Organization needs organization: Understanding integrated control in living organisms

A Biophilosophical Approach to the Determination of Brain Death

Technical and clinical developments have raised challenging questions about the concept and practice of brain death, culminating in recent calls for revision of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), which established a whole brain standard for neurologic death. Proposed changes range from abandoning the concept of brain death altogether to suggesting that current clinical practice simply should be codified as the legal standard for determining death by neurologic criteria (even while acknowledging that significant functions of the whole brain might persist). We propose a middle ground, clarifying why whole brain death is a conceptually sound standard for declaring death, and offering procedural suggestions for increasing certainty that this standard has been met. Our approach recognizes that whole brain death is a functional, not merely anatomic, determination, and incorporates an understanding of the difficulties inherent in making empirical judgments in medicine. We conclude that whole brain death is the most defensible standard for determining neurologic death-philosophically, biologically, and socially-and ought to be maintained.

Integrating Multicellular Systems: Physiological Control and Degrees of Biological Individuality

This paper focuses on physiological integration in multicellular systems, a notion often associated with biological individuality, but which has not received enough attention and needs a thorough theoretical treatment. Broadly speaking, physiological integration consists in how different components come together into a cohesive unit in which they are dependent on one another for their existence and activity. This paper argues that physiological integration can be understood by considering how the components of a biological multicellular system are controlled and coordinated in such a way that their activities can contribute to the maintenance of the system. The main implication of this perspective is that different ways of controlling their parts may give rise to multicellular organizations with different degrees of integration. After defining control, this paper analyses how control is realized in two examples of multicellular systems located at different ends of the spectrum of multicellularity: biofilms and animals. It focuses on differences in control ranges, and it argues that a high degree of integration implies control exerted at both medium and long ranges, and that insofar as biofilms lack long-range control (relative to their size) they can be considered as less integrated than other multicellular systems. It then discusses the implication of this account for the debate on physiological individuality and the idea that degrees of physiological integration imply degrees of individuality.

Using neurons to maintain autonomy: Learning from C. elegans

Understanding how biological organisms are autonomous-maintain themselves far from equilibrium through their own activities-requires understanding how they regulate those activities. In multicellular animals, such control can be exercised either via endocrine signaling through the vasculature or via neurons. In C. elegans this control is exercised by a well-delineated relatively small but distributed nervous system that relies on both chemical and electric transmission of signals. This system provides resources to integrate information from multiple sources as needed to maintain the organism. Especially important for the exercise of neural control are neuromodulators, which we present as setting agendas for control through more traditional electrical signaling. To illustrate how the C. elegans nervous system integrates multiple sources of information in controlling activities important for autonomy, we focus on feeding behavior and responses to adverse conditions. We conclude by considering how a distributed nervous system without a centralized controller is nonetheless adequate for autonomy.

Discovering autoinhibition as a design principle for the control of biological mechanisms

Autoinhibition is a design principle realized in many molecular mechanisms in biology. After explicating the notion of a design principle and showing that autoinhibition is such a principle, we focus on how researchers discovered instances of autoinhibition, using research establishing the autoinhibition of the molecular motors kinesin and dynein as our case study. Research on kinesin and dynein began in the fashion described in accounts of mechanistic explanation but, once the mechanisms had been discovered, researchers discovered that they exhibited a second phenomenon, autoinhibition. The discovery of autoinhibition not only reverses the pattern in terms of which philosophers have understood mechanism discovery but runs counter to the one phenomenon-one mechanism principle assumed to relate mechanisms and the phenomena they explain. The ubiquity of autoinhibition as a design principle, therefore, necessitates a philosophical understanding of mechanisms that recognizes how they can participate in more than one phenomenon. Since mechanisms with this design are released from autoinhibition only when they are acted on by control mechanisms, we advance a revised account of mechanisms that accommodates attribution of multiple phenomena to the same mechanism and distinguishes them from other processes that control them.