Perceived animacy influences the processing of human-like surface features in the fusiform gyrus

Disentangling five dimensions of animacy in human brain and behaviour

Distinguishing animate from inanimate things is of great behavioural importance. Despite distinct brain and behavioural responses to animate and inanimate things, it remains unclear which object properties drive these responses. Here, we investigate the importance of five object dimensions related to animacy (“being alive”, “looking like an animal”, “having agency”, “having mobility”, and “being unpredictable”) in brain (fMRI, EEG) and behaviour (property and similarity judgements) of 19 participants. We used a stimulus set of 128 images, optimized by a genetic algorithm to disentangle these five dimensions. The five dimensions explained much variance in the similarity judgments. Each dimension explained significant variance in the brain representations (except, surprisingly, “being alive”), however, to a lesser extent than in behaviour. Different brain regions sensitive to animacy may represent distinct dimensions, either as accessible perceptual stepping stones toward detecting whether something is alive or because they are of behavioural importance in their own right.

Face shape processing via visual-to-auditory sensory substitution activates regions within the face processing networks in the absence of visual experience

Previous evidence suggests that visual experience is crucial for the emergence and tuning of the typical neural system for face recognition. To challenge this conclusion, we trained congenitally blind adults to recognize faces via visual-to-auditory sensory-substitution (SDD). Our results showed a preference for trained faces over other SSD-conveyed visual categories in the fusiform gyrus and in other known face-responsive-regions of the deprived ventral visual stream. We also observed a parametric modulation in the same cortical regions, for face orientation (upright vs. inverted) and face novelty (trained vs. untrained). Our results strengthen the conclusion that there is a predisposition for sensory-independent and computation-specific processing in specific cortical regions that can be retained in life-long sensory deprivation, independently of previous perceptual experience. They also highlight that if the right training is provided, such cortical preference maintains its tuning to what were considered visual-specific face features.

Category-specific activations depend on imaging mode, task demand, and stimuli modality: An ALE meta-analysis

The cortical organization of the semantic network has been examined extensively in neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies; however, after decades of research, several issues remain controversial. A comprehensive and systematic investigation is needed to characterize the consistent patterns of category-specific activations as well as to examine factors that contribute to the varying findings across numerous neuroimaging studies. In this study, we reviewed 113 published papers that reported category-specific activations for living or nonliving concepts from the past two decades. Using the Activation Likelihood Estimate (ALE) method, we characterized the brain regions associated with living and nonliving concepts and revealed how the observed patterns were heavily influenced by methodological factors including imaging mode, task demand, and stimuli modality. Our findings provided the most comprehensive summary of category-specific activations for living and nonliving concepts and critically revealed that these activation patterns are highly contextually dependent. This work advanced our knowledge about the organization of the cortical semantic network and provided important insights into theoretical accounts and future research directions.

Neural Patterns are More Similar across Individuals during Successful Memory Encoding than during Failed Memory Encoding

After experiencing the same episode, some people can recall certain details about it, whereas others cannot. We investigate how common (intersubject) neural patterns during memory encoding influence whether an episode will be subsequently remembered, and how divergence from a common organization is associated with encoding failure. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging with intersubject multivariate analyses, we measured brain activity as people viewed episodes within wildlife videos and then assessed their memory for these episodes. During encoding, greater neural similarity was observed between the people who later remembered an episode (compared with those who did not) within the regions of the declarative memory network (hippocampus, posterior medial cortex [PMC], and dorsal Default Mode Network [dDMN]). The intersubject similarity of the PMC and dDMN was episode-specific. Hippocampal encoding patterns were also more similar between subjects for memory success that was defined after one day, compared with immediately after retrieval. The neural encoding patterns were sufficiently robust and generalizable to train machine learning classifiers to predict future recall success in held-out subjects, and a subset of decodable regions formed a network of shared classifier predictions of subsequent memory success. This work suggests that common neural patterns reflect successful, rather than unsuccessful, encoding across individuals.

