in social action monitoring

Decision-making via monitoring others’ actions is a cornerstone of interpersonal exchanges. Although the ventral premotor cortex (PMv) and the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) are cortical nodes in social brain networks, the two areas are rarely concurrently active in neuroimaging, inviting the hypothesis that they are functionally independent. Here we show in macaques that the ability of the MPFC to monitor others’ actions depends on input from the PMv. We found that delta-band coherence between the two areas emerged during action execution and action observation. Information flow especially in the delta band increased from the PMv to the MPFC as the biological nature of observed actions increased. Furthermore, selective blockade of the PMv-to-MPFC pathway using a double viral vector infection technique impaired the processing of observed, but not executed, actions. These findings demonstrate that coordinated activity in the PMv-to-MPFC pathway has a causal role in social action monitoring.

Social interactions require monitoring others’ actions to optimally organise one’s own actions. Here, the authors show that the pathway from the ventral premotor cortex (PMv) to the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) is causally involved in monitoring observed, but not executed, actions.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging multivoxel pattern analysis reveals neuronal substrates for collaboration and competition with myopic and predictive strategic reasoning

Competition and collaboration are strategies that can be used to optimize the outcomes of social interactions. Research into the neuronal substrates underlying these aspects of social behavior has been limited due to the difficulty in distinguishing complex activation via univariate analysis. Therefore, we employed multivoxel pattern analysis of functional magnetic resonance imaging to reveal the neuronal activations underlying competitive and collaborative processes when the collaborator/opponent used myopic/predictive reasoning. Twenty‐four healthy subjects participated in 2 × 2 matrix‐based sequential‐move games. Searchlight‐based multivoxel patterns were used as input for a support vector machine using nested cross‐validation to distinguish game conditions, and identified voxels were validated via the regression of the behavioral data with bootstrapping. The left anterior insula (accuracy = 78.5%) was associated with competition, and middle frontal gyrus (75.1%) was associated with predictive reasoning. The inferior/superior parietal lobules (84.8%) and middle frontal gyrus (84.7%) were associated with competition, particularly in trials with a predictive opponent. The visual/motor areas were related to response time as a proxy for visual attention and task difficulty. Our results suggest that multivoxel patterns better represent the neuronal substrates underlying the social cognition of collaboration and competition intermixed with myopic and predictive reasoning than do univariate features.

Dynamic brain-to-brain concordance and behavioral mirroring as a mechanism of the patient-clinician interaction

The patient-clinician interaction can powerfully shape treatment outcomes such as pain but is often considered an intangible "art of medicine" and has largely eluded scientific inquiry. Although brain correlates of social processes such as empathy and theory of mind have been studied using single-subject designs, specific behavioral and neural mechanisms underpinning the patient-clinician interaction are unknown. Using a two-person interactive design, we simultaneously recorded functional magnetic resonance imaging (hyperscanning) in patient-clinician dyads, who interacted via live video, while clinicians treated evoked pain in patients with chronic pain. Our results show that patient analgesia is mediated by patient-clinician nonverbal behavioral mirroring and brain-to-brain concordance in circuitry implicated in theory of mind and social mirroring. Dyad-based analyses showed extensive dynamic coupling of these brain nodes with the partners' brain activity, yet only in dyads with pre-established clinical rapport. These findings introduce a putatively key brain-behavioral mechanism for therapeutic alliance and psychosocial analgesia.

Visibly constraining an agent modulates observers' automatic false-belief tracking

Our motor system can generate representations which carry information about the goals of another agent’s actions. However, it is not known whether motor representations play a deeper role in social understanding, and, in particular, whether they enable tracking others’ beliefs. Here we show that, for adult observers, reliably manifesting an ability to track another’s false belief critically depends on representing the agent’s potential actions motorically. One signature of motor representations is that they can be disrupted by constraints on an observed agent’s action capacities. We therefore used a ‘mummification’ technique to manipulate whether the agent in a visual ball-detection task was free to act or whether he was visibly constrained from acting. Adults’ reaction times reliably reflected the agent’s beliefs only when the agent was free to act on the ball and not when the agent was visibly constrained from acting. Furthermore, it was the agent’s constrained action capabilities, rather than any perceptual novelty, that determined whether adult observers’ reaction times reliably reflected the agent’s beliefs. These findings signal that our motor system may underpin more of social cognition than previously imagined, and, in particular, that motor representations may underpin automatic false-belief tracking.

