Recognition memory: The probe, the returned signal, and the decision

In an attempt to better understand recognition memory we look at how three approaches (dual processing, signal detection, and global matching) have addressed the probe, the returned signal and the decision in four recognition paradigms. These are single-item recognition (including the remember/know paradigm), recognition in relational context, associative recognition, and source monitoring. The contrast, with regards to the double-miss rate (the probability of recognizing neither item in intact and rearranged pairs) and the effect of the oldness of the other member of the test pair, between identifying the old words in test pairs (the relational context paradigm) and first identifying the intact test pairs and then identifying the old words (adding associative recognition to the relational context paradigm) suggests that the retrieval of associative information in the relational context paradigm is unintentional, unlike the retrieval of associative information in associative recognition. It also seems possible that the information that is spontaneously retrieved in single-item recognition, possibly including the remember/know paradigm, is also unintentional, unlike the retrieval of information in source monitoring. Probable differences between intentional and unintentional retrieval, together with the pattern of effects with regards to the double-miss rate and the effect of the other member of the test pair, are used to evaluate the three approaches. Our conclusion is that all three approaches have something valid to say about recognition, but none is equally applicable across all four paradigms.

Exercise as the sum of our choices between behavioral alternatives: The Decisional Preferences in Exercising (DPEX) test

Exercising can be theorized as the result of choosing one behavior over alternative behaviors. The Decisional Preferences in Exercising (DPEX) test is a computerized, easy-to-use, publicly available (open source Python code: https://osf.io/ahbjr/) and highly adaptive research tool based on this rationale. In the DPEX, participants are asked to choose between two images by pressing a key on the computer keyboard, one showing a physical exercise and the other showing a non-exercise behavioral alternative in a series of trials. Combinations are randomly assembled from two definable pools of stimuli trial-per-trial. The test can be scored either based on a crossed random effects model (facilitating the use of different stimulus material in different studies without compromising the comparability of test scores) or with a simple proportion score. Data from diverse study samples (N = 451) showed strong correlations of DPEX scores with past and future exercise behavior (r = 0.42 and 0.47 respectively) as well as with affective experiences with exercise (e.g., 'pleasure-displeasure': r = 0.47). DPEX test scores discriminated between exercisers and non-exercisers according to receiver operating curve (ROC) analysis. The DPEX may be used to examine research questions derived from dual process theories, the effects of psychological states on behavioral choices can be tested, or the effects of behavior change interventions can be evaluated. The DPEX helps to avoid common method bias in the assessment of exercise behavior, for example, when psychological variables are measured with questionnaires.

Intuitive and deliberative approaches for diagnosing 'well' versus 'unwell': evidence from eye tracking, and potential implications for training

Rapidly assessing how ill a patient is based on their immediate presentation-colloquially termed 'eyeballing' in practice-serves a vital role in acute care settings. Yet surprisingly little is known about how this diagnostic skill is learned or how it should be taught. Some authors have pointed to a dual-process model, suggesting that assessments of illness severity are driven by two distinct types of processing: an intuitive, fast, pattern recognition-like process (Type 1) that depends on many prior patient encounters and outcomes being stored in memory; and a deliberate, slow, analytic process (Type 2) characterized by additional data gathering, data scrutiny, or recollection of rules. But prior studies have supported a dual-process model for the assessment of illness severity only insofar as experienced clinicians chiefly displayed what was presumed to be Type 1 processing. Here we further explored a dual-process model by examining whether less experienced clinicians displayed both types of processing when assessing illness severity across a series of cases. Consistent with the model, a dissociation between Type 1 and Type 2 processing was observed through resident reports of deliberation, response times, and three eye tracking metrics associated with diagnostic expertise. We conclude by discussing potential implications for the training of this enigmatic diagnostic skill.

Under pressure: Nudging increases healthy food choice in a virtual reality supermarket, irrespective of system 1 reasoning

Previous research has shown that nudging can effectively support people's healthy food choices. Yet, to date knowledge about the psychological premises of nudging is limited, highlighting the need for closer scrutiny to determine how and when nudging is most effective. In the current study, we assessed whether the presumed effect of nudging on healthy food choice is enhanced under time pressure, a condition probing alleged system 1 reasoning. Food choice was studied in a realistic virtual reality supermarket where healthier alternatives were nudged by making them more salient. We additionally explored possible differences in decision-making experiences related to nudging or time pressure. The study took place at a science festival where visitors could decide to participate in a study. Participants (n = 99) had to purchase four products, each from a different product category that was provided on a shopping list. In the nudging condition, one healthier option within each product category was nudged by making it more salient. While a main effect of nudging was found, showing in increased healthy food choices, this effect was not further qualified by time pressure, suggesting that the effectiveness of nudging is not enhanced under system 1 conditions. Relatedly, people who were and who were not aware of the nudges showed similar effects of nudging on healthy food choice. Furthermore, no differences in decision-making experiences showed, suggesting that people have similar experiences regarding impulsive and reflective decision-making irrespective of whether they are being nudged or put under time pressure. All in all, our findings are in line with recent viewpoints on the premises of nudges, suggesting that alleged system 1 conditions are not a prerequisite for nudging to be effective.

