The psychological roots of intellectual humility: The role of intelligence and cognitive flexibility

Cognitive flexibility in schizophrenia: A confirmatory factor analysis of neuropsychological measures

Cognitive flexibility (CF) is the ability to adapt cognitive strategies according to the changing environment. The deficit in CF has often been linked to various neurological and psychiatric disorders including schizophrenia. However, the operationalization and assessment of CF have not been unified and the current research suggests that the available instruments measure different aspects of CF. The main objective of the present study was to compare three frequently used neuropsychological measures of CF-Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), Trail Making Test (TMT) and Stroop Color and Word Test (SCWT) in a population of patients (N = 220) with first-episode schizophrenia spectrum disorders in order to evaluate their convergent validity. The hypothesis of an underlying latent construct was tested via a confirmatory factor analysis. We used a one-factor CF model with scores from WCST, SCWT and TMT as observed variables. The established model showed a good fit to the data (χ2 = 1.67, p = 0.43, SRMR = 0.02, RMSEA = 0.0, CFI = 1.00). The highest factor loading was found in WCST as CF explained most of the variance in this neuropsychological measure compared to the other instruments. On the other hand, a TMT ratio index and a SCWT interference demonstrated lowest loadings in the model. The findings suggest that not all the frequently used measures share an underlying factor of CF or may capture different aspects of this construct.

Unveiling the perception of politicians' intellectual humility

Embracing intellectual humility has been touted as a potential key factor in improving relationships among people with different perspectives. Surprisingly, little research has been conducted on how individuals perceive those who express their views with intellectual humility, and no research, to our knowledge, examined perceptions of intellectual humility in political leaders specifically. This study aimed to examine to what extent perceivers value intellectual humility in the face of a polarizing topic (abortion) and when it is expressed by political leaders (hypothetical presidential candidates) sharing or opposing one's view. We predicted that individuals would like the same-view leader more than the opposing-view leader; however, they would also prefer leaders expressing intellectual humility overall. Importantly, we also explored whether individuals would be more tolerant of intellectual arrogance when arrogance came from a leader who shared (vs. opposed) their ideology. A pilot study (N = 94) confirmed all these predictions. A preregistered study with a larger sample (N = 927) replicated these patterns and showed that positive evaluations of leaders' intellectual humility were also contingent on their views and the ways they expressed intellectual humility (openness to alternative views or fallibility of their own view). While perceivers evaluated both the same and opposing-view leaders' openness to alternative views positively, they evaluated the same-view (but not the opposing-view) leaders' expression of fallibility negatively. Our findings shed light on the boundary conditions of valuing intellectual humility while offering insights on when and why people may refrain from expressing humility themselves and knowingly or unknowingly contribute to polarizing discourse.

Evidence-based scientific thinking and decision-making in everyday life

In today's knowledge economy, it is critical to make decisions based on high-quality evidence. Science-related decision-making is thought to rely on a complex interplay of reasoning skills, cognitive styles, attitudes, and motivations toward information. By investigating the relationship between individual differences and behaviors related to evidence-based decision-making, our aim was to better understand how adults engage with scientific information in everyday life. First, we used a data-driven exploratory approach to identify four latent factors in a large set of measures related to cognitive skills and epistemic attitudes. The resulting structure suggests that key factors include curiosity and positive attitudes toward science, prosociality, cognitive skills, and openmindedness to new information. Second, we investigated whether these factors predicted behavior in a naturalistic decision-making task. In the task, participants were introduced to a real science-related petition and were asked to read six online articles related to the petition, which varied in scientific quality, while deciding how to vote. We demonstrate that curiosity and positive science attitudes, cognitive flexibility, prosociality and emotional states, were related to engaging with information and discernment of evidence reliability. We further found that that social authority is a powerful cue for source credibility, even above the actual quality and relevance of the sources. Our results highlight that individual motivating factors toward information engagement, like curiosity, and social factors such as social authority are important drivers of how adults judge the credibility of everyday sources of scientific information.