Weighted Brain Network Metrics for Decoding Action Intention Understanding Based on EEG

Background: Understanding the action intentions of others is important for social and human-robot interactions. Recently, many state-of-the-art approaches have been proposed for decoding action intention understanding. Although these methods have some advantages, it is still necessary to design other tools that can more efficiently classify the action intention understanding signals.

New Method: Based on EEG, we first applied phase lag index (PLI) and weighted phase lag index (WPLI) to construct functional connectivity matrices in five frequency bands and 63 micro-time windows, then calculated nine graph metrics from these matrices and subsequently used the network metrics as features to classify different brain signals related to action intention understanding.

Results: Compared with the single methods (PLI or WPLI), the combination method (PLI+WPLI) demonstrates some overwhelming victories. Most of the average classification accuracies exceed 70%, and some of them approach 80%. In statistical tests of brain network, many significantly different edges appear in the frontal, occipital, parietal, and temporal regions.

Conclusions: Weighted brain networks can effectively retain data information. The integrated method proposed in this study is extremely effective for investigating action intention understanding. Both the mirror neuron and mentalizing systems participate as collaborators in the process of action intention understanding.

Cognitive and Emotional Empathy in Young Adolescents: an fMRI Study

Objectives

We investigated the differences in cognitive and emotional empathic ability between adolescents and adults, and the differences of the brain activation during cognitive and emotional empathy tasks.

Methods

Adolescents (aged 13–15 years, n=14) and adults (aged 19–29 years, n=17) completed a range of empathic ability questionnaires and were scanned functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during both cognitive and emotional empathy task. Differences in empathic ability and brain activation between the groups were analyzed.

Results

Both cognitive and emotional empathic ability were significantly lower in the adolescent compared to the adult group. Comparing the adolescent to the adult group showed that brain activation was significantly greater in the right transverse temporal gyrus (BA 41), right insula (BA 13), right superior parietal lobule (BA 7), right precentral gyrus (BA 4), and right thalamus whilst performing emotional empathy tasks. No brain regions showed significantly greater activation in the adolescent compared to the adult group while performing cognitive empathy task. In the adolescent group, scores of the Fantasy Subscale in the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, which reflects cognitive empathic ability, negatively correlated with activity of right superior parietal lobule during emotional empathic situations (r=-0.739, p=0.006).

Conclusion

These results strongly suggest that adolescents possess lower cognitive and emotional empathic abilities than adults do and require compensatory hyperactivation of the brain regions associated with emotional empathy or embodiment in emotional empathic situation. Compensatory hyperactivation in the emotional empathy-related brain areas among adolescents are likely associated with their lower cognitive empathic ability.

Early warning signals in motion inference

The ability to infer intention lies at the basis of many social interactions played out via motor actions. We consider a simple paradigm of this ability in humans using data from experiments simulating an antagonistic game between an Attacker and a Blocker. Evidence shows early inference of an Attacker move by as much as 100ms but the nature of the informational cues signaling the impending move remains unknown. We show that the transition to action has the hallmark of a critical transition that is accompanied by early warning signals. These early warning signals occur as much as 130 ms before motion ensues-showing a sharp rise in motion autocorrelation at lag-1 and a sharp rise in the autocorrelation decay time. The early warning signals further correlate strongly with Blocker response times. We analyze the variance of the motion near the point of transition and find that it diverges in a manner consistent with the dynamics of a fold-transition. To test if humans can recognize and act upon these early warning signals, we simulate the dynamics of fold-transition events and ask people to recognize the onset of directional motion: participants react faster to fold-transition dynamics than to its uncorrelated counterpart. Together, our findings suggest that people can recognize the intent and onset of motion by inferring its early warning signals.