Level 2 perspective-taking distinguishes automatic and non-automatic belief-tracking

Little is known about whether human beings' automatic mindreading is computationally restricted to processing a limited kind of content, and what exactly the nature of that signature limit might be. We developed a novel object-detection paradigm to test adults' automatic processing in a Level 1 perspective-taking (L1PT) context (where an agent's belief, but not his visuospatial perspective, is relevantly different) and in a Level 2 perspective-taking (L2PT) context (where both the agent's belief and visuospatial perspective are relevantly different). Experiment 1 uncovered that adults' reaction times in the L1PT task were helpfully speeded by a bystander's irrelevant belief when tracking two homogenous objects but not in the L2PT task when tracking a single heterogeneous object. The limitation is especially striking given that the heterogeneous nature of the single object was fully revealed to participants as well as the bystander. The results were replicated in two further experiments, which confirmed that the selective modulation of adults' reaction times was maintained when tracking the location of a single object (Experiment 2) and when attention checks were removed (Experiment 3). Our findings suggest that automatic mindreading draws upon a distinctively minimalist model of the mental that underspecifies representation of differences in perspective relative to an agent's position in space.

Examining implicit cognitions in the evaluation of a community-wide physical activity program

The purpose of this study was to incorporate measures of attentional bias and implicit attitudes in the evaluation of a community-wide physical activity program, UWALK, by examining the relationships among proximal, intermediate, and distal outcomes of the program as outlined in the hierarchy of effects model. UWALK incorporated various communication and marketing strategies via mass media, on- and off-line platforms. Participants (N = 127) reported unprompted then prompted awareness of UWALK followed by measures of attentional bias and implicit attitudes, watched a 30-second UWALK video, then completed a thought listing task and questionnaires measuring instrumental and affective attitudes, leisure time physical activity, and demographics. Results showed that participants with unprompted awareness of UWALK demonstrated attentional bias toward UWALK images, positive implicit attitudes, and greater physical activity participation compared to unaware counterparts. Attentional bias, awareness, and implicit attitudes significantly predicted behavior, accounting for 15.2% of the variance. This study emphasizes the importance of including measures of automatic cognitions during evaluation can further inform the effects of a program. The results also showed that it is problematic to assume that visiting a website indicates a program will be remembered and related cognitions will be affected.

Implicit versus explicit measures of self-concept of self-control and their differential predictive power for spontaneous trait-relevant behaviors

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Low trait self-control constitutes a core criterion in various psychiatric disorders. Personality traits such as low self-control are mostly indexed by self-report measures. However, several theorists emphasized the importance of differentiating between explicit and implicit indices of personality traits, Therefore, the present study examined the unique predictive validity of an implicit measure of trait self-control for spontaneous dysfunctional behavior.

METHODS

As a measure of implicit trait self-control, we used an irrelevant feature task: a speeded reaction time task comprising a task-relevant stimulus feature (i.e., capital vs. lower case letter type) and a task-irrelevant feature (high vs. low self-control word type). The irrelevant feature had to be ignored, while participants (n = 34) responded to the relevant stimulus feature. However, their response was either congruent or incongruent with the irrelevant stimulus feature, resulting in facilitated or deteriorated task performance. As indicators of trait-related spontaneous dysfunctional behavior, we included indices of frustration tolerance and the preference for short-term reward over meeting long-term goals. We also included two explicit measures of trait self-control: a self-report questionnaire and an explicit self-relevance rating of the implicit task stimuli.

RESULTS

Specifically the implicit measure of trait self-control showed predictive validity for the target self-control behaviors.

LIMITATIONS

The predictive validity of implicit measures of personality traits requires further study in larger, non-student samples.

CONCLUSIONS

As predicted, the implicit measure of trait self-control showed superior predictive power for spontaneous trait-related behavior. This finding points to the relevance of complementing the routinely used self-report measures with implicit measures of trait self-control.