Intellectual humility as a tool to combat false beliefs: An individual-based approach to belief revision

False beliefs pose significant societal threats, including health risks, political polarization and even violence. In two studies (N = 884) we explored the efficacy of an individual-based approach to correcting false beliefs. We examined whether the character virtue of intellectual humility (IH)-an appreciation of one's intellectual boundaries-encourages revising one's false beliefs in response to counter-information. Our research produced encouraging but also mixed findings. Among participants who held false beliefs about the risks of vaccines (Study 1) and the 2020 US Election being rigged (Study 2), those with higher IH explored more information opposing these false beliefs. This exploration of opposing information, in turn, predicted updating away from these inaccurate health and political beliefs. IH did not directly predict updating away from false beliefs, however, suggesting that this effect-if it exists-may not be particularly powerful. Taken together, these results provide moderate support for IH as a character trait that can foster belief revision but, simultaneously, suggest that alternate pathways to combat false beliefs and misinformation may be preferred.

Comparing the influence of intellectual humility, religiosity, and political conservatism on vaccine attitudes in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom

Three studies of US, Canada, and UK respondents examined pro-vaccine attitudes as predicted by intellectual humility, belief in science, religiosity, and political attitudes. Intellectual humility refers to the capacity to understand limits of one's own beliefs and showed strong relationship to pro-vaccine attitudes across samples. Pro-vaccine attitudes were correlated with intellectual humility and negatively correlated with political conservatism and religiosity. Regression models compared overlapping influences of belief predictors on vaccine attitudes. Across countries, intellectual humility was the most consistent predictor of pro-vaccine attitudes when controlling for other beliefs and thinking styles (political conservatism, belief in science, religiosity). In comparison, political conservatism was a significant predictor of vaccine attitudes in regression models on US and Canadian respondents, and religiosity only held as a predictor in regression models in the US sample. We conclude with a discussion of intellectual humility as a predictor of vaccine attitudes and implications for research and persuasion.

Intellectual Humility and Responsiveness to Public Health Recommendations

We examined the association between intellectual humility (IH)-a willingness to consider credible new information and alternative views and revise one's own views if warranted-and adherence to experts' health behavior recommendations in the U.S. during the COVID-19 pandemic. Study 1 (N = 541) results showed that people higher in IH are more likely to engage in recommended health behaviors (e.g., mask-wearing, social distancing)-even when controlling for political affiliation. Additional analyses focused specifically on mask-wearing produced initial evidence consistent with mediation of the IH-mask-wearing relationship by the beliefs that mask-wearing 1) is an effective way to slow the spread of COVID-19 and 2) protects others. Based on the pathway from IH to mask-wearing through a concern for others found in Study 1, Study 2 further examined the relationship between IH and prosocial tendencies. The results from Study 2 (Ns for correlation coefficients ranged from 265 to 702) showed an association between IH and several values and traits that reflect a concern for others (e.g., agreeableness, benevolence). These findings suggest that IH may influence behavior through both intra- and interpersonal mechanisms. Implications of these findings for the health-behavior domain are discussed.

Everything has a limit: How intellectual humility lowers the preference for naturalness as reflected in drug choice

OBJECTIVE

Across a broad range of cultures, people demonstrate a strong preference for items that are labeled as natural. Yet, less is known about methods that can reduce the natural-is-better bias. The objective of the present research is to see whether intellectual humility, a moral virtue that can be understood as a more open and curious mindset, reduces naturalness bias in terms of drug-related decisions.

METHODS

We tested our hypotheses across four studies using different populations (university students and community adults) and methods (correlational and experimental). Study 1 involved a survey exploring whether university students choosing a synthetic drug tended to display a higher level of intellectual humility than those choosing a natural drug. Study 2 assessed the link using observation of real-world behavior in non-student adults. Study 3 adopted an experimental approach to test the idea that reflecting on one's intellectual fallibility can at least temporarily reduce naturalness bias on drug choice. Study 4 examined the potential mediating mechanism underlying the observed effect.

RESULTS

We found correlational and experimental evidence that participants higher in intellectual humility were more likely to choose the synthetic drug than those lower in intellectual humility in both self-report and behavioral measures. The results also demonstrate that openness to experience mediated the effect of intellectual humility on naturalness bias.

CONCLUSIONS

These results highlight intellectual humility as a malleable, psychological variable that can combat biased thinking associated with health-related decision-making.

Character strengths and fluid intelligence

OBJECTIVE

Research on the associations between cognitive and noncognitive personality traits has widely neglected character strengths, that means positively and morally valued personality traits that constitute good character.

METHOD

The present study aimed to bridge this gap by studying the associations between character strengths and fluid intelligence using different operationalizations of character strengths (including self- and informant-reports) and fluid intelligence in children, adolescents, and adults.