Re-imaging the intentional stance

The commonly used paradigm to investigate Dennet's 'intentional stance' compares neural activation when participants compete with a human versus a computer. This paradigm confounds whether the opponent is natural or artificial and whether it is intentional or an automaton. This functional magnetic resonance imaging study is, to our knowledge, the first to investigate the intentional stance by orthogonally varying perceptions of the opponents' intentionality (responding actively or passively according to a script) and embodiment (human or a computer). The mere perception of the opponent (whether human or computer) as intentional activated the mentalizing network: the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) bilaterally, right temporal pole, anterior paracingulate cortex (aPCC) and the precuneus. Interacting with humans versus computers induced activations in a more circumscribed right lateralized subnetwork within the mentalizing network, consisting of the TPJ and the aPCC, possibly reflective of the tendency to spontaneously attribute intentionality to humans. The interaction between intentionality (active versus passive) and opponent (human versus computer) recruited the left frontal pole, possibly in response to violations of the default intentional stance towards humans and computers. Employing an orthogonal design is important to adequately capture Dennett's conception of the intentional stance as a mentalizing strategy that can apply equally well to humans and other intentional agents.

Neural processing of social interaction: Coordinate-based meta-analytic evidence from human neuroimaging studies

While the action observation and mentalizing networks are considered to play complementary roles in understanding others' goals and intentions, they might be concurrently engaged when processing social interactions. We assessed this hypothesis via three activation-likelihood-estimation meta-analyses of neuroimaging studies on the neural processing of: (a) social interactions, (b) individual actions by the action observation network, and (c) mental states by the mentalizing network. Conjunction analyses and direct comparisons unveiled overlapping and specific regions among the resulting maps. We report quantitative meta-analytic evidence for a "social interaction network" including key nodes of the action observation and mentalizing networks. An action-social interaction-mentalizing gradient of activity along the posterior temporal cortex highlighted a hierarchical processing of interactions, from visuomotor analyses decoding individual and shared intentions to in-depth inferences on actors' intentional states. The medial prefrontal cortex, possibly in conjunction with the amygdala, might provide additional information concerning the affective valence of the interaction. This evidence suggests that the functional architecture underlying the neural processing of interactions involves the joint involvement of the action observation and mentalizing networks. These data might inform the design of rehabilitative treatments for social cognition disorders in pathological conditions, and the assessment of their outcome in randomized controlled trials.

Identifying others' informative intentions from movement kinematics

Previous research has demonstrated that people can reliably distinguish between actions with different instrumental intentions on the basis of the kinematic signatures of these actions (Cavallo, Koul, Ansuini, Capozzi, & Becchio, 2016). It has also been demonstrated that different informative intentions result in distinct action kinematics (McEllin, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2017). However, it is unknown whether people can discriminate between instrumental actions and actions performed with an informative intention, and between actions performed with different informative intentions, on the basis of kinematic cues produced in these actions. We addressed these questions using a visual discrimination paradigm in which participants were presented with point light animations of an actor playing a virtual xylophone. We systematically manipulated and amplified kinematic parameters that have been shown to reflect different informative intentions. We found that participants reliably used both spatial and temporal cues in order to discriminate between instrumental actions and actions performed with an informative intention, and between actions performed with different informative intentions. Our findings indicate that the informative cues produced in joint action and teaching go beyond serving a general informative purpose and can be used to infer specific informative intentions.

Communicative intent modulates production and comprehension of actions and gestures: A Kinect study

Actions may be used to directly act on the world around us, or as a means of communication. Effective communication requires the addressee to recognize the act as being communicative. Humans are sensitive to ostensive communicative cues, such as direct eye gaze (Csibra & Gergely, 2009). However, there may be additional cues present in the action or gesture itself. Here we investigate features that characterize the initiation of a communicative interaction in both production and comprehension. We asked 40 participants to perform 31 pairs of object-directed actions and representational gestures in more- or less- communicative contexts. Data were collected using motion capture technology for kinematics and video recording for eye-gaze. With these data, we focused on two issues. First, if and how actions and gestures are systematically modulated when performed in a communicative context. Second, if observers exploit such kinematic information to classify an act as communicative. Our study showed that during production the communicative context modulates space-time dimensions of kinematics and elicits an increase in addressee-directed eye-gaze. Naïve participants detected communicative intent in actions and gestures preferentially using eye-gaze information, only utilizing kinematic information when eye-gaze was unavailable. Our study highlights the general communicative modulation of action and gesture kinematics during production but also shows that addressees only exploit this modulation to recognize communicative intention in the absence of eye-gaze. We discuss these findings in terms of distinctive but potentially overlapping functions of addressee directed eye-gaze and kinematic modulations within the wider context of human communication and learning.

