Do Newborns Have the Ability to Imitate?

The effects of ostracism on preschoolers' over-imitation behaviors

Over-imitation represents an early developing behavior implicated in the emergence of learning, affective, and social competences. Adult over-imitation is heavily affected by contextual variables such as social ostracism, the experience of being ignored by others in a social context, an experience that threatens several psychological needs, inducing the urge to reaffiliate with a social group to restore the original state of well-being. Yet, the impact of social ostracism on over-imitation in children remains unclear. This study explored how a face-to-face triadic inclusive/ostracizing ball-tossing game affects over-imitation in predominantly White 3-year-old children (n = 43, 53.4% boys) and 5-year-old children (n = 43, 41.8% boys). Results showed that preschoolers are highly affected by social ostracism experiences, with both age groups displaying decreased positive emotionality and heightened negative emotionality when ostracized. Despite this continuity in the affective and behavioral reactions toward social exclusion, imitation fidelity is differently affected by first-person ostracism; the 3-year-olds imitated more when ostracized, whereas the 5-year-olds did so when included, signaling a developmental difference between the strategy repertoire at different ages. Overall, the current findings shed light on the social influences driving preschoolers' over-imitation behaviors, emphasizing the importance of investigating social mechanisms underlying imitation and young children's social cognition development.

A Review on Autism Spectrum Disorder Screening by Artificial Intelligence Methods

PURPOSE

With the increasing prevalence of autism spectrum disorders (ASD), the importance of early screening and diagnosis has been subject to considerable discussion. Given the subtle differences between ASD children and typically developing children during the early stages of development, it is imperative to investigate the utilization of automatic recognition methods powered by artificial intelligence. We aim to summarize the research work on this topic and sort out the markers that can be used for identification.

METHODS

We searched the papers published in the Web of Science, PubMed, Scopus, Medline, SpringerLink, Wiley Online Library, and EBSCO databases from 1st January 2013 to 13th November 2023, and 43 articles were included.

RESULTS

These articles mainly divided recognition markers into five categories: gaze behaviors, facial expressions, motor movements, voice features, and task performance. Based on the above markers, the accuracy of artificial intelligence screening ranged from 62.13 to 100%, the sensitivity ranged from 69.67 to 100%, the specificity ranged from 54 to 100%.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, artificial intelligence recognition holds promise as a tool for identifying children with ASD. However, it still needs to continually enhance the screening model and improve accuracy through multimodal screening, thereby facilitating timely intervention and treatment.

Longitudinal evidence that infants develop their imitation abilities by being imitated

Humans are widely considered the most socially sophisticated species on the planet. Their remarkable abilities in navigating the social world have given rise to complex societies and the advancement of cultural intelligence.1,2,3,4,5 But what characterizes us as ultra-social beings? Theoretical advances in social sciences over the last century purport imitation as a central mechanism for the emergence of humans' unique social-cognitive abilities.6,7,8 Uncovering the ontogeny of imitation is therefore paramount for understanding human cultural evolution. Yet how humans become able to imitate is unclear and intensely debated. Recently, multidisciplinary findings have challenged long-standing assumptions that imitation is inborn.9,10,11,12 So what are the underlying processes supporting the development of imitation? One fascinating possibility is that infants become able to imitate by being imitated.13,14,15 Cognitive theories have suggested that by perceiving others imitating one's own behavior, visual and motor representations of that behavior are coactivated and associated, leading to the emergence of imitation abilities.14,15 Here, we show that being imitated by sensitive caregivers in infancy constitutes a psychological process giving rise to infants' imitation abilities. Results demonstrated (1) that maternal imitation at 14 months positively predicted infants' imitation abilities at 18 months and (2) that maternal imitation at 14 months mediated the positive effect of maternal sensitivity at 6 months on infants' imitation abilities at 18 months. This offers substantial evidence for the role of social interactions in the emergence of imitation as a key factor for human cultural learning.

Sensorimotor foundations of speech perception in infancy

The perceptual system for speech is highly organized from early infancy. This organization bootstraps young human learners' ability to acquire their native speech and language from speech input. Here, we review behavioral and neuroimaging evidence that perceptual systems beyond the auditory modality are also specialized for speech in infancy, and that motor and sensorimotor systems can influence speech perception even in infants too young to produce speech-like vocalizations. These investigations complement existing literature on infant vocal development and on the interplay between speech perception and production systems in adults. We conclude that a multimodal speech and language network is present before speech-like vocalizations emerge.