RESULTS

The results, based on four samples (N = 193/290/330/324), suggested that morally valued personality traits are independent of fluid intelligence, with the exception of love of learning, which showed small but robust positive relationships with fluid intelligence across all samples.

CONCLUSIONS

Nonetheless, we argue for further research on the associations with other cognitive abilities and interactions between character strengths and intelligence when examining their relationships with external criteria.

Does social intolerance vary according to cognitive styles, genetic cognitive capacity, or education?

BACKGROUND

Low education, low cognitive abilities, and certain cognitive styles are suggested to predispose to social intolerance and prejudices. Evidence is, however, restricted by comparatively small samples, neglect of confounding variables and genetic factors, and a narrow focus on a single sort of prejudice. We investigated the relationships of education, polygenic cognitive potential, cognitive performance, and cognitive styles with social intolerance in adulthood over a 15-year follow-up.

METHODS

We used data from the prospective population-based Young Finns Study (n = 960-1679). Social intolerance was evaluated with the Social Intolerance Scale in 1997, 2001, and 2011; cognitive performance with the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery in 2011; cognitive styles in 1997; and socioeconomic factors in 1980 (childhood) and 2011 (adulthood); and polygenic cognitive potential was calculated based on genome-wide association studies.

RESULTS

We found that nonrational thinking, polygenic cognitive potential, cognitive performance, or socioeconomic factors were not related to social intolerance. Regarding cognitive styles, low flexibility (B = -0.759, p < .001), high perseverance (B = 1.245, p < .001), and low persistence (B = -0.329, p < .001) predicted higher social intolerance consistently in the analyses.

DISCUSSION

When developing prejudice-reduction interventions, it should be considered that educational level or cognitive performance may not be crucial for development of social intolerance. Adopting certain cognitive styles may play more important roles in development of social intolerance.

Belief traps: Tackling the inertia of harmful beliefs

Beliefs can be highly resilient in the sense that they are not easily abandoned in the face of counterevidence. This has the advantage of guiding consistent behavior and judgments but may also have destructive consequences for individuals, nature, and society. For instance, pathological beliefs can sustain psychiatric disorders, the belief that rhinoceros horn is an aphrodisiac may drive a species extinct, beliefs about gender or race may fuel discrimination, and belief in conspiracy theories can undermine democracy. Here, we present a unifying framework of how self-amplifying feedbacks shape the inertia of beliefs on levels ranging from neuronal networks to social systems. Sustained exposure to counterevidence can destabilize rigid beliefs but requires organized rational override as in cognitive behavioral therapy for pathological beliefs or institutional control of discrimination to reduce racial biases. Black-and-white thinking is a major risk factor for the formation of resilient beliefs associated with psychiatric disorders as well as prejudices and conspiracy thinking. Such dichotomous thinking is characteristic of a lack of cognitive resources, which may be exacerbated by stress. This could help explain why conspiracy thinking and psychiatric disorders tend to peak during crises. A corollary is that addressing social factors such as poverty, social cleavage, and lack of education may be the most effective way to prevent the emergence of rigid beliefs, and thus of problems ranging from psychiatric disorders to prejudices, conspiracy theories, and posttruth politics.

A Psychology of Ideology: Unpacking the Psychological Structure of Ideological Thinking

The psychological study of ideology has traditionally emphasized the content of ideological beliefs, guided by questions about what people believe, such as why people believe in omniscient gods or fascist worldviews. This theoretical focus has led to siloed subdisciplines separately dealing with political, religious, moral, and prejudiced attitudes. The fractionation has fostered a neglect of the cognitive structure of ideological worldviews and associated questions about why ideologies-in all their forms-are so compelling to the human mind. Here I argue that it is essential to consider the nature of ideological cognition across a multitude of ideologies. I offer a multidimensional, empirically tractable framework of ideological thinking, suggesting it can be conceptualized as a style of thinking that is rigid in its adherence to a doctrine and resistance to evidence-based belief-updating and favorably oriented toward an in-group and antagonistic to out-groups. The article identifies the subcomponents of ideological thinking and highlights that ideological thinking constitutes a meaningful psychological phenomenon that merits direct scholarly investigation and analysis. By emphasizing conceptual precision, methodological directions, and interdisciplinary integration across the political and cognitive sciences, the article illustrates the potential of this framework as a catalyst for developing a rigorous domain-general psychology of ideology.

Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility

In a time of societal acrimony, psychological scientists have turned to a possible antidote — intellectual humility. Interest in intellectual humility comes from diverse research areas, including researchers studying leadership and organizational behaviour, personality science, positive psychology, judgement and decision-making, education, culture, and intergroup and interpersonal relationships. In this Review, we synthesize empirical approaches to the study of intellectual humility. We critically examine diverse approaches to defining and measuring intellectual humility and identify the common element: a meta-cognitive ability to recognize the limitations of one’s beliefs and knowledge. After reviewing the validity of different measurement approaches, we highlight factors that influence intellectual humility, from relationship security to social coordination. Furthermore, we review empirical evidence concerning the benefits and drawbacks of intellectual humility for personal decision-making, interpersonal relationships, scientific enterprise and society writ large. We conclude by outlining initial attempts to boost intellectual humility, foreshadowing possible scalable interventions that can turn intellectual humility into a core interpersonal, institutional and cultural value.

Intellectual humility involves acknowledging the limitations of one’s knowledge and that one’s beliefs might be incorrect. In this Review, Porter and colleagues synthesize concepts of intellectual humility across fields and describe the complex interplay between intellectual humility and related individual and societal factors.

Flexible minds make more moderate views: Subtractive counterfactuals mitigate strong views about immigrants’ trustworthiness

Public discourse on immigration has seemed to polarize over recent years—with some people strongly trusting, but others strongly distrusting immigrants. We examined whether a cognitive strategy could mitigate these biased outgroup judgments. Given that subtractive counterfactual thoughts (“If only I had not done X. . .”) facilitate cognitive flexibility and especially a relational processing style, we hypothesized that these thoughts (vs. additive counterfactuals “If only I had done X. . .” and no counterfactuals) would weaken the relationship between people’s political orientation and the perceived trustworthiness of immigrants. In five experiments (two preregistered; total N = 1,189), we found that inducing subtractive (but not additive) counterfactuals—either via rhetorical questions in a political speech or via mindset priming—had the predicted debiasing effect. Taken together, subtle means such as using subtractive counterfactual questions in political communication seem to be a promising way to reduce biased outgroup judgments in heated public debates.

The Habitual Tendencies Questionnaire: A tool for psychometric individual differences research

Habits are automatic responses to learned stimuli or contextual cues that are insensitive to goals. Although habits may allow for automated behaviours that increase efficiency in our daily lives, an over-reliance on habits has been suggested to contribute to disorders such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). There are currently few established measures of individual differences in habitual tendencies. To fill this gap, the present study generated and validated a novel 11-item scale, the Habitual Tendencies Questionnaire (HTQ), to measure individual differences in habitual tendencies in the general population. In Study 1, factor analysis revealed three underlying subcomponents of the HTQ: Compulsivity, Preference for Regularity, and Aversion to Novelty, with Compulsivity showing the strongest association with subclinical OCD symptomatology. Study 2 validated the HTQ and replicated the findings of Study 1 in a larger sample, and explored relationships with other personality traits. The results emphasise the importance of measuring individual variation in habitual thinking styles, illustrating that different facets of habitual tendencies may contribute to diverse behavioural and clinical outcomes. The present investigation provides a new, reliable way of measuring habitual tendencies and has important implications for future explorations into the nature of individual differences from a dimensional perspective to psychiatry.

Cognitive Rigidity, Habitual Tendencies, and Obsessive-Compulsive Symptoms: Individual Differences and Compensatory Interactions

Recent theories have posited a range of cognitive risk factors for obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), including cognitive inflexibility and a maladaptive reliance on habits. However, empirical and methodological inconsistencies have obscured the understanding of whether inflexibility and habitual tendencies indeed shape OCD symptoms in clinical and sub-clinical populations, and whether there are notable interactions amongst these traits. The present investigation adopted an interactionist individual differences approach to examine the associations between behaviorally-assessed cognitive flexibility and subclinical OCD symptomatology in a healthy population. It also explored the nature of the interactions between cognitive flexibility and habitual tendencies, and the degree to which these cognitive traits predict subclinical OCD symptomatology. Across two studies, including a preregistration, Bayesian and regression analyses revealed that cognitive inflexibility and compulsive habitual tendencies act as unique and independent predictors of subclinical OCD symptomatology in healthy populations. Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between cognitive rigidity and habitual compulsivity, which accounted for 49.4% of the variance in subclinical OCD symptomatology in Study 1, and 37.3% in Study 2. In-depth analyses revealed a compensatory effect between cognitive inflexibility and habitual compulsivity such that both are necessary for OCD symptomatology, but neither is sufficient. These results imply that in order to generate reliable and nuanced models of the endophenotype of OCD symptomatology, it is essential to account for interactions between psychological traits. Moreover, the present findings have important implications for theories on the cognitive roots of OCD, and potentially in the development of interventions that target both cognitive inflexibility and habitual compulsivity.