Perceiving animacy purely from visual motion cues involves intraparietal sulcus

Distinguishing animate from inanimate objects is fundamental for social perception in humans and animals. Visual motion cues indicative of self-propelled object motion are useful for animacy perception: they can be detected over a wide expanse of visual field, at distance and in low visibility conditions, can attract attention and provide clues about object behaviour. However, the neural correlates of animacy perception evoked exclusively by visual motion cues, i.e. not relying on form, background or visual context, are unclear. We aimed to address this question in four psychophysical experiments in humans, two of which performed during neuroimaging. The stimulus was a single dot with constant form that moved on a blank background and evoked controlled degrees of perceived animacy through parametric variations of self-propelled motion cues. BOLD signals reflecting perceived animacy in a graded manner irrespective of eye movements were found in one intraparietal region. Additional whole-brain and region-of-interest analyses revealed no comparable effects in brain regions associated with social processing or other areas. Our study shows that animacy perception evoked solely by visual motion cues, a basic perceptual process in social cognition, engages brain regions not primarily associated with social cognition.

From automata to animate beings: the scope and limits of attributing socialness to artificial agents

Understanding the mechanisms and consequences of attributing socialness to artificial agents has important implications for how we can use technology to lead more productive and fulfilling lives. Here, we integrate recent findings on the factors that shape behavioral and brain mechanisms that support social interactions between humans and artificial agents. We review how visual features of an agent, as well as knowledge factors within the human observer, shape attributions across dimensions of socialness. We explore how anthropomorphism and dehumanization further influence how we perceive and interact with artificial agents. Based on these findings, we argue that the cognitive reconstruction within the human observer is likely to be far more crucial in shaping our interactions with artificial agents than previously thought, while the artificial agent's visual features are possibly of lesser importance. We combine these findings to provide an integrative theoretical account based on the "like me" hypothesis, and discuss the key role played by the Theory-of-Mind network, especially the temporal parietal junction, in the shift from mechanistic to social attributions. We conclude by highlighting outstanding questions on the impact of long-term interactions with artificial agents on the behavioral and brain mechanisms of attributing socialness to these agents.

Looming Threats and Animacy: Reduced Responsiveness in Youth with Disrupted Behavior Disorders

Theoretical models have implicated amygdala dysfunction in the development of Disruptive Behavior Disorders (DBDs; Conduct Disorder/Oppositional Defiant Disorder). Amygdala dysfunction impacts valence evaluation/response selection and emotion attention in youth with DBDs, particularly in those with elevated callous-unemotional (CU) traits. However, amygdala responsiveness during social cognition and the responsiveness of the acute threat circuitry (amygdala/periaqueductal gray) in youth with DBDs have been less well-examined, particularly with reference to CU traits. 31 youth with DBDs and 27 typically developing youth (IQ, age and gender-matched) completed a threat paradigm during fMRI where animate and inanimate, threatening and neutral stimuli appeared to loom towards or recede from participants. Reduced responsiveness to threat variables, including visual threats and encroaching stimuli, was observed within acute threat circuitry and temporal, lateral frontal and parietal cortices in youth with DBDs. This reduced responsiveness, at least with respect to the looming variable, was modulated by CU traits. Reduced responsiveness to animacy information was also observed within temporal, lateral frontal and parietal cortices, but not within amygdala. Reduced responsiveness to animacy information as a function of CU traits was observed in PCC, though not within the amygdala. Reduced threat responsiveness may contribute to risk taking and impulsivity in youth with DBDs, particularly those with high levels of CU traits. Future work will need to examine the degree to which this reduced response to animacy is independent of amygdala dysfunction in youth with DBDs and what role PCC might play in the dysfunctional social cognition observed in youth with high levels of CU traits.