Protracted development of motor cortex constrains rich interpretations of infant cognition

Cognition in preverbal human infants must be inferred from overt motor behaviors such as gaze shifts, head turns, or reaching for objects. However, infant mammals - including human infants - show protracted postnatal development of cortical motor outflow. Cortical control of eye, face, head, and limb movements is absent at birth and slowly emerges over the first postnatal year and beyond. Accordingly, the neonatal cortex in humans cannot generate the motor behaviors routinely used to support inferences about infants' cognitive abilities, and thus claims of developmental continuity between infant and adult cognition are suspect. Recognition of the protracted development of motor cortex should temper rich interpretations of infant cognition and motivate more serious consideration of the role of subcortical mechanisms in early cognitive development.

3-4-year-old children’s memory flexibility allows adaptation to an altered context

Imitation provides a reliable method to investigate the developing memory functions in childhood. The present study explored whether 3-4-year-old children are able to revise their previous experiences after a 1 week delay in order to adapt to an altered context. We used a combined short-term (Session 1) and delayed (Session 2) imitation paradigm based on a previous study with 2-year-olds. The constraints (target object close/far) and relatedly the relevance of using a tool in a goal attainment task (irrelevant/relevant, respectively) changed between the sessions. We found that children in Session 1 used the tool only when it was needed (relevant/object far context). After the 1 week delay when the tool was previously irrelevant and then became relevant, children remembered the irrelevant act and applied it in the altered context. When the tool lost its relevance after 1 week, children used the tool less than before, but did not fully omit it, despite its reduced efficiency. The present data with 3-year-olds was compared to a pattern of results with 2-year-olds (from a similar previous study), that allowed to discuss possible developmental transitions in memory and imitation. We propose that the flexible restoration of a formerly irrelevant act and the maintenance of a formerly successful solution indicate flexibility of preschooler’s memory when guiding imitation. This flexibility, however, interacts with children’s tendency to remain faithful to strategies that were previously ostensively demonstrated to them.

Mother-infant co-regulation from 0 to 2 years: The role of copy behaviors. A systematic review

The purpose of this review was twofold: (1) to examine how copy behaviors (CB) have been studied in mother-infant natural interactions from 0 to 24 months, and (2) to determine to what extent they can be considered co-regulation processes between both members of the dyad. To do this, 36 studies published between 1975 and 2021 were systematically examined, classified and discussed. The analyzed evidence showed that CB in spontaneous mother-infant interactions have been examined under different perspectives, that such behaviors might be differentially classified as distinct modes of copying according to their traits and, lastly, that CB operate as social facilitators that foster the co-regulation of both affects and behaviors and direct mothers and infants, most of the times, towards a mutual sense of interpersonal matching that adds quality to their interactions.

Faces and Voices Processing in Human and Primate Brains: Rhythmic and Multimodal Mechanisms Underlying the Evolution and Development of Speech

While influential works since the 1970s have widely assumed that imitation is an innate skill in both human and non-human primate neonates, recent empirical studies and meta-analyses have challenged this view, indicating other forms of reward-based learning as relevant factors in the development of social behavior. The visual input translation into matching motor output that underlies imitation abilities instead seems to develop along with social interactions and sensorimotor experience during infancy and childhood. Recently, a new visual stream has been identified in both human and non-human primate brains, updating the dual visual stream model. This third pathway is thought to be specialized for dynamics aspects of social perceptions such as eye-gaze, facial expression and crucially for audio-visual integration of speech. Here, we review empirical studies addressing an understudied but crucial aspect of speech and communication, namely the processing of visual orofacial cues (i.e., the perception of a speaker's lips and tongue movements) and its integration with vocal auditory cues. Along this review, we offer new insights from our understanding of speech as the product of evolution and development of a rhythmic and multimodal organization of sensorimotor brain networks, supporting volitional motor control of the upper vocal tract and audio-visual voices-faces integration.

Therapeutic Alliance as Active Inference: The Role of Therapeutic Touch and Synchrony

Recognizing and aligning individuals' unique adaptive beliefs or "priors" through cooperative communication is critical to establishing a therapeutic relationship and alliance. Using active inference, we present an empirical integrative account of the biobehavioral mechanisms that underwrite therapeutic relationships. A significant mode of establishing cooperative alliances-and potential synchrony relationships-is through ostensive cues generated by repetitive coupling during dynamic touch. Established models speak to the unique role of affectionate touch in developing communication, interpersonal interactions, and a wide variety of therapeutic benefits for patients of all ages; both neurophysiologically and behaviorally. The purpose of this article is to argue for the importance of therapeutic touch in establishing a therapeutic alliance and, ultimately, synchrony between practitioner and patient. We briefly overview the importance and role of therapeutic alliance in prosocial and clinical interactions. We then discuss how cooperative communication and mental state alignment-in intentional communication-are accomplished using active inference. We argue that alignment through active inference facilitates synchrony and communication. The ensuing account is extended to include the role of (C-) tactile afferents in realizing the beneficial effect of therapeutic synchrony. We conclude by proposing a method for synchronizing the effects of touch using the concept of active inference.