Dopamine, Cognitive Flexibility, and IQ: Epistatic Catechol-O-MethylTransferase:DRD2 Gene-Gene Interactions Modulate Mental Rigidity

Cognitive flexibility has been hypothesized to be neurochemically rooted in dopamine neurotransmission. Nonetheless, underpowered sample sizes and contradictory meta-analytic findings have obscured the role of dopamine genes in cognitive flexibility and neglected potential gene-gene interactions. In this largest neurocognitive-genetic study to date (n = 1400), single nucleotide polymorphisms associated with elevated prefrontal dopamine levels (catechol-O-methyltransferase; rs4680) and diminished striatal dopamine (C957T; rs6277) were both implicated in Wisconsin Card Sorting Test performance. Crucially, however, these genetic effects were only evident in low-IQ participants, suggesting high intelligence compensates for, and eliminates, the effect of dispositional dopamine functioning on flexibility. This interaction between cognitive systems may explain and resolve previous empirical inconsistencies in highly educated participant samples. Moreover, compensatory gene-gene interactions were discovered between catechol-O-methyltransferase and DRD2, such that genotypes conferring either elevated prefrontal dopamine or diminished striatal dopamine-via heightened striatally concentrated D2 dopamine receptor availability-are sufficient for cognitive flexibility, but neither is necessary. The study has therefore revealed a form of epistatic redundancy or substitutability among dopamine systems in shaping adaptable thought and action, thus defining boundary conditions for dopaminergic effects on flexible behavior. These results inform theories of clinical disorders and psychopharmacological interventions and uncover complex fronto-striatal synergies in human flexible cognition.

A neurocognitive model of ideological thinking

Ideological behavior has traditionally been viewed as a product of social forces. Nonetheless, an emerging science suggests that ideological worldviews can also be understood in terms of neural and cognitive principles. The article proposes a neurocognitive model of ideological thinking, arguing that ideological worldviews may be manifestations of individuals' perceptual and cognitive systems. This model makes two claims. First, there are neurocognitive antecedents to ideological thinking: the brain's low-level neurocognitive dispositions influence its receptivity to ideological doctrines. Second, there are neurocognitive consequences to ideological engagement: strong exposure and adherence to ideological doctrines can shape perceptual and cognitive systems. This article details the neurocognitive model of ideological thinking and synthesizes the empirical evidence in support of its claims. The model postulates that there are bidirectional processes between the brain and the ideological environment, and so it can address the roles of situational and motivational factors in ideologically motivated action. This endeavor highlights that an interdisciplinary neurocognitive approach to ideologies can facilitate biologically informed accounts of the ideological brain and thus reveal who is most susceptible to extreme and authoritarian ideologies. By investigating the relationships between low-level perceptual processes and high-level ideological attitudes, we can develop a better grasp of our collective history as well as the mechanisms that may structure our political futures.

Clarifying the Content of Intellectual Humility: A Systematic Review and Integrative Framework

During the last decade, intellectual humility has gone from a topic of philosophical inquiry to one of serious scientific investigation. It has been variously described as a remedy for political polarization, a tool for advancing scientific credibility, and a disposition that promotes learning. However, less attention has been paid to how intellectual humility has been defined and measured or how well psychologists' definitions and measures align with one another or with philosophers' accounts. Through a systematic review of empirical intellectual humility research, we identified 18 separate definitions and 20 measures including16 unique questionnaires. We then synthesized this research to advance a new framework of intellectual humility. Implications of this framework for measurement and future research on intellectual humility are discussed.

Intellectual humility: an old problem in a new psychological perspective

Though having been emphasised by philosophers and theologians for centuries, it is only in the last few years that the concept of intellectual humility has been explicitly defined and studied by empirical psychology. However, it has been long enough to recognise the prominent role that being intellectually humble plays for humane functioning, both at an intra- and inter-individual level. Having started with a broader philosophical and historical context, the present paper discusses the psychological conceptualisations of intellectual humility. Then the recent empirical studies are reviewed, including four strands of research referring to personality traits, cognitive functioning, social relations and religiosity. After presenting selected results, the prospects of psychological research on intellectual humility are discussed, including the limitations and challenges of measurement techniques as well as possible directions for future studies.