The attribution of animacy and agency in frontotemporal dementia versus Alzheimer's disease

Impaired attribution of animacy (state of living or being sentient) and of agency (capability of intrinsically-driven action) may underlie social behavior disturbances in behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD). We presented the Heider and Simmel film of moving geometric shapes to 11 bvFTD patients, 11 Alzheimer's disease (AD) patients, and 12 healthy controls (HCs) and rated their recorded verbal responses for animacy attribution and agency attribution. All participants had skin conductance (SC) continuously recorded while viewing the film, and all dementia participants underwent magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) for regions of interest. The bvFTD patients, but not the AD patients, were impaired in animacy attribution, compared to the HCs. In contrast, both bvFTD and AD groups were impaired in agency attribution, compared to the HCs, and only the HCs had increasing SC responsiveness during viewing of the film. On MRI analysis of cortical thicknesses, animacy scores significantly correlated across groups with the right pars orbitalis and opercularis; agency scores with the left inferior and superior parietal cortices and the supramarginal gyrus; and both scores with the left cingulate isthmus involved in visuospatial context. These findings suggest that bvFTD is specifically associated with impaired animacy attribution from right inferior frontal atrophy. In contrast, both dementias may have impaired agency attribution from left parietal cortical atrophy and absent SC increases during the film, a sympathetic indicator of attribution of a social "story" to the moving shapes. These findings clarify disease-related changes in social attribution and corroborate the neuroanatomical origins of animacy and agency.

Differential effects of face-realism and emotion on event-related brain potentials and their implications for the uncanny valley theory

Cartoon characters are omnipresent in popular media. While few studies have scientifically investigated their processing, in computer graphics, efforts are made to increase realism. Yet, close approximations of reality have been suggested to evoke sometimes a feeling of eeriness, the “uncanny valley” effect. Here, we used high-density electroencephalography to investigate brain responses to professionally stylized happy, angry, and neutral character faces. We employed six face-stylization levels varying from abstract to realistic and investigated the N170, early posterior negativity (EPN), and late positive potential (LPP) event-related components. The face-specific N170 showed a u-shaped modulation, with stronger reactions towards both most abstract and most realistic compared to medium-stylized faces. For abstract faces, N170 was generated more occipitally than for real faces, implying stronger reliance on structural processing. Although emotional faces elicited highest amplitudes on both N170 and EPN, on the N170 realism and expression interacted. Finally, LPP increased linearly with face realism, reflecting activity increase in visual and parietal cortex for more realistic faces. Results reveal differential effects of face stylization on distinct face processing stages and suggest a perceptual basis to the uncanny valley hypothesis. They are discussed in relation to face perception, media design, and computer graphics.

Specificity, reliability and sensitivity of social brain responses during spontaneous mentalizing

The debilitating effects of social dysfunction in many psychiatric disorders prompt the need for systems-level biomarkers of social abilities that can be applied in clinical populations and longitudinal studies. A promising neuroimaging approach is the animated shapes paradigm based on so-called Frith-Happé animations (FHAs) which trigger spontaneous mentalizing with minimal cognitive demands. Here, we presented FHAs during functional magnetic resonance imaging to 46 subjects and examined the specificity and sensitivity of the elicited social brain responses. Test-retest reliability was additionally assessed in 28 subjects within a two-week interval. Specific responses to spontaneous mentalizing were observed in key areas of the social brain with high sensitivity and independently from the variant low-level kinematics of the FHAs. Mentalizing-specific responses were well replicable on the group level, suggesting good-to-excellent cross-sectional reliability [intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs): 0.40-0.99; dice overlap at P_uncorr<0.001: 0.26-1.0]. Longitudinal reliability on the single-subject level was more heterogeneous (ICCs of 0.40-0.79; dice overlap at P_uncorr<0.001: 0.05-0.43). Posterior temporal sulcus activation was most reliable, including a robust differentiation between subjects across sessions (72% of voxels with ICC>0.40). These findings encourage the use of FHAs in neuroimaging research across developmental stages and psychiatric conditions, including the identification of biomarkers and pharmacological interventions.

