Visual mental imagery: Evidence for a heterarchical neural architecture

In the Mind's Eye: Exploring the Relationship Between Visual Mental Imagery and Stereotyping

Academic AbstractHow do social stereotypes shape and reflect images formed in the mind's eye? Visual mental imagery has long been assumed crucial in creating, maintaining, and perpetuating stereotypes and prejudice. Surprisingly, research in social cognition has only recently begun to explore the causal role of mental images in these phenomena. In contrast, cognitive neuroscience research on visual mental imagery (VMI) has explored the pivotal role of imagery in various consequential cognitive and behavioral phenomena. However, cognitive neuroscience has largely neglected how stereotypes influence mental imagery. This article provides a historical overview of the development of these two fields in terms of mental imagery and discusses recent advances at their intersection. Opportunities for additional integration are highlighted, and suggestions for furthering the dual study of stereotyping and mental imagery are provided.Public AbstractHow can social stereotypes impact and mirror visual imagination? It has long been assumed that visual mental imagery plays a central role in forming, maintaining, and strengthening stereotypes and prejudice. Yet, until recently, there has been limited exploration within social psychology and cognitive neuroscience on the explicit connection between visual mental images and social stereotypes. We describe the historical progression of these fields concerning visual imagery and explore recent advancements that unite stereotyping and mental imagery research. Furthermore, we propose avenues for future research to deepen our understanding of how individuals utilize mental images in stereotyping and how mental imagery can modify stereotypes.

The order of multisensory associative sequences is reinstated as context feature during successful recognition

The ability of the human brain to encode and recognize sequential information from different sensory modalities is key to memory formation. The sequence in which these modalities are presented during encoding critically affects recognition. This study investigates the encoding of sensory modality sequences and its neural impact on recognition using multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) of oscillatory EEG activity. We examined the reinstatement of multisensory episode-specific sequences in n = 32 participants who encoded sound-image associations (e.g., the image of a ship with the sound of a frog). Images and sounds were natural scenes and 2-second real-life sounds, presented sequentially during encoding. During recognition, stimulus pairs were presented simultaneously, and classification was used to test whether the modality sequence order could be decoded as a contextual feature in memory. Oscillatory results identified a distinct neural signature during successful retrieval, associated with the original modality sequence. Furthermore, MVPA successfully decoded neural patterns of different modality sequences, hinting at specific memory traces. These findings suggest that the sequence in which sensory modalities are encoded forms a neural signature, affecting later recognition. This study provides novel insights into the relationship between modality encoding and recognition, with broad implications for cognitive neuroscience and memory research.

Visual imagery of familiar people and places in category selective cortex

Visual imagery is a dynamic process recruiting a network of brain regions. We used electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) fusion to investigate the dynamics of category selective imagery in medial parietal cortex (MPC), ventral temporal cortex (VTC), and primary visual cortex (V1). Subjects attended separate EEG and fMRI sessions where they created mental images of personally familiar people and place stimuli. The fMRI contrast comparing people and place imagery replicated previous findings of category-selectivity in the medial parietal cortex. In addition, greater activity for places was found in the ventral and lateral place memory areas, the frontal eye fields, the inferior temporal sulcus, and the intraparietal sulcus. In contrast, greater activity for people was found in the fusiform face area and the right posterior superior temporal sulcus. Using multivariate decoding analysis in fMRI, we could decode individual stimuli within the preferred category in VTC. A more complex pattern emerged in MPC, which represented information that was not restricted to the preferred category. We were also able to decode category and individual stimuli in the EEG data. EEG-fMRI fusion indicated similar timings in MPC and VTC activity during imagery. However, in the VTC, fusion was higher in place selective regions during an early time window, and higher in face selective regions in a later time window. In contrast, fusion correlations in V1 occurred later during the imagery period, possibly reflecting the top-down progression of mental imagery from category-selective regions to primary visual cortex.

Visual mental imagery in typical imagers and in aphantasia: A millimeter-scale 7-T fMRI study

Most of us effortlessly describe visual objects, whether seen or remembered. Yet, around 4% of people report congenital aphantasia: they struggle to visualize objects despite being able to describe their visual appearance. What neural mechanisms create this disparity between subjective experience and objective performance? Aphantasia can provide novel insights into conscious processing and awareness. We used ultra-high field 7T fMRI to establish the neural circuits involved in visual mental imagery and perception, and to elucidate the neural mechanisms associated with the processing of internally generated visual information in the absence of imagery experience in congenital aphantasia. Ten typical imagers and 10 aphantasic individuals performed imagery and perceptual tasks in five domains: object shape, object color, written words, faces, and spatial relationships. In typical imagers, imagery tasks activated left-hemisphere frontoparietal areas, the relevant domain-preferring areas in the ventral temporal cortex partly overlapping with the perceptual domain-preferring areas, and a domain-general area in the left fusiform gyrus (the Fusiform Imagery Node). The results were valid for each individual participant. In aphantasic individuals, imagery activated similar visual areas, but there was reduced functional connectivity between the Fusiform Imagery Node and frontoparietal areas. Our results unveil the domain-general and domain-specific circuits of visual mental imagery, their functional disorganization in aphantasia, and support the general hypothesis that conscious visual experience - whether perceived or imagined - depends on the integrated activity of high-level visual cortex and frontoparietal networks.