Cognition and Emotion in Extreme Political Action: Individual Differences and Dynamic Interactions

Who is most likely to join and engage in extreme political action? Although traditional theories have focused on situational factors or group identity, an emerging science illustrates that tendencies for extreme political action may also be rooted in individuals’ idiosyncratic cognitive and affective dispositions. This article synthesizes cutting-edge evidence demonstrating that individuals’ cognitive and affective architecture shapes their willingness to support ideological violence. In the cognitive domain, traits such as cognitive rigidity, slow perceptual strategies, and poor executive functions are linked to heightened endorsement for ideological violence. In the emotion domain, characteristics associated with emotional reactivity and impaired emotional regulation, such as sensation seeking and impulsivity, can facilitate readiness for extreme political action. The review homes in on the roles of cognitive rigidity and sensation seeking as traits heightening proclivities for extreme pro-group behavior and recommends that future research should assess cognition-emotion interactions to reveal different subprofiles of political actors. A theoretical framework focused on cognitive and affective information-processing traits—and their interactions—opens up tractable empirical questions and a future research agenda. Identifying subsets of ideologues is an endeavor with potential to inform the design of evidence-based interventions aimed at reducing ideological extremism and fostering social understanding.

The cognitive and perceptual correlates of ideological attitudes: a data-driven approach

Although human existence is enveloped by ideologies, remarkably little is understood about the relationships between ideological attitudes and psychological traits. Even less is known about how cognitive dispositions-individual differences in how information is perceived and processed- sculpt individuals' ideological worldviews, proclivities for extremist beliefs and resistance (or receptivity) to evidence. Using an unprecedented number of cognitive tasks (n = 37) and personality surveys (n = 22), along with data-driven analyses including drift-diffusion and Bayesian modelling, we uncovered the specific psychological signatures of political, nationalistic, religious and dogmatic beliefs. Cognitive and personality assessments consistently outperformed demographic predictors in accounting for individual differences in ideological preferences by 4 to 15-fold. Furthermore, data-driven analyses revealed that individuals' ideological attitudes mirrored their cognitive decision-making strategies. Conservatism and nationalism were related to greater caution in perceptual decision-making tasks and to reduced strategic information processing, while dogmatism was associated with slower evidence accumulation and impulsive tendencies. Religiosity was implicated in heightened agreeableness and risk perception. Extreme pro-group attitudes, including violence endorsement against outgroups, were linked to poorer working memory, slower perceptual strategies, and tendencies towards impulsivity and sensation-seeking-reflecting overlaps with the psychological profiles of conservatism and dogmatism. Cognitive and personality signatures were also generated for ideologies such as authoritarianism, system justification, social dominance orientation, patriotism and receptivity to evidence or alternative viewpoints; elucidating their underpinnings and highlighting avenues for future research. Together these findings suggest that ideological worldviews may be reflective of low-level perceptual and cognitive functions. This article is part of the theme issue 'The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms'.

Confirmation bias is adaptive when coupled with efficient metacognition

Biases in the consideration of evidence can reduce the chances of consensus between people with different viewpoints. While such altered information processing typically leads to detrimental performance in laboratory tasks, the ubiquitous nature of confirmation bias makes it unlikely that selective information processing is universally harmful. Here, we suggest that confirmation bias is adaptive to the extent that agents have good metacognition, allowing them to downweight contradictory information when correct but still able to seek new information when they realize they are wrong. Using simulation-based modelling, we explore how the adaptiveness of holding a confirmation bias depends on such metacognitive insight. We find that the behavioural consequences of selective information processing are systematically affected by agents' introspective abilities. Strikingly, we find that selective information processing can even improve decision-making when compared with unbiased evidence accumulation, as long as it is accompanied by good metacognition. These results further suggest that interventions which boost people's metacognition might be efficient in alleviating the negative effects of selective information processing on issues such as political polarization.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms’.