Perceived live interaction modulates the developing social brain

Although children's social development is embedded in social interaction, most developmental neuroscience studies have examined responses to non-interactive social stimuli (e.g. photographs of faces). The neural mechanisms of real-world social behavior are of special interest during middle childhood (roughly ages 7-13), a time of increased social complexity and competence coinciding with structural and functional social brain development. Evidence from adult neuroscience studies suggests that social interaction may alter neural processing, but no neuroimaging studies in children have directly examined the effects of live social-interactive context on social cognition. In the current study of middle childhood, we compare the processing of two types of speech: speech that children believed was presented over a real-time audio-feed by a social partner and speech that they believed was recorded. Although in reality all speech was prerecorded, perceived live speech resulted in significantly greater neural activation in regions associated with social cognitive processing. These findings underscore the importance of using ecologically-valid and interactive methods to understand the developing social brain.

The Uncanny Valley: Existence and Explanations

More than 40 years ago, Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori (1970/2005) proposed the “uncanny valley” hypothesis, which predicted a nonlinear relation between robots’ perceived human likeness and their likability. Although some studies have corroborated this hypothesis and proposed explanations for its existence, the evidence on both fronts has been mixed and open to debate. We first review the literature to ascertain whether the uncanny valley exists. We then try to explain the uncanny phenomenon by reviewing hypotheses derived from diverse theoretical and methodological perspectives within psychology and allied fields, including evolutionary, social, cognitive, and psychodynamic approaches. Next, we provide an evaluation and critique of these studies by focusing on their methodological limitations, leading us to question the accepted definition of the uncanny valley. We examine the definitions of human likeness and likability, and propose a statistical test to preliminarily quantify their nonlinear relation. We argue that the uncanny valley hypothesis is ultimately an engineering problem that bears on the possibility of building androids that may some day become indistinguishable from humans. In closing, we propose a dehumanization hypothesis to explain the uncanny phenomenon.

How Well Do Computer-Generated Faces Tap Face Expertise?

The use of computer-generated (CG) stimuli in face processing research is proliferating due to the ease with which faces can be generated, standardised and manipulated. However there has been surprisingly little research into whether CG faces are processed in the same way as photographs of real faces. The present study assessed how well CG faces tap face identity expertise by investigating whether two indicators of face expertise are reduced for CG faces when compared to face photographs. These indicators were accuracy for identification of own-race faces and the other-race effect (ORE)-the well-established finding that own-race faces are recognised more accurately than other-race faces. In Experiment 1 Caucasian and Asian participants completed a recognition memory task for own- and other-race real and CG faces. Overall accuracy for own-race faces was dramatically reduced for CG compared to real faces and the ORE was significantly and substantially attenuated for CG faces. Experiment 2 investigated perceptual discrimination for own- and other-race real and CG faces with Caucasian and Asian participants. Here again, accuracy for own-race faces was significantly reduced for CG compared to real faces. However the ORE was not affected by format. Together these results signal that CG faces of the type tested here do not fully tap face expertise. Technological advancement may, in the future, produce CG faces that are equivalent to real photographs. Until then caution is advised when interpreting results obtained using CG faces.

Whole-agent selectivity within the macaque face-processing system

The primate brain contains a set of face-selective areas, which are thought to extract the rich social information that faces provide, such as emotional state and personal identity. The nature of this information raises a fundamental question about these face-selective areas: Do they respond to a face purely because of its visual attributes, or because the face embodies a larger social agent? Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to determine whether the macaque face patch system exhibits a whole-agent response above and beyond its responses to individually presented faces and bodies. We found a systematic development of whole-agent preference through the face patches, from subadditive integration of face and body responses in posterior face patches to superadditive integration in anterior face patches. Superadditivity was not observed for faces atop nonbody objects, implying categorical specificity of face-body interaction. Furthermore, superadditivity was robust to visual degradation of facial detail, suggesting whole-agent selectivity does not require prior face recognition. In contrast, even the body patches immediately adjacent to anterior face areas did not exhibit superadditivity. This asymmetry between face- and body-processing systems may explain why observers attribute bodies' social signals to faces, and not vice versa. The development of whole-agent selectivity from posterior to anterior face patches, in concert with the recently described development of natural motion selectivity from ventral to dorsal face patches, identifies a single face patch, AF (anterior fundus), as a likely link between the analysis of facial shape and semantic inferences about other agents.