Spontaneous mentalizing in neurotypicals scoring high versus low on symptomatology of autism spectrum disorder

Evaluative contexts facilitate implicit mentalizing: relation to the broader autism phenotype and mental health

One promising account for autism is implicit mentalizing difficulties. However, this account and even the existence of implicit mentalizing have been challenged because the replication results are mixed. Those unsuccessful replications may be due to the task contexts not being sufficiently evaluative. Therefore, the current study developed a more evaluative paradigm by implementing a prompt question. This was assessed in 60 non-autistic adults and compared with a non-prompt version. Additionally, parents of autistic children are thought to show a genetic liability to autistic traits and cognition and often report mental health problems, but the broader autism phenotype (BAP) is an under-researched area. Thus, we also aimed to compare 33 BAP and 26 non-BAP mothers on mentalizing abilities, autistic traits, compensation and mental health. Our results revealed that more evaluative contexts can facilitate implicit mentalizing in BAP and non-BAP populations, and thus improve task reliability and replicability. Surprisingly, BAP mothers showed better implicit mentalizing but worse mental health than non-BAP mothers, which indicates the heterogeneity in the broader autism phenotype and the need to promote BAP mothers' psychological resilience. The findings underscore the importance of contexts for implicit mentalizing and the need to profile mentalizing and mental health in BAP parents.

Examining whether adults with autism spectrum disorder encounter multiple problems in theory of mind: a study based on meta-analysis

Theory of mind (ToM) represents a complex ability, while persons with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) encounter difficulties in the processing of ToM. The present ToM-focused studies on adults with ASD report inconsistent results, possibly owing to the differences between tasks. For instance, different ToM-related tasks involve different cognitive abilities, but the development of these cognitive abilities is different among adults with ASD, thereby leading to different behaviors by the same individual with ASD in different tasks. Therefore, it is of vital significance to explore the potential reasons for inconsistencies in the existing studies based on the task classification perspective. Hence, this study primarily reviews the existing ToM tasks used in studies on adults with ASD; afterward, based on the forms and characteristics of the task, the current ToM tasks are classified into four categories-reading comprehension, perceptual scene comprehension, comprehensive scene comprehension , and self-other processing. Subsequently, a meta-analysis is undertaken to determine the difference in each ToM task category between the ASD group and the typically developing (TD) group. As a result, 110 research papers (including 3,205 adults with ASD and 3,675 TD adults) that fulfilled the stated criteria are examined in this study. The study findings suggest that adults with ASD demonstrate worse performance in terms of all four ToM task categories as compared to TD adults. Furthermore, compared with tasks of self-other processing and perceptual scene comprehension, adults with ASD perform worse in reading comprehension and comprehensive scene comprehension. This shows that the differences between tasks may exert a potential influence on the study results. Future studies should focus on different abilities involved in ToM processing and the choice of ToM tasks, in order to elucidate the critical problems of ToM in adults with ASD.

Cortisol awakening response and testosterone jointly affect adolescents' theory of mind

Adolescence is a critical period for the maturation of neurobiological processes and hormone secretion. Recent studies on the dual-hormone hypothesis have indicated that basal cortisol and testosterone jointly affect dominant and aggressive behavior among adolescents and adults. Whether this hypothesis applies to prosocial-related understanding of others' mental states remains unclear. The present study investigated associations between basal testosterone, basal cortisol (and cortisol awakening response [CAR]), and the cognitive/affective theory of mind (ToM) in 243 adolescents (67.9 % male, aged 14 to 17 years, M_age = 16.09, standard deviation = 0.62). Cognitive ToM (cToM) and affective ToM (aToM) were assessed with a cartoon story reasoning task: In the cToM condition, participants viewed a comic strip story and needed to predict what would happen based on a character's intentions, and in the aToM condition, they viewed a comic strip of two characters interacting and needed to think about what would make the protagonist feel better. The results showed that basal testosterone and basal cortisol did not interact with each other to affect the performance of ToM, either in terms of ToM accuracy or response speed. However, under the condition of low CAR, testosterone is associated with the fast performance of cToM, although the interaction of testosterone and CAR occurred only in female adolescents. Overall, our data provide new evidence for the dual-hormone hypothesis and further extend the hypothesis to social understanding.

Neural correlates of own name and own face processing in neurotypical adults scoring low versus high on symptomatology of autism spectrum disorder

Previous event-related potential (ERP) research showed reduced self-referential processing in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). As different self-related stimuli were studied in isolation, it is unclear whether findings can be ascribed to a common underlying mechanism. Further, it is unknown whether altered self-referential processing is also evident in neurotypicals scoring high on ASD symptomatology. We compared ERPs in response to one's own name and face (versus other names/faces) between neurotypical adults scoring high versus low on ASD symptomatology. Conform previous research, the parietal P3 was enhanced, both for own name and face, indicating a self-referential effect. The N250 was only enhanced for one's own face. However, the self-referential parietal P3 effect did not correlate between the names and faces conditions, arguing against a common underlying mechanism. No group effects appeared, neither for names nor faces, suggesting that reduced self-referential processing is not a dimensional ASD feature in the neurotypical population.