A little shot of humility: Intellectual humility predicts vaccination attitudes and intention to vaccinate against COVID-19

Vaccinations remain a critical, albeit surprisingly controversial, health behavior, especially with the promise of widely available COVID‐19 vaccine. Intellectual humility, a virtue characterized by nonjudgmental recognition of one's own intellectual fallibility, may counter rigidity associated with anti‐vaccination attitudes and help promote vaccine‐related behaviors. This study investigated whether intellectual humility is related to anti‐vaccination attitudes and intentions to vaccinate against COVID‐19, and whether intellectual humility can predict unique variance in these outcomes beyond participant demographic and personal factors. Participants (N = 351, 57.23% male, mean age = 37.41 years, SD = 11.51) completed a multidimensional measure for intellectual humility, the anti‐vaccination attitudes (VAX) scale, and a two‐item COVID‐19 vaccination intention scale. Bivariate correlations demonstrated that intellectual humility was negatively related with anti‐vaccination attitudes overall, r(349) = −.46, p < .001, and positively related to intentions to vaccinate against COVID‐19, r(349) = .20, p < .001. Hierarchical multiple regression revealed that intellectual humility predicted all four types anti‐vaccination attitudes, overall anti‐vaccination attitudes, and COVID‐19 vaccination intentions above and beyond demographic and personal factors (i.e., sex, race/ethnicity, age, education, socioeconomic status, and political orientation), ΔR² between .08 and .18, ps < .001. These results bolster intellectual humility as a malleable psychological factor to consider in efforts to combat anti‐vaccination attitudes and promote COVID‐19 vaccination uptake.

The thermodynamics of cognition: A mathematical treatment

There is a general expectation that the laws of classical physics must apply to biology, particularly the neural system. The evoked cycle represents the brain's energy/information exchange with the physical environment through stimulus. Therefore, the thermodynamics of emotions might elucidate the neurological origin of intellectual evolution, and explain the psychological and health consequences of positive and negative emotional states based on their energy profiles. We utilized the Carnot cycle and Landauer's principle to analyze the energetic consequences of the brain's resting and evoked states during and after various cognitive states. Namely, positive emotional states can be represented by the reversed Carnot cycle, whereas negative emotional reactions trigger the Carnot cycle. The two conditions have contrasting energetic and entropic aftereffects with consequences for mental energy. The mathematics of the Carnot and reversed Carnot cycles, which can explain recent findings in human psychology, might be constructive in the scientific endeavor in turning psychology into hard science.

Disliked but Free to Speak: Cognitive Ability Is Related to Supporting Freedom of Speech for Groups Across the Ideological Spectrum

Freedom of speech for all citizens is often considered as a cornerstone of democratic societies. In three studies, we examined the relationship between cognitive ability and support for freedom of speech for a variety of social groups across the ideological spectrum ( N 1 varies between 1,373 and 18,719, N 2 = 298, N 3 = 395). Corroborating our theoretical expectations, although cognitive ability was related to more affective prejudice toward relatively conservative groups and less affective prejudice toward relatively liberal groups (Study 2), people with higher levels of cognitive ability were more in favor of freedom of speech for all target groups (Studies 1–3). The relationship between cognitive ability and freedom of speech support was mediated by intellectual humility (preregistered Study 3). These results indicate that cognitive ability contributes to support for the democratic right of freedom of speech for all social–ideological groups.

Cognitive Inflexibility Predicts Extremist Attitudes

Research into the roots of ideological extremism has traditionally focused on the social, economic, and demographic factors that make people vulnerable to adopting hostile attitudes toward outgroups. However, there is insufficient empirical work on individual differences in implicit cognition and information processing styles that amplify an individual’s susceptibility to endorsing violence to protect an ideological cause or group. Here we present original evidence that objectively assessed cognitive inflexibility predicts extremist attitudes, including a willingness to harm others, and sacrifice one’s life for the group. Across two samples (N = 1,047) from the United Kingdom and United States, structural equation models demonstrated that cognitive inflexibility predicted endorsement of violence to protect the national ingroup, which in turn predicted a willingness to die for the group. These statistical models accounted for an average of 31.4% of the variance in willingness to die for the group, after accounting for demographic variables. Furthermore, cognitive inflexibility was related to greater confidence in the decision to sacrifice one’s life in an ingroup trolley problem scenario. Analysis of participants’ performance on the cognitive tasks revealed that cognitive rigidity – distinctly from other aspects of cognition – was specifically implicated as a cognitive antecedent of extremist attitudes. Implications for the study of radicalization and identity fusion through a neurocognitive lens are discussed.