Adaptation aftereffects reveal representations for encoding of contingent social actions

A hallmark of human social behavior is the effortless ability to relate one's own actions to that of the interaction partner, e.g., when stretching out one's arms to catch a tripping child. What are the behavioral properties of the neural substrates that support this indispensable human skill? Here we examined the processes underlying the ability to relate actions to each other, namely the recognition of spatiotemporal contingencies between actions (e.g., a "giving" that is followed by a "taking"). We used a behavioral adaptation paradigm to examine the response properties of perceptual mechanisms at a behavioral level. In contrast to the common view that action-sensitive units are primarily selective for one action (i.e., primary action, e.g., 'throwing"), we demonstrate that these processes also exhibit sensitivity to a matching contingent action (e.g., "catching"). Control experiments demonstrate that the sensitivity of action recognition processes to contingent actions cannot be explained by lower-level visual features or amodal semantic adaptation. Moreover, we show that action recognition processes are sensitive only to contingent actions, but not to noncontingent actions, demonstrating their selective sensitivity to contingent actions. Our findings show the selective coding mechanism for action contingencies by action-sensitive processes and demonstrate how the representations of individual actions in social interactions can be linked in a unified representation.

Investigating Mirror System (MS) Activity in Adults with ASD When Inferring Others' Intentions Using Both TMS and EEG

ASD is associated with mentalizing deficits that may correspond with atypical mirror system (MS) activation. We investigated MS activity in adults with and without ASD when inferring others' intentions using TMS-induced motor evoked potentials (MEPs) and mu suppression measured by EEG. Autistic traits were measured for all participants. Our EEG data show, high levels of autistic traits predicted reduced right mu (8-10 Hz) suppression when mentalizing. Higher left mu (8-10 Hz) suppression was associated with superior mentalizing performances. Eye-tracking and TMS data showed no differences associated with autistic traits. Our data suggest ASD is associated with reduced right MS activity when mentalizing, TMS-induced MEPs and mu suppression measure different aspects of MS functioning and the MS is directly involved in inferring intentions.

Action Observation Areas Represent Intentions From Subtle Kinematic Features

Mirror neurons have been proposed to underlie humans' ability to understand others' actions and intentions. Despite 2 decades of research, however, the exact computational and neuronal mechanisms implied in this ability remain unclear. In the current study, we investigated whether, in the absence of contextual cues, regions considered to be part of the human mirror neuron system represent intention from movement kinematics. A total of 21 participants observed reach-to-grasp movements, performed with either the intention to drink or to pour while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging. Multivoxel pattern analysis revealed successful decoding of intentions from distributed patterns of activity in a network of structures comprising the inferior parietal lobule, the superior parietal lobule, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the middle frontal gyrus. Consistent with the proposal that parietal regions play a key role in intention understanding, classifier weights were higher in the inferior parietal region. These results provide the first demonstration that putative mirror neuron regions represent subtle differences in movement kinematics to read the intention of an observed motor act.

Performance monitoring in the medial frontal cortex and related neural networks: From monitoring self actions to understanding others' actions

Action is a key channel for interacting with the outer world. As such, the ability to monitor actions and their consequences - regardless as to whether they are self-generated or other-generated - is of crucial importance for adaptive behavior. The medial frontal cortex (MFC) has long been studied as a critical node for performance monitoring in nonsocial contexts. Accumulating evidence suggests that the MFC is involved in a wide range of functions necessary for one's own performance monitoring, including error detection, and monitoring and resolving response conflicts. Recent studies, however, have also pointed to the importance of the MFC in performance monitoring under social conditions, ranging from monitoring and understanding others' actions to reading others' mental states, such as their beliefs and intentions (i.e., mentalizing). Here we review the functional roles of the MFC and related neural networks in performance monitoring in both nonsocial and social contexts, with an emphasis on the emerging field of a social systems neuroscience approach using macaque monkeys as a model system. Future work should determine the way in which the MFC exerts its monitoring function via interactions with other brain regions, such as the superior temporal sulcus in the mentalizing system and the ventral premotor cortex in the mirror system.