Environment-Related and Body-Related Components of the Minimal Self

Perceptual changes that an agent produces by efferent activity can become part of the agent’s minimal self. Yet, in human agents, efferent activities produce perceptual changes in various sensory modalities and in various temporal and spatial proximities. Some of these changes occur at the “biological” body, and they are to some extent conveyed by “private” sensory signals, whereas other changes occur in the environment of that biological body and are conveyed by “public” sensory signals. We discuss commonalties and differences of these signals for generating selfhood. We argue that despite considerable functional overlap of these sensory signals in generating self-experience, there are reasons to tell them apart in theorizing and empirical research about development of the self.

Body, Self and Others: Harding, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on Intersubjectivity

Douglas Harding developed a unique first-person experimental approach for investigating consciousness that is still relatively unknown in academia. In this paper, I present a critical dialogue between Harding, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on the phenomenology of the body and intersubjectivity. Like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Harding observes that from the first-person perspective, I cannot see my own head. He points out that visually speaking nothing gets in the way of others. I am radically open to others and the world. Neither does my somatic experience establish a boundary between me and the world. Rather to experience these sensations as part of a bounded, shaped thing (a body), already involves bringing in the perspectives of others. The reader is guided through a series of Harding’s first-person experiments to test these phenomenological claims for themselves. For Sartre, the other’s subjectivity is known through The Look, which makes me into a mere object for them. Merleau-Ponty criticised Sartre for making intersubjective relations primarily ones of conflict. Rather he held that the intentionality of my body is primordially interconnected with that of others’ bodies. We are already situated in a shared social world. For Harding, like Sartre, my consciousness is a form of nothingness; however, in contrast to Sartre, it does not negate the world, but is absolutely united with it. Confrontation is a delusion that comes from imagining that I am behind a face. Rather in lived personal relationships, I become the other. I conclude by arguing that for Harding all self-awareness is a form of other-awareness, and vice versa.

The Radically Embodied Conscious Cybernetic Bayesian Brain: From Free Energy to Free Will and Back Again

Drawing from both enactivist and cognitivist perspectives on mind, I propose that explaining teleological phenomena may require reappraising both "Cartesian theaters" and mental homunculi in terms of embodied self-models (ESMs), understood as body maps with agentic properties, functioning as predictive-memory systems and cybernetic controllers. Quasi-homuncular ESMs are suggested to constitute a major organizing principle for neural architectures due to their initial and ongoing significance for solutions to inference problems in cognitive (and affective) development. Embodied experiences provide foundational lessons in learning curriculums in which agents explore increasingly challenging problem spaces, so answering an unresolved question in Bayesian cognitive science: what are biologically plausible mechanisms for equipping learners with sufficiently powerful inductive biases to adequately constrain inference spaces? Drawing on models from neurophysiology, psychology, and developmental robotics, I describe how embodiment provides fundamental sources of empirical priors (as reliably learnable posterior expectations). If ESMs play this kind of foundational role in cognitive development, then bidirectional linkages will be found between all sensory modalities and frontal-parietal control hierarchies, so infusing all senses with somatic-motoric properties, thereby structuring all perception by relevant affordances, so solving frame problems for embodied agents. Drawing upon the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference framework, I describe a particular mechanism for intentional action selection via consciously imagined (and explicitly represented) goal realization, where contrasts between desired and present states influence ongoing policy selection via predictive coding mechanisms and backward-chained imaginings (as self-realizing predictions). This embodied developmental legacy suggests a mechanism by which imaginings can be intentionally shaped by (internalized) partially-expressed motor acts, so providing means of agentic control for attention, working memory, imagination, and behavior. I further describe the nature(s) of mental causation and self-control, and also provide an account of readiness potentials in Libet paradigms wherein conscious intentions shape causal streams leading to enaction. Finally, I provide neurophenomenological handlings of prototypical qualia including pleasure, pain, and desire in terms of self-annihilating free energy gradients via quasi-synesthetic interoceptive active inference. In brief, this manuscript is intended to illustrate how radically embodied minds may create foundations for intelligence (as capacity for learning and inference), consciousness (as somatically-grounded self-world modeling), and will (as deployment of predictive models for enacting valued goals).