Facial Imitation Improves Emotion Recognition in Adults with Different Levels of Sub-Clinical Autistic Traits

We used computer-based automatic expression analysis to investigate the impact of imitation on facial emotion recognition with a baseline-intervention-retest design. The participants: 55 young adults with varying degrees of autistic traits, completed an emotion recognition task with images of faces displaying one of six basic emotional expressions. This task was then repeated with instructions to imitate the expressions. During the experiment, a camera captured the participants’ faces for an automatic evaluation of their imitation performance. The instruction to imitate enhanced imitation performance as well as emotion recognition. Of relevance, emotion recognition improvements in the imitation block were larger in people with higher levels of autistic traits, whereas imitation enhancements were independent of autistic traits. The finding that an imitation instruction improves emotion recognition, and that imitation is a positive within-participant predictor of recognition accuracy in the imitation block supports the idea of a link between motor expression and perception in the processing of emotions, which might be mediated by the mirror neuron system. However, because there was no evidence that people with higher autistic traits differ in their imitative behavior per se, their disproportional emotion recognition benefits could have arisen from indirect effects of imitation instructions

Depression, trauma and mentalizing: No influence of depressive symptoms on spontaneous theory of mind in a subclinical sample

BACKGROUND

Depressive symptoms are associated with impaired social functioning, arguably because of reduced mentalizing abilities. However, findings in persons with depressive symptoms and/or major depressive disorder (MDD) are presently mixed, finding evidence both for and against the hypothesis of reduced mentalizing abilities.

AIMS

This study investigated spontaneous cognitive mentalizing in 36 age-, sex- and education-matched students with depressive symptoms and 45 comparisons with minimal depressive symptoms.

METHOD

To assess spontaneous mentalizing, we used the implicit theory of mind (ToM) task, which looks specifically at spontaneous computation of false belief.

RESULTS

Bayesian analysis did not support the hypothesis of impaired mentalizing; in fact, it suggested that the results were 3.90 times more likely to have occurred under the null hypothesis. Results remained stable when comparing depressed and non-depressed individuals without maltreatment exposure but were inconclusive in the maltreatment-exposed groups.

CONCLUSION

The findings suggest no effect of spontaneous mentalizing in a high-functioning depressed sample. Moreover, the findings also emphasize the need to control for childhood maltreatment experiences in future ToM and social functioning research, as these may constitute subgroups within depressed samples. Tailored therapy for maltreated depression individuals may be beneficial.

Visibly constraining an agent modulates observers' automatic false-belief tracking

Our motor system can generate representations which carry information about the goals of another agent’s actions. However, it is not known whether motor representations play a deeper role in social understanding, and, in particular, whether they enable tracking others’ beliefs. Here we show that, for adult observers, reliably manifesting an ability to track another’s false belief critically depends on representing the agent’s potential actions motorically. One signature of motor representations is that they can be disrupted by constraints on an observed agent’s action capacities. We therefore used a ‘mummification’ technique to manipulate whether the agent in a visual ball-detection task was free to act or whether he was visibly constrained from acting. Adults’ reaction times reliably reflected the agent’s beliefs only when the agent was free to act on the ball and not when the agent was visibly constrained from acting. Furthermore, it was the agent’s constrained action capabilities, rather than any perceptual novelty, that determined whether adult observers’ reaction times reliably reflected the agent’s beliefs. These findings signal that our motor system may underpin more of social cognition than previously imagined, and, in particular, that motor representations may underpin automatic false-belief tracking.

Level 2 perspective-taking distinguishes automatic and non-automatic belief-tracking

Little is known about whether human beings' automatic mindreading is computationally restricted to processing a limited kind of content, and what exactly the nature of that signature limit might be. We developed a novel object-detection paradigm to test adults' automatic processing in a Level 1 perspective-taking (L1PT) context (where an agent's belief, but not his visuospatial perspective, is relevantly different) and in a Level 2 perspective-taking (L2PT) context (where both the agent's belief and visuospatial perspective are relevantly different). Experiment 1 uncovered that adults' reaction times in the L1PT task were helpfully speeded by a bystander's irrelevant belief when tracking two homogenous objects but not in the L2PT task when tracking a single heterogeneous object. The limitation is especially striking given that the heterogeneous nature of the single object was fully revealed to participants as well as the bystander. The results were replicated in two further experiments, which confirmed that the selective modulation of adults' reaction times was maintained when tracking the location of a single object (Experiment 2) and when attention checks were removed (Experiment 3). Our findings suggest that automatic mindreading draws upon a distinctively minimalist model of the mental that underspecifies representation of differences in perspective relative to an agent's position in space.

Spontaneous Theory of Mind is reduced for nonhuman-like agents as compared to human-like agents

Theory of Mind research has shown that we spontaneously take into account other's beliefs. In the current study, we investigate, with a spontaneous Theory of Mind (ToM) task, if this belief representation also applies to nonhuman-like agents. In a series of three experiments, we show here that we do not spontaneously take into account beliefs of nonhuman-like others, or at least we do it to a lesser extent than for human and human-like agents. Further, the experience we have with the other agent, in our case a dog, does not modulate spontaneous ToM: the same pattern of results was obtained when dog owners and no owners were compared. However, when more attention was attracted to the dog behavior, participants' behavior was influenced by the beliefs of the dog. In sum, spontaneous belief representation seems to be primarily restricted to human and human-like agents, but can be facilitated when more attention is drawn to a nonhuman-like agent.