Early modulation of intra-cortical inhibition during the observation of action mistakes

Errors while performing an action are fundamental for learning. During interaction others' errors must be monitored and taken into account to allow joint action coordination and imitation learning. This monitoring relies on an action observation network (AON) mainly based on parietofrontal recurrent circuits. Although different studies suggest that inappropriate actions may rapidly be inhibited during execution, little is known about the modulation of the AON when an action misstep is shown. Here we used single and paired pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation to assess corticospinal excitability, intracortical facilitation and intracortical inhibition at different time intervals (120, 180, 240 ms) after the visual presentation of a motor execution error. Results show a specific and early (120 ms) decrease of intracortical inhibition likely because of a significant mismatch between the observed erroneous action and observer's expectations. Indeed, as proposed by the top-down predictive framework, the motor system may be involved in the generation of these error signals and our data show that this mechanism could rely on the early decrease of intracortical inhibition within the corticomotor system.

Development of social systems neuroscience using macaques

This paper reviews the literature on social neuroscience studies using macaques in the hope of encouraging as many researchers as possible to participate in this field of research and thereby accelerate the system-level understanding of social cognition and behavior. We describe how different parts of the primate brain are engaged in different aspects of social information processing, with particular emphasis on the use of experimental paradigms involving more than one monkey in laboratory settings. The description begins with how individual neurons are used for evaluating socially relevant information, such as the identity, face, and focus of attention of others in various social contexts. A description of the neural bases of social reward processing and social action monitoring follows. Finally, we provide several perspectives on novel experimental strategies to help clarify the nature of interacting brains under more socially and ecologically plausible conditions.

Spatiotemporal Phase Synchronization in Adaptive Reconfiguration from Action Observation Network to Mentalizing Network for Understanding Other's Action Intention

In action intention understanding, the mirror system is involved in perception-action matching process and the mentalizing system underlies higher-level intention inference. By analyzing the dynamic functional connectivity in α (8-12 Hz) and β (12-30 Hz) frequency bands over a "hand-cup interaction" observation task, this study investigates the topological transition from the action observation network (AON) to the mentalizing network (MZN), and estimates their functional relevance for intention identification from other's different action kinematics. Sequential brain microstates were extracted based on event-related potentials (ERPs), in which significantly differing neuronal responses were found in N170-P200 related to perceptually matching kinematic profiles and P400-700 involved in goal inference. Inter-electrode weighted phase lag index analysis on the ERP microstates revealed a shift of hub centrality salient in α frequency band, from the AON dominated by left-lateral frontal-premotor-temporal and temporal-parietooccipital synchronizations to the MZN consisting of more bilateral frontal-parietal and temporal-parietal synchronizations. As compared with usual actions, intention identification of unintelligible actions induces weaker synchronizations in the AON but dramatically increased connectivity in right frontal-temporal-parietal regions of the MZN, indicating a spatiotemporally complementary effect between the functional network configurations involved in mirror and mentalizing processes. Perceptual processing in observing usual/unintelligible actions decreases/increases requirements for intention inference, which would induce less/greater functional network reorganization on the way to mentalization. From the comparison, our study suggests that the adaptive topological changes from the AON to the MZN indicate implicit causal association between the mirror and mentalizing systems for decoding others' intentionality.