Demystifying visual word form area visual and nonvisual response properties with precision fMRI

The visual word form area (VWFA) is a region in the left ventrotemporal cortex (VTC) whose specificity remains contentious. Using precision fMRI, we examine the VWFA's responses to numerous visual and nonvisual stimuli, comparing them to adjacent category-selective visual regions and regions involved in language and attentional demand. We find that VWFA responds moderately to non-word visual stimuli, but is unique within VTC in its pronounced selectivity for visual words. Interestingly, the VWFA is also the only category-selective visual region engaged in auditory language, unlike the ubiquitous attentional demand effect throughout the VTC. However, this language selectivity is dwarfed by its visual responses even to nonpreferred categories, indicating the VWFA is not a core (amodal) language region. We also observed two additional auditory language VTC clusters, but these had no specificity for visual words. Our detailed investigation clarifies longstanding controversies about the landscape of visual and auditory language functionality within VTC.

Internal coupling: Eye behavior coupled to visual imagery

Our eyes do not only respond to visual perception but also to internal cognition involving visual imagery, which can be referred to as internal coupling. This review synthesizes evidence on internal coupling across diverse domains including episodic memory and simulation, visuospatial memory, numerical cognition, object movement, body movement, and brightness imagery. In each domain, eye movements consistently reflect distinct aspects of mental imagery typically akin to those seen in corresponding visual experiences. Several findings further suggest that internal coupling may not only coincide with but also supports internal cognition as evidenced by improved cognitive performance. Available theoretical accounts suggest that internal coupling may serve at least two functional roles in visual imagery: facilitating memory reconstruction and indicating shifts in internal attention. Moreover, recent insights into the neurobiology of internal coupling highlight substantially shared neural pathways in externally and internally directed cognition. The review concludes by identifying open questions and promising avenues for future research such as exploring moderating roles of context and individual differences in internal coupling.

A Systematic Review of Aphantasia: Concept, Measurement, Neural Basis, and Theory Development

People with aphantasia exhibit the inability to voluntarily generate or form mental imagery in their minds. Since the term "aphantasia" was proposed to describe this, it has gained increasing attention from psychiatrists, neuroscientists, and clinicians. Previous studies have mainly focused on the definition, prevalence, and measurement of aphantasia, its impacts on individuals' cognitive and emotional processing, and theoretical frameworks synthesizing existing findings, which have contributed greatly to our understanding of aphantasia. However, there are still some debates regarding the conclusions derived from existing research and the theories that were constructed from various sources of evidence. Building upon existing endeavors, this systematic review emphasizes that future research is much needed to refine the definition and diagnosis of aphantasia, strengthen empirical investigations at behavioral and neural levels, and, more importantly, develop or update theories. These multiple lines of efforts could lead to a deeper understanding of aphantasia and further guide researchers in future research directions.

Phantasia, aphantasia, and hyperphantasia: Empirical data and conceptual considerations

Within the past decade, the term "phantasia" has been increasingly used to describe the human capacity, faculty, or power of visual mental imagery, with extremes of imagery vividness characterised as "aphantasia" and "hyperphantasia". A substantial volume of empirical research addressing these constructs has now been published, including attempts to find inductive correlates of behaviourally defined aphantasia, for example using research questionnaires and functional magnetic resonance imaging. Mental imagery has long been noted as a source of conceptual confusions but no specific conceptual analysis of the new formulation of phantasia, aphantasia, and hyperphantasia has been undertaken hitherto. We offer some conceptual considerations on phantasia, noting the ongoing confusion of perceptual with mental images, and the ubiquitous use of unvalidated subjective assessment instruments such as the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) in diagnosis and assessment, development of which was predicated on these conceptual confusions. We offer some suggestions for a conceptual framework for future empirical studies in this field, circumventing these conceptual confusions.

Aphantasia and involuntary imagery

Aphantasia is a condition that is often characterized as the impaired ability to create voluntary mental images. Aphantasia is assumed to selectively affect voluntary imagery mainly because even though aphantasics report being unable to visualize something at will, many report having visual dreams. We argue that this common characterization of aphantasia is incorrect. Studies on aphantasia are often not clear about whether they are assessing voluntary or involuntary imagery, but some studies show that several forms of involuntary imagery are also affected in aphantasia (including imagery in dreams). We also raise problems for two attempts to show that involuntary images are preserved in aphantasia. In addition, we report the results of a study about afterimages in aphantasia, which suggest that these tend to be less intense in aphantasics than in controls. Involuntary imagery is often treated as a unitary kind that is either present or absent in aphantasia. We suggest that this approach is mistaken and that we should look at different types of involuntary imagery case by case. Doing so reveals no evidence of preserved involuntary imagery in aphantasia. We suggest that a broader characterization of aphantasia, as a deficit in forming mental imagery, whether voluntary or not, is more appropriate. Characterizing aphantasia as a volitional deficit is likely to lead researchers to give incorrect explanations for aphantasia, and to look for the wrong mechanisms underlying it.