Vitality Forms Expressed by Others Modulate Our Own Motor Response: A Kinematic Study

During social interaction, actions, and words may be expressed in different ways, for example, gently or rudely. A handshake can be gentle or vigorous and, similarly, tone of voice can be pleasant or rude. These aspects of social communication have been named vitality forms by Daniel Stern. Vitality forms represent how an action is performed and characterize all human interactions. In spite of their importance in social life, to date it is not clear whether the vitality forms expressed by the agent can influence the execution of a subsequent action performed by the receiver. To shed light on this matter, in the present study we carried out a kinematic study aiming to assess whether and how visual and auditory properties of vitality forms expressed by others influenced the motor response of participants. In particular, participants were presented with video-clips showing a male and a female actor performing a "giving request" (give me) or a "taking request" (take it) in visual, auditory, and mixed modalities (visual and auditory). Most importantly, requests were expressed with rude or gentle vitality forms. After the actor's request, participants performed a subsequent action. Results showed that vitality forms expressed by the actors influenced the kinematic parameters of the participants' actions regardless to the modality by which they are conveyed.

Potential for social involvement modulates activity within the mirror and the mentalizing systems

Processing biological motion is fundamental for everyday life activities, such as social interaction, motor learning and nonverbal communication. The ability to detect the nature of a motor pattern has been investigated by means of point-light displays (PLD), sets of moving light points reproducing human kinematics, easily recognizable as meaningful once in motion. Although PLD are rudimentary, the human brain can decipher their content including social intentions. Neuroimaging studies suggest that inferring the social meaning conveyed by PLD could rely on both the Mirror Neuron System (MNS) and the Mentalizing System (MS), but their specific role to this endeavor remains uncertain. We describe a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment in which participants had to judge whether visually presented PLD and videoclips of human-like walkers (HL) were facing towards or away from them. Results show that coding for stimulus direction specifically engages the MNS when considering PLD moving away from the observer, while the nature of the stimulus reveals a dissociation between MNS -mainly involved in coding for PLD- and MS, recruited by HL moving away. These results suggest that the contribution of the two systems can be modulated by the nature of the observed stimulus and its potential for social involvement.

Decoding social intentions in human prehensile actions: Insights from a combined kinematics-fMRI study

Consistent evidence suggests that the way we reach and grasp an object is modulated not only by object properties (e.g., size, shape, texture, fragility and weight), but also by the types of intention driving the action, among which the intention to interact with another agent (i.e., social intention). Action observation studies ascribe the neural substrate of this 'intentional' component to the putative mirror neuron (pMNS) and the mentalizing (MS) systems. How social intentions are translated into executed actions, however, has yet to be addressed. We conducted a kinematic and a functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) study considering a reach-to-grasp movement performed towards the same object positioned at the same location but with different intentions: passing it to another person (social condition) or putting it on a concave base (individual condition). Kinematics showed that individual and social intentions are characterized by different profiles, with a slower movement at the level of both the reaching (i.e., arm movement) and the grasping (i.e., hand aperture) components. fMRI results showed that: (i) distinct voxel pattern activity for the social and the individual condition are present within the pMNS and the MS during action execution; (ii) decoding accuracies of regions belonging to the pMNS and the MS are correlated, suggesting that these two systems could interact for the generation of appropriate motor commands. Results are discussed in terms of motor simulation and inferential processes as part of a hierarchical generative model for action intention understanding and generation of appropriate motor commands.

To Pass or Not to Pass: Modeling the Movement and Affordance Dynamics of a Pick and Place Task

Humans commonly engage in tasks that require or are made more efficient by coordinating with other humans. In this paper we introduce a task dynamics approach for modeling multi-agent interaction and decision making in a pick and place task where an agent must move an object from one location to another and decide whether to act alone or with a partner. Our aims were to identify and model (1) the affordance related dynamics that define an actor's choice to move an object alone or to pass it to their co-actor and (2) the trajectory dynamics of an actor's hand movements when moving to grasp, relocate, or pass the object. Using a virtual reality pick and place task, we demonstrate that both the decision to pass or not pass an object and the movement trajectories of the participants can be characterized in terms of a behavioral dynamics model. Simulations suggest that the proposed behavioral dynamics model exhibits features observed in human participants including hysteresis in decision making, non-straight line trajectories, and non-constant velocity profiles. The proposed model highlights how the same low-dimensional behavioral dynamics can operate to constrain multiple (and often nested) levels of human activity and suggests that knowledge of what, when, where and how to move or act during pick and place behavior may be defined by these low dimensional task dynamics and, thus, can emerge spontaneously and in real-time with little a priori planning.

Neural coding of prior expectations in hierarchical intention inference

The ability to infer other people’s intentions is crucial for successful human social interactions. Such inference relies on an adaptive interplay of sensory evidence and prior expectations. Crucially, this interplay would also depend on the type of intention inferred, i.e., on how abstract the intention is. However, what neural mechanisms adjust the interplay of prior and sensory evidence to the abstractness of the intention remains conjecture. We addressed this question in two separate fMRI experiments, which exploited action scenes depicting different types of intentions (Superordinate vs. Basic; Social vs. Non-social), and manipulated both prior and sensory evidence. We found that participants increasingly relied on priors as sensory evidence became scarcer. Activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) reflected this interplay between the two sources of information. Moreover, the more abstract the intention to infer (Superordinate > Basic, Social > Non-Social), the greater the modulation of backward connectivity between the mPFC and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), resulting in an increased influence of priors over the intention inference. These results suggest a critical role for the fronto-parietal network in adjusting the relative weight of prior and sensory evidence during hierarchical intention inference.

Neural mirroring and social interaction: Motor system involvement during action observation relates to early peer cooperation

Whether we hand over objects to someone, play a team sport, or make music together, social interaction often involves interpersonal action coordination, both during instances of cooperation and entrainment. Neural mirroring is thought to play a crucial role in processing other's actions and is therefore considered important for social interaction. Still, to date, it is unknown whether interindividual differences in neural mirroring play a role in interpersonal coordination during different instances of social interaction. A relation between neural mirroring and interpersonal coordination has particularly relevant implications for early childhood, since successful early interaction with peers is predictive of a more favorable social development. We examined the relation between neural mirroring and children's interpersonal coordination during peer interaction using EEG and longitudinal behavioral data. Results showed that 4-year-old children with higher levels of motor system involvement during action observation (as indicated by lower beta-power) were more successful in early peer cooperation. This is the first evidence for a relation between motor system involvement during action observation and interpersonal coordination during other instances of social interaction. The findings suggest that interindividual differences in neural mirroring are related to interpersonal coordination and thus successful social interaction.

It's all in the type of the task: Dopamine modulates kinematic patterns during competitive vs. cooperative interaction in Parkinson's disease

Increasing evidence suggests that a dysfunctional dopaminergic system affects the ability to socially interact. Since Parkinson's disease (PD) provides a model for assessing dopaminergic dysfunctions in humans, our study was designed to investigate social interactions in PD patients receiving dopamine replacement therapy (Levodopa=l-Dopa) and in neurologically healthy controls. We focused on the kinematics of one action, reaching to grasp a wooden block, which was performed within the context of two basic modes of social cognition, namely cooperation and competition. During the cooperative tasks, two participants were instructed to reach and grasp their respective objects and to cooperate in forming a specific configuration on the working table. During the competitive tasks, two participants were instructed to compete to place their own object at the bottom of a tower to be built on the working table. PD patients' ability to modulate motor patterning depending on the intention motivating the action they were about to perform was evaluated in both "on" (with l-Dopa) and "off" (without l-Dopa) states. Study results revealed that both the healthy controls and the 'on' PD patients had distinct kinematic patterns for cooperative and competitive actions and that these differed from patterns mirroring similar actions performed by those same participants in non social conditions. The kinematic patterns of the healthy controls and the 'on' patients were highly correlated during the cooperative tasks. The 'off' PD patients were, instead, unable to differentiate between isolated and social conditions. These results support the hypothesis that dopaminergic neurotransmission is involved in shaping the mechanisms underlying social interactions.

Neural correlates of naturalistic social cognition: brain-behavior relationships in healthy adults

Being able to infer the thoughts, feelings and intentions of those around us is indispensable in order to function in a social world. Despite growing interest in social cognition and its neural underpinnings, the factors that contribute to successful mental state attribution remain unclear. Current knowledge is limited because the most widely used tasks suffer from two main constraints: (i) They fail to capture individual variability due to ceiling effects and (ii) they use highly simplistic, often artificial stimuli inapt to mirror real-world socio-cognitive demands. In the present study, we address these problems by employing complex depictions of naturalistic social interactions that vary in both valence (positive vs negative) and ambiguity (high vs low). Thirty-eight healthy participants (20 female) made mental state judgments while brain responses were obtained using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Accuracy varied based on valence and ambiguity conditions and women were more accurate than men with highly ambiguous social stimuli. Activity of the orbitofrontal cortex predicted performance in the high ambiguity condition. The results shed light on subtle differences in mentalizing abilities and associated neural activity.

Mirror Neurons of Ventral Premotor Cortex Are Modulated by Social Cues Provided by Others' Gaze

Mirror neurons (MNs) in the inferior parietal lobule and ventral premotor cortex (PMv) can code the intentions of other individuals using contextual cues. Gaze direction is an important social cue that can be used for understanding the meaning of actions made by other individuals. Here we addressed the issue of whether PMv MNs are influenced by the gaze direction of another individual. We recorded single-unit activity in macaque PMv while the monkey was observing an experimenter performing a grasping action and orienting his gaze either toward (congruent gaze condition) or away (incongruent gaze condition) from a target object. The results showed that one-half of the recorded MNs were modulated by the gaze direction of the human agent. These gaze-modulated neurons were evenly distributed between those preferring a gaze direction congruent with the direction where the grasping action was performed and the others that preferred an incongruent gaze. Whereas the presence of congruent responses is in line with the usual coupling of hand and gaze in both executed and observed actions, the incongruent responses can be explained by the long exposure of the monkeys to this condition. Our results reveal that the representation of observed actions in PMv is influenced by contextual information not only extracted from physical cues, but also from cues endowed with biological or social value.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT

In this study, we present the first evidence showing that social cues modulate MNs in the monkey ventral premotor cortex. These data suggest that there is an integrated representation of other's hand actions and gaze direction at the single neuron level in the ventral premotor cortex, and support the hypothesis of a functional role of MNs in decoding actions and understanding motor intentions.

Understanding intentional actions from observers' viewpoints: A social neuroscience perspective

When we see others, we also try to 'see' their unobservable states of minds, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. We carefully monitor others' actions, as we assume that those actions are outward manifestations of their internal states. Actors and observers can have divergent views on the cause of the same actions. Critically, it is often the observers' view that affects important decisions in social life, from deciding the optimal level of cooperation to judging moral responsibility and court's decisions. Thus, the judgment about intentionality and agency in others' actions determines the way in which the observer deals with the actor. The primate brain has two separate neural systems that function in understanding others' actions and intentions. The mirror system is activated by others' visible actions and predicts their physical consequences in goal terms, whereas the mentalizing system is primarily involved in the prediction of others' intentions and upcoming actions regardless of whether others' actions are directly observable or not. The functional roles of the two systems have sometimes been described as mutually independent or even oppositional. I propose a hypothesis that the two systems may collaborate closely for judging the sense of other-agency.

Humans but Not Chimpanzees Vary Face-Scanning Patterns Depending on Contexts during Action Observation

Human and nonhuman primates comprehend the actions of other individuals by detecting social cues, including others’ goal-directed motor actions and faces. However, little is known about how this information is integrated with action understanding. Here, we present the ontogenetic and evolutionary foundations of this capacity by comparing face-scanning patterns of chimpanzees and humans as they viewed goal-directed human actions within contexts that differ in whether or not the predicted goal is achieved. Human adults and children attend to the actor’s face during action sequences, and this tendency is particularly pronounced in adults when observing that the predicted goal is not achieved. Chimpanzees rarely attend to the actor’s face during the goal-directed action, regardless of whether the predicted action goal is achieved or not. These results suggest that in humans, but not chimpanzees, attention to actor’s faces conveying referential information toward the target object indicates the process of observers making inferences about the intentionality of an action. Furthermore, this remarkable predisposition to observe others’ actions by integrating the prediction of action goals and the actor’s intention is developmentally acquired.